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**The Athenian Ephebeia in the Lycurgan Period: 334/3 – 322/1 B.C.**

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**The Athenian Ephebeia in the Lycurgan Period: 334/3 – 322/1 B.C.**

by

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*To My Parents*

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## **The Athenian Ephebeia in the Lycurgan Period: 334/3-322/1 B.C.**

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This dissertation examines the origin, purpose, and function of the Athenian ephebeia during the Lycurgan period (334/3-322/1 B.C.). The ephebeia, a compulsory two-year long state-funded and organized program of military service for eighteen and nineteen year old citizens called ephebes, did not exist as a formal institution prior to 334/3 B.C., the date of the earliest known ephebic inscriptions. Instead, the *demos* probably created the ephebeia after Alexander's destruction of Thebes in September 335 B.C. because they needed a standing army to defend Attica against Boeotian raiders. The ephebeia, then, was not a Lycurgan reform of a long-standing institution but founded *de novo* for a specific military purpose.

This explains many hitherto misunderstood aspects of the ephebeia's organization, officials, and military activities. Having entrusted the defense of Athens to the youngest and most immature citizens with no combat experience, the *demos* turned them into a capable fighting force by subjecting them to unusually strict discipline and by establishing a program of military training under specialized instructors. The *demos* also encouraged reluctant ephebes to serve by appealing to their love of honor (*philotimia*) and rewarded them with many honors at the end of their garrison duty.

In addition to its military activities, the ephebeia played an important role in the civic and moral *paideia* of the ephebes because they were unable to gain the educational benefits from Athens' democratic institutions. The ephebeia, by instilling moderation, piety, and patriotic fervor in the ephebes, sought to make them virtuous citizens both dedicated to preserving the democracy and deeply motivated to freeing Athens from Macedonian domination. This devotion to the state explains why the institution was abolished by the pro-Macedonian oligarchy (321/0-319/8 B.C.) established after Athens' defeat in the Lamian War in 322 B.C.

## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	1
<b>Chapter One: An Ephebeia before Chaeronea</b> .....	4
1.1: Explicit Evidence for the Ephebeia .....	5
1.2: Military Training before the Lycurgan Period?.....	12
1.3: Aeschines' <i>Synepheboi</i> and the Athenian Military System .....	23
1.4: Aeschines as <i>Peripolos</i> .....	40
1.5: Conclusion.....	56
<b>Chapter Two: The Creation of the Ephebeia</b> .....	57
2.1: Chaeronea and the Lycurgan Program.....	58
2.2: Epicrates' Ephebic Legislation.....	65
2.3: The Professionalization of an Amateur Militia? .....	69
2.4: The Ephebeia as a Reaction to Chaeronea? .....	75
2.5: The Ephebeia and the Defense of Attica.....	80
2.6: Problems on the Border: the Ephebeia and Thebes' Destruction.....	89
2.7: Conclusion.....	97
<b>Chapter Three: The Ephebeia as a Military Institution</b> .....	99
3.1: Citizen Participation in the Ephebeia.....	99
3.2: An Unwelcome Obligation: The Avoidance of Ephebic Service.....	109
3.3: Military Discipline in the Ephebeia: Εὐταξία and Πειθαρχία .....	121
3.4: Military Training in the Ephebeia .....	135
3.5: Conclusion.....	146
<b>Chapter Four: The Lycurgan Ephebeia</b> .....	147
4.1: Lycurgus' <i>Paideia</i> of the Young .....	148
4.2: The Ephebe as σώφρων πολίτης .....	156
4.3: The Tour of Temples: Patriotism, Glory, and Self-Sacrifice .....	164
4.4: The Ephebes as Pious Citizens .....	171
4.5: The Abolition of the Ephebeia .....	177
4.6: Conclusion.....	182
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	184
<b>Appendix: The Corpus of Lycurgan Ephebic Inscriptions</b> .....	186
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	227
<b>Vita</b> .....	245



## Introduction

This study examines the Athenian ephebeia, a two-year long state-funded program of garrison duty, military training, and civic education, for eighteen and nineteen year old citizens called ephebes. It argues against the prevailing view that the ephebeia as described in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* and attested in the corpus of ephebic inscriptions was “but a temporary phase in an institution which had ancient antecedents and one which later, beginning with the oligarchic revolution of 322/1, underwent many further changes.”<sup>1</sup> My aim is not only to show that the ephebeia should be seen as a creation of the Lycurgan period and to explain what circumstances prompted the Athenians to establish this peculiar and enigmatic institution four years after the battle of Chaeronea, but also to reconstruct the purpose and function of the ephebeia from its inception to its probable abolition in the aftermath of the Lamian war (334/3-322/1).<sup>2</sup> By placing the ephebeia in its proper historical, military, and socio-economic context, I also hope to improve our understanding of Lycurgan Athens and shed additional light on how the Athenians sought to survive under Macedonian domination and aimed to regain their former leading position in the Greek world.

The first two chapters attempt to resolve the long-standing scholarly controversy concerning the date of the ephebeia’s origin. In the first chapter I examine and reject the various arguments advanced by scholars that are claimed to prove a pre-Lycurgan ephebeia. Having shown that citizens did not receive military training at public expense before the 330’s, I then discuss Aeschines’ *peripoleia*, probably the most important piece of evidence cited by the advocates for an early ephebeia. My analysis suggests that this passage, despite the similarity in terminology (i.e. *sunephebos* and *peripolos*) to that used to describe the ephebeia in the *Athenaion Politeia*, should not be taken as evidence that the youngest citizens had to perform two years of compulsory garrison duty c. 372. I argue that Aeschines’ military service was no different from the the youngest citizens in

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34.

<sup>2</sup> All dates are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

the fifth century and that fourth-century ephebes before the creation of the ephebeia functioned as a homeguard in times of war and were ineligible for *strateia* (overseas campaigns) except under exceptional circumstances.

With the epigraphic evidence suggesting a date of 335/4 for the inception of the ephebeia, chapter two investigates why it began to function in the following year. Contrary to scholarly opinion, the institution, I contend, was not created for the purpose of training citizens to be better warriors with the goal of strengthening the Athenian army that had been decisively defeated at Chaeronea in 338. Nor should we see the ephebeia as an inevitable consequence of the Lycurgan program's aim to revitalize Athens in response to the city's subordination to Macedon, as scholars have supposed, but rather as an extraordinary solution to a border crisis after Alexander's destruction of Thebes in September 335. In an atmosphere of great anxiety and fear the Athenians, bereft of their most important ally and facing increased border tension and hostility with Alexander's Boeotian allies, were compelled by their insecurity and weakness to raise a standing army to protect *Attica*. Having no other viable alternative the *demos*, I propose, used ephebes and modified their traditional duties to fulfill this immediate need. This resulted in the establishment of a new institution – the ephebeia – perhaps through Epicrates' legislation “concerning the ephebes” (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης) in late 335/4.

The third chapter explores how the *demos* sought to turn a given *helikia* of youths inexperienced in the art of war into a standing army capable of defending the *chora* effectively against Boeotian raiders. I argue that while they sought to mobilize the ephebes of every census class for garrison duty, some were at first unwilling to serve because they felt that it was detrimental to their personal interests. The *demos* encouraged these reluctant individuals to participate, I suggest, by ensuring that all would have an opportunity to satisfy their desire for distinction (*philotimia*) during their stint of service. I also contend that the characterization of youths as susceptible to unruly violence accounts for the prominence of discipline (*eutaxia*) and obedience (*peitharchia*) in the ephebeia, to the extent that the *sophronistes* was exceptionally granted the power to thrash those ephebes who acted in a disorderly manner. Alongside maximizing

recruitment and ensuring good discipline, the *demos* hired specialized instructors to teach the ephebes physical training and rudimentary skills in hoplite and non-hoplite arms. This training, I maintain, was primarily intended to give the ephebes the necessary skills to deal with Boeotian raiders.

The concluding chapter examines the role the ephebeia played in the ephebes' civic and moral education during the Lycurgan period. We will see that this *paideia* consisted of instruction in *sophrosyne* under the supervision of the *sophonistes*, a tour of the city's sanctuaries, and involvement in various cults and festivals. I further suggest that the *demos* incorporated these features into the ephebeia because the ephebes could not have gained the educational benefits of participating in the city's democratic institutions until they had completed their stint of military service. By cultivating patriotism, self-control, and piety in the youngest citizens, the ephebeia, I propose, sought to make them decent, law-abiding citizens who were devoted to the preservation of the constitution and willing to fight vigorously and die willingly for their *patris* against Macedon, should the Athenians have an opportunity to rebel. This unyielding loyalty to the democracy may help to explain why the pro-Macedonian oligarchy under Phocion and Demades (321/0-319/8) probably abolished the ephebeia after Athens' defeat in the Lamian War in 322.

## Chapter One: An Ephebeia before Chaeronea?

The *communis opinio* is that the ephebeia antedated the Lycurgan period, contrary to the view of Wilamowitz and his supporters, who maintain that it was created *de novo* in the mid 330's.<sup>1</sup> Scholars have deployed an array of arguments to show that the ephebeia must have existed as a formal institution from the second quarter of the fourth-century onwards and perhaps as early as the sixth-century.<sup>2</sup> As Lofberg aptly puts it, “we must admit that long before that date [i.e. 335] there existed, if not the ephebeia as we now know it, at least the germ from which grew the institution so completely described by Aristotle.”<sup>3</sup> I contend, however, that Wilamowitz's position is consistent with the literary and epigraphic evidence. While his opponents are right to argue that the ephebeia had antecedents, they have confused them with the existence of the institution itself.<sup>4</sup> This has occurred because scholars have to some extent misunderstood the nature of Athenian military practices in the Classical period. The following discussion has two objectives. The first is to show that there was no pre-Lycurgan ephebeia, while the second is to examine the antecedents of the institution so as to determine the role the youngest citizens played within the Athenian military system prior to its creation, what

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<sup>1</sup> A good summary of the debate up to 1950 can be found in Reinmuth 1952, 34-5; Nilsson 1955, 17-20. For a more recent bibliography, see Burckhardt 1996, 26-33.

<sup>2</sup> Reinmuth 1952; 1971; Pélékidis 1962; Gauthier 1976; Vidal-Naquet 1986a; Winkler 1990.

<sup>3</sup> Lofberg 1925, 335. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 106, was skeptical whether anything definite could be said about the institution at the different stages of its development on account of the paucity of information. Pélékidis 1962, 9, however, argues that the ephebeia before Chaeronea was identical in every respect to the Lycurgan institution (*contra* Ober 1985a, 90-6; Christ 2001, 416-7). See also Reinmuth's 1966, 793-9, esp. 794, review of Pélékidis 1962, in which he rejects his position. Most scholars have followed Reinmuth 1952 & 1971, who argues that the ephebeia in the early fourth century was a military institution, whose sole concern was military training (e.g. Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; Roscam 1969, 206; Gauthier 1976, 193-4; Faraguna 1992, 276; Hunter 1994, 152).

<sup>4</sup> When Reinmuth published his article “*The Genesis of the Athenian Ephebia*” in 1952, he observed that “the dictum of Wilamowitz that the ephebia began to function in 335/4 on the basis of a law passed the year before, has had the effect of diverting later studies on the subject from an examination of the antecedents of the institution and of confining discussion of its beginnings largely to arguments about the date of its origin” (34; cf. 39). Part of the reason why Reinmuth's article proved so influential (and hence gained supporters for a pre-Lycurgan ephebeia) was that he exploited a major problem with the approach of Wilamowitz's supporters: i.e. their denial that the ephebeia had any antecedents. This entailed rejecting or explaining away any similarity in terminology or in prior military practices approximating those of the ephebeia as the *Athenaion Politeia* describes it (e.g. Wilamowitz 1893, 191-4; Bryant 1907, 73-88; Brenot 1920; Forbes 1929, 109-126).

duties they were required to perform, and under what circumstances they undertook their military service.<sup>5</sup>

### 1.1: Explicit Evidence for the Ephebeia

Chapter forty-two of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* is our main literary evidence for the ephebeia.<sup>6</sup> I quote it in full:<sup>7</sup>

(1) And the present state of the constitution has this following form. Those born to citizens on both sides share in the constitution, and they are registered among the demesmen when they are eighteen years old. And when they are enrolled, the demesmen, under oath, vote concerning them, first whether they seem to have attained the age according to the law, and if they do not seem so, they return again to the boys, and secondly whether he is free and born [legitimately] in accordance with the laws. Then, if they vote that he is not free, he appeals to the law court, and the demesmen choose five men from their number as prosecutors, and if he seems to be enrolled illegally, the city sells him: and if he wins his case, the demesmen must enroll him. (2) And after this the council examines those registered, and if anyone seems to be younger than eighteen years old, it fines the demesmen who enrolled him. And when the ephebes have been examined, their fathers, gathered together tribe by tribe, choose under oath three of their tribesmen who are more than forty years old, whom they consider to be the best and the most suitable to take care of the ephebes, and from them the people elects one of each tribe as *sophronistes*, and elects a *kosmetes* from the other Athenians to be over them all. (3) These officials, having gathered the ephebes together, first take a circuit of the temples, then march to Piraeus, and some garrison Munychia and others Acte. And the people also elects two physical trainers and instructors for them, who teach the ephebes to fight with hoplite weapons, to fire the bow, to cast the javelin, and to discharge the catapult. And it also grants to the *sophronistai* a drachma per head for

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<sup>5</sup> The recent work of Marcellus 1994, 24-49, places more emphasis on the antecedents than has been the case in previous studies, but his explanation of the terminology (i.e. *ephebos* and *peripolos*) fails to appreciate the complexity of Athenian military practices.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Rhodes 1981, 61, 63: "No one would now deny that A.P. is the πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων from the collection of πολιτεῖαι attributed in the ancient world to Aristotle, that it was written in the 330's and 320's when Aristotle was in Athens, and that it is a product of the Aristotelian school ... On the evidence we have, Aristotle could have written this work himself, but I do not believe he did. That does not diminish the interest and importance of A.P." Day and Chambers 1962, 1-4, however, argue that Aristotle is the author. For a detailed commentary on chapter 42, see Rhodes 1981, 493-510.

<sup>7</sup> All translations from the Greek and Latin are my own unless otherwise stated.

sustenance, and four obols per head to the ephebes: and each *sophronistes*, taking the pay for his own tribesmen, purchases the provisions for all in common (for they mess together by tribes), and takes care of all other things. (4) And the ephebes spend their first year in this manner: and in the following year, when the assembly is held in the theatre [where] the ephebes demonstrate their parade ground drill to the people and receive a shield and spear from the city, they patrol the countryside and pass their time in the guard-posts. (5) And they garrison for two years, wearing a *chlamys*, and they are exempt from all taxes; and they can neither be sued nor initiate a law suit, so that there may be no excuse for absence, except concerning an estate, an heiress, and if anyone may have inherited a priesthood. And when two years have passed, they are now with the others (i.e. they have attained full citizenship rights).<sup>8</sup>

This chapter comes at the beginning of the treatise's second half (42-69), in which the author analyzes the constitution as it appeared in his own time (42.1: "Ἐχει δ' ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας). Having discussed the requirements for citizenship and the *dokimasia* of the new citizens (42.1-2), the author then outlines the function and organization of the ephebeia (42.2-5), describing a centrally organized and funded

<sup>8</sup> (1.) "Ἐχει δ' ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστών, ἐγγράφονται δ' εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες. ὅταν δ' ἐγγράφονται, διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὁμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσι, ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας, δεύτερον δ' εἰ ἐλεύθερός ἐστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. ἔπειτ' ἂν μὲν ἀποψηφίσωνται μὴ εἶναι ἐλεύθερον, ὁ μὲν ἐφήσιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγόρους αἰροῦνται πέντε [ἄν]δρας ἐξ αὐτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξη δικάως ἐγγράφεσθαι, πωλεῖ τοῦτον ἢ πόλις· ἐὰν δὲ νικήσῃ, τοῖς [δ]ημόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν. (2.) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δ[οκ]ιμάζει τοὺς ἐγγραφέντας ἢ βουλή, κἂν τις δόξ[ῃ] νεώτερος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτων εἶναι, ζημιοῖ τ[ο]ῦς δημότας τοὺς ἐγγράψαντας. ἐπὶ δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν [κ]ατὰ φυλὰς, ὁμόσαντες αἰροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἓνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστήν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. (3.) συλλαβόντες δ' οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον, εἴτ' εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτὴν. χειροτ[ο]νεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους, οἵτινες ὀπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν καὶ καταπάλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφ[ὴν] τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν ἀ' ἐκάστῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἐκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλὰς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων. (4.) καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐνιαυτὸν οὕτως διάγουσι· τὸν δ' ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. (5.) φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη χλαμύδας ἔχοντες, καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων· καὶ δίκην οὔτε δίδασιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ἢ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι, πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλή[ρου], κἂν τ[ι]νι κατὰ τὸ γένος ἱερῶσύνῃ γέννηται. διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἔτων, ἥδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.

military institution, in which elected officials – the *kosmetes* and the tribal *sophronistai* – supervise the *epheboi* and coordinate their activities. The *demos* also elects specialized military instructors – the *paidotribai* and *didaskaloi* – to train the *epheboi* in the art of war. These *epheboi* were eighteen and nineteen year old Athenian citizen males who were obliged to perform a two year long military service, which consisted of garrison duty in the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and the border fortresses. They have a distinct status, separate from the rest of the citizen body in a physical and a civic sense, and are required to complete the *ephebeia* in order to attain their full franchise. The initial publication of the *Athenaion Politeia* is conventionally dated to the late 330's, with revisions in the text made during the first half of the 320's to keep it up to date.<sup>9</sup> Since the chapter contains no perceptible later revisions, the author's description of the *ephebeia* probably also dates c. 330.<sup>10</sup>

Contemporary with the *Athenaion Politeia* are the earliest of the corpus of ephebic inscriptions erected in honor of those ephebes who have completed their term of military service. Currently this corpus consists of twenty-eight inscriptions, which are either securely dated to or are thought to belong to the years 333/2-323/2.<sup>11</sup> Though ephebic inscriptions continue for nearly six hundred years from 333/2, with the last extant example dated just after the Herulean invasion of Greece in 267/8 A.D.,<sup>12</sup> the ephebic

<sup>9</sup> See Rhodes 1981, 51-58, esp. 56. Day and Chambers 1962, 196-7, lower the date of composition to 327-324.

<sup>10</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* says that the ephebes in their second year of service displayed their skill to the *demos* by undertaking “tactical maneuvers (τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις)” before the Assembly in the theatre (42.4). While scholars have taken ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ to mean the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus, Dillery 1982, 462-6 has convincingly argued that the writer is instead referring to the theatre-shaped end of the Panathenaic Stadium (cf. Humphreys 1985, 227, n. 32; *contra* Faraguna 1992, 279, n. 111). Since the stadium was completed in the summer of 330 shortly before the Greater Panathenaea (Will 1983, 87-8; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 38-9), the ephebes probably first staged their military reviews in it in 330/29 or perhaps the previous year. Provided that the *Athenaion Politeia* wrote this as part of his original composition rather than as a revision, the author is probably describing the *ephebeia* as it was c. 330. Rhodes 1981, 51-2, 495, holds that the chapter was written after the mid 330's. This *terminus post quem* is not based on the content of the chapter, but from the epigraphic evidence (pp. 8-11).

<sup>11</sup> I have compiled a register of twenty-eight Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions in the Appendix (pp. 186-226). The members of the corpus are arranged in chronological order and are abbreviated E1-E28, dating from the enrollment years of 334/3 to 323/2. The register includes the text of each inscription, a discussion of alternative readings and dates if controversial, and problems with interpretation.

<sup>12</sup> See Kennell 2006, 15-30, for a register of all extant Athenian ephebic inscriptions from the Lycurgan period to the Herulean invasion.

corpus in the Lycurgan period forms a homogenous group on account of its distinctive format. The content of these inscriptions is both consistent with the *Athenaion Politeia*'s description and provides additional information on various aspects of the ephebeia: they use the term *epheboi* in a way which is consistent with the treatise, mention the same officials (along with others which only appear on inscriptions in this period), and show ephebes performing the same garrison duties as those described in the *Athenaion Politeia*. The epigraphic and literary evidence thus clearly refer to the same institution,<sup>13</sup> though they do not call it the *ephebeia* or any other such term.<sup>14</sup>

While the *Athenaion Politeia* does not shed light on the ephebeia's origins or indicate for how long the institution had existed,<sup>15</sup> the epigraphic evidence is suggestive of a *terminus ante quem* for its inception. Beginning with Foucart's publication of **E2** in 1889, the earliest securely dated ephebic inscriptions are for the enrollment class in the archonship of Ctesicles (334/3),<sup>16</sup> which were erected at the end of the ephebes' second year of service (333/2).<sup>17</sup> Wilamowitz argued that Foucart's inscription was proof that the ephebeia was created after Chaeronea.<sup>18</sup> Both the advocates for an early ephebeia and their opponents generally consider this epigraphic evidence his strongest argument and the most difficult to counter.<sup>19</sup> Pélékidis, realizing that the discovery of an earlier inscription would prove the existence of an early ephebeia, suggests that "[Wilamowitz's] epigraphic argument is still doubtful for another reason: it is precisely from 350-330 that

<sup>13</sup> Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; Reinmuth 1966, 794; Rhodes 1981, 494.

<sup>14</sup> The term *ephebeia* first appears in the ephebic corpus in the Hellenistic period. While it occurs as a likely restoration on two third-century inscriptions (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 700, line 16; *SEG* 26.98, line 21), the first certain instance is on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1028, line 43, dated to 100/99.

<sup>15</sup> Wilamowitz 1893, 194, took this as proof that the ephebeia was a newly introduced institution ("Aristotle seine vor seinem augen neu eingefürte institution schildert"), because there was no such documentation on its origins to be found ("Auch ist nirgend formelhafte urkundensprache"). But this is misreading the writer's purpose: his aim was to provide a contemporary description of the ephebeia, not an analysis of its origins.

<sup>16</sup> Foucart 1889, 253, published **E2** = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156. A year later Philios *AE* 1890, 91-94, published **E3** = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1189. A third inscription was added when Mitchel 1961, 349-50, reedited **E4** = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2970 and moved the date from the archonship of Praxiboulos (315/14) to Ctesicles.

<sup>17</sup> For the dating of ephebic inscriptions, see p. 187, n. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Wilamowitz 1893, 193-4.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Forbes 1929, 119; Roscam 1969, 200.



our epigraphic material becomes more and more abundant.”<sup>20</sup> But the inscriptions he cites as potential candidates have now been shown to be non-ephebic.<sup>21</sup> Nor has his attempt to move two archonless ephebic inscriptions to the early 340’s been accepted.<sup>22</sup>

In 1967 Mitsos published two stones which he thought belonged to a single stele.<sup>23</sup> The first inscription (*EM* 13354) was clearly dated (lines 9-10) to the archonship of Nicophemus (361/0). In the second (*EM* 13354a = **E1**), the tribe Acamantis honored Autolycus the κοσμητῆς τῶν ἐφ[ή]βων with an olive crown for his care of the ephebes (lines 15-20). The formulaic phraseology of the decree’s unrestored section (the right hand side), which is typical of ephebic inscriptions in the Lycurgan Period, along with the technical use of *ephebos* and the certain restoration of *kosmetes*, suggested that *EM* 13354a was an ephebic inscription. While *archontos* could be read on the heading of the inscription, the name of the archon could not (line 13). Mitsos restored it as *epi Nikophemo*. His inscription, then, proved that the ephebeia as the *Athenaion Politeia* describes it existed in the 360’s. Despite Woodhead’s doubts about the restoration,<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 12. His point seems to be that the vagaries of excavation and the Athenian epigraphic habit may account for why an earlier ephebic inscription has not been found. Certainly, as Lambert 2004, 86, points out, the epigraphic evidence for Athens increases c. 338-322: “Probably more significant was the developing culture of the written word in the activities of the polis, which reached its zenith in the Lycurgan period, epigraphically the most intensely documented in Athenian history as regards the number and variety of inscriptions produced by the polis and its organs and subgroups.” See also Hedrick 1999, 387-439. The epigraphic evidence for the Lycurgan period is collected in Schwenk 1985. But see also Lambert 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007.

<sup>21</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 12, cites Gomme 1933, 69-70, and Pritchett 1947, 184, no. 91. Gomme suggests that four fragmentary lists of names (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2370, 2382, 2384, 2388), dated c. 370-350, could be from ephebic rosters. But all are now known to be prytany decrees (see Meritt and Trail 1974, nos. 15, 18, 56, 74). Pritchett’s inscription is now recognized as bouletic (*SEG* 23.63). Pélékidis 1962, 252, n. 4, however, argues that the restoration [τοὺς βούς ἐφ[ή]βους οἱ] for *IG* I<sup>2</sup> 84, line 31, dated to 421/0, should be rejected. Sokolowski 1969, no. 13, has reedited the inscription and abandoned the restoration.

<sup>22</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 147-51, nos. 7 and 9. Pritchett 1949, 273-8, plausibly dates **E18**, a dedication of Oineis, to 330/29 because of the prosopographical evidence. Pouilloux 1954, 107-110, no. 2, uses the same criterion to date **E15**, a dedication of Pandionis, to around 332/1. Both authors assume that these inscriptions belong to the Lycurgan ephebic corpus. But Pélékidis dates them to 346-326 and 349/8-329/8 respectively without citing new evidence. Mitchel 1964, 244, n. 34, rejects this approach as unsound while Reinmuth 1970, 34-8, 42-50, nos. 10 and 12, accepts Pritchett’s and Pouilloux’s dates over Pélékidis’ arguments.

<sup>23</sup> Mitsos 1965 (1967), 131-6.

<sup>24</sup> *SEG* 23.78 (1968): Ita Mitsos, sed nobis incertum manet an decreta ambo anno eidem sint attribuenda, et in vs. 13 fortasse archon alius (cum nomine paullo longiore) requirendus est. Quod si ita sit, decretum alterum in ex. s. IV<sup>a</sup> collocare debemus et de interpretatione institutionis ephebicæ difficulties nonnullas evitemus; sed in ea re melius iudicabunt peritiores.

Reinmuth readily accepted it as confirmation of his theories and used it as his main evidence for further speculation into the nature of the early ephebeia.<sup>25</sup>

Mitchel's thorough reexamination of the stones confirmed the doubts of Woodhead about the restoration of Nicophemus and the association of the two inscriptions.<sup>26</sup> He showed that *EM* 13354 and *EM* 13354a differ markedly, not only in the working of the stones' surfaces, but also in their respective letter sizes, the length of their stoichedon lines (34 vs. 35), and their overall widths (0.496m vs. 0.498m). Mitchel also confirmed Lewis' observation of the "basic improbability of repeating the same archon's name in a second large heading."<sup>27</sup> Finally, Mitchel shows that the archon's name needs eleven letters, not nine, and that the only candidate in the Lycurgan period who fits the gap exactly is Ctesicles, thus down-dating the decree from 361/0 to 333/2.<sup>28</sup> Mitsos defended his restoration, but his arguments are insufficient to counter Mitchel's observations.<sup>29</sup> Despite the geological association of the two stones,<sup>30</sup> the arguments against an early date for *EM* 13354a are decisive in showing that the inscription should be regarded as part of the Lycurgan ephebic corpus and that **E1**, like the three previously known examples (**E2-E4**), refers to the ephebic enrollment year of 334/3.

The reception of these arguments among the advocates for an early ephebeia has been mixed. Some reject or at least suspend their belief in the date of **E1**,<sup>31</sup> while others adhere to an early date for the inscription and use it as decisive proof that there was an ephebeia a generation before Chaeronea, sometimes without any acknowledgement that

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<sup>25</sup> Reinmuth 1967 (1971), 47; 1971, 2, 123. Cf. Pritchett 1974, 104, n. 243; Piérart 1974, 278, n. 88.

<sup>26</sup> Mitchel 1975, 233-43.

<sup>27</sup> Lewis 1973, 254; Mitchel 1975, 240-1.

<sup>28</sup> Mitchel 1975, 241. Two archons have eleven letters in the genitive: Ctesicles (334/3) and Nicocrates (333/2). Mitchel rightly rejected the latter because [...8....] Aenesistratou Acharneus was the *kosmetes* for that year, whereas Autolycus [...9....] Thoricios held that office on *EM* 13354a. Dow 1976, 84, also thought that the decree pointed to the first few years of the Lycurgan ephebeia.

<sup>29</sup> Mitsos 1975 (1976), 39-40. For a summary of the debate over *EM* 13354a, see Robert and Robert 1976, 452, no. 194.

<sup>30</sup> Herz and Wenner 1978, 1071-2, note that the geological structures of the two stones suggest that they should be associated with each other. Hansen 1987, 138-9, n. 49, uses this as evidence that they belong to the same stele and hence share the same date. But the similarity in geological structure does not preclude the two stones from being cut and worked at different times or two inscriptions cut in different years on the same stele.

<sup>31</sup> E.g. Rhodes 1981, 494; Ober 1985a, 93-4; Burckhardt 1996, 30.

Mitsos' restoration has been questioned.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Reinmuth, Gauthier,<sup>33</sup> and Vidal-Naquet,<sup>34</sup> three of the four (the other being Pélékidis) most influential and cited authorities on the ephebeia, depend heavily upon **E1** for their arguments and interpretation of the literary evidence. By doing so they give a false impression that there is direct and explicit evidence for a pre-Lycurgan institution. Even scholars who are well aware of the inscription's problematic date can be misled on account of their reliance on the above three scholars' arguments.<sup>35</sup>

Despite this confusion over **E1**'s date and contrary to Pélékidis' expectation that an earlier ephebic inscription would be found,<sup>36</sup> the epigraphic evidence for the *terminus post quem* of the operation of the ephebeia has remained the same for over a century. Four ephebic inscriptions are known for the enrollment class of 334/3 and eight(?) more for the next year (333/2), with examples occurring thereafter, but none are attested earlier. Both the late and early ephebeia camps explain this "efflorescence" of ephebic inscriptions for these years, as Lewis puts it,<sup>37</sup> by supposing that Epicrates' law "concerning the ephebes," preserved in Harpocration (s.v. Ἐπικράτης) and passed shortly before 334/3, created the organization as we know it from the *Athenaion Politeia*.<sup>38</sup> They disagree, however, on its scope and significance since Harpocration does not say whether his legislation (1) created a new institution or (2) reformed an already existing ephebeia.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>32</sup> E.g. McCulloch and Cameron 1980, 13.

<sup>33</sup> Gauthier 1976, 193, 195.

<sup>34</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 97, 122, n. 1.

<sup>35</sup> E.g. Winkler 1990, 26, n. 11, notes that Mitsos' inscription is disputed and consequently the earliest inscription is dated to 334/3. But he then cites Gauthier's 1976, 190-5, interpretation of Xenophon's *Poroi* 4.51-2 as his chief evidence for military training before the ephebeia without mentioning Gauthier's dependence on the inscription. Winkler's analysis in turn has been widely cited by many scholars.

<sup>36</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 9: "et l'avenir on trouvera peut-être des inscriptions datées avec certitude d'avant 336/5."

<sup>37</sup> Lewis 1973, 254.

<sup>38</sup> See pp. 65-9, for a detailed discussion of this law.

<sup>39</sup> A new institution: Wilamowitz 1893, 194; Brenot 1920, 30, 49; Forbes 1929, 126; Marcellus 1994, 48. Dow 1976, 84, does not mention Epicrates but draws the same conclusion. He comments that the large number of extant inscriptions for 334/3 and 333/2 "virtually proves that the Ephebia was then new, and this was the object of intense public interest. On this (strong) evidence, the Ephebia was created after Khaironeia and began to function in 334/3." A reformed institution: e.g. Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; Reinmuth 1971, 124; Humphreys 1985, 202; Bosworth 1988a, 209; Faraguna 1992, 275; Habicht 1997, 16.

To resolve this, we should not assume, as some scholars have done,<sup>40</sup> that the epigraphic evidence is decisive proof that the ephebeia did not exist before 334/3.<sup>41</sup> Since the advocates for an early ephebeia maintain that the institution existed from at least the early fourth-century onwards because its essential features antedated the *Athenaion Politeia*, namely that citizens under twenty called *epheboi* were obligated to participate in a mass military training program and to perform mandatory garrison duty for two years, we must now determine the validity of their arguments and reassess the evidence presented for each of these claims.

### 1.2: Military training before the Lycurgan Ephebeia?

A distinctive (and perhaps original) feature of the ephebeia was its publicly financed and compulsory program of peacetime citizen training. According to the *Athenaion Politeia*, two *paidotribai* taught them physical exercise and specialized instructors (*didaskaloi*) showed them how “to fight with hoplite weapons, to fire the bow, to hurl the javelin, and to discharge the catapult” (42.3). They were also trained to maneuver in formation (42.4). The ephebes’ instruction thus included all aspects of land warfare, except for the cavalry.<sup>42</sup>

Scholars, recognizing the important role that this training played in preparing ephebes for their two years of military service,<sup>43</sup> argue that the ephebeia must have existed before Chaeronea because of the necessity of training young Athenians for their future duties in the hoplite phalanx. Ridley’s view is representative: “common-sense is enough to indicate ... that no Athenian could be expected at the age of eighteen, on becoming a citizen, to be able without further ado to take his place in the phalanx to carry

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<sup>40</sup> Siewert 1977, 102; Wheeler 1982, 229; Develin 1989, 5; Dillery 2002, 468

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Ridley 1979, 532: “Unfortunately, there is no epigraphical evidence before the late fourth-century (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156, 1189), although on the other hand, there is nothing here proving that this was the very origin of the ephebeia, as is commonly claimed.”

<sup>42</sup> For a comprehensive discussion of military training in the ephebeia, see pp. 135-46.

<sup>43</sup> E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 126: “The ephebeia in the fourth century was organized on military lines to carry out a military purpose: the training of the first two cadres of the 42 age-groups for active military duty.”

on this demanding and dangerous fighting for another forty-odd years.”<sup>44</sup> Despite their conviction that young Athenians *must* or *should* have trained for war from the fifth century onwards, scholars present no evidence that *explicitly* refers to a pre-Lycurgan training program.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the argument for it depends almost entirely on Xenophon’s *Poroi* (4.51-2), which, it is claimed, is an *indirect* reference to an early ephebeia.<sup>46</sup> It is important to point out, however, that most scholarly discussions of this passage have been made without reference to or without sufficient consideration for contemporary evidence on the state of military training in Greece and Athens in the Classical period.<sup>47</sup> My intention is first to discuss these general statements on military training and then assess this (supposed) positive evidence for the ephebeia.

The prevailing opinion is that some kind of training program already existed at the beginning of the fourth century, if not much earlier. While scholars disagree over the details of this program, most believe that it was obligatory for at least a substantial portion of ephebes and resembled the description of the program in the *Athenaion Politeia*: i.e. a state-organized program in which Athenian youths were trained in various aspects of the art of war.<sup>48</sup> Yet ancient writers suggest that there was no mandatory training for Athenian citizens before Chaeronea. The starting point for any investigation is Aristotle’s statement in the *Politics*, in which he explains Sparta’s success in warfare in terms of the existence or non-existence of training programs outside of Sparta:

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<sup>44</sup> Ridley 1979, 534. See also Bonner 1933, 89; Jaeger 1945, 250; Reinmuth 1952, 44-5, 50; 1971, 137; Roscam 1969, 205; Ober 1985a, 90-95; Burckhardt 1996, 32; Christ 2001, 416-7.

<sup>45</sup> Scholars often acknowledge the lack of explicit evidence (Girard 1892, 629; Ridley 1979, 531, 534; Burckhardt 1996, 32). Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34, cites no sources but conjectures on how an early training system may have operated on the basis of the earliest attested ephebic inscriptions. Reinmuth 1952, 45-47, tries to explain this silence by conjecturing that the early ephebeia was a “purely military organization” or that “the supervision by the state of military training during the first years of citizenship developed so naturally and so logically from citizenship as the Athenians conceived it, that it is not strange that we read so little about this preliminary training in our sources.”

<sup>46</sup> Winkler 1990, 30, calls this passage “the text which comes nearest to being decisive on the issue of a pre-Lykourgan ephebic training.”

<sup>47</sup> Exceptions: Marcellus 1994, 27-8, 30-31; Rawlings 2000, 237-243; van Wees 2004, 87-95.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 127; Gauthier 1976, 190-5; Ober 1985a, 90-95; Sekunda 1990, 151-3; Munn 1993, 188; Burckhardt 1996, 32-33; Christ 2001, 416.

And yet we know that the Spartans themselves surpassed others, so long as (ἕως μὲν) they themselves persisted in their laborious exercises, but now (νῦν δὲ) they are inferior to others in gymnastic and warlike contests: for in this way they excelled not because they trained their young, but only because they practiced against those who did not. ... But we must not judge them from their former (προτέρων) activities, but from their present ones (νῦν). For they now (νῦν) have rivals in their educational system, but previously (πρότερον) they had none (Arist. *Pol.* 8.3.4, 1338b25-39).<sup>49</sup>

Aristotle is clearly contrasting two distinct periods. He first refers to an earlier period when the Spartans were dominant in land warfare because they alone trained for it. This training consisted of physical conditioning and collective weapons- and formation-drill.<sup>50</sup> In Aristotle's time, however, the Spartans were no longer preeminent because their enemies trained in a manner comparable to the Spartan method. Though he does not mention it, Aristotle must be thinking of the battle of Leuctra in 371, when the Thebans decisively defeated the Spartans, as the beginning of Sparta's decline on the battlefield.<sup>51</sup> This view is corroborated by Xenophon, who says that "other men are mere improvisers in soldiering, but the Lacedaemonians alone are truly the technicians in warfare" (*Lak.Pol.* 13.5).<sup>52</sup> Xenophon was writing in the late 370's, when the Spartans were still dominant, and his description of Spartan drill assumes that other Greeks were unfamiliar with and incapable of performing similar maneuvers (*Lak.Pol.* 11.5-10).

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<sup>49</sup> ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνους μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. ... δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον. This fundamental passage, which Pritchett 1974, 209, calls "possibly the most important single passage which compares methods of military training in early Greek states," has been routinely ignored in discussions of the early ephebeia (e.g. Pélékidis 1962; Reinmuth 1952; 1971).

<sup>50</sup> See Anderson 1970, 84-110; Lazenby 1985, 25-28.

<sup>51</sup> It is important to point out that Aristotle is referring to a *general* trend for military training before and after Leuctra. While Gorgidas created the Sacred Band in 378 (De Voto 1992, 5) and the Argives the One Thousand in 421-418 (Thuc. 5.67.2; D.S. 12.75.7; 12.79.1, 4), they were exceptions in that both of these picked corps were permanent and received constant training at public expense. Other élite units such as the Athenian Three Hundred at Plataea and at Syracuse (Hdt. 9.21.3; Thuc. 6.100.3) were *ad hoc* formations created for a particular task for whom there is no mention of training (for Athens, see Tritle 1989, 55-6; *contra* Pritchett 1974, 224).

<sup>52</sup> On Spartan training and the comparative lack of it elsewhere in Greece, see Pritchett 1974, 208-31; 1985, 61-5; Lazenby 1985, 3-4; Hanson 2000, 31-2; van Wees 2004, 89-95; Lendon 2005, 91-114.

Before 371, then, no Greek state, including Athens, trained its citizens in the Spartan manner. Sixty years earlier, Thucydides made Pericles boast in his Funeral Oration that the Athenians are no less brave than the Spartans should they meet in battle:

And in our training practices for warfare we also differ from our enemy in the following way ... And in education, while they right from their youth pursue manliness by laborious training (ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει), though leading a relaxed life we no less go to face equivalent dangers ... And yet if we are willing to meet danger, by relaxation rather than by toilsome training (πόνων μελέτῃ) and not by the compulsion of laws more than by habits of manliness, we gain an advantage both in not suffering in advance for troubles we anticipate, and when we come to meet them we seem no less daring than those who always toil (τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων) ... (Thuc. 2.39).<sup>53</sup>

While the Spartans train continuously for warfare from childhood, the Athenians are not under any compulsion to train nor is it desirable for them to do so. It was this incompatibility of individual Athenian liberty with an obligatory training program which convinced Wilamowitz that the ephebeia did not exist in the fifth century.<sup>54</sup> Pélékidis disagrees with Wilamowitz and argues that if there were such an incompatibility there would not have been universal acceptance of military conscription in Athens.<sup>55</sup> Pericles, however, is not saying that the Athenians are less willing to perform military service than the Spartans, but that the former are just as courageous *in hoplite warfare* as the latter without any formal military training.<sup>56</sup> Pélékidis mistakenly conflates the two and

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<sup>53</sup> Διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. ... καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθύς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. ... καίτοι εἰ ῥαθυμῖα μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλεόν ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι ...

<sup>54</sup> Wilamowitz 1893, 191: “das ist eine institution, die grell von der ἐλευθερία, der παρρησία dem ζῆν ὥς ἂν τις βούληται abstrict, auf die die demagogen Athens damals so stolz sind. wer über diese institution nicht zuerst den kopf schüttelt, dem ist das athenische leben und denken vollkommen fremd geblieben, mag er auch dicke bücher darüber geshrieben haben.” See also Brenot 1920, 7-8, 10; Marcellus 1994, 27.

<sup>55</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 9.

<sup>56</sup> It should be stressed that Pericles is restating the universal belief held among Greeks throughout the Archaic and Classical periods that the only proper military activity is a straightforward clash between rival phalanxes consisting of hoplite-farmers and other well-to-do citizens (i.e. excluding cavalry and light

assumes that the acceptance of one entails the existence of the other. Loraux attacks Wilamowitz for interpreting Pericles' speech "in realistic terms," because the claims of non-professionalism and the presentation of Athenians as aristocratic warriors imbued with inborn bravery are *topoi* characteristic of funeral orations.<sup>57</sup> But, as we have seen, Aristotle does suggest that the Athenians did not engage in mandatory training before 371: non-professionalism may have been a *topos*, but it was grounded in reality, at least on land.<sup>58</sup>

Cawkwell, however, astutely points out that "Perikles' words do not exclude some sort of drill at Athens."<sup>59</sup> Some minimal unit training was indeed necessary; Anderson has shown that hoplites needed to be drilled in formation in a few standard spear movements so as to avoid confusion in the ranks.<sup>60</sup> Classical and later sources not only suggest that the Athenians held military reviews in the fifth- and fourth-centuries both in peacetime and when they were mustering before a campaign, but also that some kind of unit training took place at these reviews.<sup>61</sup> While such reviews were the closest the Athenians came to peacetime mass training before the ephebeia, Isocrates'

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infantry on land or naval warfare on the sea) and that only the participants in these clashes showed true courage.

<sup>57</sup> Loraux 1986, 150-3. See also Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 89-90.

<sup>58</sup> This is in contrast to the Athenians' attitude that training was a necessary prerequisite for success on the sea (e.g. Thuc. 1.142.9; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2-32; Plut. *Per.* 11). On naval training, see Amit 1965, 49-50; Jordan 1975, 103-6.

<sup>59</sup> Cawkwell 1972, 262, n. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Anderson 1970, 87.

<sup>61</sup> On drilling in Athens, see Cawkwell 1972, 262, n. 4; Pritchett 1974, 208, n. 3; Ridley 1979, 517. Aristophanes in the *Peace* has the chorus sing "for long enough we have lost and ruined ourselves by wandering from Lyceum to Lyceum with spear, with shield" (353-6). Aristophanes is clearly referring to hoplites (σὺν δόρει σὺν ἀσπίδι). The scholiast on 356 comments: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐξόδων ἐξοπλίσαις τινὲς ἐγίνοντο ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ διὰ τὸ παρακεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποδείξει τῶν μᾶλλον πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν. The close proximity of the Lyceum to the city made it an ideal place for mustering under arms (ἐξοπλίσαις) before campaign. Aristophanes probably means this. But "the displays of the more warlike men" suggests that the Athenians held voluntary peacetime reviews, in which formation drill regularly took place. Isocrates' use of ἐξετάσεις (7.82, see the next note) implies that these reviews were held, though he does not specify how often. Nor does he distinguish between hoplite and cavalry reviews. Cavalry reviews were held in the Lyceum, the Academy, Phaleron, and the hippodrome from the 360's onwards if not earlier (see Spence 1993, 43, 77-8 on Xen. *Hipp.* 3.1; 3.6; 3.14). Late fourth- and early third-century inscriptions praise taxiarchs for their attention to reviews, but it is unclear whether the same situation applied to the period before Chaeronea (e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 500 [305/4], line 12; Hesp. 2, 156 [275/4], no. 5, lines 14-15; *Agora* 16.187 [271/70], line 17). The muster-reviews would have acted as a refresher for veteran hoplites and allow those called up for the first time to gain some familiarity in using their spears in mass formation.



*Areopagiticus*, dated to 356, suggests that they were reluctant to attend them: “we have so neglected warlike affairs, that we do not even venture to go to reviews unless we receive pay for it” (7.82).<sup>62</sup> Badly attended reviews do not constitute a training program.<sup>63</sup>

According to Aristotle, as we have seen, cities other than Sparta established peacetime training programs after Leuctra. Following the example of the Theban Sacred Band, these cities trained small élite units of citizen soldiers and maintained them at public expense.<sup>64</sup> The Athenians, however, had no such program, not even for Athens’ élite citizen corps, the *epilektoi*.<sup>65</sup> Xenophon, writing in c. 355,<sup>66</sup> makes Socrates say to the younger Pericles: “when will the Athenians train their bodies [like the Lacedaemonians] in this way, they themselves who not only neglect their fitness, but also mock those who attend to it” (*Mem.* 3.5.15).<sup>67</sup> Elsewhere, Socrates castigates Epigenes for his bad physical condition, and, having stated the advantages of fitness and the perils of unfitness in warfare, he says “indeed, because the city does not undertake military

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<sup>62</sup> ἀλλήλοις μὲν γὰρ κακὰ παρέχοντες οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν διαλείπομεν, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον οὕτω κατημελήκαμεν, ὥστ’ οὐδ’ εἰς τὰς ἐξετάσεις ἰέναι τολμῶμεν ἢ μὴ λαμβάνωμεν ἀργύριον. Plato’s proposal that men must train in peacetime as well as in wartime, “taking no heed of wintry-weather or the burning sun” (*Leg.* 829A-B), is a reaction against this lack of enthusiasm in Athens and elsewhere for such drill. Plato is well aware that that his audience would regard the notion of training in heavy armor “no less than once each month” as ridiculous and unnecessary (*Leg.* 829D). His training program, consisting of sham battles and ambushes (*Leg.* 830E), is unattested at Athens. On Plato’s proposals, see Morrow 1960, 318-52.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Anderson’s 1970, 98, observation that Xenophon draws his inspiration for the tactical maneuvers in the *Cyropaedia* from Sparta and not from Athens (i.e. Athenian drill was rudimentary and badly performed).

<sup>64</sup> E.g. *Eparittoi* of the Arcadian League: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22, 33-4, 7.5.3; D.S. 15.62.2, 15.67.2. For these élite units and the general trend towards citizen training, see Pritchett 1974, 221-3; van Wees 2004, 89-95; Lendon 2005, 106-114. For the Sacred Band, see de Voto 1992, 3-19. The Thebans were unusual because they trained a substantial portion of the citizen body (Pritchett 1985, 64-5; Hammond 2000, 92-3).

<sup>65</sup> Tritle 1989, 57, suggests that “the taxiarch had the responsibility of training and otherwise maintaining a high level of military preparedness, discipline, and spirit among the *epilektoi* of his tribe.” But the text he cites, *SEG* 3.116 (c. 330), only says that Procleides the taxiarch of Aiantis took care of the *epilektoi* and the duties assigned to them, not that he trained them. Tritle also argues that this élite corps was formed after the change to conscription by age-group in order to compensate for the numerous “physically unfit, untrained, and/or unmotivated” citizens who typically served on campaign (56). If so, it reflects the general lack of enthusiasm for training among the Athenian citizenry. Christ 2001, 417-8, rejects Tritle’s argument, but his position depends on the view that all ephebes trained for war from the second quarter of the fourth century.

<sup>66</sup> Delebecque 1957, 477-95, dates the third and fourth books of the *Memorabilia* to c. 355.

<sup>67</sup> The dramatic date of the dialogue is late fifth century, but the historical context is the Theban threat to Athens before the battle of Mantinea in 362. πότε γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέονται, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων, ἢ σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως, οἱ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων καταγελῶσι;

training at public expense, you must not make it an excuse for neglecting it in private, but for attending to it no less carefully yourself” (Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5).<sup>68</sup> Socrates would not have needed to state the advantages of physical training if such training were compulsory. These literary sources strongly suggest that the Athenians had no publicly funded training system before the mid 350’s.<sup>69</sup> Consequently few Athenians had sufficient wealth and leisure to undertake physical training in the various gymnasia in Athens before the mass participation of ephebes in the ephebeia.<sup>70</sup>

At no point do Xenophon and the other authors qualify the above statements to the effect that the youngest Athenians were treated differently from the rest of the citizen body, nor do they hint that they were compelled to undertake military training. The proponents of an early ephebeia, however, claim that a passage of Xenophon’s *Poroi* (c. 355),<sup>71</sup> does refer to such a training program. Xenophon, having suggested various methods to increase Athens’ revenue, suggests using it in the following way:

If the things which I have spoken of are carried out, I claim that not only would the city be better off financially, but would also become more obedient and more disciplined and more successful in war. For those

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<sup>68</sup> οὔτοι χρή, ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἦττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Reinmuth 1952, 48 and Bonner 1933, 89, reject this passage as an exaggeration without explanation.

<sup>69</sup> This is the usual reading of δημοσίᾳ (e.g. Pritchett 1974, 217, n. 5; 1985, 64, n. 195; Wheeler 1982, 230; Rawlings 2000, 242). Ridley 1979, 535, however, argues that “what Xenophon is getting at is not that Athenians did not maintain any military fitness in a state connection; rather, his once comparing Athens to Sparta.” Xenophon is clearly contrasting Athens with Sparta, but surely the basis of Xenophon’s comparison is that Athens did not have a state organized training system while Sparta did. Otherwise what is Xenophon trying to compare?

<sup>70</sup> Xenophon, comparing the general situation among citizens in Greece with the disciplined mercenaries of Jason, tyrant of Pherae, makes Polydamas (quoting Jason) say “very few men train their bodies in each city (σωμασκοῦσιν γε μὴν μάλα ὀλίγοι τινὲς ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει), but no one serves among my mercenaries unless he can endure as severe toils as I myself” (*Hell.* 6.1.5). This “general situation” in 374 can be taken to apply to Athens, though Xenophon does not explain what he means by “very few”. Pritchard 2003, 293-349, argues persuasively that *regular* participation in physical training in the Classical period was limited to the wealthy, who comprised a small portion of the Athenian citizen body. See also Kyle 1987, 102-23; *contra* Fisher 1998, 84-104. Contemporary with the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon, comparing the Athenian hoplites with the Thebans, has the same concern for the lack of Athenian attention to physical training: “and our hoplites will be no lesser and having no worse bodies ... if they are trained correctly with god’s help (ὀπλιταὶ τε οὐ μείους ἔσονται καὶ τὰ σώματα τοίνυν οὐ χείρω ἔχοντες ... ἢν ὀρθῶς ἀσκηθῶσι σὺν θεῷ)” (*Hipp.* 7.3).

<sup>71</sup> For the date of the *Poroi*, see Gauthier 1976, 4-6.

assigned to physical training in the gymnasia (οἳ τε γὰρ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι) would do this far more attentively by receiving maintenance (τὴν τροφήν ἀπολαμβάνοντες) more than when under the gymnasiarchs in the torch races: and those [assigned to] garrison duty in the fortresses and those [assigned to] serve as peltasts and [assigned to] patrol the countryside would perform more of all these things, if maintenance (τροφή) were given for each of the tasks (Xen. *Por.* 4.51-2).<sup>72</sup>

Who is the subject? Gauthier argues that οἱ ταχθέντες were *epheboi* because (1) only ephebes were compelled to train in the gymnasium (γυμνάζεσθαι),<sup>73</sup> and (2) οἱ ταχθέντες performed the same activities – competing in torch races, undertaking garrison duty, and patrolling the countryside – which are attested for ephebes in the *Athenaion Politeia* (42.2-5) and the ephebic inscriptions.<sup>74</sup> This analysis has been very influential among scholars, not only providing additional evidence for the existence of an early ephebeia, but also fuelling more speculation about the nature of its training program.<sup>75</sup>

Gauthier's interpretation, however, is problematic. First, he cannot explain why Xenophon chose to use οἱ ταχθέντες instead of *epheboi* or some other term to refer to Athenian citizens under twenty. Indeed, if Xenophon meant for οἱ ταχθέντες to be taken as *epheboi*, why didn't he use the latter as he did in the *Cyropaedeia* (1.2.5-13), which was written about the same time as the *Poroi*? While Gauthier is right to point out that Xenophon's use of *trophe*, or ration-payment, suggests that the subject of this passage are

<sup>72</sup> Πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα ξύμφημι ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι. οἳ τε γὰρ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι πολὺ ἂν ἐπιμελέστερον τοῦτο πράττειν ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν τροφήν ἀπολαμβάνοντες πλείω ἢ ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι· οἳ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις οἳ τε πελτάζειν καὶ περιπολεῖν τὴν χώραν πάντα ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἂν πράττειν, ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τῶν ἔργων τῆς τροφῆς ἀποδιδομένης.

<sup>73</sup> Gauthier 1976, 192: "Mais aux seuls éphèbes il est *prescript* (cf. ταχθέντες) de s'entraîner dans les gymnases." Sekunda 1990, 151, makes the same point: "This passage can hardly be referring to anything other than the ephebate since only the ephebes, at any period in Athenian history, were 'ordered' to train in the gymnasia (οἳ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι)."

<sup>74</sup> Gauthier 1976, 190-5. Bryant 1907, 86, had previously noted the similarity between the *Poroi* and the ephebeia, but doubted the authorship of the treatise. Lofberg 1925, 331, and Reinmuth 1952, 37, have also examined the passage before Gauthier, but do not associate it with the ephebeia.

<sup>75</sup> E.g. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 122, n. 1; Hansen 1987, 139-40, n. 49; Winkler 1990, 28-31; Sekunda 1990, 151-3; Faraguna 1992, 276; Burckhardt 1996, 30; Chankowski 1997, 333, n. 8; Rawlings 2000, 253, n. 40; Fisher 2001, 182; van Wees 2004, 94.

the citizens of Athens rather than mercenaries,<sup>76</sup> his argument that οἱ ταχθέντες should not be taken as *politai* but as *epheboi* is unconvincing because his assumption that the ephebeia existed in the 350's (and hence that Xenophon must be referring to the institution) depends upon an early date for E1, which, as we have seen, should instead be dated to 333/2.<sup>77</sup>

Second, Gauthier has misunderstood the nature of Xenophon's proposal concerning military training. For Gauthier Xenophon is recommending that the ephebes should be maintained at public expense so that they could train with more dedication.<sup>78</sup> He thus assumes that ephebes were *already* being trained *en masse* in the gymnasia. But, as we have seen, Xenophon says explicitly in the *Memorabilia* that Athens did not have a publicly funded training program in the mid 350's and consequently the majority of Athenian citizens neglected to train their bodies for war (3.5.15; 3.12.5).<sup>79</sup> Xenophon's proposal in the *Poroi* should therefore be understood as his solution to this problem of getting more Athenians to train regularly in the gymnasia. When Xenophon says οἱ τε γὰρ ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι πολὺ ἂν ἐπιμελέστερον τοῦτο πράττοιεν ἐν τοῖς

<sup>76</sup> For the use of *trophe* and *misthos* in the *Poroi*, see Gauthier 1976, 20-32. The *communis opinio* is that Xenophon is referring to citizens, whereas he would have used *misthos* and *sitos* if they were mercenaries: Lofberg 1925, 331; Gauthier 1976, 191; Ober 1985a, 93, n. 17; Sekunda 1990, 151. Marcellus 1994, 42, compares the *trophe* to the payment of rations in the *Athenaion Politeia*. Forbes 1929, 121, argues that they are irregularly paid mercenaries. On *trophe* generally, see Pritchett 1974, 3-6; Griffith 1935, 268-72; Loomis 1998.

<sup>77</sup> Gauthier 1976, 193. He follows Reinmuth's discussion of E1 and his inferences from it that the ephebeia existed as a formal institution from at least c. 371 (1971, 1-4, 123-38). Gauthier's explanation for why Xenophon chose not to mention ἔφηβοι but instead οἱ ταχθέντες is that the former was ambiguous in meaning before the Lycurgan ephebeia (193-4). His evidence for this supposed ambiguity is E1, lines 15-20, in which *neaniskoi* and *epheboi* are used interchangeably: ὁ κοσμητὴς τῶν ἐφ' ἡβῶν Αὐτόλυκος κ[αλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμε]λήθη τῶν νεανίσκ[ων, δεδόχθαι τῇ Ἀκαμαντίδ]ι φυλῇ ἐπαινέσ[αι Αὐτόλυκον ....9..... Θο]ρίκιον φιλοτιμ[ίας ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῇ]ς περὶ τοὺς ἐφ' ἡβ[ους]. But a more convincing explanation for the use of these two terms is an attempt to avoid the repetition of *epheboi* in the same clause (Pélékidis 1962, 126-7). Gauthier does not cite, but should have noticed, that both terms also occur in an ephebic inscription of the tribe Leontis (E8), dated to the archonship of Nicocrates (332/1), when there cannot have been any ambiguity with the meaning of *epheboi*: ἐπεὶ δὲ Φιλόθεος ὁ σωφ[ρον]ιστὴς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]φ' ἡβῶν ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]ίσκων (Col. I., lines 4-7).

<sup>78</sup> Gauthier 1976, 193-5.

<sup>79</sup> This is consistent with the statements of his contemporary Isocrates, who in *On the Peace* criticizes the Athenians for their apathy in military matters: "but we seek to rule the whole world, but are unwilling to go on campaign, and choose to make war against almost all men, but we do not train ourselves for it (οὐχ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀσκοῦμεν) ..." (8.44).

γυμνασίοις τὴν τροφήν ἀπολαμβάνοντες πλείω ἢ ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι (4.52), he is suggesting that Athens should create a mandatory physical training program in which all Athenian citizens, not just those under twenty, would receive state-funded *trophe* to help them train.<sup>80</sup>

To illustrate the level of physical fitness he expects his new training program to achieve, Xenophon thinks that “those [citizens] assigned to physical training in the *gymnasia*” would pay more attention (ἐπιμελέστερον) to their training than those who ἐν ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι. He invokes this comparison, not because all οἱ ταχθέντες competed in the torch races, as Gauthier believes,<sup>81</sup> but because the few wealthy citizens who competed as *lampadephoroi* as youths in Athenian festivals trained assiduously for the event and received *trophe* from their tribal gymnasiarchs.<sup>82</sup> Though these youths were probably of ephebic age, this should not be taken as evidence that the ephebeia existed at this time. The implication of the passage is that the physical prowess of these *lampadephoroi*, who comprised a small portion of the citizen body, was far superior to that of the average Athenian citizen: i.e. all Athenians could attain this standard if and only if Athens provided *trophe* just as the gymnasiarchs did for the members of their torch racing teams.

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<sup>80</sup> Xenophon is using *trophe* in the same way as in *Poroi* 4.33, in which he, having discussed various methods to increase mining revenues, says that “there would be sufficient *trophe* for all Athenians from public funds (καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ εἴρηται ὥς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης τῆς πόλεως ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφήν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι).” I thank Joe Jansen, who has recently completed his dissertation on the *Poroi*, for this reference.

<sup>81</sup> Gauthier 1976, 192. Sekunda 1990, 158, following Gauthier, argues that the ephebes trained in the *gymnasia* in order to compete in the torch races in their first year of the ephebeia.

<sup>82</sup> The evidence for training for the torch race is Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 1087-8: (λαμπάδα δ’ οὐδεὶς οἷός τε φέρειν ὑπ’ ἀγυμνασίας ἔτι νυνί). For the view that few Athenians had the wealth and leisure to train and compete in these races, see Prichard 2000, 110-1; 2003, 328-30. The epigraphic evidence supports Prichard’s view, as an inscription of a victorious team of Aiantis, dated to 350’s or 340’s, has ten members (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1250, lines 13-22). For the introduction of the gymnasiarchy for the torch race (421/0), see Davies 1967, 35. On the liturgy and its duties, see Sekunda 1990, 156-8. Following Gauthier 1976, 191, I take γυμνασιαρχούμενοι to be a passive temporal participle. If οἱ ταχθέντες are Athenian citizens and not just ephebes, then γυμνασιαρχούμενοι refers to those few wealthy citizens who, as ephebes, competed as *lampadephoroi* under the supervision of the tribal gymnasiarchs. For the torch race in the Lycurgan ephebeia, see pp. 116-8.

Marcellus suggests that ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι should be taken in the sense of “the young men assigned to the gymnasiarch in charge of festival *lampadephoroi*.”<sup>83</sup> But this reading is inconsistent and is unnecessary with the use of the three other infinitives in the passage (φρουρεῖν, πελτάζειν, περιπολεῖν), which refer to those citizens conscripted to perform garrison duty, to serve as peltasts (i.e. those citizens who could not afford hoplite armor), and to patrol the countryside as *peripoloi* (4.52).<sup>84</sup> If we accept that Xenophon’s proposal is to create a mass training program for all Athenian citizens, we should then accept that ταχθέντες γυμνάζεσθαι refers to those Athenians who were conscripted to do gymnastic training. By offering *trophe* for all these military activities, Xenophon hopes to make the Athenian citizen body better disciplined, more obedient, and more formidable in war.<sup>85</sup> This passage of the *Poroi*, then, is neither concerned with the ephebeia nor ephebes in particular. It is not evidence for ephebic training, but for its absence.

The evidence taken together suggests that at no point before Chaeronea were Athenian citizens, ephebes included, obliged to train for hoplite warfare. With the exception of the badly attended drills, training was an informal affair, the personal concern of the citizen. Socrates, for example, tries to *persuade* Epigenes, whose age is somewhere between eighteen and thirty years of age, that it is in his best interest to train his body for war (3.12.1-8). The *decision* to train, however, is Epigenes’; he is free to train if he is so inclined, but chooses not to. Despite the efforts of Xenophon and Plato in the *Memorabilia/Cyropaedia* and *Republic/Laws* respectively, who argued that training was vital for success in war, the Athenians clung stubbornly to their conviction that such

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<sup>83</sup> Marcellus 1994, 42. He cites no evidence to support his case.

<sup>84</sup> For a discussion of military conscription, see pp. 28-31.

<sup>85</sup> Gauthier 1976, 190-1, compares εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν to the terminology of the ephebic inscriptions (see also Faraguna 1992, 276), citing E8 (332/1), lines 7-8 and IG II<sup>2</sup> 665 (266/5), lines 9-10, as evidence, and concludes that they must refer to youths who served in the ephebeia. But *eutaxia*, “good order”, and *peitharchia*, “obedience”, are two of Xenophon’s stock terms when he discusses military discipline (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.6, 3.5.21; *Anab.* 3.2.30; *Ages.* 6.4; cf. Isoc. *Pan.* 115). There is nothing in these terms themselves that limits their application in this passage just to ephebes nor should they be used as evidence for an early ephebeia.

training was unnecessary.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, Pericles, as we have seen, could boast that the Athenians had as much courage as the Spartans without concerning themselves with such excessive training (Thuc. 2.39). This prevailing amateurism is reflected in Plato's complaint that a man who takes up a shield could not become a skilled soldier on the very same day (*Resp.* 374D). As Plato observes, the necessity of making a living was far more important to the average citizen than undertaking military exercises (*Leg.* 831C-832A). This amateur ethos left no room for a mandatory training program as described in the *Athenaion Politeia*. With this understood, let us now discuss the term *ephebos*.

### 1.3: Aeschines' *Synepheboi* and the Athenian Military System

Perhaps the most important piece of evidence for an early ephebeia occurs in Aeschines' *On The Embassy*, dated to 343. In this speech, Aeschines, defends himself against Demosthenes' slandering of his military record (19.113),<sup>87</sup> with the claim that "for having passed from the boys I became a *peripolos* of this land for two years, and I will provide for you my fellow *epheboi* and my officers as witnesses of these statements" (2.167).<sup>88</sup> Aeschines states his age, and hence provides a date for his *peripoleia*, in his speech *Against Timarchus*. Talking about youthful appearance in old age, he says, "Misgolas is one of these men. For he happens to be my equal in age and a fellow *ephebos*, and we are forty-five years old at this time" (1.49).<sup>89</sup> Since Aeschines delivered

<sup>86</sup> Lendon 2005, 109: "that training was irrelevant to military success was not a position Xenophon shared, but in his generation he had to argue for the importance of training in his polemical *Cyropaedia* because in his day the value of training could not be taken for granted." See also Jaeger 1945, 251-8; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 95; Rawlings 2000, 242.

<sup>87</sup> On Aeschines' response to Demosthenes' allegation, see Burckhardt 1996, 237-9; Fisher 2001, 13-14; Roisman 2005, 118-19. Charges of cowardice on and off the battlefield between public figures in order to gain political advantage were common in fourth-century Athenian oratory. For a list of such accusations and the ongoing exchange between Demosthenes and Aeschines, see Christ 2006, 58, n. 37, and 132-42.

<sup>88</sup> ἐκ παίδων μὲν γὰρ ἀπαλλαγείς περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης ἐγενόμην δύο ἔτη, καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν τοὺς συνεφήβους καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἡμῶν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. The manuscripts have συνάρχοντας, but Bekker emended it to ἄρχοντας.

<sup>89</sup> Τούτων δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὁ Μισγόλας. Τυχάνει μὲν γὰρ ἡλικιώτης ὢν ἐμὸς καὶ συνέφηβος, καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῖν τουτὶ πέμπτον καὶ τετταρακοστὸν ἔτος.

his speech in 346/5,<sup>90</sup> he was born in 391/0 or 390/89, which suggests that he served his two years as a *peripolos* in 373/2-371/0 or 372/1-370/69.<sup>91</sup>

Scholars associate Aeschines' *On The Embassy* with the ephebeia because Aeschines calls his companions *sunepheboi*, and so presumably would have called himself an *ephebos*, a term which is attested in the *Athenaion Politeia* and in the ephebic inscriptions. These scholars, convinced that Aeschines is referring to a formal ephebic institution (see section four below), argue that *ephebos* in the Classical period meant without exception "a young man who undertakes his ephebic service."<sup>92</sup> But does Aeschines' use of *sunepheboi* presuppose the existence of the ephebeia? No – I argue in this section that while Aeschines and the *Athenaion Politeia* use *ephebos* in the same technical sense, the term does not have the meaning in these authors and in the other epigraphic and literary attestations of *ephebos* before Chaeronea which Chankowski and other scholars have supposed.

#### (a) *Ephebos* as a civic term

The literal meaning of ἔφηβος, consisting of the prefix ἐπί and the stem ἥβη, can perhaps best be rendered as "a youth in the period of adolescence/puberty."<sup>93</sup> The

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<sup>90</sup> Harris 1985, 376-80.

<sup>91</sup> Determining when Aeschines undertook his *peripoleia* has been problematic on account of the orator's assertion that he and Misgolas were both forty-five years old, but Timarchus is younger (1.49), even though Aeschines says elsewhere (1.109) that Timarchus was a *bouletes* in the archonship of Nikophemus (361/0), which implies that Timarchus was in fact the same age. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this chronological inconsistency concerning Aeschines' age. Lewis 1958, 108, has suggested that πέμπτον καὶ τετταρακοστόν in 1.49 should be emended to τέταρτον καὶ πεντηκοστόν, which would have pushed back Aeschines' *peripoleia* to 380/79-378/7 or 379/8-377/6. Harris 1988, 211-214, has noted problems with this emendation and shows that Aeschines is lying about Misgolas' age, but not his own, in order to make his charge against Timarchus plausible. Certainly Harris' solution is less problematic than Munn's 188, n. 5, proposed emendation, who assumes that Aeschines did not die in Antipater's purge of 322/1 but instead in the democratic purge of 318/7 and that μθ' has been corrupted to με'. If so, Aeschines' *peripoleia* would have occurred during 377/6-375/4 or 376/5-374/3. Fisher 2001, 10-12, in his recent commentary on the *Against Timarchus*, has reexamined the chronological problems and accepts Harris' argument over Lewis and Munn.

<sup>92</sup> Chankowski 1997, 339: "En effet, dans aucun texte de la période classique l'acception non technique du mot "éphèbe" n'est attestée. Ce terme n'a qu'une seule signification, technique et institutionnelle à la fois: celle d'un "jeune homme qui exerce son service éphébique", c'est-à-dire celle décrite par Aristote." See also Pélékidis 1962, 60; Winkler 1990, 31; Kennell 2006, ix.

<sup>93</sup> For *ephebos* as a compound of ἥβη rather than ἥβάω, see Pélékidis 1962, 57; Chaintraine 1983, 404-5, s.v. ἥβη. *Hebe* was the nearest the Greeks came to the modern notion of adolescence, though "puberty is



phrase ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι or “to be two years older than puberty” – attested in Attic oratory and in the lexicographers – suggests that *hebe* in a civic sense began for Athenian males at sixteen, approximately when their fathers enrolled them in the phratry,<sup>94</sup> and continued for two more years until they turned eighteen years old.<sup>95</sup> At the completion of these two years of *hebe* the youths were considered sufficiently mature to be eligible for citizenship. The *Athenaion Politeia* provides the fullest account of how they became citizens. The author makes it clear that all youths who had attained eighteen years of age in the preceding year were admitted into the citizen body by enrolling them in the “deme register” or the *lexiarchicon grammateion*, provided that they could demonstrate to their (potential) fellow demesmen, to the law court (if necessary), and to the *bouletai* in the *dokimasia* that they satisfied the criteria for citizenship – their age, their status as freemen, and their Athenian parentage (42.1-2).<sup>96</sup>

At the beginning of the *Athenaion Politeia*’s description of the enrollment procedure the author defines the youths in terms of their Athenian parentage, using the circumlocution οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν or “those born of citizens on both

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often a more satisfactory translation” (Garland 1990, 166; also see Golden 1990, 28). See Pélékidis 1962, 59-60, for various words formed from ἡβη.

<sup>94</sup> See Lambert 1993, 167, 173-4.

<sup>95</sup> For a detailed discussion of ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι, see Labarbe 1957, 67-75; Pélékidis 1962, 51-60. The lexicographers show that there were divergent interpretations of this phrase in antiquity. While Didymus defines *hebe* as fourteen and hence ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι as sixteen (Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι; schol. on Aeschin. 3.122), the *Anecdota Graeca* s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι gives sixteen and eighteen respectively. Pélékidis 1962, 51-60, tries to explain this difference by arguing that the ephebeia in Solon’s time was a period of four years beginning when Athenians turned sixteen, but later was reduced to two years when the age of *hebe* was raised to sixteen. He provides no evidence, however, that the ephebeia existed in the early sixth-century. Golden 1990, 28-9, more plausibly argues that ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι was pre-Cleisthenic expression which originally referred to Athenians gaining citizenship by enrolling in the phratry (i.e. at sixteen), but was then modified after the reforms to satisfy the new admission age of eighteen for enrollment in the deme registry (see the next note).

<sup>96</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* does not mention the *lexiarchicon grammateion* but the author must have been thinking of the register when he says ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς δημότας (42.1). Cf. Harp. s.v. Κοινὸν γραμματεῖον καὶ ληξιαρχικόν: τὸ μὲν κοινὸν γραμματεῖόν ἐστιν εἰς ὃ ἐνεγράφοντο οἱ εἰσαγόμενοι εἰς τοὺς φράτορας καὶ γεννήτας, τὸ δὲ ληξιαρχικόν εἰς ὃ ἐνεγράφοντο οἱ εἰς τοὺς δήμους ἐγγραφόμενοι, ὡς δεικνύουσιν ἄλλοι τε ῥήτορες καὶ Ἰσαῖος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ Ἀπολλοδώρου κλήρου. For a detailed analysis of *Ath. Pol.* 42.1-2 and citizen registration generally, see Rhodes 1972, 171-4; 1981, 497-502; Whitehead 1986, 97-104. The author says that the youths had to be ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες when they enrolled among the demesmen (42.1). The arguments of Golden 1979, 25-38, and Rhodes 1981, 497-8, show that ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότες should be understood as “eighteen years old” and not “in their eighteenth year,” as Sealey 1957, 195-7, and Welsh 1977, 77-85, maintain.

sides” (42.1). It is only when they have successfully passed their *dokimasia* before the *boule* and hence received formal recognition from the *polis* of their new status as citizens that he calls them *epheboi* (42.2: ἐπὶ δὲ διετέες ἡβῆσαι οἱ ἔφηβοι).<sup>97</sup> This suggests that *ephebos* was used in the technical sense of “one who has become a citizen” rather than “one who is in the act of becoming a citizen,” as Marcellus has argued.<sup>98</sup> Being an *ephebos* meant that the youth, at the end of his ἐπὶ διετέες ἡβῆσαι, assumed the rights and responsibilities of citizenship: i.e. he has ceased to be under the authority of his father and has gained the right to be *kurios* over his own affairs and participate in public life. The ephebe could now inherit his patrimony and own property, participate in Athenian cults and festivals, attend and vote in the *ecclesia* (see below for a discussion on the *pinax ecclesiastikos*), represent himself in the lawcourt and make legal contracts, and be eligible for public largesse.<sup>99</sup> But passing the *dokimasia* entailed more for the new citizen than the acquisition of legal rights. For an Athenian youth, to be called an *ephebos* was also an acknowledgement of his new status as an adult male and that he was no longer considered to be among the boys.<sup>100</sup> The use of ἐφηβάω in fifth- and fourth-century authors with the meaning “to reach adulthood” conveys this idea of maturation

<sup>97</sup> Rhodes 1981, 502-3.

<sup>98</sup> Marcellus 1994, 47-8.

<sup>99</sup> See Lacey 1968, 125-9; Sinclair 1988; Manville 1990, 8-9; Hansen 1991, 97-9; Strauss 1993, 95. The use of ἐπὶ διετέες ἡβῆσαι as an expression of legal competence in forensic speeches suggests that civic majority began at the end of a youth's *hebe* (i.e. two years after puberty). See [Dem]. 46.20, 24; Isae. 8.31; 10.12; Aeschin. 3.122; Hyp. Fr. 192 Jensen = Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετέες ἡβῆσαι: see Labarbe 1957, 68, n. 1. Demosthenes and other speakers would refer to the passing of their *dokimasia* as the time when they came of age and began their lives as citizens (Dem. 27.5; 30.6; Lys. 10.31; 32.9).

<sup>100</sup> Goldhill 1987, 67. Cf. the *Athenaion Politeia*'s statement that if the demesmen do not agree that the candidate-citizens have attained the prescribed age (τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου), the latter “return again to the boys (ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παῖδας)” (42.1). The only direct evidence that sexual maturity played a role in determining a youth's age comes from Aristophanes' *Wasps*, where Philocleon says that one of the pleasures of being a juryman (probably during an appeal) is gazing upon the private parts of youths undergoing their *dokimasia* (577-8). Robertson 2000, 149-74, investigates the implications of Philocleon's statement and argues that not only did the adult Athenians' subjective assessment of a youth's physique play a dominant role in determining his age but also that “his adulthood was not something which he possessed before the *dokimasia*, but rather something which the *dokimasia* conferred upon him” (153). Robertson may be going too far in asserting that physical attributes were the most important factor in determining adulthood, but there is no doubt that it was one of the criteria. See Rhodes 1972, 173; Whitehead 1986, 100-1.

and associates it with the physical capability of undertaking the military obligations expected of citizens.<sup>101</sup>

Aeschines seems to have used *sunephebos* in his *On The Embassy* in the same sense as the *Athenaion Politeia*, though he does not mention his *dokimasia* and enrollment on the deme register,<sup>102</sup> because his account suggests that he became an *ephebos* when he had “passed from the boys (ἐκ παίδων ... ἀπαλλαθείς),” (2.167): i.e. he had reached legal adulthood and become a citizen.<sup>103</sup> But was he called an *ephebos* when he had turned eighteen c. 372? Scholars have assumed rather than demonstrated that he was an *ephebos* at this time. Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus* suggests that the youngest Athenians citizens were called *epheboi* in 346/5 (1.49) and that his audience was already familiar with the term because he did not explain its meaning. Given that *ephebos* is unattested in fifth-century Athenian literature<sup>104</sup> and that the earliest extant example occurs in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* dated c. 355 (1.2.5-13),<sup>105</sup> it is likely that the term came into use at some time during the first half of the fourth century.

### **(b) *Epheboi* as the First *Helikia***

There is in fact reason to think that Aeschines’ use of *sunepheboi* is not anachronistic but reflects contemporary usage in the late 370’s. To show this, we need to understand what Aeschines meant when he said that Misgolas was his ἡλικιώτης ... καὶ συνέφηβος in *Against Timarchus* (1.49). Scholars have disagreed over the significance

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<sup>101</sup> Aesch. *Sept.* 665; Eur. fr. 559 Nauck; Hdt. 6.83.1; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.1.12. Also see Garland’s 1990, 170-4, analysis of Telemachus’ attainment of manhood, which emphasizes these ideas.

<sup>102</sup> Whitehead 1986, 97-103, argues that the *dokimasia* was first introduced after Cleisthenes’ reforms (for the fifth century, see Ar. *Vesp.* 578), though it is unclear whether the three-stage procedure as described in the *Athenaion Politeia* antedated the fourth century.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Aeschines’ use of the same phrase in referring to the activities of Timarchus and Demosthenes when they became adults (1.40; 2.99).

<sup>104</sup> McCulloch and Cameron 1980, 1-14, claim that Aeschylus in the *Seven Against Thebes* makes Eteocles use ἔφηβος rather than ἔφηβος in line 11, though he is in fact referring to a citizen of ephebic age (i.e. 18-19 years old). This is unconvincing for three reasons. (1) As we have seen, no direct evidence supports their view that the ephebeia existed at this time. (2) They follow Reinmuth’s interpretation of the Mitsos inscription without any indication that it has been misdated. (3) They fail to mention that Aeschylus’ clever allusion to *ephebos* would be unique in fifth-century literature.

<sup>105</sup> Garland 1990, 324, n. 166, mistakenly cites Aeschin. 2.167 and Dem. 19.303 as the earliest attested instances of *ephebos*. Lacey 1968, 294, n. 28, incorrectly holds that *ephebos* was first used after 336.

of these terms. Brenot and Forbes maintain that *sunephebos* was used non-technically before the creation of the ephebeia: the orator thus meant no more than “a fellow youth of the same age.”<sup>106</sup> But if *sunephebos* had this meaning, why then did Aeschines use ἡλικιώτης? Foxhall observes that a “*hēlikīōtēs* is a ‘mate’, a ‘companion’”. The word itself implies that both parties are around the same age.”<sup>107</sup> Certainly Aeschines uses the term elsewhere with this meaning (1.42; 2.168, 184; cf. Lys. 20.36; Hdt. 5.71). The advocates for an early ephebeia, rejecting Brenot’s and Forbes’ position, argue that ἡλικιώτης ... καὶ συνέφηβος can only be explained with reference to the ephebeia: i.e. *sunephebos* meant “a comrade in the ephebeia.”<sup>108</sup>

The significance of *sunephebos* is suggested by a passage in the *Athenaion Politeia*. At the time of its composition, the conscription method used in Athens was by age-groups. The author describes how this system operated:

The arbitrators are men who are in their sixtieth year. This is clear from archons and the eponymous heroes. For there are ten eponymous heroes of the tribes, and forty-two [i.e. 18-59 years old] of the age-classes [eligible for military service]. Previously, when the *epheboi* were enrolled they used to be inscribed onto whitened tablets, both the archon under whom they enrolled and the eponymous hero of the previous year’s arbitrators were being inscribed upon them [i.e. the whitened tablets]. But now [the *epheboi*] are inscribed onto a bronze stele, and the stele is set up in front of the Bouleterion beside the eponymous heroes ... And they also use the eponymous heroes for military expeditions, and whenever they send out an age-class [on an expedition], they give public notice, from what archon and eponymous hero up to which must serve on campaign ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 53.4, 7).<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Brenot 1920, 17-18; Forbes 1929, 122, 124.

<sup>107</sup> Foxhall 1998, 58.

<sup>108</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 41. Also see Lofberg 1925, 333; Ober 1985a, 93; Winkler 1990, 29; Burckhardt 1996, 26, 30; Fisher 2001, 182. Other scholars hold a similar position based upon Aeschin. 2.167 alone: e.g. Ridley 1979, 533; Mathieu 1937, 315. *Sunephebos* occurs on numerous ephebic inscriptions of the Hellenistic and Roman periods (209 B.C. – 256 A.D.). For a list, see Kennell 2006, 16. Despite this later association with the ephebeia, these instances of *sunephebos* should not be taken as evidence for how Aeschines used the term in the second and third quarters of the fourth century.

<sup>109</sup> διαιτηταὶ δ’ εἰσὶν οἷς ἂν ἑξηκοστὸν ἔτος ᾗ. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν ἐπωνύμων. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐπωνυμοὶ δέκα μὲν οἱ τῶν φυλῶν, δύο δὲ καὶ τετταράκοντα οἱ τῶν ἡλικίων· οἱ δὲ ἔφηβοι ἐγγραφόμενοι πρότερον μὲν εἰς λευκωμένα γραμματεῖα ἐνεγράφοντο, καὶ ἐπεγράφοντο αὐτοῖς ὃ τ’ ἀρχῶν ἐφ’ οὗ ἐνεγράφησαν, καὶ ὁ ἐπωνυμὸς ὁ τῷ προτέρῳ ἔ[τ]ει δεδαιτηκώς, νῦν δ’ εἰς στήλην χαλκῇ ἀναγράφονται, καὶ ἴσταται ἡ στήλη πρὸ τοῦ

According to the *Athenaion Politeia* the *epheboi* were those eighteen year olds in a given archon year whose names were enrolled on the centrally compiled and permanent hoplite register for that year.<sup>110</sup> These *epheboi*, as first year conscripts, collectively formed a new conscript age-class (ἡλικία), which was identified by the name of its eponymous hero (ἑπωνύμος). A dedication of the ephebes and *sophronistes* of Aiantis to the hero Munichus for the *helikia* enrolled in the archonship of Nicocrates (333/2) (E6, line 5) provides the sole surviving instance of an *eponumos*.<sup>111</sup> The *helikia* acquired the name of its eponymous hero from the previous year's arbitrators, who, at sixty, were ineligible for military service (Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 24.3). The names of the *epheboi* were inscribed on a bronze stele, which was erected outside the Bouleterion.<sup>112</sup>

The *Athenaion Politeia* implies that conscription by *eponumoi* existed before the work was written. The author distinguishes between two mediums used for inscribing new conscripts: the imperfect ἐνεγράφοντο along with πρότερον suggests that the ephebes were enrolling on the λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα for some time before the present situation (νῦν δ'), when the ephebes "are inscribed (ἀναγράφονται)" on the στήλην χαλκῇν. Pélékidis argues that the interval of time implied by πρότερον μὲν ... νῦν δ' must antedate the composition of the *Athenaion Politeia*.<sup>113</sup> He is right to propose this, since the imperfect ἐπεγράφοντο does suggest that "the system of the forty-two ἑπωνύμοι was older than" the Lycurgan ephebeia.<sup>114</sup> Though the author of the

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βουλευτηρίου παρὰ τοὺς ἑπωνύμους ... χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς ἑπωνύμοις καὶ πρὸς τὰς στρατείας, καὶ ὅταν ἡλικίαν ἐκπέμπωσι, προγράφουσιν, ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχοντος καὶ ἑπωνύμου μέχρι τίνων δεῖ στρατεύεσθαι. For a detailed discussion of this passage and conscription system, see Rhodes 1981, 591-6; Hansen 1985, 15, 83-9; Hamel 1998a, 26-8; Christ 2001, 409-12. This passage has not been mentioned in many previous discussions on the ephebeia despite its importance in determining the meaning of *ephebos*. Scholars who mention it briefly include Pélékidis 1962, 73-4; Faraguna 1992, 275; Marcellus 1994, 26.

<sup>110</sup> For the creation and upkeep of these age-class lists, see Hansen 1985, 15; Christ 2001, 410.

<sup>111</sup> See Habicht 1961 (1962), 143-6; Reinmuth 1971, 17; Rhodes 1981, 593. Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 100, n. 11, suggests that Panops may have been another eponymous hero, but this is uncertain.

<sup>112</sup> Sekunda 1992, 321, wrongly asserts that the *stelai* and the ephebic inscriptions had the same function, though the former were inscribed at enrollment and the latter after the completion of the ephebes' service. For the triangular bases upon which these *stelai* stood, see Stroud 1979, 49-57.

<sup>113</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 73-4.

<sup>114</sup> Rhodes 1981, 592-3. See also Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 87. Rhodes believes that the shift from λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα to στήλην χαλκῇν occurred when the ephebeia was reformed, which he

*Athenaion Politeia* does not indicate for how long this method of conscription had been in operation before his time, the Athenians were probably first conscripted by *eponumoi* somewhere in the period 386-366, when they replaced the older system *ek katalogou*.<sup>115</sup> Certainly this new conscription system was in use when Aeschines delivered his *Against Timarchus* in 346/5. It is likely, then, that Aeschines had it in mind when he called Misgolas a ἡλικιώτης ... καὶ συνέφηβος. If so, it follows that he was not only claiming that Misgolas was a fellow member of his *helikia* when he himself had turned eighteen and gained his citizen rights, but also that they had the same eponymous hero because they became eligible for military conscription in the same year.<sup>116</sup>

This technical use of *ephebos* is probably best rendered as “new citizen conscript.” Given that the Athenians had introduced conscription by *eponumoi* sometime in the two decades before 366, it is therefore possible that this system was in operation when Aeschines came of age (c. 372). If we accept this, Aeschines and his companions would have been called *epheboi* when they had passed their *dokimasia* and become citizens (2.167), unless there had been a change in terminology before the mid 340’s. While this confirms Winkler’s suspicion that Aeschines was not using *sunephebos* anachronistically in both of his speeches,<sup>117</sup> it does not imply the existence of the

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dates c. 335/4. Wilamowitz 1893, 224, n. 77, argues that the creation of the *ephebeia* was responsible (*contra* Pélékidis 1962, 101).

<sup>115</sup> The Athenians used two conscription methods in the fifth- and fourth-centuries. In the older method, first attested in the 450’s (D.S. 11.81.4; 84.4-5), the *strategoí* would select hoplites for service on a given campaign by publishing tribal lists (*katalogoi*) of conscripts under the names of the ten eponymous heroes (Ar. *Pax* 1183-4; *Av.* 450). This system was known as *ek katalogou* or “from the *katalogos*,” because the *strategoí* (with the assistance of the tribal *taxiarchoi*) would compile a *katalogos* of the hoplites they needed from each tribe (Thuc. 6.26.2; 31.5) rather than from a central register (Hansen 1985, 83-7; Christ 2001, 400-3; *contra* Jones 1957, 163; Burckhardt 1996, 21, n. 31). The prevailing opinion is that the first unambiguous case of conscription by *eponumoi* is in 352 (Dem. 3.4), while the last recorded instance of *ek katalogou* was in 348 (Dem. 39.8). The two systems thus coexisted side by side until *ek katalogou* was abandoned in the early 340’s (Andrewes 1981, 2; Hansen 1985, 88-9; Hamel 1998a, 26-7). Christ 2001, 412-6, however, has convincingly argued that this change occurred much earlier, that Aeschines’ account of his first military campaign to Phlius in 366 (2.168) implies that conscription by *eponumoi* was already in use at that time, and that its adoption should therefore be dated between 386-366.

<sup>116</sup> Aeschines’ motive was perhaps to deceive his audience into thinking that there was irrefutable evidence on the λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα outside the Bouleuterion that Misgolas was indeed the same age as himself. This explanation reinforces Harris’ 1988, 213, point that Aeschines is lying to his audience.

<sup>117</sup> Winkler 1990, 29. This would mean that the use of *ephebos* antedated Xenophon’s *Cyropaedeia*.

ephebeia, as Pélékidis and Chankowski have maintained;<sup>118</sup> *ephebos* in this context is explicitly connected with the conscription of the youngest citizens. Some scholars, however, argue that the ephebeia was responsible for the adoption of the new conscription system because ephebes were already organized by age groups.<sup>119</sup> But it is difficult to see why, if the ephebeia existed, Athens would have had *two* conscription methods in operation at the same time, one for citizens under twenty (*eponumoi*), another for those older (*ek katalogou*), before the latter was abandoned. This would have made conscription complicated, especially if the Athenians were calling up both groups at the same time. Instead, the Athenians probably introduced the new system because it enabled a faster mobilization and it was considered a more equitable and democratic form of conscription than *ek katalogou*.<sup>120</sup>

### (c) The Ephebic Oath

An examination of the ephebic oath may provide a plausible explanation for why the Athenians decided to use the term *epheboi* for conscription by *eponumoi*. The ephebic oath certainly antedates Chaeronea. In his speech *Against Leocrates*, Lycurgus implies that the oath was one of “the ancient laws of the city (τῆς πόλεως οἱ παλαιοὶ νόμοι)” (75-6). Demosthenes, referring to the events of 348, says that Aeschines, urging action against Philip, read “the oath of the ephebes in the temple of Aglauros (τὸν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀγλαύρου τῶν ἐφήβων ὄρκον)” (19.303).<sup>121</sup> Contemporary with this is the text of the ephebic oath inscribed upon a mid-fourth century inscription found at Acharnae.<sup>122</sup>

The ancestral oath of the ephebes, which the ephebes must swear. I shall not bring shame upon these sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man

<sup>118</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 73-4; Chankowski 1997, 339.

<sup>119</sup> Hansen 1985, 89; I take Ober’s 1985a, 96, mention of “a highly mobile rapid deployment force” as ephebes; Munn 1993, 189; Christ 2001, 416-7.

<sup>120</sup> See Ober 1985, 96; Munn 1993, 189; Christ 2001, 418-9, on Ar. *Eq.* 1369-72; Lys. 9.4.

<sup>121</sup> Winkler 1990, 29, incorrectly says that Aeschines took the oath.

<sup>122</sup> The bibliography on the text, date, and content of this inscription is extensive: *SEG* 21.519; Tod 204; Robert 1938, 297-307; Daux 1971, 370-383; Siewert 1977, 102-11; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 440-9, no. 88. The text of the oath is also quoted in Pollux (8.105-6) and Stobaeus (43.48). Lycurgus paraphrases the oath in the *Against Leocrates* (76-8), but the text of the oath read out by the clerk does not survive (77).

beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of things sacred and profane and I shall not hand the fatherland on lessened, but greater and better as far as I am able and with all. And I shall be obedient to whoever exercise power reasonably on any occasion and to the laws currently in force and any reasonably put into force in the future. If anyone destroys these, I shall not give them allegiance both as far as in my own power and in union with all. I shall honour the ancestral religion Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Herakles, and the boundaries of the fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees (Trans. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 88, lines 5-20).<sup>123</sup>

The oath claims to be “ancestral (πάτριος),” but how old in fact was it? There are several reasons for thinking that it antedates the fourth century. Scholars have drawn attention to the archaic nature of the vocabulary and the content of the oath. The literary versions of the oath as preserved in Pollux (8.105-6) and Stobaeus (43.48) show that these authors have modified the archaisms present in the epigraphic text so that the oath would be better comprehended by their readers.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, the presence of functional divinities of military prowess (Enyo, Enyalios) and fertility (Thallo, Auxo) whose cults were obscure in the Classical period and the appeal to the “boundaries of the fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees” as witnesses of the oath suggest an early origin.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, scholars have claimed that faint echoes of the oath can be found in

<sup>123</sup> ὅρκος ἐφήβων πάτριος, ὃν ὁμνύναι δεῖ τοὺς ἐφήβους· οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὄπλα οὐδὲ λείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἂν στειγῆσω· ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων, καὶ ὁκ ἐλάττω παραδῶσω τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω κατὰ τε ἑμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ πάντων, καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων ἐμφρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσμῶν τῶν ἱδρυμένων καὶ οὓς ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἱδρῦσονται ἐμφρόνως· ἐὰν δὲ τις ἀναιρεῖ, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω κατὰ τε ἑμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ πάντων, καὶ τιμήσω ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια· ἱστορες θεοὶ Ἀγλαυρος, Ἑστία, Ἐνυώ, Ἐνυάλιος, Ἄρης καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀρεία, Ζεὺς, Θαλλώ, Αὐξώ, Ἥγεμόνη, Ἡρακλῆς, ὅροι τῆς πατρίδος, πυροί, κριθαί, ἄμπελοι, ἐλᾶαι, συκαί.

<sup>124</sup> Siewert 1977, 109. Pollux and Stobaeus, for instance, modify τῶν ἀεὶ κραινόντων in the inscription (lines 11-12) to τῶν ἀεὶ κρινόντων. For an analysis of the various modifications made to the text, see Robert 1938, 303-5; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 445-6. Marcellus 1994 argues that not only does the oath antedate Chaeronea (44-8) but also that “the wording of the oath which survives dates from the creation of the ephebeia in 335” (162-3). This is odd, because the text of the oath found at Archarnae is dated to the middle of the fourth century. He (44) cites Siewert 1977, 104, that the inscription dates from the 330’s, but Siewert makes no such claim.

<sup>125</sup> Siewert 1977, 109; Robert 1938, 305-6; Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 446. For a discussion of the deities and witnesses on the Archarnae stele, see Merklebach 1972, 281-3. Stobaeus omits the deities and other witnesses, while Pollux mentions some of the deities (Ἀγλαυρος, Ἐνυάλιος, Ἄρης, Ζεὺς, Θαλλώ, Αὐξώ, Ἥγεμόνη), but omits the inanimate witnesses (ὅροι τῆς πατρίδος, πυροί, κριθαί, ἄμπελοι,



fifth-century literature, which suggest that the wording was familiar to their audiences.<sup>126</sup> Though Marcellus prudently points out the difficulties of this approach in examining these claims,<sup>127</sup> there are nevertheless some examples that do seem to echo the oath, with Thucydides 1.144.4 the most convincing.<sup>128</sup> Finally, two vase paintings dated to the early fifth century apparently show a young man of ephebic age taking the oath at the Aglaurion.<sup>129</sup>

The evidence taken together suggests a fifth-century or earlier origin for the ephebic oath, though there is no consensus over the date.<sup>130</sup> The advocates for an early

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ἐλᾶαι, σὺκαῖ). The connection between agricultural production and hoplite fighting is consistent with the sporadic pitched battles which took place on borderland disputed by neighboring *poleis* in the Archaic period rather than the continuous fighting of the fourth century (see Thuc. 1.15.2). For a summary of warfare before the fifth century, see Hanson 2000, 202-6.

<sup>126</sup> See Pélékidis 1962, 24, on Ar. *Neph.* 1220; *Aves.* 1451; Siewert 1977, 104-7, on Thuc. 1.144; 2.37.3; Soph. *Ant.* 663-71; Aesch. *Pers.* 956-62; Loraux 1986, 201 and 423, n. 178, on Thuc. 2.37.3; 202, on Lys. 13.63; 305, on Ar. *Pax.* 596-8.

<sup>127</sup> Marcellus 1994, 44: “We should be aware, however, that the similarities between the Siewert passages and the ephebic oath may not, in fact, stem from direct reference or borrowing, but may instead reflect a parent ideology common to both, without any direct relationship between the two.”

<sup>128</sup> Thucydides makes Pericles say: “we must not fall short of [our predecessors’] example, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way and endeavor to hand down our empire to posterity” (1.144.4). As Siewert 1977, 104, points out, Thucydides’ use of ἀμύνεσθαι ... μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι does resemble the wording of the oath: ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων, καὶ ὃκ ἐλάττω παραδώσω τὴν πατρίδα (lines 8-10). It is likely, then, that Thucydides was thinking of the oath and his audience would have recognized it as such. Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 449, cautiously accept this and other examples. But also see Marcellus 1994, 44-5.

<sup>129</sup> See Conze 1868, 264-8, pls. H and I. The value of Plutarch’s statement that Alcibiades advised the Athenians “to make secure by deed the oath regularly put in the temple of Aglauros to the *epheboi* (τὸν ἐν Ἀγρᾶλίου προβαλλόμενον αἰεὶ τοῖς ἐφήβοις ὄρκον ἔργῳ βεβαιοῦν)” is difficult to determine (*Alc.* 15.7-8; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 3.15), since the wording of the oath and the use of *epheboi* may be anachronistic and not reliable evidence for a fifth-century oath. Pélékidis 1962, 72, 76, was hesitant to see such a late source as decisive. But Lofberg 1925, 332, makes the important point that Plutarch’s sources must have given him a reason to mention the oath. Siewert 1977, 108, n. 32, plausibly suggests that Plutarch’s source was “Theopompus’ excursus on Athenian demagogues in his *Philippica*.” He notes that Theopompus mentions the oath of Plataea (*FGrHist* 115, F 153), which is associated with the ephebic oath on the Archarnae stele (lines 21-51) and in Lycurgus (*Leoc.* 80-1). Russell 1995, 203-4, takes Plut. *Alc.* 15.7-8 as an *apologia* for Alcibiades against his critics and dates it to his lifetime or the fourth century.

<sup>130</sup> Robertson 1976, 21, dates the creation of the ephebic oath and the ephebeia to the 360’s. But Rhodes and Osborne 2003, 447-8, argue more convincingly that the oath was archaic in origin (for the evidence, see Siewert 1977) while the stele of the oath at Archarnae was erected to encourage resistance against Philip II. Robert 1938, 306, estimates “plus antique que le iv<sup>e</sup> siècle.” Mathieu 1937, 313, suggests a date between the reforms of Cleisthenes and Ephialtes/Pericles (i.e. 510-455). Siewert 1977, 111, proposes an earlier date “within the 100 or 120 years between the introduction of hoplite warfare ... and the definite ascendancy of Peisistratus.” Roussel 1921, 459, also argues that the oath dates from the Archaic period.

ephebeia adduce this as proof that the institution existed before Chaeronea.<sup>131</sup> This is not conclusive, however, because the oath could have been administered before the creation of the ephebeia.<sup>132</sup> Even if we accept that newly enrolled Athenians swore a citizenship oath in the fifth century, we cannot be certain that they were in fact called *epheboi*, since the noun *ephebos* is not attested before the fourth century. Nor can we be sure whether the Athenians called their citizenship oath ὁ ὄρκος ἐφήβων. The lack of evidence for *ephebos* in the fifth century suggests that it was a neologism created by the Athenians when they adopted the system of conscription by *eponumoi* c. 386-66. The noun was perhaps derived from either ἐπὶ διετές ἡβῆσαι or ἐφηβάω (more likely); both terms were already associated with civic majority and hence the military obligations the new citizens were required to fulfill.<sup>133</sup> This would mean that, though the citizenship oath existed in the fifth century, it was known as “the oath of the ephebes” only in the following century. It is also likely that the Athenians used *ephebos* from the very beginning with two different meanings depending upon context: i.e. one pertaining to the attainment of citizenship, which involved passing the *dokimasia* and swearing the oath, and the other referring to an Athenian citizen who is liable for military conscription.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>131</sup> E.g. Girard 1892, 622; Roussel 1921, 459; Lofberg 1925, 332-3; Bonner 1933, 90; Reinmuth 1952, 40-2; Pélékidis 1962, 75-7; Roscam 1969, 201-4; Ridley 1979, 532; Rhodes 1981, 494; Ober 1985a, 91, n. 14; Faraguna 1992, 274.

<sup>132</sup> Brenot 1920, 29; Forbes 1929, 123; Siewert 1977, 102.

<sup>133</sup> Sinclair 1988, 54-5, clarifies this relationship between citizenship and military obligation: “of all the citizen’s responsibilities the military was in many ways paramount. Traditionally, the ability to arm oneself as a hoplite and to defend the polis – that is, the physical ability and financial ability – in a sense constituted the fully qualified citizen.” See also Manville 1990, 9-10; Hansen 1991, 99-100.

<sup>134</sup> Previous studies are thus wrong in assuming that *ephebos* was limited to *one* meaning before 334/3. Marcellus 1994, 47, for instance, argues that “although cognates of the word *ephebos* can be found in various places with a range of meanings, the word only occurs in pre-Lycurgan Athenian sources in the limited context of citizen initiation: either enrollment in the register or taking the oath itself.” He thus explains Aeschines’ use of *sunepheboi* as those Athenians who swore the ephebic oath together when they became citizens. It is odd, however, that he cites Photius’ *Lexicon* as evidence for his theory (s.v. Συνέφηβος: ὁ μετὰ τινος τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν ἐφηβεύσας), but omits [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 53, whose context is clear and connection with Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus* can be demonstrated. He also contends that ἐφηβεύω means “to be in the act of becoming a citizen” and cites Aesch. *Sept.* 665 as evidence, though ἐφηβῆσεντα is formed from ἐφηβάω and not ἐφηβεύω.

#### (d) *Epheboi* as a Military Class

If we are correct in asserting that *epheboi* in pre-Lycurgan Athens referred to the attainment of citizenship and the first age class to be conscripted by *eponumoi*, we are left to consider the nature of their military responsibilities. The best evidence for this is found in Aeschines' *On The Embassy* (2.167-70). In his defense of his military record the orator distinguishes between the kind of military service he undertook as a youth and as an older citizen. Having mentioned his two-year stint as a *peripolos* he then says that he took part in his first campaign (*strateia*) to Phlius in 366, followed by campaigns in Euboea (*tas eis Euboian strateias*) (2.168-9). The implication is that when he was a youth he was ineligible to be conscripted for *strateia* – a military campaign conducted beyond the borders of Attica.<sup>135</sup> A century later Teles the Cynic in his *On the Comparison of Wealth and Poverty*, contrasting the unfortunate lot of the Athenian citizen at the different stages of his life, makes the same observation:

And when he is a child he desires to become an *ephebos*, but when he has become an *ephebos* he once more seeks to put away his chlamys, but when he becomes a man he hastens once again to old age. “But now,” he says, “life is unlivable – the campaign, the liturgy, the political affairs – there is no spare time.” He has become an old man (fr. 42 Hense).<sup>136</sup>

For Teles *strateia* is one of the responsibilities an Athenian acquires once he has taken off his chlamys (i.e. ceased to be an *ephebos*) and has attained manhood (*andreia*). Daly points out that “as the agent-noun to be associated with στρατεία is στρατιώτης, this passage would seem to imply that the soldier (στρατιώτης) must be distinct from the ephebe.”<sup>137</sup> Teles, in other words, saw *strateia* as the duty of the *aner*, not the *ephebos*.

Aeschines and Teles suggest that Athenian citizens under twenty had a special military status. While every Athenian citizen was obliged to defend his homeland against

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<sup>135</sup> Reinmuth 1952, 40.

<sup>136</sup> καὶ παῖς μὲν ὢν ἐπιθυμεῖ ἔφηβος γενέσθαι, ἔφηβος δὲ γενόμενος ζητεῖ πάλιν τὸ χλαμύδιον ἀποθέσθαι, ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρωθῇ πάλιν εἰς τὸ γῆρας σπεύδει. νῦν δέ, φησὶν, ἀβίωτος ὁ βίος, στρατεία, λειτουργία, πολιτικὰ πράγματα, σχολάσαι [αὐτῶ] οὐκ ἔστι. πρεσβύτης γέγονε. I thank Kevin Daly for referring me to this passage.

<sup>137</sup> Daly 2001, 338.

all threats, the youngest (and oldest) citizens were exceptional in that their military service was usually restricted to Athenian soil, perhaps on account of their inferior physical strength (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.7). The *Athenaion Politeia*'s description of the ephebes' garrison duties in a "typical year" of the ephebeia implies that their military duties were confined to Attica (42.3-5).<sup>138</sup> Late sources too suggest that Athenian citizens under twenty did not normally campaign abroad.<sup>139</sup> Consistent with this is Diodorus' comment that the Athenians sent out a full levy in 369, just three years after Aeschines' *peripoleia*, which included "even the young (καὶ τοὺς νέους)", in this case the youngest citizens, under Iphicrates to help the Spartans (D.S. 15.63.2).<sup>140</sup> Hansen points out that "the adverbial καὶ shows that it was an extraordinary measure and that the *neoi* were not ordinarily sent out."<sup>141</sup>

The youngest citizens must have had the same role in the fifth century, because Thucydides says that on the eve of the first invasion of the Peloponnesians in 431 the duty of the *neotatoi* and *presbutatoi* is to garrison the fortified areas of Attica (2.13.6-7). He then contrasts these citizens with the main field army of thirteen thousand hoplites, consisting of those citizens aged between the *neotatoi* and *presbutatoi*, which is free to campaign elsewhere in Greece. Thucydides also implies that this division of the Athenian army into three age classes existed as early as the First Peloponnesian War, since he uses both terms in his description of Myronides' campaign against the Corinthians in 458 (1.105.4-6; cf. Lys. 13.4-7).<sup>142</sup> Like the campaign in 369 the Athenians used the *neotatoi*

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Forbes 1929, 120. For the epigraphic evidence concerning the ephebes' garrison duties in Attica, see pp. 81-2. The terminology of the ephebic inscriptions should also be noted: they always call ephebes *epheboi* (on two inscriptions they are called *neaniskoi*, to avoid repeating *epheboi* – E1, lines 15-6; E8, Col. I, lines 5-6), never *stratiotai* or any other such term, because the latter unlike the former are liable for *strateia*.

<sup>139</sup> Schol. on Aeschin. 1.18; Schol. on Aeschin. 2.168; Schol. on Aeschin. 3.122; Suda s.v. Τερθρεία.

<sup>140</sup> ὁ γὰρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος, μεγάλῳψυχος ὢν καὶ φιλόφρων, τὴν μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων ἰσχὺν οὐ κατεπλάγησαν, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν πανδημί. καὶ παραχρῆμα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς νέους αὐθημερόν, ὄντας μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίου.

<sup>141</sup> Hansen 1985, 41, suggests that Diodorus' use of καὶ marks out τοὺς νέους as "the youngest citizens" (cf. D.S. 18.46.3-7) rather than the more common meaning of "those of military age" found elsewhere in the author.

<sup>142</sup> οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἱ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρά Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσορροποῦ πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ

and *presbutatoi* because they were compelled to: the main field army was fully engaged simultaneously in Aegina and Egypt (Thuc. 1.105.3). While Thucydides and Diodorus do not specify the ages of the *neotatoi* and *neoi* respectively, in both instances they were probably eighteen and nineteen years old, just as in the *Athenaion Politeia*.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the variations in the terminology used to identify the youngest citizens – *epheboi*, *neoi*, and *neotatoi* – the *Athenaion Politeia*, Diodorus Siculus and Thucydides thus describe the same military system in which the youngest citizens constitute a special military class whose primary function is to garrison the countryside. Though these youths as a group were usually not obliged to undertake military service beyond the borders of Attica, it is possible that individuals could have volunteered for *strateia* if they wished to.<sup>144</sup> With the exception of Pélékidis,<sup>145</sup> both the advocates for an early ephebeia and their opponents agree that the *epheboi* in the *Athenaion Politeia* and the *neotatoi* in Thucydides refer to the same group of citizens who are required to perform the same duties. The former stress this continuity and hold this as proof that the institution existed before Chaeronea.<sup>146</sup> But the latter rightly point out that the existence of the youngest

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ἐκότεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον) ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

<sup>143</sup> See Gomme 1927, 142-150; Jones 1957, 161-80; Hansen 1981, 19-32; van Wees 2004, 241-3. While scholars agree on the ages of the *neotatoi*, the age of the *presbutatoi* is disputed. Jones and van Wees suggest forty as the age at which Athenians were not normally conscripted for service outside of Attica, while Hansen and Gomme maintain that the *presbutatoi* began at fifty years old. Both views have textual support and the issue remains unresolved (cf. Lyc. *Leoc.* 39; D.S. 13.72.4; 18.10.12; Aeschin. 2.133; Dem. 3.4).

<sup>144</sup> Westlake 1954, 90-94, suggests that citizens under twenty could have volunteered for overseas expeditions. His evidence is Aristophanes' *Birds*, lines 1360-71, in which Peithetairus arms a father-beater as a hoplite and then persuades him to serve outside of Attica. Westlake takes the father-beater as a youth because he could not find evidence for voluntary enlistment *ek katalogou*. Andrewes 1981, 2, however, cites Plutarch as proof of citizen volunteers (*Per.* 18.2) and disputes Westlake's identification. But this passage and others (e.g. Lys. 9.15; Diod. 11.84.4) do not exclude the possibility that Athenian youths volunteered for service abroad.

<sup>145</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 47-9, was hesitant to make this identification because Thucydides uses *neotatoi* (and *neoterōi*) elsewhere, especially for the Spartan army (4.125.3, 5.50.3, 5.64.3, 5.75.1). In doing so he misunderstands the differences between Spartan and Athenian military organization. While the Athenians in Thucydides' time recognized three broad age categories for citizens – the youngest, oldest, and those in between – they were not organized into specific age classes like the Spartans (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.32, 4.5.16, 5.4.39, 6.4.17). Pélékidis thus fails to understand that Thucydides uses *neotatoi* in this sense when referring to the youngest hoplites in Brasidas' army (4.125.3). On Spartan military organization, see Anderson 1970, 225-51; Lazenby 1985.

<sup>146</sup> Dumont 1876, 4; Girard 1892, 622; Lofberg 1925, 330; Reinmuth 1952, 36-9; Roscam 1969, 207-10; Ridley 1979, 533; Munn 1993, 189; Burckhardt 1996, 32.

citizens as a special military class is not in itself proof for a formal ephebic institution or a mass training program.<sup>147</sup> There is no reason to think that the *neotatoi* in the fifth century were members of a separate institution any more than the *presbutatoi*, who had identical military obligations.

There remains to consider how we are to account for the *Athenaion Politeia*'s technical use of *epheboi* for the first two *helikiai* in the author's description of the ephebeia (42.2-5), while the same term is limited to the first *helikia* in his account of conscription by *eponumoi* (53.4-7). It is clear that the *Athenaion Politeia* was not the first to use *epheboi* for a special military class, since Aeschines uses *sunepheboi* in the *On The Embassy* to refer to those citizens under twenty who were ineligible for *strateia* (2.167). This suggests that *epheboi* had this technical meaning at the latest by the mid 340's. This date can be pushed back another decade if we consider Xenophon's fictional Persian *epheboi* in the *Cyropaedeia* (c. 355). Though these *epheboi* begin their military service at a different age and serve for ten years (1.2.4-13), Xenophon nevertheless defines them as members of a distinct military class, irrespective of age, until they join the ranks of the mature men (1.2.15). Xenophon's use of *epheboi*, then, is consistent with Aeschines and the *Athenaion Politeia*.

Rhodes suggests that "it was an ancient practice to give the title ἔφηβος to young citizens in their first two years after the δοκιμασία."<sup>148</sup> But it is unlikely that *ephebos* was used for this military category before the adoption of conscription by *eponumoi* c. 386-66. So long as the Athenians were conscripted *ek katalogou*, citizens under twenty were distinguished as a *group* from their older compatriots. But the abandonment of this system prompted the Athenians to use a term to differentiate between the first two age-

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<sup>147</sup> Bryant 1907, 79, n. 6; Forbes 1929, 120-1; Marcellus 1994, 38. But Brenot 1920, 9, and Forbes 1929, 121, are unconvincing when they argue that the difference in the armament of the *neotatoi* in Thucydides and the *epheboi* in the *Athenaion Politeia* is decisive evidence against a fifth-century ephebeia (see Lofberg 1925, 331; Roscam 1969, 208). Hansen 1981, 19-24, suggests that the *neotatoi* and *presbutatoi* in Thuc. 2.13.6-7 should be taken as referring to all Athenian citizens 18-19 and 50-59 (i.e. from all census classes) who were equipped as hoplites and light troops, rather than just as hoplites (*contra* van Wees 2004, 242).

<sup>148</sup> Rhodes 1981, 495.

classes in their new conscription system.<sup>149</sup> If the Athenians were conscripted by *eponumoi* c. 372 and Aeschines was not anachronistic in referring to his fellow *epheboi* as a military class at this time, *epheboi* probably acquired both of these technical meanings in the late 370's. We do not know what term *epheboi* replaced, but citizens under twenty were probably still called *neotatoi*, just as in the fifth century (Thuc. 1.105.4-6; 2.13.6-7). If so, the Athenians chose to use *epheboi* instead of *neotatoi* so as to avoid using two terms for the same group of citizens and because, after the adoption of the new conscription system, *epheboi* for the youngest *helikia* already referred to citizens whose primary military obligation was to act as a homeguard. Given this, we should take the extension of *epheboi*'s meaning to the entire military class (i.e. the first two *helikiai* in [Arist.] *Ath.Pol.* 53) as a straightforward development.

If we accept the above, how do we explain the function of the *pinax ecclesiastikos*? Scholars argue that newly enrolled citizens could not enroll on this deme register and hence attend and/or address the *ecclesia* until they turned twenty (i.e. they gained their full civic rights), because they were required to complete their garrison duty and military training in the *ephebeia*, which lasted two years.<sup>150</sup> The sources suggest, however, that citizens under twenty years old could attend the *ecclesia* if they wished to (Dem. 21.193), though it was “not the done thing” for them to speak.<sup>151</sup> But there is no

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<sup>149</sup> The Athenians probably would not have had a comprehensive list of all eighteen year olds before they were conscripted by *eponumoi*, since there was no central *katalogos* for the system *ek katalogou* (see p. 30, n. 115). Were there lists at a local level? Though we do not have any direct evidence for how the *strategoí* compiled their tribal *katalogoi* for a given campaign (Hansen 1985, 85), they must have been based upon the deme registers that the demarchs submitted either complete or in modified form of those demesmen eligible to serve (Whitehead 1986, 164; Bugh 1988, 55; Christ 2001, 401). While the *lexiarchicon grammateion* was apparently not arranged by age-classes to facilitate conscription (Whitehead 1986, 35, n. 130; *contra* van Effenterre 1976, 11, 15), it cannot be ruled out that the demarch was able to identify the youngest citizens on the register.

<sup>150</sup> Hansen 1987, 7; 1991, 89, 100; Faraguna 1992, 274-5; Robertson 2000, 149-50. The *pinax ecclesiasticos* is a deme register mentioned only in [Dem]. 44.35, who provides no details about its nature and purpose. The name of the register suggests that it had something to do with the *ecclesia*, and scholars assume that it allowed a citizen to attend or speak to it. Since [Demosthenes] criticizes Leochares for enrolling on the *pinax ecclesiasticos* before the *lexiarchicon grammateion* it is reasonable to conclude that it was “an improper reversal of the normal order of events” (Whitehead 1986, 104).

<sup>151</sup> Xenophon says that whenever Glaucon, “who was not yet twenty,” attempted to address the *ecclesia*, he was met with ridicule and laughter from his fellow citizens (*Mem.* 3.6.1). It is unclear, however, whether this reaction was due to his lack of knowledge on issues important to the *polis* (cf. 3.6.2-18) or to the mere fact that he was trying to speak. The latter is suggested by Mantitheus, who says that his attempt to speak

need to assume an ephebeia to explain the *pinax ecclesiastikos*. Instead, it is likely that citizens of ephebic age were denied the right to speak in the *ecclesia* because they were not eligible for *strateia* except under exceptional circumstances: it is only when they became *neoi* and bore the burden of overseas military service that this right was granted.<sup>152</sup>

To sum up, *ephebos* was used in three different technical senses in the Classical period. First, it referred to a new citizen who has just passed his *dokimasia* and then sworn the citizenship oath, which in the fourth century was called “the oath of the ephebes” and which bound him to his civic responsibilities when he became eligible for military service. Second, it was used for the first *helikia* or age-group liable for conscription by *eponumoi*. Third, it defined a military class, consisting of those citizens under twenty (i.e. the first two *helekiai*) whose main duty was to perform garrison duty in Attica. Aeschines used *sunepheboi* in his *On The Embassy* and *Against Timarchus* with all these meanings, none of which imply the existence of the ephebeia before Chaeronea.<sup>153</sup>

#### 1.4: Aeschines as *Peripolos*

Another argument for an early ephebeia is premised upon Aeschines’ statement in the *On The Embassy* that when he was an *ephebos* he was a “*peripolos* of this land for two years (περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης ἐγενόμην δύ’ ἔτη)” (167). Before we can examine the claims scholars have made concerning the role the youngest citizens played in garrisoning the fortresses of Attica, we should first determine what kind of activities Aeschines may have performed during his military service. Though he mentions no

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before the people created resentment against him because he was too young (see Roisman 2005, 24 on Lys. 16.20). For Glaucon, see Rhodes 1981, 494-5; Whitehead 1986, 104, n. 95 & 97.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Sinclair’s 1988, 31, comment on the link between political privilege and military service: “When he turned 30, more opportunities were available to him – the right to offer himself for election to the Boule (Council of 500) or to the various offices of state like the position of strategos (general) and the right to serve as a dikast or jurymen on the jury panels (dikasteria). In the intervening period he had the opportunity to gain political experience and knowledge within the limitation that the 20-29 age group was most liable to be called up for military service.”

<sup>153</sup> One may object that meanings two and three could have caused confusion for Aeschines’ audience, but Aeschines is careful to stress to the jurors what meaning of *ephebos* he is using (i.e. in the former speech he uses *sunephebos* for a military class, while in the latter he clearly uses it for the first *helikia*).



details, we can nevertheless reconstruct them from the literary and epigraphic evidence concerning *peripoloi* and *peripolarchoi* in Athens in the Classical period.<sup>154</sup>

The earliest mention of *peripoloi* in Athenian service occurs during the Peloponnesian War, when the *strategos* Demosthenes in 424 laid an ambush at the Eunalion in Megara with a contingent of “Plataean light-armed troops and the *peripoloi* in addition” (4.67.2).<sup>155</sup> A scholiast commenting on this passage defines *peripoloi* as follows: “*Peripoloi*: Some of the guards are called fixed, others *peripoloi*. The fixed are those who always invest and besiege, but the *peripoloi* are those who go around and patrol the forts in protecting them.”<sup>156</sup> This suggests that *peripoloi* are *phylakes* who garrison a fortress, patrol in its vicinity, and provide security for those living in the area.<sup>157</sup> They should therefore be taken as a mobile force of garrison troops with policing functions, rather than a police force in the modern sense.<sup>158</sup> The scholiast is right to associate *peripoloi* with garrison fortresses, since a fragment of the fifth-century comic Eupolis says that “and the *peripoloi* are to depart to the forts (fr. 341 Kock: καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀπιέν’ εἰς τὰ φρούρια).” Though the context of the fragment is unclear, Eupolis is probably referring to the deployment of *peripoloi* at the forts.<sup>159</sup> While scholars take τὰ φρούρια to mean border forts (cf. ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ ... παρ’ ἑπαλξιν in Thuc. 2.13.6), they mistakenly infer from this that *peripoloi* were exclusively border

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<sup>154</sup> The principal studies of *peripoloi* in Athens are Foucart 1889, 265-8; Griffith 1936, 86-8; Hommel 1937, Col. 852-6; Kent 1941, 348-9; Robert 1955, 283-92; Pélékidis 1962, 35-44; Cabanes 1991, 210-5; Daly 2001, 306-14.

<sup>155</sup> οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταιῆς τε φιλοὶ καὶ ἕτεροι περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἐνυάλιον. For ἕτεροι with the meaning of “in addition”, see Hornblower 1996, 234.

<sup>156</sup> περίπολοι: τῶν φυλάκων οἱ μὲν ἰδρυμένοι καλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ περίπολοι, ἰδρυμένοι μὲν οἱ ἀεὶ περικαθεζόμενοι καὶ πολιορκοῦντες, περίπολοι δὲ οἱ περιερχόμενοι καὶ περιπολοῦντες τὰ φρούρια ἐν τῷ φυλάττειν.

<sup>157</sup> Sekunda 1990, 153, wrongly claims that *phylakes* and *peripoloi* were two mutually exclusive groups. His evidence is Xenophon’s *Poroi* 4.52: οἳ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις οἳ τε πελτάζειν καὶ περιπολεῖν. He interprets the successive οἳ τε as contrastive (152), but Faraguna 1992, 277, n. 105, argues that they cannot be contrastive because there is no δέ, but inclusive, and must refer to the same group: i.e. citizens could be *phylakes* and *peripoloi* at the same time.

<sup>158</sup> Before *peripoloi* and *peripolarchoi* were recognized as garrison troops, they were considered to be rural police (Foucart 1889, 266) and police inspectors (Kent 1941, 348) respectively.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Thucydides’ comment that the Syracusans “also brought their garrisons into the patrol-forts in the countryside (6.45.2: καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμεζον).” Also see his use of *peripolion* for Locris (3.99) and Syracuse (7.48.5).

guards, perhaps because the epigraphic evidence in the Lycurgan period shows that the ephebes were stationed on the frontier of Attica in their second year.<sup>160</sup>

The evidence provided by Thucydides and Xenophon, however, suggests that *peripoloi* were also deployed at fortified points within the Athens-Piraeus circuit. Thucydides says that one of the officers who arrested Alexicles in 411 was “a certain Hermon, *archon* of those *peripoloi* stationed at Munychia” (8.92.5).<sup>161</sup> Munychia, whose strategic importance for controlling Piraeus and Athens was recognized from Hippias onwards on account of its defensive qualities, was an ideal place for a garrison and for patrolling the immediate hinterland of the city.<sup>162</sup> Xenophon implies that this deployment was in no way exceptional in his *Poroi*, where he presents a hypothetical scenario in which an enemy force from Thebes or Megara invades the silver mines at Laurium. He says: “So if they [i.e. the invaders] march from some point to the silver mines, it will be necessary to go past the city: and if they are few, it is likely that they are destroyed both by the cavalry and the *peripoloi*” (4.47).<sup>163</sup> Xenophon makes it clear that the *peripoloi* are sallying out from Athens, not the border forts, to attack the enemy.<sup>164</sup>

Aeschines, then, could have been stationed in a border fort and/or in the Athens-Piraeus enceinte. Wherever he was deployed, he was under the command of officers he calls *archontes*. This is Bekker’s emendation: if the manuscript reading – *sunarchontes* – is accepted, then Aeschines may have been an officer himself. One of these *archontes* must have been the *peripolarchos*, an office attested in literature and epigraphically from the fifth century.<sup>165</sup> As the name suggests, the *peripolarchos* must have been a military

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<sup>160</sup> Ober 1985a, 90-5; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 107-8; Kent 1941, 348; Sekunda 1990, 153; Marcellus 1994, 38.

<sup>161</sup> Ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἑρμῶν τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνιχίᾳσι τεταγμένων ἀρχῶν.

<sup>162</sup> For Munychia from the Archaic period to the Macedonian occupation in the Hellenistic period, see McCredie 1966, 103-5; Rhodes 1981, 233-4, 455-8; Whitehead 1986, 402-3.

<sup>163</sup> ἦν οὖν πορεύωνται ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀργύρεια, παρίεναι αὐτοὺς δεήσει τὴν πόλιν· κἂν μὲν ὧσιν ὀλίγοι, εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ ἱππέων καὶ ὑπὸ περιπόλων.

<sup>164</sup> This is the implication of Munn’s 1993, 27, observation on *Poroi* 4.43-8 that “Xenophon regards the city itself as the primary base for troops to repel even small parties of the invading enemy.”

<sup>165</sup> For a list of *peripolarchoi*, see Kroll and Mitchel 1980, 88, n. 5.

officer in charge of the *peripoloi*.<sup>166</sup> Hermon, mentioned above, was almost certainly a *peripolarchos*, though Thucydides calls him an *archon*.<sup>167</sup> The *peripolarchos* was probably elected by the *demos* and his prominence on garrison inscriptions suggests that he was of high rank in the military hierarchy, perhaps immediately under the *strategos*.<sup>168</sup>

An honorary decree of the Eleusinians for the *peripolarchos* Smicythion, dated to the end of the fourth century, sheds light on the military responsibilities of the office: "... and he stationed himself and the soldiers (στρατιώτας) with him at Eleusis and acted according to the *strategoi* and the deme in order that sufficient protection might come to Eleusis and as many of the other things as were needed for the protection of Eleusis ...” (IG II<sup>2</sup> 1193, lines 4-10; cf. IG II<sup>2</sup> 204, lines 16-23).<sup>169</sup> Smicythion’s duty, then, was to ensure that he and his soldiers provided φυλακή ικανή for the inhabitants of Eleusis.<sup>170</sup> This is consistent with what we know about the duties of the *peripoloi*. The importance of this office suggests that Aeschines was under the command of a *peripolarchos* rather than

<sup>166</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 37; Kroll and Mitchel 1980, 88. Forbes 1929, 122, argues that all of Aeschines’ *archontes* were *peripolarchoi* and that this is proof that the ephebeia did not exist. But the *archontes* could have included the *strategos*, *taxiarchos*, and the *lochagos* (Brenot 1920, 17). The *peripoloi* in the ephebeia were probably also commanded by *peripolarchoi*, even though they do not appear on the ephebic inscriptions.

<sup>167</sup> A scholiast to Thuc. 8.92.2 defines a περιπόλαρχος as ὁ τῶν περιπόλων ἄρχων. Jordan 1970, 234, n. 16, plausibly identifies Hermon the *peripolarchos* in Thucydides with Hermon the *archon* on IG I<sup>2</sup> 304A, lines 9-10.

<sup>168</sup> See Reinmuth 1952, 39; Pélékidis 1962, 37-8. For the election of the *peripolarchos* see Kent 1941, 349, on IG II<sup>2</sup> 1260, lines 10-11: περιπόλαρχ[ος χειροτονηθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ] δήμου. This restoration is plausible because a parallel phrase occurs for the *strategos* in lines 14-5. If so, we do not know how many *peripolarchoi* were elected: they are not mentioned in [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 61. See Rhodes 1981, 676-88, on this passage. This would explain why all known *peripolarchoi* are Athenian citizens (Kroll and Mitchel 1980, 86-96). Given that the *Athenaion Politeia* says that the tribal *taxiarchoi* chose the *lochagoi* for their *taxis* or “regiment” (61.3), it is likely that the *peripolarchoi* outranked the *lochagoi*, as Pélékidis suggests. The *peripolarchos* is honored or mentioned alongside the *strategos* in several fourth-century inscriptions from Eleusis, Rhamnous, and Sounion: IG II<sup>2</sup> 204 (352/1), lines 19-21; SEG 41.150 (338/7), lines 1-2; SEG 41.148 (ca. 338/7), lines 1-2; IG II<sup>2</sup> 2973 (336/5), lines 1-2; SEG 38.175 (330’s?), lines 1-2; IG II<sup>2</sup> 2968 (ca. 324/3), lines 2-3; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1260 (ca. 307-304), lines 1-2; IG II<sup>2</sup> 1193 (ca. 300), lines 2-8. This suggests a relatively high rank for the *peripolarchos*, perhaps second in command of the fort he was assigned to.

<sup>169</sup> καὶ αὐτός τε αὐτὸν ἔταξεν Ἐλευσῖνάδε καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἔπραττεν πρὸς τε τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν δη[μ]ον ὅπως φυλακή ικανή ἔλθοι Ἐλευ[σί]νάδε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσων ἐδεῖτο [εἰς φ]υλακὴν Ἐλευσίνος.

<sup>170</sup> Smicythion may not have been alone, since IG II<sup>2</sup> 204 and 2973 attest to the existence of multiple *peripolarchoi* in service at Eleusis. Given that Eleusis was the most important fortified circuit outside of Athens (Munn 1993, 7), the Athenians may have needed several groups of *peripoloi* to ensure that the Thriasian plain was properly patrolled. See also Griffith 1935, 88.

one himself, probably on account of his youth and inexperience, even if he was an *archon*.<sup>171</sup>

The evidence suggests that from at least as early as the beginning of the Archidamian War (431-21) *peripoloi* served as garrison troops and that the nature of their military duties – manning the fortresses and patrolling the countryside – remained unchanged throughout the Classical period. There is no reason to think that Aeschines' military service as a περίπολος τῆς χώρας ταύτης was any different.<sup>172</sup> The advocates for an early ephebeia associate Aeschines' garrison duty with the *Athenaion Politeia*, which says that the *epheboi* in their second year of service, having demonstrated their skill in the art of war to the *demos*, “patrol the land and pass time in the fortresses (42.4: περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις).” They also take Aeschines' mention of δύ' ἔτη as proof that he is referring to his two years of mandatory military service because the ephebes in the Lycurgan period were required to complete a two-year term of duty in the garrisons before they were allowed to join the rest of the citizen body ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5: φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη ... διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δουῖν ἐτῶν).

These parallels have convinced scholars that Aeschines must have undertaken his military service as a participant in a formal ephebic organization, which is distinct from the rest of the citizen body.<sup>173</sup> They argue that it must have been the same as the ephebes

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<sup>171</sup> Marcellus 1994, 36, states without argument that Aeschines was a *peripolarchos*. Mitchel 1961, 357, n. 13, and Sekunda 1992, 329, argue that Aeschines was an ephebic *taxiarchos* or *lochagos*. These offices, however, are only attested on ephebic inscriptions in the Lycurgan period. For a discussion of ephebic *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi*, see pp. 115-6.

<sup>172</sup> Brenot 1920, 17, and Forbes 1929, 119-20, argue that Aeschines served as a mercenary. They cite Foucart 1889, 264-6, as evidence, who does not make the claim. This interpretation is inconsistent with Aeschines' account of his military record (2.167-70). As Harris 1995, 29, points out, Aeschines' objective is to show that “he was a loyal citizen who had risked his life for his community and thus deserved their gratitude.” The orator thus emphasizes his bravery on the battlefield when he was called up to serve on overseas campaigns (*strateiai*) and notes carefully the honors and praise he received from his commanding officers for performing his duty in an exemplary manner. His aim is clearly to demonstrate that he had a distinguished and commendable record of military service as a citizen of Athens. If he was a mercenary, it would have undermined the purpose of his excursus, given the low esteem in which mercenaries were held (Lofberg 1922, 157; Reinmuth 1952, 36; Marcellus 1994, 37).

<sup>173</sup> Harpocration s.v. περίπολος was the first to compare Aeschines and the author of the *Athenaion Politeia*, with the assumption that both authors were referring to the same institution. Modern scholars who follow Harpocration are: Lofberg 1925, 333-4; Gomme 1933, 8, n. 3; Reinmuth 1952, 36-8; 1966, 798;

in the Lycurgan period, which consisted of garrison duty in the Piraeus in the first year, followed by garrison and patrol duty along the Boeotian frontier in the second year ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5).<sup>174</sup> Even their opponents concede that Aeschines' testimony does suggest that there were eighteen and nineteen year-old Athenians called *epheboi* who routinely patrolled the Attic countryside nearly forty years before the earliest attested ephebic inscription.<sup>175</sup> Scholars thus assume that every year hundreds of ephebes, just as in the Lycurgan ephebeia, were likewise obligated to garrison the border fortresses of Attica in times of peace and war.<sup>176</sup> As Christ puts it:

Aeschines suggests in his military autobiography that this [i.e. obligatory military service and training in the ephebeia] was the normal arrangement by the time he began his two years of service c. 372 B.C. with his fellow ephebes ... he treats his service as routine and does not seek special credit for it, as he does later in the same excursus for his exceptional role as one of the *epilektoi* at Tamynae.<sup>177</sup>

Christ assumes, as most advocates for an early ephebeia have done, that Aeschines' ephebic service was unremarkable because the institution at this time consisted of a two-year *peripoleia*.<sup>178</sup> But if Aeschines' military service was the "the normal arrangement,"

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1971, 126; Marrou 1956, 151; Pélékidis 1962, 40-42, 71; Ridley 1979, 532; Ober 1985a, 93; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 106; 1986b, 133; Winkler 1990, 29; Munn 1993, 188; Christ 2001, 416.

<sup>174</sup> Reinmuth 1952, 36-9; Ober 1985a, 90-6; Sekunda 1990, 151-3.

<sup>175</sup> Bryant 1907, 79; Forbes 1929, 122; Marcellus 1994, 39-40. *Contra* Brenot 1920, 15-9.

<sup>176</sup> Munn 1993, 188: "The realities of war [between Athens and Sparta in 378-5] on their own borders introduced them to this unpleasant necessity and prompted them to take thought as to how best to minimize reliance on mercenaries as they faced the continuing demands on manpower for the defense of Attica. The result was the concentration of the duties of citizen ephebes ... on garrison and patrol duty along the frontiers ... Now, under the press of the Boeotian War, their two years of mandatory service were focused on the defense of the countryside, as we learn from the example of Aeschines, who began his career in the 370's with two years of duty as an ephebe *peripolos* in the Attic countryside."

<sup>177</sup> Christ 2001, 416.

<sup>178</sup> Munn 1993, 188, n. 5, argues that Aeschines "provides evidence that patrol duties in the countryside, which by Aristotles' time were limited to the second year of ephebic service ... were performed during both years of ephebic duty in the 370's." Reinmuth 1952, 37-8, suggests that the ephebes in Aeschines and the *Athenaion Politeia* must have been *peripoloi* in both years of their garrison duty. Reinmuth's evidence is Pollux's statement that "for two years the ephebes were numbered among the *peripoloi* (δύο δὲ εἰς περιπόλους ἡριθμοῦντο) (8.105 s.v. περίπολοι)." Reinmuth assumes that Pollux is referring to the ephebeia in Aeschines' time as well as later. Pollux, however, does not mention Aeschines. Though one cannot place much confidence in Pollux's confused passage, Reinmuth is right to point out that ephebes served as *peripoloi* in both years of the ephebeia (see pp. 87-8).

why then did the orator stress to his audience that he served for two years? Surely there would have been no need to mention this to his audience if Athenian citizens routinely carried out their mandatory *peripoleia* in their first two years of citizenship. Furthermore, given that Aeschines is careful to show that his witnesses could substantiate his claim that he did indeed perform garrison duty for two years (2.167: καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν τοὺς συνεφήβους καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἡμῶν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι), the implication is that his audience would have regarded his length of service as atypical for citizens of his age.

Indeed, Harpocration found Aeschines' statement problematic and concluded that his use of witnesses proves that his ephebic service was exceptional.<sup>179</sup> Cabanes, following Harpocration, argues that the two-year length of Aeschines' *peripoleia* was unusual because he had extended his stint in the ephebeia for one more year.<sup>180</sup> This explanation is unconvincing, however, because (1) Aeschines would have been a *neos* during his third year, not an *ephebos*; yet he calls upon his fellow *epheboi* as witnesses, but not *neoi*. (2) There are no certain instances of ephebes extending their military service in the Lycurgan ephebeia.<sup>181</sup> (3) Aeschines, having become a *neos*, would have been eligible for *strateia* and there is no evidence that Athenian citizens ever claimed garrison duty as an exemption from overseas military service.<sup>182</sup>

Furthermore, while there is no reason to doubt Aeschines' assertion that he did in fact carry out military service before he became a *neos*, it could not have been continuous, because according to Demosthenes Aeschines worked as an undersecretary as soon as he had registered in his deme (18.261),<sup>183</sup> at the same time Aeschines said that he was serving as a *peripolos*. In the ephebeia, however, the ephebes were obligated to

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<sup>179</sup> Harpocration s.v. περίπολος: Αἰσχίνης ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς πρεσβείας. Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων λέγων φησὶν οὕτως τὸν δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης ἀποδεξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ περὶ τὰς τάξεις καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τοῦ δήμου περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. παρατηρητέον οὖν ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἓνα φησὶν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τοῖς περιπόλοις γίγνεσθαι τοὺς ἐφήβους, ὁ δὲ Αἰσχίνης δύο· καὶ τάχα διὰ τοῦτο ἐπεμνήσθη τοῦ πράγματος ὁ ῥήτωρ, καίπερ πάντων τῶν ἐφήβων ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιπολούντων, ὅτι αὐτὸς δύο ἔτη γέγονεν ἐν τοῖς περιπόλοις· διὸ καὶ μαρτυρῶν ἐδήλωσεν αὐτό.

<sup>180</sup> Cabanes 1991, 212. See also Foucart 1889, 264; Pélékidis 1962, 39; Daly 2001, 332-3.

<sup>181</sup> See p. 103, n. 20.

<sup>182</sup> For a summary of the exemptions citizens could claim when they were called up for service in the army, see Hansen 1985, 16-21; Christ 2001, 404-7.

<sup>183</sup> See Harris 1995, 29-30.

perform military service all year round. To ensure that they had no excuse for absence from their duties (ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ᾗ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι), they were excluded from participating in civic life except in cases involving an inheritance, an heiress, or an hereditary priesthood ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5). Nor is Aeschines unique. Bryant has provided numerous examples of other young Athenians under twenty in the Classical period who engage in civic life when they should have been undertaking their military service, if, that is, the ephebeia existed.<sup>184</sup> The example of Glaucon in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is the most telling, because not only is he under twenty *and* trying to realize his political ambitions by speaking in the *ecclesia* (3.6.1), but he has also never visited the border garrisons and has no understanding of their purpose (3.6.10-11). This would not have been possible if Glaucon had served in the ephebeia as the *Athenaion Politeia* describes it. Pélékidis and Girard dismiss Glaucon as an exception,<sup>185</sup> but all the examples Bryant and others have cited cannot have been exceptions if the ephebeia had existed before Chaeronea.<sup>186</sup>

Reinmuth, reconciling this evidence with his belief in an early ephebeia, argues that the ephebes “were doubtless free to follow their own pursuits even as the older citizens during part of the year not occupied by military duties” before Lycurgus’ reform made their service continuous. While Aeschines was obliged to perform military service, it was intermittent or seasonal in nature.<sup>187</sup> But Reinmuth does not explain how such a system could have worked successfully *in practice*: if ephebes were free to pursue their own interests, how could the Athenians have mustered enough of them at any one time to ensure that the permanent border garrisons remained well-manned all year round to protect the countryside of Attica?<sup>188</sup> Indeed, the discontinuous nature of Aeschines’

<sup>184</sup> Bryant 1907, 81-4. Cf. Brenot 1920, 23-4; Forbes 1929, 118, 122-3; Marcellus 1994, 28-9.

<sup>185</sup> Girard 1892, 79; Pélékidis 1962, 22. Golden, 1979, 29, n. 21, suggests that all of Bryant’s examples might have served in the cavalry instead.

<sup>186</sup> See Bryant 1907, 84.

<sup>187</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 126, 129; cf. 1952, 36-7. See also Marcellus 1994, 40; Burckhardt 1996, 32; van Wees 2004, 94.

<sup>188</sup> Permanent garrisons are first attested during the Peloponnesian war, since Thucydides says that the Athenians had garrisoned the *phrouria* before the first Spartan invasion of Attica in 431 and then deployed and maintained the *phylakai* by land and sea throughout the war (Thuc. 2.13.6; 2.24.1; cf. Lys. 12.40; 14.35). For the fifth-century border defense system, see Winter 1971, 13-14; Garlan 1974, 78-9; Munn

military service should cast doubt on the assumption made by scholars that he was obliged to serve a single two-year term. But if we acknowledge that there was no such requirement, we should instead admit the possibility that he was called out at least twice over a two-year period.

Also, Aeschines could not have received *trophe* during his military service, because Xenophon explicitly says in the *Poroi* that it was not given for garrison duty, at least during the 350's (4.52). This is in contrast to the ephebeia, where the Athenians allocated a daily *trophe* to the ephebes, dispensed by the *sophronistes* ([Arist].*Ath.Pol.* 42.3). The Athenians did this because they recognized that state-funded maintenance was necessary since the majority of citizens worked out of necessity and did not possess sufficient wealth to maintain themselves throughout the two years of their military service.<sup>189</sup> Given that Aeschines' modest means forced him to work for a living, the amount of time he could afford to spend on garrison duty must have been limited.<sup>190</sup>

Furthermore, if there was an ephebeia in Aeschines' time, as the proponents of a pre-Lycurgan ephebeia claim, this institution could not have existed without ephebic officials. At the minimum these officials would have been required to organize the ephebes and to liaise between them and the regular Athenian military officers. Reinmuth does identify the *kosmetes* restored on the Mitsos inscription (= **E1**) with one of the *archontes* Aeschines invokes as witnesses for his *peripoleia*. But this is unconvincing, since **E1**, as we have seen, dates to 333/2, not 361/0.<sup>191</sup> Since Aeschines provides no additional information on these *archontes*, Reinmuth has no case for interpreting them as ephebic officials and hence no positive evidence for an ephebic organization. Apart from this, there is no evidence for ephebic *kosmetai* or *sophronistai* or their equivalent before

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1993, 7-11; Hanson 1998, 89-91. Ober 1985a, 193-5, denies the existence of this system at this time, but Daly 2001, 4-17, shows that this belief is without foundation. Xenophon attests to the existence of permanent rural garrisons in the fourth century when he makes Socrates ask Glaucon how many of the *phrouroi* are well placed and how many are redundant (*Mem.* 3.6.10). The epigraphic evidence suggests that perhaps 450-650 ephebes served annually in the Lycurgan period (see pp. 99-101).

<sup>189</sup> See Roisman 2005, 125-7, on [Dem]. 50.12-16, where Apollodorus discusses the reasons why his rowers, who must have included poor Athenian citizens, deserted his ship out of necessity because they received inadequate pay.

<sup>190</sup> On Aeschines' family and his lack of wealth when he was an ephebe, see Harris 1995, 21-33.

<sup>191</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 127-133. He assumes that the ephebeia was under the *kosmetes* c. 372 while the tribal *sophronistai* were introduced in the Lycurgan period for the ephebes' moral education.



the first securely dated enrollment class (334/3).<sup>192</sup> With the exception of those scholars who accept the early date for **E1**, the advocates for an early ephebeia admit that it was Epicrates' legislation which created these offices as part of the institution's reorganization after Chaeronea.<sup>193</sup> But these scholars cannot explain how it could have functioned c. 372 if there were no ephebic officials.<sup>194</sup>

The evidence taken together suggests that Aeschines' testimony should not be regarded as proof of a formal ephebic institution. Not only were his stints of garrison duty not of long duration but he must have also served under regular military officers, just like his older compatriots. We find additional support for this interpretation in Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia* and Plato's *Laws*, both written in the 350's. These authors propose educational systems in which youths are obligated to perform garrison duty. Three positions have been taken on these works and their relevance to an early date for the ephebeia: (1) They are proof that an ephebeia existed because the authors adapted details of the institution to suit their own proposals.<sup>195</sup> (2) They prove that the ephebeia did not exist at the time of composition.<sup>196</sup> (3) They are irrelevant because their proposals are

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<sup>192</sup> See Wilamowitz 1893, 191-2; Brenot 1920, 28-9; Forbes 1929, 115-21. Aristotle in the *Politics* does not include the *kosmetes* and the *sophronistai* in his list of magistrates concerned with instilling good order (*eukosmia*) nor does he mention any equivalent for these offices, though he considers his list fairly comprehensive (6.5.13, 1323a). The date of the *Politics* is uncertain, but the work was probably composed sometime between 348 and 322 (see Weil 1960, 182-210). Given the omission of the ephebic offices, this passage must have a *terminus ante quem* of 334/3.

<sup>193</sup> Gomme 1933, 8, n. 3; Reinmuth 1952, 39, 46 (before the publication of **E1**); Mitchel 1975, 233.

<sup>194</sup> Fisher 2001, 65-6, asserts that the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai* were among the new offices created when the ephebeia was reformed in 335/4, but says nothing about this aspect of the institution prior to this date. Burckhardt 1996, 32-3, gets into similar difficulties when he says that "war die Institution in der lykurgischen Zeit straffer organisiert," but is unable to demonstrate how the ephebeia in Aeschines' time was organized without ephebic officials: i.e. he assumes an organization which is similar to the ephebeia. Foucart 1889, 266, assumes rather than shows that the ephebic *peripoloi* in Aeschines' time were commanded by *sophronistai* rather than *peripolarchoi*. Some scholars argue that the latter ran the institution (Reinmuth 1952, 38-9; Pélékidis 1962, 37-8; Ober 1985a, 93). While there is no reason to doubt that *peripolarchoi* were included among Aeschines' *archontes*, they were military officers, whose task was to lead *peripoloi* that the *strategos* had assigned to them, not ephebic officials. But to speculate whether the ephebes were distributed among the ranks of the *peripoloi* or served in separate units begs the question (Kent 1941, 348-9; Reinmuth 1952, 38), because this presupposes the existence of officials who have *already* organized the ephebes before they were allocated to the *peripolarchoi*, just as the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai* did in the ephebeia ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.3).

<sup>195</sup> Lofberg 1925, 332, n. 4; Pélékidis 1962, 19-33; Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 107, 232; Winkler 1990, 31-2.

<sup>196</sup> Bryant 1907, 84-5; Brenot 1920, 28; Forbes 1929, 114; Marcellus 1994, 32-3.

modeled on Spartan institutions.<sup>197</sup> The last position is untenable. While Xenophon and Plato are clearly inspired by the Spartan *agoge* and *krypteia*, it is nevertheless hard to understand why they would have not compared their ideas to or drawn upon elements of an Athenian institution which would have been familiar to their Athenian readers. Nor is it likely that these authors would have omitted an institution whose principles were in broad agreement with the ideas they were proposing.<sup>198</sup>

In the *Cyropaedeia*, Xenophon devotes substantial space to youths he calls *epheboi*, one of the four age classes in his fictional Persian educational system (1.2.8-12). These *epheboi* guard the government buildings at night. During the day half of their number attend the Persian king on hunts, while the remainder spend their time training for war and providing security for the countryside. These *epheboi* begin their military service at sixteen or seventeen rather than eighteen and serve for ten years instead of Aeschines' two (Cyr. 1.2.8, 12). Though Pélékidis admits that Xenophon's ideas are Spartan in origin, he also draws attention to Xenophon's use of the term *epheboi* and holds this as proof that the author has the *ephebeia* in mind.<sup>199</sup> It is more likely, however, that Xenophon used *epheboi* because the term defined a special military class of the first two *helikiai* which is ineligible for *strateia*, as I have argued above. The author thus adapted this term to suit his proposal because it was familiar to his readers.

Plato describes a different system in his *Laws* for guarding the countryside (760B-763C, 778E). Having divided the country into twelve sections, one per tribe, he proposes that each tribe selects five officers called *agronomoi* or *phrourarchoi*. Each officer then selects twelve youths (*neoi*) to serve under him, or sixty per tribe. These youths are aged between twenty-five and thirty when they begin their military service. They serve for two

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<sup>197</sup> Reinmuth 1966, 795; Ridley 1979, 534; Burckhardt 1996, 49-50.

<sup>198</sup> Bryant 1907, 85: "Xenophon, for all that his heart was in Sparta, would hardly pass over a home institution so entirely in the spirit of that Phaeacian realm he calls Persian, and Plato would scarcely have ignored an Attic ἐφηβεία to which he might have pointed as a triumphant vindication of his educational theory."

<sup>199</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 23.

years and guard a different sector every month.<sup>200</sup> The youths mess together, undertake engineering projects related to defense, and train in the gymnasia they build. Though the length of service for the *neoi* is the same as in the ephebeia, Plato's proposal differs from the institution in that the youths are not called *epheboi*, they are not obligated to serve but are selected by their officers (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.15), and they are older. Finally, Plato does not know what to call these *neoi*: "whether one delights in calling them *kryptoi* or *agronomoi* or whatever takes your fancy (763B: εἴτε τις κρυπτούς εἴτε ἀγρονόμους εἴθ' ὅτι καλῶν)."

It should be clear that Xenophon's and Plato's detailed proposals concerning military service for youths share only the vaguest resemblance to the ephebeia as described in the *Athenaion Politeia*. These authors, who are clearly inspired by Spartan institutions, should therefore not be taken as evidence for the existence of the ephebeia in the 350's.<sup>201</sup> With the exception of this utopian literature, scholars' claims that Aeschines' testimony proves that the youngest Athenian citizens carried out two years of mandatory garrison duty before Chaeronea is supported by no other evidence.<sup>202</sup> Nor can they show that these citizens were a perennial presence on the frontier.<sup>203</sup> Indeed, apart from Xenophon's *Poroi* 4.51-2 (discussed above), the only positive evidence produced by scholars is *Memorabilia* 3.5.25-7.<sup>204</sup> In this passage Xenophon makes Socrates suggest to Pericles that lightly armed Athenian youths (μέχρι τῆς ἐλαφρᾶς ἡλικίας ὥπλισμένους κουφοτέροις ὅπλοις) should be deployed in the mountainous border

<sup>200</sup> Daly 2001, 361-5, shows that Plato's system of protecting the *chora* of his ideal state diverges significantly from Athenian military practices, in that his division of the *chora* into tribal sectors and the rotation of the tribal units through these sectors are unattested elsewhere.

<sup>201</sup> See Bryant 1907, 85; Brenot 1920, 28; Forbes 1929, 114; Marcellus 1994, 33.

<sup>202</sup> As Bryant 1907, 84, puts it: "We may grant at once that it is dangerous to argue *ex silentio*. And yet if Aristotle's ἐφηβεία, or any of its essential features, had been in existence at Athens in the fifth century, is it too much to suppose that somewhere in the pages of poet or philosopher, orator or historian, there would have been a reference to it?"

<sup>203</sup> Ober 1985a, 94, asserts that "even without the new inscription [i.e. E1] the evidence cited above [including Aeschines] is sufficient to prove that by the second quarter of the fourth century the *chora* was guarded by young citizen-soldiers, almost certainly ephebes, and there was a good deal of contemporary interest in these troops and their duties." While Ober is right to point out that Aeschines patrolled the countryside and served in the garrisons, he assumes rather than offers clear evidence, apart from the *Athenaion Politeia*, that contingents of ephebes routinely manned these forts.

<sup>204</sup> E.g. Munn 1993, 107, n. 25, cites these two passages of Xenophon along with Aeschin. 2.167 and [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4 as evidence for ephebes equipped as light troops patrolling the borderlands of Attica.

regions, just like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, where they would cause harm to their enemies and provide a strong defensive bulwark for the citizens of the *chora*. Xenophon's proposal is clearly an innovation c. 355, but there is no evidence to suggest that ephebes fought exclusively as light-troops in the Lycurgan period.<sup>205</sup>

But if we are correct in asserting that Aeschines' garrison duty is not evidence for the existence of an early ephebeia, how then do we explain his military service? The most explicit statement concerning the circumstances under which the youngest citizens served as garrison troops is found in Thucydides, who makes Pericles say on the eve of the first Spartan invasion of Attica in 431:

There are thirteen thousand hoplites without the sixteen thousand in the fortresses and along the battlements. For so many were guarding at first whenever the enemy made their invasion, both from the oldest (*presbutatoi*) and the youngest (*neotatoi*) citizens, and from the metics as many as were hoplites (Thuc. 2.13.6-7).<sup>206</sup>

Thucydides' point is clear: the *neotatoi* were called out as a group to man the fortresses (φρουρία) and the Athens-Piraeus enceinte (ἐπαλξις) whenever Attica was in danger of invasion. His use of the optative in secondary sequence (ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν) suggests that they were used in this manner before 431, perhaps as early as 458 when the *neotatoi* are first attested (Thuc. 1.105.4-6). Thucydides does not say for how long they were required to serve during the five Spartan invasions of the Archidamian War (431-421), but it was probably a little longer than the length of each invasion, which lasted

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<sup>205</sup> Scholars have debated over whether Xenophon's use of βλαβερούς in βλαβερούς μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολὴν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι is offensive or defensive in nature. Lofberg 1925, 332, argues that Xenophon is urging a hitherto defensive ephebeia to go on the offense against the Boeotians. His opponents think that the whole passage should be taken as defensive, which in their opinion shows that the ephebeia did not exist when Xenophon wrote the *Memorabilia* (Brenot 1920, 24; Forbes 1929, 121-2; Marcellus 1994, 32). While the author's objective is to get the Athenians to raid Boeotian territory (Munn 1993, 31, n. 61), his proposal clearly assumes that no standing force of young Athenians armed as light-armed troops existed at that time to defend the frontier (Ober 1985a, 77; Munn 1993, 187). For ephebes as light troops, see pp. 143-6.

<sup>206</sup> χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς, ὀπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίου καὶ μυρίου εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ' ἐπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὀπλῖται ἦσαν.

from fifteen to forty days (Thuc. 2.57.2; 4.6.2).<sup>207</sup> Thucydides' description suggests that their service was limited to these invasions, though a more extended deployment in the Deceleian War (413-404) cannot be ruled out.<sup>208</sup>

Another passage which implies that citizens under twenty performed garrison duty under similar circumstances is Demosthenes' *Against Meidias*, where the orator claims that Meidias slandered those who had voted against him at a recent Assembly:

Then I think he won't hesitate even to accuse the people and the Ekklesia, and he'll repeat today what he was bold enough to say at the time of the *probole* – that the meeting comprised all those who had stayed in Athens when they should have gone on campaign, and all those who had left the forts unmanned, and that it was choristers and aliens and men of that sort who voted him down.<sup>209</sup> (Dem. 21.193. Trans. MacDowell 1990, 201)

According to the orator, Meidias distinguished between those who ought to have marched out (δέον ἐξιέναι) against Euboea and those who had abandoned the fortresses they were assigned to (τὰ φρούρι' ἦσαν ἔρημα λελοιπότες). Meidias then identifies the latter – χορευταὶ καὶ ξένοι. The χορευταί must refer to citizens under twenty, because choristers were exempt from military service (Dem. 21.15; 39.16).<sup>210</sup> No reason is given for the deployment of these youngest citizens, but it is likely that they were called up for service after the Athenians had sent out an expedition under Phocion to Euboea to support the tyrant Plutarch in spring 348, possibly in response to increased tension on the Attic-Boeotian frontier, which prompted the Athenians to buttress their existing garrisons

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<sup>207</sup> For an overview of these invasions, see Hanson 1998, 132-6.

<sup>208</sup> Most scholars who argue for the fifth-century existence of the ephebeia hold or imply that the *neotatoi* were used extensively as border guards and were a permanent presence on the frontier (e.g. Lofberg 1925, 330-1; Reinmuth 1952, 44; Pélékidis 1962, 47-9; Ridley 1979, 533; Harding 1988, 64, n. 11; Burckhardt 1996, 30; *contra* Ober 1985a, 90).

<sup>209</sup> οἶμαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ τοῦ δήμου κατηγορεῖν ὀκνήσειν οὐδὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἀλλ' ἅπερ τότε ἐτόλμα λέγειν ὅτ' ἦν ἡ προβολή, ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἐρεῖν, ὥς ὅσοι δέον ἐξιέναι κατέμενον καὶ ὅσοι τὰ φρούρι' ἦσαν ἔρημα λελοιπότες, ἐξεκλησίασαν, καὶ χορευταὶ καὶ ξένοι καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν οἱ κατεχειροτόνησαν αὐτοῦ.

<sup>210</sup> For the identification of the χορευταί as the youngest citizens, see Ober 1985a, 99; Daly 2001, 429, n. 732.

for a limited time.<sup>211</sup> A similar incident can perhaps be found in Ariston's account of his *phroura* at Panactum in 343; it is likely that he was part of a mass call up of ephebes to reinforce the garrison because the Thebans were threatening the area. This should not be pressed too far, however, because of the uncertainty concerning Ariston's age.<sup>212</sup>

These passages suggest that the youngest citizens before the creation of the ephebeia not only comprised a special military class but also acted as a reserve of manpower to be drawn upon whenever the Athenians feared that their homeland was in danger of invasion; otherwise they were not required to perform garrison duty. If we accept this, Aeschines and his fellow *epheboi* were called out en masse for a limited time to provide additional border security. Given that they carried out their military service c. 373/2-370/69, it is likely that Athenian anxiety over the rapidly growing power of Thebes

<sup>211</sup> Tritle 1988, 76-9, shows that Phocion's force consisted of cavalry, the *epilektoi* (Athens' elite hoplite regiment), along with a general levy of hoplites. The size of the contingent is unknown, but 3,000 should be considered a minimum (80). At any rate, this would have been the pick of the Athenian army. For a discussion of Phocion's expedition and the events leading up to the campaign, see Brunt 1969, 247-51; Tritle 1988, 79-89. MacDowell 1990, 404, says: "in 348 there may have been apprehension that the Thebans would attack in order to divert Athenian forces from Euboea." He offers no evidence to support his assertion, but it is likely given the Athenian fear of Theban aggression after 370 (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4; Poly. 3.9.20; Aeschin. 2.105; Plut. *Phoc.* 9.4), especially after the latter had occupied the disputed border area of Oropos in 366, which remained a major point of contention between the two powers (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; D.S. 15.76.1; Dem. 3.28; 19.325-6).

<sup>212</sup> Ariston says that two years before the speech he was conscripted for garrison duty at Panactum (Dem. 54.3: ἐξῆλθον ἔτος τουτὶ τρίτον εἰς Πάνακτον φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης). Scholars assume that Ariston is referring to the Athenian expedition to Panactum in 343 mentioned by Demosthenes (19.326), rather than to an otherwise unknown incident which prompted the Athenians to garrison all their border fortresses in 357 (Carey and Reid 1985, 69, on schol. on Dem. 21.193). Ariston must have been young, since he talks about his age as a potential impediment in court (Dem. 54.1: ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν). Scholars have argued that he could not have been an *ephebos*: (1) Ariston calls his fellow soldiers *stratiotai*, not *epheboi*, and his commanders were a *taxiarchos* and a *strategos* (Ober 1985a, 217-8; Burckhardt 1996, 244, n. 329, on Dem. 54.4-5). (2) "The phrase φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης ... suggests a selection from the roll of adult citizens, not the obligatory φρουρά of the ephebe" (Cary and Reid 1985, 69). (3) Ariston could have brought a suit against Conon's sons, but chose not to (Daly 2001, 245, n. 172, on Dem. 54.6). Moreover, scholars cannot actually demonstrate that Panactum was permanently garrisoned by a contingent of ephebes undertaking their mandatory service (e.g. Ober 1985a, 218). The above arguments, however, are not decisive. First, Ariston's use of φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης does not exclude the youngest citizens, since, as we have seen, all the *helikiai* conscripted by *eponymoi* (i.e. citizens 18-59 years old) were eligible for garrison duty (for the connection between φρουρᾶς ἡμῖν προγραφείσης and [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7, see Cary and Reid 1985, 78; Daly 2001, 244-7). Second, the presence of the *taxiarchos* is not decisive, because ephebic officials are not attested prior to the Lycurgan ephebeia and consequently ephebes, like other citizens, would have been organized by tribes under tribal *taxiarchoi* ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 61). Third, Ariston, if he was under twenty, would not have been prohibited from the lawcourt, unlike the ephebes in the Lycurgan period ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.5).

in this period was responsible for their *peripoleiai*. Though the Thebans in Aeschines' time were not yet the openly hostile "rivals on the borders (ὄμοροι ἀντίπαλοι)" who were a constant threat to the Athenians after 370 (Xen. *Hipp.* 7.1), the latter were nevertheless alarmed at the Theban destruction of Plataea in 373/2 (an ally of Athens), followed by their aggression against Thespieae, and finally at the Thebans' unexpected victory over the Spartans at Leuctra in 371.<sup>213</sup>

But if Aeschines' short stints as a *peripolos* were typical for citizens of his age, why then would the Athenians have found his testimony unusual? I suggest that, unlike his later military career, the orator had no opportunity to distinguish himself during his military service while he was an *ephebos*. This is why he does not draw attention to his martial qualities or mention any honor or praise he received from his commanding officers for his devotion to duty (cf. 2.168-9).<sup>214</sup> Instead, he deliberately omits the circumstances under which he served and thereby creates the impression that he served *continuously* over a two-year period in order to convince his audience that even as a youth he was exceptionally devoted to the *polis* because he, unlike other *epheboi*, performed garrison duty above and beyond the call of duty. Certainly his intention was to contrast himself favorably with a youth like Glaucôn, who had clearly never served in the frontier forts (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10-11).

<sup>213</sup> See Buckler 1980, 182-4. The destruction of Plataea (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; D.S. 15.46.4-6; Isoc. 14.6; Paus. 9.1.8). The Athenians awarded citizenship to the Plataean refugees (Isoc. 14.51-2; [Dem]. 59.104-6). The pillaging of Thespieae, followed by expulsion of pro-Spartan Thespians (D.S. 15.46.6; 51.3; Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1). For the incorporation of Thebes' rivals into the Boeotian League in the 370's and 360's and the negative reaction of Athens, see Buckley 1980, 15-23; Bakhuizen 1994, 307-30; Hammond 2000, 88-93. The Athenians listened with consternation to the garlanded Theban messenger, who addressed the *boule* on their victory at Leuctra, and dismissed him without providing the customary hospitality and with no reply (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19-20).

<sup>214</sup> Aeschines mentions the following military exploits: (1) His bravery in the Nemean Ravine on the expedition under Alcibiades to Phlius in 366, which was praised by his commanders (ἡγωνισάμην ὥστε ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπαινέσθαι). (2) He fought at the battle of Mantinea in 362 in a manner "not shamefully nor unworthily for the city (οὐκ αἰσχρῶς οὐδ' ἀναξίως τῆς πόλεως)." (3) He took part in two expeditions to Euboea. In the second (349/8) he fought as an *epilektos*, a member of Athens' élite hoplite corps, at the battle of Tamynae, where he was crowned for his prowess on the battlefield (στεφανωθῆναι).

## 1.6: Conclusion

Despite the arguments of the advocates for an early ephebeia, the institution as described in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* is unlikely to have antedated the Lycurgan period because its essential features – mass military training, mandatory garrison duty, and a formal ephebic organization – are unattested before 334/3, the year in which the earliest securely dated ephebic inscriptions indicate that ephebes were enrolled in the ephebeia. While scholars have maintained that Aeschines' use of *peripolos* and *ephebos* is decisive evidence that the ephebeia existed c. 372 and that his military service must have been the same as the ephebes c. 330, we have seen that Aeschines' *peripoleia*, despite the similar terminology, can be explained without assuming a pre-Lycurgan institution. Indeed, if we accept the arguments presented here, we can understand that Aeschines uses *sunephebos* with various technical meanings associated with the attainment of civic majority and the obligation of military service. But *ephebos* in the fourth century never meant “a youth who serves in the ephebeia,” as scholars have assumed, not even in the *Athenaion Politeia*, which provides our most detailed description of the ephebeia. Also, an examination of Aeschines' military service shows that the youngest citizens, since they constituted a special military category called *neotatoi* in the fifth century and *epheboi* in the fourth, were not only not usually conscripted for *strateia*, but were also not called up en masse for garrison duty except under exceptional conditions. Having discussed the role of citizens under twenty in the Athenian military system before Chaeronea, let us now discuss the creation of the ephebeia.



## Chapter Two: The Creation of the Ephebeia

But there is a tragic irony in all this. For Athens developed this meticulous organization for recruiting her national army just when Philip's victory and Macedonian hegemony had ended Hellenic independence and the free city. As happens so often in the history of human institutions, the ephebeia did not reach perfection until for all practical purposes it had lost its *raison d'être*.<sup>1</sup>

Though Marrou is mistaken in his belief that the ephebeia existed prior to the battle of Chaeronea, his analysis draws attention to a seeming paradox concerning the inception of the institution. Why did the Athenians, having paid no heed to the suggestions of utopian theorists such as Xenophon and Plato to create systems of youth education when Athens had full autonomy, decide to do so under the domination of Macedon? The first positive evidence for the ephebeia occurs after Chaeronea, since the corpus of ephebic inscriptions strongly suggests that the institution began to function in 334/3 (E1-E4). This is the limit of our knowledge concerning the origin of the ephebeia: we have no direct evidence for why the Athenians created the institution.

Modern attempts to provide an explanation have rightly focused on the military nature of the institution.<sup>2</sup> Given that the *Athenaion Politeia* treats the ephebeia as a military organization and nowhere hints that the ephebes' military activities were "ceremonial" or "nominal" as some scholars have supposed (42.2-5),<sup>3</sup> there is no reason

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<sup>1</sup> Marrou 1956, 152.

<sup>2</sup> Dillery 2002, 469: "While it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the broader cultural importance of the ephebate, especially in the Lycurgan era, it is equally wrong to lose sight of the basic fact that it was designed as a military institution."

<sup>3</sup> Sawada 1996, 77, argues that the "nature of this two-year military training of young men at the age of 18-20, however, was quite ceremonial." He cites Pélékidis 1962, 103-117, who makes no such claim. On the contrary, Pélékidis explicitly says: "La caractère militaire de l'institution est constamment souligné, mais cela n'exclut pas d'autres activités [i.e. participation in festivals and religious processions] (117)." Loomis 1998, 53, treats the ephebeia as if it was a military academy: "Although the ephebes had nominal military duties, serving as a national guard, they really were *training* for their future responsibilities as citizens and soldiers; certainly their work was neither as strenuous nor as dangerous as that of soldiers in combat." Loomis, however, provides no evidence to justify this assertion. In fact, as we will see in this chapter, the military activities the ephebes performed were vital for the security of Athens. Will 1983, 94, n. 310, argues that the ephebeia was not a military organization, but was created for the purpose of increasing citizen participation in the democracy. There is no evidence to suggest this and his theory is contradicted by

to think that the ephebeia should not be regarded as a solution to a military problem which arose at some point in the first few years of Macedonian hegemony (i.e. 338/7-335/4). I argue that if we consider what *immediate* military benefit the ephebeia conferred upon Athens and place it in its proper historical context – namely Athens’ relationship with Macedon in the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great – it is clear that scholars have misunderstood what problem the institution was intended to fix and which events prior to 334/3 were responsible for its creation. Since scholars have attributed the creation/reformation of the ephebeia to Lycurgus, let us begin with the aftermath of Chaeronea and the Athenian recovery program undertaken during his administration.

### 2.1: Chaeronea and The Lycurgan Program<sup>4</sup>

In the summer of 338/7 Philip II of Macedon decisively defeated the Athenians and their allies at the battle of Chaeronea and became the dominant power in Greece.<sup>5</sup> When the surviving Athenians made their way back to Athens and brought news of the catastrophe, pandemonium erupted in the city (Lyc. *Leoc.* 39-40, 131; Dem. 18.248). With the expectation that an invasion of Attica was imminent (Dem. 18.195), the Athenians prepared for a prolonged siege, determined to resist to the bitter end. But Philip and his army never crossed into Attica (Aeschin. 3.131). Instead, he offered terms to the Athenians. To convince them that they were genuine, he returned the ashes of the citizens killed at Chaeronea, conveyed to Athens by Alexander himself as a mark of

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the tight restrictions placed upon the ephebes while they served in the ephebeia to ensure that they did *not* take part in public life ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5).

<sup>4</sup> There is, unfortunately, no contemporary source that provides a connected historical narrative of Mainland Greece for the period between Chaeronea and the Lamian war. We are dependent on Arrian, Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, the earliest of whom wrote several centuries after the events described in their works. It is therefore difficult to assess the trustworthiness of these authors, though their writings make it clear that they drew upon a variety of earlier sources. On these matters, see Bosworth 1988b, esp. 1-15. While we are fortunate to possess a number of Attic speeches that provides a rich vein of information about Athenian politics and insight into the Athenians’ perception of important events during Lycurgan period, the accuracy of this historical information is open to distortion, deception, and outright fabrication (see Worthington 1994, 109-29). Consequently, I have used this literary evidence with caution throughout this chapter, limiting my assertions to those matters which scholars are in general agreement.

<sup>5</sup> According to Plutarch, Chaeronea was fought on the seventh of Metageitnion, i.e. on the second of August 338/7 (*Cam.* 19.8).

honor, and then released the prisoners without ransom (Plut. *Dem.* 21.2; Just. 9.4.5; D.S. 16.87.3).<sup>6</sup> Swayed by his generosity, the Athenians, advised by Phocion, accepted his terms (Plut. *Phoc.* 16.4).<sup>7</sup>

Philip allowed them to retain full control of their constitution (Paus. 7.10.5). He did not station a garrison on Athenian soil (Aristid. 13.182); neither was there a purge of Athens' political leaders, including staunch anti-Macedonians such as Demosthenes, who later delivered the funeral oration in honor of the citizens slain at Chaeronea (Dem. 18.285 [Plut. *Mor.* 845F]). The Athenians lost the Chersonese and their naval league was dissolved, but the city retained the cleruchies of Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, and continued to control Delos.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, Philip returned Oropos, which had been under Theban control since 366, to Athens.<sup>9</sup> Grateful for his leniency, the Athenians voted to grant Philip and Alexander citizenship and then erected a statue of the former in the Agora.<sup>10</sup> With this generous settlement, Philip hoped to ease the Athenians' humiliation at their defeat, to make their subordination to Macedon more palatable, and to build up the necessary goodwill so that they would actively assist him against the Persians.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Diodorus attributes Philip's generosity towards the Athenians to Demades' rebuke that Philip was acting like a Thersites in mocking his prisoners after the battle when fortune had made him an Agamemnon. Philip, stung by this admonishment, freed Demades, who then persuaded him to release the captive Athenians and to offer favorable terms to Athens (16.87). For differing opinions on the historicity of this anecdote, see Cawkwell 1978, 167; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 605; Sealey 1993, 198; Hammond 1994, 156.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed discussion of Philip's treaty with the Athenians, see Schaefer 1887, 25-31; Roebuck 1948, 79-82; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 606-9.

<sup>8</sup> Although no ancient source says that Athens lost the Chersonese, this is deduced from the fact that there is no positive evidence for Athenian control over the area after 338/7 (see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 607). For the loss of the naval league, see Paus. 1.25.3. Athenian control of the islands: Samos ([Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62.2; Plut. *Alex.* 28; D.S. 18.56.7); Lemnos ([Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 61.6; 62.2); Imbros and Skyros ([Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62.2); Delos (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1652).

<sup>9</sup> For the return of Oropos, see Paus. 1.34.1; D.S. 18.56.6; Hyp. *Eux.* 16; [Demad.]. 9; Schol. on Dem. 18.99. Knoepfler 1993, 295-6, argues that Alexander, not Philip, returned Oropos to Athenian control. The above sources are quite specific, however, that Philip performed the act.

<sup>10</sup> For Philip and Alexander, see Plut. *Dem.* 22.3; [Demad.]. 9; Paus. 1.9.4; Schol. on Aristid. 13.178 (Dindorf); Just. 9.4.5. For a discussion of the evidence concerning these honors, see Schaefer 1887, 31-3; Osborne 1983, T68-71.

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of Philip's motives towards Athens, see Ellis 1976, 199-201; Cawkwell 1978, 166-7. As Hammond and Griffith 1979, 619-21, put it: "The Athenian navy could have been destroyed after Chaeronea. If Philip had been implacable and put Athens under siege, the navy could have been among the first victims of an unconditional surrender. The conclusion is unavoidable that he wanted the Athenian navy to survive, and the presumption must be that he recognized his own need of it, for a war against Persia ... Peace without dishonour was the setting in which the Athenians, guided by their wiser counsellors,

In early 337 Philip summoned the delegates of the Athenians and other cities (except for Sparta) to a congress in Corinth and had them agree to a Common Peace,<sup>12</sup> which resulted in the establishment of the League of Corinth.<sup>13</sup> The Greeks were guaranteed freedom and autonomy and it was stipulated that their constitutions would be free from outside interference. They also swore to maintain the peace and to undertake military action led by the *hegemon* of the league against those who broke it. Finally, they voted Philip as *hegemon* and swore never to subvert the kingdom of Philip and his successors.<sup>14</sup> These provisions effectively deprived the Greeks of their independence in international affairs and ensured that they had to conform to Philip's wishes, since any attempt by them to extend their power beyond the bounds set by their settlement with Philip would violate the Common Peace and risk retaliation from the Macedonian king.<sup>15</sup> The Athenians, for example, had no choice but to comply with Philip's demand for triremes and cavalry for his campaign against Persia (Plut. *Phoc.* 16.6-7; cf. D.S. 16.89.3; Just. 9.5.1-7), even though they knew that the war was not to their own advantage.<sup>16</sup> It is

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might salvage their pride, turn away from acts or thoughts of disloyalty, and lend their necessary support on the element which was truly their own, the sea, in its Aegean and eastern waters."

<sup>12</sup> According to Plutarch, the Athenians voted to participate in the Common Peace (on Demades' motion) against the advice of Phocion, who urged them to wait until they had ascertained what Philip required of them (*Phoc.* 16.5-6). It is doubtful, however, whether the Athenians had a choice in the matter, given Philip's superior military might. Cawkwell 1969, 167, n. 5, dates the congress to early 337.

<sup>13</sup> For the institution's foundation, constitution, officials, and its juridical nature, see Ryder 1965, 150-62; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 623-46.

<sup>14</sup> A fragmentary copy of the terms of the Common Peace has been found in Athens (Tod. II, no. 177 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 236 [338/7]). This inscription, together with the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech *On the Treaty with Alexander* (17), constitutes the principal evidence for the *sunthekai* in 338/7 (see Ryder 1965, 150-1). The date of [Dem]. 17 is disputed. Will 1983, 68-70, suggests a date no later than 333/2, but Cawkwell's 1961, 74-8, argument for 331/0 is more convincing.

<sup>15</sup> For the Common Peace as an instrument of Macedonian domination, see Ryder 1965, 104-5; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 633; Bosworth 1988a, 187. As Cawkwell 1978, 176, aptly puts it: "By the League of Corinth the King of Macedon was instilled with authority and power to enforce it [i.e. transgressions of the Common Peace] within Greece itself; let trouble arise and 'those in charge of the general security' would swiftly act ... under the King of Macedon, once at her doorstep, now within her doors, she had total peace and no liberty."

<sup>16</sup> Macedonian propaganda framed the war as a joint undertaking between Philip and the Greeks to exact vengeance for Xerxes' destruction of Greek temples in 480-79 (D.S. 16.89.3). The Athenians, however, were well aware that a successful campaign would increase Philip's power further and weaken Persia, which they considered as a potential ally against Macedon (see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 631-2; Sealey 1993, 200-1; Habicht 1997, 12).

unsurprising, then, that Lycurgus regarded Chaeronea as the moment when Greek freedom was buried with those who died on that battlefield (*Leoc.* 50).<sup>17</sup>

The loss of independence did not lead to demoralization and paralysis in Athens. Instead it spurred the Athenians under the administration of Lycurgus to carry out an extensive revitalization program to give Athens the necessary strength and will to resist the hegemony of Macedon.<sup>18</sup> Lycurgus, son of Lycophron, of the deme Boutadae, was born c. 390 into the aristocratic *genos* of the Eteoboutadae. This aristocratic clan traced its ancestry to Erechtheus and handed down through its membership the ancient and important priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus, centered on the Erectheum and hence at the heart of Athens' state religion. Lycurgus himself held the priesthood as did his son Habron ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843E-F).<sup>19</sup> Alongside the *genos*' importance in the religious life of the *polis*, the sources stress the long-established loyalty of Lycurgus and his ancestors to the democracy ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852A).<sup>20</sup> Nothing certain is known about his political career until his prosecution of the general Lysicles for his role in the defeat of the Athenians at

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<sup>17</sup> μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ἀπάντων τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐλευθερίαν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν σώμασιν εἶχον. ἅμα γὰρ οὗτοί τε τὸν βίον μετήλλαξαν, καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς δουλείαν μετέπεσεν· συνετάφη γὰρ τοῖς τούτων σώμασιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερία. The Spartans had a similar opinion of the Common Peace: soli Lacedaemonii et regem et leges contempserunt, servitutem, non pacem rati, quae non ipsis civitatibus conveniret, sed a victore ferretur (Just. 9.5.1-3).

<sup>18</sup> The main literary source for Lycurgus and the Lycurgan program is the *Vitae decem oratorum* (*Mor.* 841A-844A). This treatise, preserved among Plutarch's works, is of unknown authorship and probably dates at the earliest to the Augustan period, since the stemma of Lycurgus' descendants continues to this time (See Merkel 1986, 45, n. 18, on [Plut]. *Mor.* 843B-C). In the "Epigraphical Appendix" of the work is the decree of Stratocles (*Mor.* 851F-852E), which was passed in 307/6 after the restoration of the democracy. The decree honored Lycurgus for his achievements and granted him a statue in the Agora (for the base, see *IG II<sup>2</sup> 3776 = EM 10607*). Fragments of the decree have also been found (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 457* and *513*), which differ in some respects from the literary version. For the text of both versions, see Conomis 1970, 13-17; Mitchel 1986, 51-4. Interpretation of the decree is problematic, however, because it says more about how Athenians wished to see Lycurgus in the restored democracy than a faithful account of his accomplishments (see Merker 1986, 45; Sealey 1993, 21). Fifteen speeches of Lycurgus were known in antiquity (see Conomis 1961, 76-9, on [Plut]. *Mor.* 843C), of which one speech – *Against Leocrates* (331/0) – has survived complete, while fragments exist for the others (collected in Conomis 1970).

<sup>19</sup> For a history of the Eteoboutidae, see Kirchner 1903, nos. 9232, 9251; Davies 1971, 348-53, no. 9251; Bourriot 1976, 1304-47; Parker 1995, 290-3. The graves of Lycurgus' family have recently been found in the Ceramicus: see Matthaiou 1987, 31-44.

<sup>20</sup> ἐπεὶ δὲ Λυκοῦργος Λυκόφρονος Βουτάδης παραλαβὼν παρὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ προγόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ παλαιοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὖνοιαν καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ Λυκούργου, Λυκομήδης τε καὶ Λυκοῦργος, καὶ ζῶντες ἐτιμῶντο ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τελευτήσασιν αὐτοῖς δι' ἀνδραγαθίαν ἔδωκεν ὁ δῆμος δημοσίας ταφὰς ἐν Κεραμεικῷ. The author also says that this Lycurgus, grandfather of the fourth-century statesman, was executed by the Thirty (841B). He was probably the same man of that name lampooned in Aristophanes' *Birds* (1296).

Chaeronea (D.S. 16.88.2).<sup>21</sup> Even so, the *demos* could not have entrusted him with the charge of Athens' financial affairs in the 330's unless he had already gained a "reputation as an honest and able administrator," as Mitchel puts it.<sup>22</sup> Late evidence does suggest that he was held in good regard by his compatriots.<sup>23</sup>

The literary sources do not explicitly name the office which Lycurgus held as the head administrator of Athens, though they use similar terminology – namely variations of the root διοικε- "to manage" – to describe it.<sup>24</sup> Even so, there is no evidence that his official title, as some scholars have supposed, was ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει, which literally means "the man in charge of administration" but is perhaps best rendered as "state treasurer" or "state comptroller."<sup>25</sup> Whatever the name of his office, it is clear that Lycurgus controlled Athens' finances for three consecutive four-year terms ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841B, 852B), or for twelve years in all (D.S. 16.88.1). Since a law limited his tenure in the office to one term, Lycurgus had his friends elected to it for the next two terms while

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<sup>21</sup> Lycurgus may have accompanied Demosthenes and Polyeuctus to the Peloponnese in 343 to arouse animosity towards Philip ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841E), though Demosthenes does not mention him (9.72). Humphreys 2004, 77-8, argues from Lucian *Parasite* 42 that he was *bouletes* in 338/7. But Hansen 1992, 58, rightly rejects Lucian, because a citizen could only be a *bouletes* twice in his life ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 62.3) and he is already attested epigraphically as *bouletes* in 336/5 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 328) and in 329/8 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1672).

<sup>22</sup> Mitchel 1970, 12.

<sup>23</sup> The decree of Stratocles stresses his honesty and may also allude to his earlier offices: καὶ διδούς εὐθύνας πολλάκις τῶν πεπολιτευμένων ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει διετέλεσεν ἀνεξέλεγκτος καὶ ἀδωροδόκητος τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852D). The *Vitae decem oratorum* says that Lycurgus "continued to be held in high esteem for his entire life in the opinion of the Athenians and to be considered a just man (841F; cf. 842F)."

<sup>24</sup> Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe (ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων); D.S. 16.88.1 (δῶδεκα μὲν ἔτη τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως διοίκησας); [Plut]. *Mor.* 841B-C (πιστευσάμενος τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν χρημάτων· ταμίας γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας ταλάντων μυρίων τετρακισχιλίων, ἣ ὥς τινες μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἑξακοσίων πεντήκοντα); 852B (γενόμενος τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου ταμίας τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας καὶ διανείμας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου μύρια καὶ ὀκτακισχίλια καὶ ἑνακόσια τάλαντα ... δόξας δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα δικαίως διωκηκέναι πολλάκις). For a discussion of these sources, see Faraguna 1992, 197-9.

<sup>25</sup> See Merker 1986, 43, n. 9, for a range of possible translations for this difficult technical term. The *Athenaion Politeia* does not mention this office in its account of the city's administration nor refer to any which approximates to it (see esp. 43.1), probably because it was an extraordinary one, initially at least, created for Lycurgus by *psephismata* rather than by *nomoi*, unlike the other offices mentioned in the treatise (See Rhodes 1981, 516; Henry 1984, 52, n. 13). The first attested instance of an official called ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει was Habron, Lycurgus' son, in 307/6, (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 436, line 36). Scholars disagree over whether Lycurgus himself or his successors ever held this title (there is no certainty given the extant evidence: see the previous note), with some suggesting that it was used only after the restoration of the democracy. For various opinions, see Merritt 1960, 4, no. 3; Buchanan 1962, 77; Mitchel 1970, 28; Merker 1986, 43, n. 9; Faraguna 1992, 198-9; Hakkarainen 1997, 7.

still retaining control of the administration in his own hands ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841C). The epigraphic evidence suggests that Xenocles of Sphettus served as his proxy for the second term; the name of the holder of the third term is unknown.<sup>26</sup> Controversy exists over when Lycurgus began his first four-year term.<sup>27</sup> Some scholars maintain that his three terms ran from Greater Panathenaea to Greater Panathenaea (i.e. 338/7-326/5).<sup>28</sup> But more convincing is the argument that Lycurgus entered his office in 336/5 rather than 338/7, while his third term would have ended in 324/3, had he not died late in 325/4.<sup>29</sup>

His activities as state treasurer are summarized in a fragment of Hyperides' speech *In Defense of the Children of Lycurgus*, delivered after Lycurgus' death:

What will those who pass by his grave say? "This man lived a prudent life, when he was appointed for the administration of the finances, he discovered sources of revenue, he built the theatre, the odeium, the dockyards, he constructed triremes and harbors: Our city disgraced him and imprisoned his children (Fr. 118 Sauppe).<sup>30</sup>

The fragment is consistent with the *Vitae decem oratorum*, which says that Lycurgus increased Athens' annual income, without tribute, to the unprecedented figure of 1,200

<sup>26</sup> Meritt 1960, 2-4, no. 3 = *SEG* 19.119, lines 4-5 (Ξενοκλῆς Ξείνιδος Σφῆττιος) and lines 7-9 (κ(α)τ[ασταθεῖς ἐ]πὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῆς πόλεως). Merrit has dated the inscription to the Lycurgan period on account of its lettering. This has been accepted by scholars, including Lewis 1997, 227, n. 40 = Rhodes 1972, 108, n. 1. For a discussion of this inscription and how Lycurgus might have controlled Athens' finances after his first term, see Engels 1992, 8-12.

<sup>27</sup> For a summary of the various views, see Merker 1986, 44-5; Engels 1992, 6-8.

<sup>28</sup> E.g. Markianos 1969, 326; Mitchel 1970, 28-9; Will 1983, 22-3; Engels 1992, 6; Hakkarainen 1997, 7. The case for 338/7 assumes that the treasurers of the Theoric and the Military Funds ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 43.1) ran from Greater Panathenaea to Greater Panathenaea and that Lycurgus' office was no different (see Develin 1984, 133-8).

<sup>29</sup> Rhodes 1972, 236-7, and Lewis 1997, 212-4, have shown that the turn of the treasurers of the Theoric and Military funds ran for annual terms (i.e. to and from each Lesser or Greater Panathenaea). Lewis 1997, 221-4, has also demonstrated that Lycurgus was still in his third term of office when he died in 325/4 (see [Plut]. *Mor.* 842F). For the date of his death, see Davies 1971, 351, on [Plut]. *Mor.* 848F. Lewis' view is now generally accepted by scholars: e.g. Bosworth 1988a, 205, n. 21; Wallace 1989, 195; Faraguna 1992, 199-200; Humphreys 2004, 78.

<sup>30</sup> τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις, ἐποίησατο, λιμένας· τοῦτον ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἡτίμωσεν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔδησεν αὐτοῦ.

talents ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842F).<sup>31</sup> This does not contradict the 14-19,000 talents said to have passed through his hands during his twelve years in office.<sup>32</sup> How Lycurgus managed to increase public revenues, without tribute, to a level unprecedented in Athenian history is unclear. Faraguna has suggested that Lycurgus boosted Athens' income through the exploitation of the silver mines of Laurium, the selling of public land, the leasing of sacred land, and the reorganization of cults on a sound financial footing.<sup>33</sup> In addition, Lycurgus fully realized the potential of Piraeus as a commercial center and raised considerable revenues by taxing the merchants passing through Athens.<sup>34</sup>

This increase in income made it possible for the Athenians under Lycurgus' administration to carry out the most important projects in the period between Chaeronea and the Lamian War (i.e. 338/7-323/2): (1) The strengthening of Athens' military defenses. (2) The enhancement of the *polis*' traditional cults by the refurbishment and construction of sanctuaries and through the adornment of these cults with magnificent dedications and sacred vessels. (3) The construction of public buildings, such as the Panathenaic Stadium and the gymnasium at the Lyceum ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C).<sup>35</sup> While Lycurgus is rightly considered to be the leading figure in these projects on account of his control of public finances, it is clear from the literary and epigraphic evidence that he also depended upon the energetic cooperation of many members of the upper class, several of whom were politically prominent in their own right, such as Demosthenes, Demades, and

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<sup>31</sup> For a detailed and thorough analysis of Athenian finances in the Lycurgan period, see Faraguna 1992, 286-400. Also see Mitchel 1970, 31-4; Will 1983, 77-9; Burke 1984, 251-264; Bosworth 1988a, 206-8; Humphreys 2004, 85-6.

<sup>32</sup> The *Vitae decem oratorum* says fourteen thousand talents and wrongly reports that the Stratocles' decree gives a higher figure of 18,650 talents ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841B), whereas the decree actually says that revenues were 8,900 talents ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852B). Burke 1984, 251, n. 5, discusses these figures, which cannot be easily reconciled, and concludes that these cumulative totals are consistent with an average of 1,200 talents per annum over twelve years. Stratocles may have obtained these figures from the stele of Lycurgus' financial records which was set up outside the Lyceum ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843F).

<sup>33</sup> Faraguna 1992, 289-380.

<sup>34</sup> Burke 1984, 258-64.

<sup>35</sup> For these projects, see Mitchel 1965; 1970; Mossé 1973, 68-101; Will 1983; Schwenk 1985; Bosworth 1988a, 187-228; Engels 1992; Faraguna 1992; Marcellus 1994, 123-69; Habicht 1997, 6-35; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997; Humphreys 2004, 77-129, = 1985, 199-252. These will be discussed further in this and subsequent chapters in connection with the ephebeia.



Xenocles of Sphettus.<sup>36</sup> The Lycurgan program, then, should be seen as a collective effort, even if the decree of Stratocles gives all the credit to Lycurgus and often omits those who cooperated with him in the implementation of a given project.<sup>37</sup>

## 2.2: Epicrates' Ephebic Legislation

Certainly an organization such as the ephebeia cannot have been created without broad support among Athens' political leadership and the *demos*, given the military, social, economic, and political ramifications of the institution. No contemporary source, however, discusses the ephebeia's foundation.<sup>38</sup> Nor does the decree of Stratocles and the *Vitae decem oratorum* mention the ephebeia as one of Lycurgus' achievements. Indeed, the only passage which can be understood to refer to the creation of the ephebeia is a fragment of Lycurgus' *On the Financial Administration* (ἐν τῷ περὶ διοικήσεως), a speech in which he gave an account of his management of Athens' finances, probably at his *euthuna*, after the expiration of one of his *pentaeterides* in office.<sup>39</sup> The second-

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<sup>36</sup> For a discussion of the Athenians who participated in the Lycurgan program, see Mitchel 1970, 11-26; Faraguna 1992, 211-43; Mikalson 1998, 32-6; Humphreys 2004, 83-99. Hansen's 1983, 158-80, list of politically active citizens in fourth-century Athens who introduced laws during Lycurgus' administration contains more than fifty names. Mitchel 1970, 26, rightly says that "the governing of the city was throughout the Lykourgan Period in the hands of a conservative group within which the ideological differences were less than generally supposed and personal dislikes did not prevent cooperation on essential matters of external and internal policy." Lewis 1955, 27-36, has studied those who participated with Lycurgus in three important religious projects and concludes that they were of high average age (for those whose ages can be ascertained), wealthy, and were important individuals in their own right (35): these citizens acted as commissioners for the Amphiareia (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> 298 [329/8]), contributors towards a dedication at the Amphiareion (AE 1917, 41 [328/7]), and *hieropoioi* for the Pythais (*SIG*<sup>3</sup> 296 [326/5]). Other studies suggest that the wealthy Athenians who worked with Lycurgus, at least in religious activities, should not be considered a monolithic group but as a fluid group of individuals who contributed in accordance with their personal religious tastes (Mikalson 1998, 36; Humphreys 2004, 97).

<sup>37</sup> In the decree of Stratocles, for example, Lycurgus is praised for adorning Athena with new processional vessels and solid gold victories ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852B; cf. 841D; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 457b, lines 3-4). The epigraphic evidence, however, suggests that while Lycurgus proposed the law to reorganize Athens' cult finances (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 333 = Schwenk 1985, no. 21 [335/4]), it was executed by many officials, not the least Demades, who was treasurer of the stratiotic fund at that time (see Mitchel 1962, 213-29, esp. 222, on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1493, 1494, and 1495). This cooperation occurred despite the fact that Lycurgus and Demades were often bitter political enemies, as can be seen in the former's attack on Cephisodotus' proposal of honors for Demades' services on behalf of Athens (see Conomis 1961, 126-8, on Lycurgus Fr. 9.1-4 Conomis).

<sup>38</sup> Contemporary references to the ephebeia: Arist. *Pol.* 1322a, 6.5.7; Din. 3.16; *Against Agasicles* fr. 68; Demad. fr. 68 De Falco; *Lyc. Leoc.* 76-7.

<sup>39</sup> The speech survives in fragments. For a collection and commentary on these fragments, see Conomis 1961, 98-107; 1970, 98-100. Conomis 1961, 99, suggests that it dates to the *euthuna* of Lycurgus' first

century A.D. grammarian Harpocration preserves the following fragment, under the heading Epicrates:

And there is another Epicrates whom Lycurgus mentions in his speech *On the Financial Administration*, when he says that a bronze statue of him was erected on account of his legislation concerning the ephebes (διὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων), who he says possessed property worth six hundred talents (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης = Lyc. Fr. 5.3 Conomis).<sup>40</sup>

Pélékidis argues that “le passage d’Harpocration pose plusieurs questions qui restent sans réponse, nous ne savons ni à quelle époque a vécu Épocratès, ni à quel moment il a proposé sa loi sur les éphèbes, ni si cette loi établissait l’éphébie, ni si elle apportait des modifications à son statut, ni pourquoi Lycurgue mentionne la statue de bronze érigée en l’honneur d’Épocratès.”<sup>41</sup> While some scholars agree with Pélékidis,<sup>42</sup> the prevailing opinion is that Epicrates’ legislation was responsible for the creation of the ephebeia as the *Athenaion Politeia* describes it.<sup>43</sup> Pélékidis’ objections, however, do carry some weight and the following discussion will examine what, if anything, can be deduced from Harpocration’s fragment.

First, who was Epicrates? Harpocration’s paraphrase of Lycurgus says nothing about him except that he is said to have “possessed property worth six hundred talents (κεκτῆσθαι ταλάντων ἑξακοσίων οὐσίαν).” From this we can infer that Epicrates was wealthy. Some scholars have therefore sought to identify him with a certain Epicrates of Pallene mentioned by Hyperides in the *Defense of Euxenippus*, dated c. 330-324,<sup>44</sup> whom

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four-year term. Since the *euthunai* of Athens’ magistrates took place in the first two months after their offices had ended (see Hansen 1991, 223), Lycurgus must have delivered the *On the Financial Administration* in early 332/1.

<sup>40</sup> ἕτερος δ’ ἐστὶν Ἐπικράτης οὗ μνημονεύει Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῷ Περὶ <τῆς> διοικήσεως, λέγων ὡς χαλκοῦς ἐστάθη διὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων, ὃν φασὶ κεκτῆσθαι ταλάντων ἑξακοσίων οὐσίαν.

<sup>41</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 13.

<sup>42</sup> E.g.: Reinmuth 1971, 124: “This Epikrates is otherwise not indentifiable. The nature of his law can only be the subject of conjecture. Neither man nor measure can be dated.”

<sup>43</sup> For a list of scholars, see p. 11, n. 39. Mitchel 1964, 344, n.34, rather puzzlingly says that scholars “need not insist that the law was moved by Epikrates, although he is the only likely candidate” despite the fact that Harpocration explicitly attributes the law to him.

<sup>44</sup> For the date, see Whitehead 2000, 155-7.

Lysander had unsuccessfully accused of illegally working the silver mines at Laurion: the prosecutor had claimed that this Epicrates and his associates had made three hundred talents in profit from mine-working in just three years (35).<sup>45</sup> Davies also suggests, without explanation, that he was the same man as Ἐπικράτης ... οἴητου, who was a *bouletes* from Pallene in 335/4 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1700 = *Agora* 15.43, lines 200-1).<sup>46</sup> But these identifications are by no means compelling. For example, it is just as likely that the Epicrates in Harpocraton could have been the Epicrates of Pallene who owned a workshop at Nape in the mining area in the 330's, as Humphreys and Faraguna suggest,<sup>47</sup> or the Epicrates, son of Isocrates, of the deme Euonymon, who also leased a mine c. 342/1-339/8.<sup>48</sup> Given the available evidence, the identity of Epicrates cannot be established with any certainty.

It should also be stressed that nothing is known about the content of Epicrates' νόμος ὁ περὶ τῶν ἐφήβων. The supposition that it created the ephebeia is based upon the likelihood that the institution, as we have seen in Chapter One, did not exist as a formal organization before the Lycurgan period. But if the *nomos* did found the ephebeia, Epicrates must have proposed his legislation in 336/5 or 335/4, since Lycurgus began his first four-year term in 336/5 and the ephebeia is first attested epigraphically in 334/3.<sup>49</sup> Another possibility is that the *nomos* was one of the regulations (*nomoi*) attested in the ephebic inscriptions that governed the activities of the ephebes when they undertook their

<sup>45</sup> See Davies 1971, no. 4909 E & G; Hansen 1989, 45; Traill 1997, no. 393520, identifies this Epicrates with the man of the same name (no. 393525) who proposed a decree concerning the funding of a festival in 354/3 (*Agora* I 7495, line 4); Whitehead 2000, 248. Habicht 1997, 23, n. 28, takes Hyperides to mean that Epicrates' himself made 300 talents, but Whitehead 2000, 250, is surely right that Hyperides is referring to the profit made by a consortium, not just Epicrates.

<sup>46</sup> Davies 1971, no. 4909 D. But Traill 1997, no. 394115, does not make this identification.

<sup>47</sup> Faraguna 1992, 275, n. 96; Humphreys 2004, 82, n. 13.

<sup>48</sup> For Epicrates of Euonymon and Pallene, see Davies 1971, nos. 4386 and 4909 F; Traill 1997, nos. 393395 and 393885.

<sup>49</sup> The usual assumption is that the *nomos* was passed in either 336/5 or 335/4 because the epigraphic evidence would not allow a date much earlier (see Mitchel 1964, 344, n. 34; 1975, 233) than the earliest attested ephebic inscription, which scholars have often incorrectly thought to be 335/4 rather than 334/3. E.g. 336/5: Wilamowitz 1892, 194; Brenot 1920, 41; Bosworth 1988a, 209; Engels 1989, 322, n. 677; Habicht 1995, 16. 335/4: Gauthier 1976, 193; Rhodes 1981, 494; Vidal-Naquet 1986b, 133; Chankowski 1997, 333; Knoepfler 2001, 382. Rawlings 2000, 237, suggests a date of c. 337/6. Atkinson 1981, 43, opines "soon after Chaeronea." Marcellus 1994, 154, accepting Davies' identification of the Epicrates in Harpocraton with Ἐπικράτης ... οἴητου, suggests that Epicrates proposed his law in 335/4 while he served in the *Boule*, though he offers no evidence to substantiate this claim.

military service: **E2** (= *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156 [333/2]), line 28: πάντα ὅ[σα αὐτ]οῖς οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσιν, and line 54: πάντα ὅσα οἱ νόμοι αὐτοῖς προστάττουσιν. **E8** (= Meritt 1940, 59-66, no. 8 [332/1], Col. I, lines 7-9): φησιν εἶναι εὐτα[κτὸν]τας καὶ πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]ις καὶ ἑαυτῷ.<sup>50</sup> If so, Epicrates' law could have been passed at any time during Lycurgus' term in office or those of his proxies (i.e. 336/5-325/4).<sup>51</sup>

There are two reasons to think that Epicrates' *nomos* could have created the ephebeia. First, as Faraguna suggests, Lycurgus mentioned Epicrates' legislation in the *On the Financial Administration* because he considered it one of the achievements of his first term in office.<sup>52</sup> It is unlikely that he would have done so if the *nomos* was merely one of the regulations discussed above. Second, the Athenians set up a bronze statue of Epicrates (χαλκοῦς ἐστάθη) on account of his law. We know from the literary and epigraphic evidence that Lycurgus energetically solicited wealthy individuals to contribute money and material towards important projects, who then received public honors from the *demos* for their benefactions.<sup>53</sup> The few individuals honored with a statue in the Agora had, as far as we can tell, performed some duty of vital importance to Athens or had spent much money on the city's behalf: e.g. the *demos* honored Neoptolemus of Melite, on Lycurgus' motion, with a bronze statue and a crown for promising to gild the altar of Apollo ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843F-844A).<sup>54</sup> Forbes, then, is

<sup>50</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 213: "la vie éphébique était réglementée dans ses moindres détails par les lois et les décrets du peuple." Conomis 1961, 102, suggests that Epicrates' *nomos* may have been a series of laws.

<sup>51</sup> Given the paucity of the evidence, we cannot rule out the following: (1) The regulations in **E2** could have been enacted between the creation of the ephebeia and the first ephebic enrollment year (i.e. they were not necessarily part of the legislation which established the institution). (2) New regulations continued to be introduced as the ephebeia matured in the Lycurgan period (i.e. the *nomoi* in **E2** and **E8** need not have been identical). The earliest such change attested in the ephebic corpus is on the highly fragmentary inscription *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 556 (c. 305/4) = Reinmuth 1971, no. 18, which probably reduced ephebic service from two years to one (i.e. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 478 [305/4] = Reinmuth 1971, no. 17). Inscriptions from the second-century onwards routinely mention the name of the proposer of the new regulation (e.g. *SEG* 15.104 [127/6], line 105; Hesp. 16, 147, 171, no. 67 [116/5], line 32; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1043 [38/7], line 50).

<sup>52</sup> Faraguna, 1992, 275, n. 96.

<sup>53</sup> The decree of Stratocles says that Lycurgus raised 650 talents as loans from rich individuals ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852B; cf. 250 talents in 841D). On the granting of public honors for private benefactors in Lycurgan Athens, see Mitchel 1970, 34-5; Hakkarainen 1997, 9-10, 20-1, 25-8; Mikalson 2000, 34-5. Many of the inscriptions collected in Schwenk 1985 are honorary decrees. Lambert 2004; 2006; 2007 has also compiled a register of fourth-century honorary inscriptions, including the Lycurgan period.

<sup>54</sup> Epicrates and Neoptolemus probably had their statues erected in the Agora, as had Demades for his mission to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes (Din. 1.101) and Diphilus for unknown reasons (Din.

probably right to suggest that Epicrates' "patriotic zeal impelled him to make a generous contribution toward the expenses of founding and maintaining the ephebeia."<sup>55</sup>

Even so, it cannot be established with certainty from Harpocration's fragment that Epicrates' legislation did in fact create the ephebeia. At any rate, the passage provides no insight into what military problem prompted the Athenians to found the institution. Nor does it explain why they employed this solution in 334/3. It is to these matters that we must now turn.

### 2.3: The Professionalization of an Amateur Militia?

Scholars, regardless of their position on the existence of an early ephebeia, generally agree that the Lycurgan institution should be seen as a reaction to the defeat which the Macedonians under Philip II had inflicted upon the numerically superior coalition of the Athenians and their allies at Chaeronea.<sup>56</sup> The Athenians themselves suffered terribly – 1,000 dead and 2,000 captured – about half of those who fought in the battle.<sup>57</sup> If we can trust two stratagems of the battle preserved in Polyaeus, Philip himself commanded the Macedonians facing the Athenians and gained victory over them on account of his excellent generalship and the superior fighting quality of his army. In the first stratagem, Philip staged a controlled withdrawal of his troops to high ground, which caused the Athenians under Stratocles to pursue him impetuously. Philip then reversed direction and charged the Athenians, putting them to flight (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.2).

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1.43). The epigraphic evidence suggests that the awarding of a statue for an Athenian citizen was rare in the fourth century: see Henry 1983, 294-6. Marcellus 1994, 155, assumes that Lycurgus proposed the honor for Epicrates, but Harpocration does not mention the name of the proposer.

<sup>55</sup> Forbes 1929, 126. See also Conomis 1961, 102; Sealey 1993, 211.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. Brenot 1920, 47-8; Forbes 1929, 125; Nilsson 1955, 20; Mitchel 1965, 197; 1970, 37; Garland 1975, 175; Atkinson 1981, 43; Hansen 1991, 89; Sekunda 1992, 345; Marcellus 1994, 141, 156; Burckhardt 1996, 45-6; van Wees 2004, 95. Pélékidis 1962, 7-17, however, argues that Chaeronea had no impact on the ephebeia because the institution in the late fifth or early fourth centuries was identical to the one described in the *Athenaion Politeia* (see also Reinmuth 1971, 132-3; Ober 1985a, 91, n. 14; Munn 1993, 188; Christ 2001, 416).

<sup>57</sup> D.S. 16.86.5; Paus. 7.10.5; Dem. 18.264; [Demad]. 9-10. The Boeotian and Achaean contingents, the allies of the Athenians, also suffered considerable losses: D.S. 16.86.6 (Boeotians); Plut. *Pel.* 18.5 (Sacred Band); Paus. 7.6.5 (Achaean). The extant sources make a detailed reconstruction of the battle impossible: D.S. 16.85.5-86.6; Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.2, 7; Plut. *Alex.* 9.3; Dem. 19.2; Just. 9.3; Paus. 9.40.10. The most thorough and convincing modern account of Chaeronea is Hammond 1938, 186-218. Also see the discussions of Pritchett 1958, 307-11; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 589-603; Rahe 1981, 84-7.

Referring to the aforementioned maneuver, Polyaeus in the second stratagem makes a general statement concerning the relative martial prowess of the combatants:

At Chaeronea Philip, realizing that the Athenians were impulsive (ὄξεῖς) and in poor physical condition (ἀγυμνάστους), while his Macedonians were well trained (ἡσκηκότας) and were in a state of excellent physical fitness (γεγυμνασμένους), prolonged the engagement and thus quickly exhausted the Athenians and made them easy to defeat (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.7).<sup>58</sup>

Certainly the amateur citizen militia of Athens would have stood little chance in pitched battle against the superbly drilled and physically conditioned, organized, and equipped professionals of the Macedonian phalanx, who could undertake long marches at a speed unmatched by any other army in Greece and perform battlefield maneuvers beyond the capability of even the Spartans in their prime.<sup>59</sup> As Justin puts it, the Greeks at Chaeronea were superior in numbers, but the Macedonians were victorious because they were “invigorated by constant service in the field (9.3.9).”<sup>60</sup>

Scholars argue that the *demos*, having realized that their fellow citizens had performed poorly against the Macedonians because the former lacked sufficient training and discipline, sought to remedy these deficiencies by hiring specialized military instructors to teach the ephebes how to fight more effectively ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3), so that they “might stand firm in the battle line and be obedient to their officers.”<sup>61</sup> In making this argument scholars stress that the *primary* motivation behind Epicrates’

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<sup>58</sup> Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ γιγνώσκων τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὄξεῖς καὶ ἀγυμνάστους, τοὺς δὲ Μακεδόνας ἡσκηκότας καὶ γεγυμνασμένους, ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν παράταξιν ἐκτείνας ταχέως παρέλυσεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ εὐχειρώτους ἐποίησε. Cf. Frontinus, who is probably drawing from the same source: Philippus ad Chaeroneam memor, sibi esse militem longo usu duratum, Atheniensibus acrem quidem, sed inexercitatum et in impetus tantum violentum, ex industria proelium traxit, moxque languentibus iam Atheniensibus concitatius intulit signa et ipsos cecidit (*Strat.* 2.1.9).

<sup>59</sup> Philip was famous in antiquity for turning his army into a formidable military machine: e.g. Dem. 2.17; D.S. 16.3.1-3; Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.10; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.6; Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.2-4. For a detailed discussion of his army, see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 405-449.

<sup>60</sup> Proelio commisso, cum Athenienses longe maiore militum numero praestarent, adsiduis bellis indurate virtute Macedonum vincuntur. Justin’s use of *Athenienses* should be taken to refer to all the Greeks who fought at Chaeronea, not just the Athenian contingent.

<sup>61</sup> Mitchel 1970, 37. See also Burckhardt 1996, 45.

legislation was to train Athenian citizens, especially for hoplite battle.<sup>62</sup> Others also suppose that the obligatory nature of ephebic service for all classes of citizens, including *thetes*, and especially the state-funded issue of hoplite arms to every ephebe ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4), should be understood as an effort by the *demos* to increase the numerical strength of Athens' hoplite forces.<sup>63</sup> The overall objective of the ephebeia was thus to create a citizen army, uniformly equipped and trained, which could fight more successfully against the Macedonians should Athens and Philip once more come to blows.<sup>64</sup> This view has led scholars to believe that the institution was conceived as the land component of Lycurgus' program to revitalize Athens' military power,<sup>65</sup> or even as the centerpiece of his efforts to increase patriotism, piety, and civic pride among the citizen body of Athens.<sup>66</sup>

The consensus view, then, is that the ephebeia was the solution to the Athenians' need to improve the effectiveness of the hoplite phalanx in the wake of their catastrophic defeat at Chaeronea. As Reinmuth puts it:

Under these circumstances [i.e. Macedonian domination], Lycurgus and his associates may well have felt that Athens could in time regain her old position. To make possible the continuance of the *demos kai demokratia*,

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<sup>62</sup> E.g. Forbes 1929, 115: "The compulsion to enter the ephebeia was occasioned by the desire to train as many soldiers as possible to fight for Athens in the period of her military decline." Conomis 1961, 102: "I also share the belief that the main innovation of Epicrates' law was that it made the institution public and compulsory, its primary aim being military training. Bosworth 1988a, 209: "The ephebic legislation was clearly intended to produce a more efficient citizen army ... The result of the training was in theory an effective citizen army, well armed and trained and deeply motivated to defend Athens." Sealey 1993, 211: "The purpose [of Epicrates' reform] was to train young men for military service."

<sup>63</sup> Bertosa 2003, 372: The "gist of the ephebic reform was to admit thetes to the program for the first time; given that they constituted the majority of the citizens, the purpose of this had to have been to effect a massive increase in the city's hoplite forces." Also see Forbes 1929, 115; Ridley 1979, 519; Sekunda 1992, 345; Habicht 1997, 17.

<sup>64</sup> See Reinmuth 1967, 49; Burckhardt 1996, 45, 51-2; Rawlings 2000, 242; van Wees 2004, 94-5.

<sup>65</sup> E.g.: Atkinson 1981, 43: "Thus walls, shipsheds and a naval arsenal were built, and probably soon after Chaeronea Lycurgus organized the reform of the ephebate, obliging all 18 year olds to enroll for two years military training and service." Bosworth 1988a, 209: "Parallel to the refurbishment of the navy was the reorganization of the ephebeia." Tracy 1995, 10: "The inscriptions reveal that the fleet was well maintained, and a new arsenal designed by the architect Philon was completed in Piraeus. Complementing this, the training of young men as soldiers, the ephebeia, gained an active new life." Harding 1995, 125: "During the period between Khaironeia and the death of Alexander the city rebuilt its walls, strengthened its navy, retrained its youth and restored its finances."

<sup>66</sup> As Marcellus 1994, 143, puts it: "the novelty of the ephebeia would fit well with Lycurgan ideas about religion and patriotism." See also Mitchel 1970, 37; Habicht 1997, 16-7; Humphreys 2004, 88.

Athens must create a land army which would be as effective against such an army as Philip's. To accomplish this, the system of ephebic military service was overhauled in 335/4. There is no documentation for the statement, but the striking way in which the distinctive features of the Aristotelian ephebia are designed to meet the weaknesses of the Athenian army of the times [as revealed at Chaeronea] ... almost force the conclusion upon us.<sup>67</sup>

But should the “distinctive features” of the ephebeia be seen as the means by which the Athenians attempted to catch up with Philip's formidable military machine? Scholars have assumed that the Athenians' overriding concern after Chaeronea was to train the whole citizen body or at least the top three census classes to be better fighters. But if so, it is hard to understand why they created an institution which restricted its training to eighteen year old citizens, who traditionally did not fight outside the borders of Attica except in emergencies and comprised only about three percent of the male citizen body.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, since the ephebes began their training in 334/3 (**E1-E4**), the ephebeia did nothing to improve the fighting quality of those Athenians who had been beaten so badly by the Macedonians.<sup>69</sup>

It is also difficult to reconcile the view that the main purpose of the ephebeia was to train Athenian citizens to fight pitched battles against the Macedonian phalanx with the *type* of weapons training the ephebes actually received, which included instruction in the use of non-hoplite weaponry – the bow, javelin, and catapult– which are useless in close combat (Thuc. 4.32.4; Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.7; 6.3.24; 7.4.15). This is not to say that the ephebes

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<sup>67</sup> Reinmuth 1967, 49. The italics are his. Though Reinmuth later rejected this view – the ephebeia's reorganization in response to Philip's victory at Chaeronea – on account of his acceptance of an early date for **E1** (1971, 125-6), his argument is nevertheless representative of prevailing scholarly opinion.

<sup>68</sup> Comparative demographic data and literary evidence suggests that 3.3% of c. 31,000 Athenian citizens were aged 18 in the Lycurgan period: i.e. c. 900-950 males became citizens in a typical year (see pp. 105-6). While 18-19 year old citizens served in the ephebeia, about 6.7% of the adult male population aged 18-80+, only those ephebes in their first year of military service were required to undertake military training ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).

<sup>69</sup> It should be stressed, however, that scholars, to the best of my knowledge, do not even consider this a problem on account of their mistaken belief that the ephebeia existed as formal institution prior to Chaeronea and hence falsely assume that the Athenian citizens who fought in the battle had already received instruction in the art of war. For these scholars the ephebic training system as described in the *Athenaion Politeia* should be regarded as a “new approach to the existing practices, whatever they may have been (Mitchel 1970, 37).”



were not instructed in skills useful for hoplite warfare, since they were drilled in unit tactics and the *paidotribai* trained them in physical exercise ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4): Polyaeus' statement that the Athenian soldiers were ἀγυμνάστοι at Chaeronea could not apply to those citizens trained in the ephebeia (*Strat.* 4.2.7). Even so, one would have expected the Athenians to have trained the ephebes *exclusively* for hoplite warfare, given that they had little chance of regaining their freedom unless they could decisively defeat the Macedonians in pitched battle, just as the Thebans (335/4), the Spartans (331/0), and the Greeks (under the leadership of the Athenians) tried to do in the Lamian War (323/2).<sup>70</sup>

Sekunda argues that “the defeat at Chaironeia had impressed upon the Athenians the need to extend the strength of their hoplite forces, by including all citizens and not just those of ‘the hoplite census classes’” and that the ephebeia was intended to fix this problem.<sup>71</sup> The evidence he presents, however, does not support his argument. The donation of shields made by the *strategoi* Diotimos and Charidemos immediately after Chaeronea should be seen as an attempt to reequip those citizens who had lost their shields in the battle rather than an effort to furnish hoplite arms for the *thetes* who had never possessed them (Dem. 18.114, 116).<sup>72</sup> The gifting of the shields was one of the emergency measures undertaken in the aftermath of Chaeronea, when the Athenians

<sup>70</sup> Scholars who assume that some kind of mass training existed before Chaeronea miss this important point. Burckhardt 1996, 44, for example, argues that the ephebes prior to Epicrates' legislation were trained as hoplites, implying that the instruction in non-hoplite weaponry was a consequence of the reform. He does not explain, however, why the Athenians should introduce non-hoplite weapons into the training program when the object of the reform was to improve citizens' skills in hoplite warfare (cf. 45-6). See also Ridley 1979, 530-47.

<sup>71</sup> Sekunda 1992, 345-6. Cf. Engels 1992, 22: “eine wirkliche Verstaatlichung und Professionalisierung des Hoplitendienstes der jungen Bürger im lykurgischen Athen.”

<sup>72</sup> For Diotimos and Charidemos as *strategoi* in 338/7, see Pritchett 1974, 88; Develin 1989, 343. While Sekunda recognizes that these shields were issued in the crisis after Chaeronea, he does not take into account that a minority of the 5,000 Athenian hoplites who were not killed at Chaeronea would have returned to Athens with their panoply intact: (1) The 2,000 citizens captured on the battlefield would have been despoiled of their arms (see Vaughn 1991, 46-7). (2) Many of the remainder who fled to Athens would have thrown away their shields and other items in order to save themselves (cf. Archil. Fr. 5 West; Hdt. 5.95.1). The interpolated decree in Demosthenes, if genuine, explicitly says that Charidemos supplied the shieldless *neaniskoi* who had been disarmed (18.116; cf. Kroll 1977, 146, n. 16). Demosthenes' equipping of citizens who lacked arms (καθώπλισε τοὺς πολίτας τῶν ἐλλειπόντων) may also refer to those Athenians who fought in the battle and who had lost their arms afterwards ([Plut]. *Mor.* 851A), though all that can be deduced from Demochares' decree (since the events depicted are not in chronological order) is that Demosthenes made the gift at some point in 338/7-337/6.

manned the city walls with every adult male capable of bearing arms in the expectation of a Macedonian assault on Athens: Hyperides even illegally proposed enfranchising the resident aliens and freeing the slaves if they were willing to defend Athens.<sup>73</sup>

Before the ephebeia regular state involvement in the equipping of citizens for hoplite warfare was limited to the orphaned sons of Athenians killed in battle,<sup>74</sup> though Athens would supply *thetes* with hoplite armor in emergencies (e.g. Thuc. 6.72.4; 8.25.1).<sup>75</sup> Otherwise the procurement of arms and armor was a private affair, subject to the personal wealth and inclination of the individual citizen.<sup>76</sup> The issuance of the hoplite spear and shield at public expense to all ephebes at the beginning of their second year in the ephebeia therefore marked a decisive break with established Athenian military practice ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).<sup>77</sup> But did this lead to a substantial increase in the size of Athens' hoplite forces after Chaeronea? While Sekunda is right to argue that *thetes* were required to serve in the ephebeia, it would have taken thirty-one years (from 334/3), or thirty-five years after Chaeronea (338/7), before the entire phalanx consisted of former cadets (i.e. those aged 20-50 years old including the *thetes*), who had been trained and

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<sup>73</sup> According to Lycurgus the defense of Athens immediately after Chaeronea chiefly depended upon men fifty years old and over (*Leoc.* 39-40). He does not mention the youngest citizens, though they too must have been present en masse (cf. 44). The Athenians gave the *strategoi* wide powers to mobilize whomever they needed for the defense of Athens (16). For Hyperides' proposal, see [Plut]. *Mor.* 849A; Lyc. *Leoc.* 41. He also moved to arm the *boule* and send it to Piraeus (Lyc. *Leoc.* 36-7). Aristogeiton later indicted the orator for his *graphe paranomon*, but he was not found guilty (see Osborne 1990, T 67, on [Plut]. *Mor.* 848F-849A; Suda s.v. Ἀριστογείτων).

<sup>74</sup> The orphans, having been supported by the state during their minority, were given a panoply and paraded before the *demos* at the start of the Greater Dionysia in the theatre of Dionysus: see Aeschin. 3.154; Arist. *Pol.* 2.5.4, 1268a9; Dem. 60.32; Isoc. 8.82; Lys. 2.75-6; Thuc. 2.46; Plato. *Men.* 248E-249B; [Xen]. *Ath.Pol.* 3.4. Some scholars have suggested that the origins of the ephebeia should be seen in the passing-out parade of war orphans because it fell out of use after the inception of the institution (see Bryant 1907, 87-8; Mathieu 1937, 315-8). Pélékidis 1962, 14-17, and Dillery 2002, 466-9, however, have shown that this view is without foundation.

<sup>75</sup> Athens routinely supplied garrison troops with missile weapons (e.g. javelins and arrows) as an inscription, dated to the archonship of Pythodotus (343/2), recently found at the fortress of Panactum attests (see Munn 1996, 52-3, on inv. 1992-300).

<sup>76</sup> See Pritchett 1971, 3, n. 3; Loomis 1998, 58-9; van Wees 1998, 333-78; 2004, 52-4.

<sup>77</sup> The arms were probably distributed from the arsenal on the Acropolis, where Lycurgus is said to have stockpiled "many suits of armor and fifty thousand missiles ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C; cf. Paus. 1.29.16)." Sekunda 1992, 346, plausibly suggests that the Athenians had collected so many panoplies over the Lycurgan period that they also equipped part of Leosthenes' mercenary force (D.S. 17.9.4).

equipped in the institution.<sup>78</sup> The evidence taken together suggests that we should reject the claim of scholars that the ephebeia was in its conception intended primarily to improve the fighting ability of the Athenian army.

#### 2.4: The Ephebeia as a Reaction to Chaeronea?

The conventional view, as we have seen, is that the Athenians created the ephebeia on account of their defeat at Chaeronea. This assertion is problematic, however, because there is a four-year gap between the supposed cause (i.e. Chaeronea) and the effect (i.e. the first attested ephebic enrollment class).<sup>79</sup> Since these scholars also accept that Epicrates' *nomos* founded the institution, it would mean that the Athenians waited at least two years after Chaeronea (336/5-335/4) before they decided to pass the legislation to create it.<sup>80</sup> Some scholars, recognizing this difficulty, have sought to explain this interval by supposing that the Lycurgan ephebeia was intended to be and was perceived by the Macedonians to be a threat to their hegemony, which prompted the Athenians to delay the founding of the institution until it was safe to do so in 334/3.<sup>81</sup> Mitchel, for example, makes this assumption when he suggests that Alexander intended to abolish the ephebeia after the destruction of Thebes until Phocion persuaded him to relent because

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<sup>78</sup> Bertosa 2003, 372, also recognizes this difficulty, that “bolstering the ranks of the hoplites one age class at a time [i.e. the newly admitted *thetes*] via the *ephebeia* would have been a very inefficient way of going about this (his italics).” Reinmuth 1967, 50-1, seems to be unaware that this is a problem, though he says that of “the citizen troops at Lamia in 323/2, all under 40 years of age, slightly more than half, 11 out of 20 yearly cadres, had been epheboi.”

<sup>79</sup> Both Knoepfler 2001, 382, and Bertosa 2003, 370-1, have voiced similar concerns.

<sup>80</sup> In making this argument I do not mean to imply that the Athenians could have created a complex institution such as the ephebeia without taking some time to plan and then to put their plan into effect – I suggest later in this chapter that this process may have taken months. Even so, I contend in this section that a four-year interval makes it unlikely that Chaeronea was the cause if we consider the Athenians' military strength compared to the Macedonians and the military activities of the Lycurgan program.

<sup>81</sup> Reinmuth 1967, 49: “A programme which so obviously looked forward to the re-establishment of Athens among the contenders for leadership could not have been tolerated by Philip or Alexander. Antipater would be inclined to overlook its implications. It was only after Philip's death and Alexander's departure for Asia in the spring of 334/3 that Lycurgus ventured to put it into effect.” The argument is nonsensical. If the ephebeia presented a military threat to Philip and Alexander when they had the full Macedonian army at their disposal, how then could the institution have been less threatening to Antipater, who now had only a portion of those forces available to enforce the Common Peace?

the latter claimed that the program of ephebic training was of negligible military value.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, some scholars have argued that the institution was so great a threat to Philip and Alexander that the ephebeia cannot have been created *de novo* because both monarchs would not have permitted it to continue.<sup>83</sup>

But was the ephebeia a threat? No – if we consider the nature of Macedonian hegemony over Greece. The Athenians were acutely aware that freedom could be regained if and only if they could assemble a coalition at least as strong as the one which had opposed Philip at Chaeronea *and* if the Macedonians dissipated their strength at the same time through internal struggle (see below).<sup>84</sup> Given this, the Athenians, like other Greeks, had no choice but to submit so long as Philip remained in firm control of the Macedonian army. Certainly Philip tried to ensure that potentially hostile Greek states would remain disunited. First, in the settlements which he made with his enemies after Chaeronea he installed many pro-Macedonian regimes and stationed several garrisons in strategic locations.<sup>85</sup> The Athenians' most important ally, the Thebans, suffered this fate.<sup>86</sup> Second, the Macedonian-enforced Common Peace kept the Athenians and Thebans, two of the three traditional Greek powers (Sparta being the other), on a tight leash and prevented them from reforming an anti-Macedonian alliance.<sup>87</sup>

The Athenian reaction to Philip's assassination in October 336 shows the weakness of their position after Chaeronea.<sup>88</sup> When news of the assassination reached Athens, the Athenians received it with joy and awarded honors to Pausanias, Philip's murderer (D.S. 17.3.2; Plut. *Dem.* 22.2). Confident that Alexander would not leave Pella

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<sup>82</sup> Mitchel 1962, 224, n. 36. Bertosa 2003, 373, argues that the Athenians decided to reform the ephebeia while Alexander was campaigning in Illyria in 335/4 because any attempt to do so after the destruction of Thebes would have been "suicidal" for Athens. He offers no explanation, however, for this assertion.

<sup>83</sup> Reinmuth 1952, 49; Pélékidis 1962, 11. *Contra* Marcellus 1994, 140.

<sup>84</sup> See Sealey 1993, 198, for this important observation.

<sup>85</sup> See Roebuck 1948, 73-92; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 604-23.

<sup>86</sup> Philip exacted a ransom for the Thebans killed and captured at Chaeronea, executed or exiled the political leaders in Thebes, overthrew the constitution and installed an oligarchy of three hundred supporters to run affairs as he wished, and stationed a Macedonian garrison on the Cadmea (D.S. 16.87.3; Just. 9.4.6-8). Philip also attempted to drive a wedge between Athens and Thebes by returning Oropus to the former: see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 608, 611.

<sup>87</sup> See Ryder 1965, 104-5; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 633.

<sup>88</sup> For the date of the assassination, see Bosworth 1980, 45-6. These events are discussed in Schaefer 1887, 88-97; Will 1983, 31-6; Bosworth 1988a, 25-8, 188-90; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 3-17.

(Aeschin. 3.160), the Athenians encouraged other Greeks to revolt and, through Demosthenes, seemingly got in contact with Attalus and Alexander's generals in Asia (D.S. 17.3.2, 5.1; Plut. *Dem.* 23.2), both flagrant violations of the Common Peace. Phocion opposed these activities and pointed out (correctly) that Macedonian power had been reduced only by one man (Plut. *Phoc.* 16.6). The Athenian aim was clearly to gather a coalition against Alexander (anti-Macedon opposition had already appeared in Aetolia, Thebes, Argos, Elis, and Arcadia: D.S. 17.3.3-5), if given enough time, and to exploit divisions within the Macedonian leadership. Alexander's lightning march to Thebes threw the Athenians and the rest of Greece into confusion and ended all hopes for a unified resistance (D.S. 17.4.4; Just. 11.2.5). In this situation Athens prepared for war by abandoning the countryside and defending the city-walls (D.S. 17.4.5) and had no choice but to submit to Alexander, seek his forgiveness, and renew the alliance (Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.3; D.S. 17.4.6-9).

It should be clear, then, that without allies the Athenians by themselves posed no threat to Philip or his successor Alexander, because no *polis*, Athens included, had sufficient strength to match the military might of Macedon on land.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, the Athenians could not even hope to fight against the Boeotians on equal terms, as Phocion bluntly stated to the Athenians when they were clamoring to go to war with the Boeotians after the latter had seized Oropus in 366 (Plut. *Phoc.* 9.4; cf. Xen. *Hipp.* 7.3; *Mem.* 3.5.4). This is understandable, since the hoplite phalanx from the fifth century onwards was regarded as the weakest arm of Athens' military forces on account of its inferior numbers (compared to the city's enemies), inadequate discipline, and lack of skill ([Xen]. *Ath.Pol.* 2.1; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.19). Given that the training and equipping of citizens in the ephebeia did not put right the deficiencies of the Athenian forces which had been beaten so badly by Philip at Chaeronea, as we have seen, it is hard to see how the Macedonians could have regarded the institution as a threat.

Moreover, the notion that the Athenians were compelled by fear of Macedonian retaliation c. 338/7-335/4 to delay the ephebeia's foundation is belied by the Athenians'

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<sup>89</sup> Cawkwell 1969, 164: "the central fact of this age is military, not moral – viz. the huge preponderance in military potential of the Macedonian state over the power of any single Greek state."

effort in this period to strengthen Athens' fortifications. Immediately after Chaeronea the Athenians, realizing that their antiquated city walls were inadequate to withstand Philip's formidable siege train, worked desperately to repair and upgrade them by building palisades and digging trenches (Dem. 18.248; Lyc. *Leoc.* 44; Aeschin. 3.236).<sup>90</sup> This modernization of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte continued at least into the next year, since Demosthenes, who held the tribal office of Commissioner for the Walls in 338/7, moved a decree at the end of this year or in the first half of 337/6 to rebuild the walls and contributed funds for this task (Aeschin. 3.27-31; Dem. 18.299-300; [Plut]. *Mor.* 845F; 851A).<sup>91</sup> Extensive work was also undertaken on the border forts, if the construction at Rhamnous and Phyle is representative.<sup>92</sup>

Nor did the Athenians let their fear of the Macedonians prevent them from devoting substantial resources to improving their navy and hence their ability to secure the corn supply, which was crucial for Athens' continued independence after Chaeronea.<sup>93</sup> According to the decree of Stratocles, Lycurgus "equipped four hundred

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<sup>90</sup> Some scholars argue that the strength of Athens' walls, the determined resistance of her defenders, and her naval superiority, which could keep the city supplied for a siege lasting months, dissuaded Philip from attacking the city (e.g. Roebuck 1948, 80; Mitchel 1970, 5; Sealey 1993, 199; Habicht 1997, 11). A more convincing explanation is that he chose not to attack the Athenians, not because he could not have taken Athens if he had determined to do so (Hammond 1994, 155; Cawkwell 1996, 98-9), though this cannot be proved since the siege did not occur, but because he needed the Athenian navy for his coming war against the Persians (Cawkwell 1978, 166).

<sup>91</sup> A fragmentary inscription records repairs of the walls of Piraeus (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 244 = Schwenk 1985, no. 3). For the date, see Maier 1959, 36-48; Schwenk 1985, 24-6. Cawkwell 1963, 66, n. 109 dates the inscription to Eubulus' time (*contra* Mitchel 1970, 34, n. 129). Archeological excavations have shown that the landward defenses were extensively remodeled, with a moat and a fore-wall added to the strengthened inner wall (see Threpsiades 1935, 31-2; Mitchel 1965, 197; Winter 1971, 276-7; Wycherley 1978, 18-20).

<sup>92</sup> For Rhamnous, see Poullioux 1954, 55-6, 62-6. For Phyle, see Maier 1959, 42; Munn 1993, 122, on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 244, line 11.

<sup>93</sup> Athens' independence, national prestige, and her position as a great power in the Greek world depended upon the possession of a navy whose strength surpassed all rivals (Ober 1978, 119-30, esp. 124-5; Harding 1995, 111, n. 36). For the vulnerability of the grain supply in the 330's and 320's, including food shortages, see Garnsey 1988, 134-64. In the aftermath of Chaeronea Demosthenes was sent away from Athens as grain commissioner to ensure the supply of corn (Dem. 18. 248; Aesch. 3.159; [Plut]. *Mor.* 851A-B; Din. 1.78-80). The Athenians were well aware that Philip's control of the Hellespont rendered Athens' grain supply insecure and gave him a weapon to coerce the city if circumstances dictated. Hammond and Griffith 1979, 607, rightly say that the loss of the Chersonese would "have acted as a standing discouragement to the Athenians from going to war with Philip again or making preparations to go to war." To keep the grain supply open, Athens on several occasions dispatched ships to clear the seas of pirates: e.g. two ships sent under Diotimos in 334/3 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1623, lines 276-308; [Plut]. *Mor.* 844A; Schwenk 1985, no. 25) and one hundred triremes after the Macedonians had seized the grain fleet at Tenedos in 332/1(?) ([Dem]. 17.19-

seaworthy triremes, some he fitted out, others he built from scratch. Additionally he completed both the shipsheds and the naval arsenal ... after he had taken them up half-done.”<sup>94</sup> While the Athenian navy had 349 triremes in 353/2 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1613, lines 284-92), Lycurgus had increased the fleet to 410 ships in 330/29 of which 18 were the heavier and more up-to-date *tetrereis* (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627, lines 266-78). Four years later (326/5) the Athenians appear to have had the same number of ships, but now possessed 50 *tetrereis* (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1628, lines 481-500), while in the following year 417 ships are attested including 50 *tetrereis* and 7 *pentereis* (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1629, lines 783-812).<sup>95</sup>

Lycurgus also completed the shipsheds (νεωσοίκοι) and the naval arsenal (σκευοθήκη), which Eubulus had begun but had left half-finished (ἡμίεργα) (Aeschin. 3.25; Din. 1.96).<sup>96</sup> Certainly more shipsheds were needed to keep pace with the shipbuilding program: 372 had been built by 330/29, of which 82 were in Munychia, 196 in Zea, and 94 in Kantharus (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627, lines 398-405). During the fourth century the Athenian navy suffered from a serious shortage of equipment, which had severely limited the number of ships ready for action.<sup>97</sup> Eubulus’ solution was Philon’s arsenal, begun in 347/6 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 505), which was intended to store the majority of the navy’s equipment.<sup>98</sup> Lycurgus resumed the arsenal’s construction after it was interrupted by the war against Philip (Philochorus FGrHist 328, F 135) and probably completed it by 330/29 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627, lines 288, 292).<sup>99</sup> These measures ensured that Athens’ huge fleet would be in a constant state of battle preparedness, perhaps for the first time since the Peloponnesian War.

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20). They also established a colony in the Adriatic in 325/4, whose purpose was to secure the grain supply and ward off Etruscan pirates (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1629, lines 2157-223).

<sup>94</sup> [Plut]. *Mor.* 852C: τετρακοσίας δὲ τριήρεις πλωσίμους κατεσκεύασε, τὰς μὲν ἐπισκευάσας τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ναυπηγησάμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡμίεργα παραλαβὼν τοὺς τε νεωσοίκους καὶ τὴν σκευοθήκην ... ἐξεργάσατο. See also [Plut]. *Mor.* 841C-D; Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe; Paus. 1.29.16.

<sup>95</sup> For a discussion of these figures, see Ashton 1979, 237-42; Morrison 1987, 89-93.

<sup>96</sup> See Cawkwell 1963, 65-6. From 347/6-323/2 the Athenians exacted an annual levy of ten talents from metics for their construction (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 505).

<sup>97</sup> See Gabrielsen 1994, 146-69.

<sup>98</sup> Plut. *Sulla* 14.7; Vitruvius. *De arch. praef.* 7.12; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1668. For the arsenal, with bibliography, see Townsend 1982, 261-4; Will 1983, 89; Garland 1987, 156-8; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 15-7.

<sup>99</sup> Lycurgus also built another storehouse on the Acropolis with complete sets of equipment for 100 triremes: see Gabrielsen 1994, 146-9, 157.

Though the decree of Stratocles portrays this military buildup – the strengthening of Athens’ land defenses, the expansion and modernization of the navy, and the improvement of the city’s naval infrastructure – as preparation for the Lamian War (323/2) ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C: ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευῆς),<sup>100</sup> the Athenians after Chaeronea could not have known when the opportunity (such as Philip’s assassination) would come to cast off the Macedonian yoke and reclaim their former leading position in Greek affairs.<sup>101</sup> Under these circumstances the ephebeia should have been a priority for the Athenians, if, as scholars have claimed, the *demos* had recognized that the training and equipping of ephebes was vital for reviving Athens’ hoplite forces in the wake of Philip’s victory.<sup>102</sup> But if we reject this claim and agree that the Athenians had no reason to delay the institution’s foundation to 334/3, we must seek another explanation for why the Athenians created the ephebeia, an institution without parallel in Athenian history.

## 2.5: The Ephebeia and the Defense of Attica

In Lycurgan Athens, if not earlier, “the defense of the countryside (ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας)” was one of the mandatory topics for discussion at the ten ἐκκλησίαι κύριαι and hence a matter of the highest institutional concern for the *demos* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 43.4).<sup>103</sup> The Athenians devoted substantial human and material resources to protect the

<sup>100</sup> Will 1983, 96-7, denies that these military preparations were directed against Macedon. But Mitchel 1970, 49-50, is surely right in arguing that the Athenians’ fear of and desire to be free from Macedonian domination provided the impetus behind the military buildup (cf. Bosworth 1985, 436).

<sup>101</sup> Badian 1995, 80-106, shows that Athenian foreign policy throughout the fourth century was ultimately directed to recovering the naval empire Athens’ possessed in the fifth century. Despite being no longer financially or militarily capable of realizing her aspirations to supremacy in the Greek world, the Athenians made repeated attempts to do so until they were completely defeated in the Lamian War, from which the Athenians never recovered (*contra* Harding 1995, 105-25). If so, the loss of what remained of the Athenian League would have been a bitter blow to Athens’ traditional claim of hegemony (see Hammond and Griffith 1979, 607).

<sup>102</sup> If the Athenians had considered it such a priority to train their citizenry, why didn’t they do so? They could have turned the city into a “workshop of war” in the same manner as the Spartan king Agesilaus did at Ephesus in the spring of 395, where all the (non-Spartan) contingents were vigorously training to be hoplites, cavalymen, archers, and peltasts (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16-8). If we can trust Xenophon, the rest of the Boeotians likewise were quick to emulate the Thebans and train vigorously in their arms within a year after their victory at Leuctra (*Hell.* 6.5.23).

<sup>103</sup> See Hansen 1987, 25-7, for the agenda at the curial Assembly. For the use of ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας on decrees and what kind of business the heading entailed, see Rhodes 1972, 231-5. Ober 1985a, 88-9, argues



*chora* of Attica, building upon the rough terrain which made the border difficult for enemies to traverse (Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.25). Under the command of a general whose duty was exclusively concerned with the defense of Attica ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 61.1: στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν),<sup>104</sup> the Athenians were protected by a sophisticated defensive system which consisted of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and an extensive network of garrison fortresses built along the Megarian and Boeotian borders (Eleusis, Eleutherai, Oinoe, Panactum, Phyle, Aphidna, and Rhamnous) and the eastern seaboard (e.g. Thoricus and Sounium). In addition, numerous minor fortifications of various kinds, such as watch-towers and signal stations, occupied the Attic landscape. Finally, the Athenians had constructed a wall across the Aigaleus-Parnes gap, known to historians as the Dema Wall.<sup>105</sup>

From 334/3 onwards the ephebeia played an important role in garrisoning the fortified points of Attica. The *Athenaion Politeia* summarizes the ephebes' duties as follows: "[The ephebes] march to the Piraeus, and some garrison Munychia and others Acte. ... in the following year ... they patrol the countryside and pass their time in the guard-posts. And they perform garrison duty for two years ... ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5)."<sup>106</sup> The epigraphic evidence suggests that the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ and the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ commanded the ephebes in their first year of service, while in their second year the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ (= στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν) had authority over them when they garrisoned the border fortresses.<sup>107</sup> The central importance

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that "the defense of the *chora*" was already on the agenda at curial meetings from at least the 360's, if not after the end of the Peloponnesian War (Arist. *Rhet.* 1359b-1360a; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10-11).

<sup>104</sup> The office is first attested on *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 204, lines 19-21, dated to 352/1. The Athenians may have created it after the Thebans annexed Oropus in 366 (Munn 1993, 190-1; cf. Ober 1985a, 89-90).

<sup>105</sup> The bibliography on Athenian fortifications is extensive. The most important works are: Pouilloux 1954; McCredie 1966; Winter 1971; Garland 1974; Lawrence 1979; Ober 1985a; Munn 1993. I do not intend to discuss the controversies over the identification, location, and date of (re)construction of these fortifications. For the existence of various elements of this system in the fifth century, see p. 47, n. 188.

<sup>106</sup> εἴτ' εἰς Πειραιέα πορεύονται, καὶ φρουροῦσιν οἱ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτὴν ... περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη.

<sup>107</sup> For the relationship between the ephebes and these *strategoi*, see Pélékidis 1962, 109; Reinmuth 1971, 78-80. The στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ and the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ are attested on four ephebic inscriptions dating to the first few years of the institution: **E4** (333/2), lines 4-6; **E7** (332/1), lines 9-10; **E8** (332/1), Col. II, lines 9-12; **E12** (333/2 or 332/1), lines 2-7. In **E5** (332/1), the former is instead called στρατηγὸς τοῦ Πειραιῶς (lines 4-5). Though the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* says that two

of garrison duty is also made clear in **E2** = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156, dated to 333/2, in which two decrees (the *Boule* and the deme of Eleusis) honor the ephebes of the tribe Cecropis for their guard duty at Eleusis: ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι[ι οἱ] τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες Ἐλευσῖνι ... (lines 36-7) and ἐπειδὴ ... ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσίνος οἱ[ι] τῆ[ς Κεκροπίδ]ο[ς ἔφηβ]οι ... (lines 45-7).<sup>108</sup> Other ephebic inscriptions confirm the presence of contingents of ephebes at the border forts.<sup>109</sup>

Scholars have failed to realize this aspect of the ephebeia – the two-year period of mandatory military service for citizens of ephebic age – as a radical departure from previous Athenian military practices, because they believed (I think mistakenly) that ephebes routinely performed garrison duty at least from the time of Aeschines’ *peripoleia* (Aeschin. 2.167). On account of this they have argued that Epicrates’ *nomos* either had no effect on this pre-existing military system, or had modified it by making the ephebes’ service continuous (whereas Aeschines’ was intermittent) or by extending the requirement to serve to citizens of all census classes (i.e. including the *thetes*).<sup>110</sup> But if the youngest Athenians were not called out *en masse* for service in the garrison forts prior to Chaeronea except in times of emergency (Thuc. 2.13.6-7; Dem. 21.193; cf. Glaucon in

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generals were assigned to Piraeus (61.1: δύο δ’ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιέα, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν Μουνιχίαν, τὸν δ’ εἰς τὴν Ἀκτὴν, οἱ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἐν Πειραιεῖ), the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτεῖ first appears on **E20** (331/0-325/4) alongside the two generals mentioned above (left and right sides, lines 42-4). The likely deployment of the ephebes into two relatively equal groups of five tribes on Munychia and Acte (Pélékidis 1962, 114) was probably responsible for the creation of “the general on Acte” because the Athenians realized that two generals could provide more effective leadership for the ephebes than one. The following mention a στρατηγὸς but do not specify his assigned duties: **E18** (329/8?), Left Side, lines 6-7; **E21** (331/0 or 324/3), lines 3-5 (restored).

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Mitchel’s 1984, 117, heavy restoration of **E3** = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1189, dated to the same year, in which the demesmen of Eleusis honor the ephebes of the tribe Hippothontis: ἐπειδὴ οἱ τῆς Ἱπποθ[ωντί]δος ἔφηβοι καλῶς τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσίνος ἐπε]μελοῦντο καὶ ἐκόσ[μο]υν καὶ [πάντων ὧν οἱ νόμοι προσέταττον αὐτοῖς ταχθέντες] Ἐλευσῖνι ἐπεμελοῦντο ... (lines 4-6).

<sup>109</sup> Panactum (**E21** – Hippothontis 331/0 or 324/3; **E23** – Leontis 334/3-323/2; **E24** – Leontis 334/3-323/2); Eleusis, Phyle, Rhamnous (**E15** – Pandionis 331/0 or 330/29); Eleusis, Rhamnous (**E5** – Cecropis 332/1); Rhamnous (**E10** – Eretheis 333/2 or 332/1; **E16** – Aegeis 330/29; **E22** – Acamantis 333/2-323/2). It should be pointed out, however, that **E2** and **E3** are the only inscriptions which explicitly state that the ephebes had performed garrison duty on the Attic-Boeotian border. The demes which honor the ephebes on **E5** and **E15** are rightly thought to do so because of the former’s gratitude to the latter for their dedication to their duty (Reinmuth 1971, 35; Clinton 1988, 22). The dedications of Hippothontis and Leontis at Panactum, which was not a deme, should likewise be understood as the tribes honoring the ephebes for their sterling service. The remaining inscriptions are suggestive but not conclusive.

<sup>110</sup> E.g. Reinmuth 1971, 123-38; Gauthier 1976, 193-5; Ober 1985a, 90-6; Burckhardt 1996, 44; van Wees 2004, 94-5.

Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10-11), as I have argued in the previous chapter,<sup>111</sup> we must accept that compulsory garrison duty was a new obligation imposed upon these citizens in the Lyscurgan Period.

Ascertaining why the *demos* made this choice is central to our understanding of why the Athenians created the ephebeia. I contend that the institution was founded because the Athenians recognized the need to raise and maintain a standing army to ensure greater security for the *chora* and that the publicly funded mass-training system and ephebic officials – both unattested before the creation of the ephebeia – should be seen in the light of training, organizing, and leading this armed force. Indeed, it is clear from the epigraphic evidence that the ephebeia provided Athens with the *immediate benefit*, unlike the program of military training, of 450-500 additional citizens in 334/3 and at least 1,000 in subsequent years (i.e. 333/2-322/1) devoted to protecting the countryside of Attica throughout the year.<sup>112</sup> From the inception of the institution to the Lamian War (334/3-323/2) these ephebes probably made up a significant portion, if not the majority, of the garrison troops deployed in Attica.<sup>113</sup>

But how did the ephebeia contribute to the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας? The first possibility is that the creation of the ephebeia improved the Athenians' chances of withstanding an invasion. If we believe Ober, the Athenians in the fourth century had rejected the city-based strategy of Pericles on account of their defeat in the Peloponnesian War in favor of a preclusive frontier defense, in which the border forts, by guarding the

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<sup>111</sup> See pp. 44-55.

<sup>112</sup> The number of citizens who served in the ephebeia can be roughly estimated from the rosters of seven (**E2, E5, E9, E10, E14, E18, E20**) of the twenty-eight inscriptions of the Lyscurgan ephebic corpus. These suggest that 450-500 citizens served in the first two enrollment years of the institution (i.e. 334/3 and 333/2) and perhaps 600-650 thereafter. For the epigraphic evidence, see pp. 99-101.

<sup>113</sup> Few scholars have conjectured the overall number of garrison troops employed to defend Attica in peacetime. Munn 1993, 169, n. 61, estimates that around 2,500 men garrisoned the border fortresses in 378-375, which he considers an absolute minimum for the Athenian forces marshaled at the frontier to ward off the threat of Spartan forces at this time. This figure, even if correct, however, applies only to reinforced frontier garrisons at a heightened state of alert (he cites the 2,500 hoplites mentioned in [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3 as evidence; but see Rhodes 1981, 306). The nominal establishment strength of the border garrisons and Piraeus in peacetime therefore must have been significantly lower than Munn's estimate, though how much lower cannot be determined given the evidence. van Wees 2002, 71, supposes that "except when the army was mobilized, they [i.e. the ephebes] constituted the largest organized groups of armed men in the country", but it is impossible to be certain.

major routes into Attica, would so effectively block the advance of an invading army that the enemy would be forced to withdraw when the main Athenian force arrived to relieve the garrisons.<sup>114</sup> In his view the ephebeia was intended to provide the garrisons on the border with the troops, consisting of second-year ephebes and ex-ephebes, necessary to achieve this objective.<sup>115</sup> This hypothesis on preclusive defense should be rejected, however, because there is no evidence that Athens' extensive system of border fortresses could in fact prevent a full-scale enemy invasion of Attica, and fourth-century literature betrays no knowledge of a system akin to the French Maginot line such as Ober describes.<sup>116</sup>

The Athenians' efforts to modernize the Athens-Piraeus enceinte and to increase the readiness of the fleet after Chaeronea, discussed in the previous section, should be seen in the light of their continued willingness to employ a city-based strategy of territorial defense.<sup>117</sup> That they should do so is unsurprising given that the Athenians responded to the threat of Macedonian invasions on at least four occasions from 346 to 335 in the same way as their fifth-century ancestors did when they faced the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War.<sup>118</sup> A standing army of one thousand ephebes, then, who would

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<sup>114</sup> Ober 1985a, esp. 191-222. He summarizes his theory as follows: "The economic and military realities of the postwar era in conjunction with an emotional reaction against the failed policy of city-based defense led to the growth of a defensive mentality among the Athenians who became determined to protect the *chora* of Attica against future incursions. The defensive mentality led fourth-century military theorists to consider new approaches to land defense and most of them came to prefer a defensive system based on the preclusive protection of the state frontiers (208)."

<sup>115</sup> Ober 1985a, 95-6. See also Faraguna 1992, 279.

<sup>116</sup> Harding 1988, 61-71, has shown that the notion of the Athenians' "defensive mentality" and the development of a preclusive system of defense after 404 should be rejected. Despite Ober's 1989b, 294-301, attempts to defend his thesis, Harding's objections still stand. See also Harding's 1990, 377-80, response to Ober 1989b. Munn 1993, 15-25, has also clearly demonstrated from Xenophon's discussions of territorial defense (Xen. *Hipp.* 7.2-4; *Por.* 4.43-8) that "Xenophon's scenario is surprisingly consonant with the Periclean approach to the defense of Attica (21):" i.e. Xenophon did not think that the border fortresses could have acted as a preclusive defensive system. To this must be added Lycurgus' praise of the Athenians who died at Chaeronea, who fought in Boeotia rather than from the walls of Athens (*Leoc.* 47). Munn also shows that there is no evidence to support the view that fortresses could prevent the passage of a numerically superior invading army.

<sup>117</sup> Atkinson 1981, 4, is therefore mistaken in his belief that the ephebeia was tantamount to a rejection of the Periclean defensive strategy.

<sup>118</sup> 346/5 (Dem. 19.86, 125; Aeschin. 3.139); 338/7 (*Lyc. Leoc.* 16, 38); 336/5 (D.S. 17.4.6); 335/4 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.2; [Demad]. 14). Pericles' strategy entailed avoiding an open confrontation with a more powerful invader, sending out cavalry patrols from the city and the border fortresses to harass the enemy as they sought to ravage and plunder the *chora* of Attica, evacuating the rural population to the city, and

have been called out in any case to defend Athenian territory in the event of an invasion (cf. Thuc. 2.13.6-7), would have been no more effective at preventing a Macedonian attack from 334/3 onwards than the Athenians were in 378 when a large force under Sphodrias eluded Athens' border defenses and penetrated undetected into the Thriasian plain (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20-1).

But if the φυλακτήρια did not constitute a Maginot line, what role did the forts play in the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας? First, these rural fortifications, many of which were located near deme-centers,<sup>119</sup> served in times of emergency as places of refuge from enemy attacks for those citizens who had insufficient time to evacuate their families and property to the city.<sup>120</sup> When Philip threatened to invade Attica in 346, a decree of Callisthenes, inserted into the text of Demosthenes, specifies that the Athenians should “remove all property from the countryside as quickly as possible, if within 120 stades to the city and Piraeus, but if outside this distance to Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnous, and Sounium (18.38).”<sup>121</sup> In the *Poroi* Xenophon suggests that if a new fort was constructed at Mt. Besa in southern Attica between the existing ones of Thoricus and Anaphlystus, the inhabitants around Laurium would have a shorter distance to flee to safety in the event of an invasion (4.43-9; cf. *Cyr.* 5.2.2; 6.1.14). The ephebes stationed at the border forts would have helped to ensure that the garrisons could offer sufficient protection for those citizens who sought their safety.

Second, the garrison fortresses functioned as strong-points from which garrison troops would patrol the *chora* to protect the citizenry from small raiding parties of enemy

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depending upon the fleet to supply sufficient corn to feed the throngs of citizens gathered within Athens (Thuc. 143.3-5). For the use of cavalry to harass invaders in the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. 2.19.2; 2.22.2 and the detailed discussions of Ober 1985b, 171-88; Spence 1990, 91-109. Xenophon advocates the very same practice in the 350's (*Hipp.* 4.15; 7.2-4, 14-15).

<sup>119</sup> McCredie 1966, 91-2.

<sup>120</sup> See McCredie 1966, 92-4; Hanson 1983, 112-16; Munn 1993, 25-7.

<sup>121</sup> κατακομίζειν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν πάντα τὴν ταχίστην, τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς σταδίων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι εἰς ἄστυ καὶ Πειραιᾶ, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς σταδίων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι εἰς Ἐλευσίνα καὶ Φυλὴν καὶ Ἀφιδναν καὶ Ῥαμνοῦντα καὶ Σούνιον. Hanson 1998, 113, says that it “is impossible to determine the degree of authenticity of this decree; it may represent the essence of genuine legislation in the time of Demosthenes.” Munn 1993, 26, n. 55, maintains that the decree, though Hellenistic in origin, accurately reflects the role of Attica's forts when Athens readied itself for war. He opines that the decree may have been part of a collection of Attic decrees assembled by Craterus of Macedon in the third century.

soldiers (in wartime) and bands of freebooters (in peace).<sup>122</sup> In Xenophon's *Hiero* Simonides advises the tyrant on the advantages of deploying a standing army of mercenary soldiers for this very purpose:

If therefore the first duty enjoined on the mercenaries were to act as the bodyguard of the whole community and render help to all ... the citizens would know that this is one service rendered to them by the mercenaries. Nor is this all: for naturally the mercenaries would also be able to give fearlessness and security in the fullest measure to the labourers and livestock in this country, and the benefit would not be confined to your own estates, but would be felt up and down the countryside. Again, they are competent to afford the citizens leisure for attending to their private affairs by guarding the vital positions (τὰ ἐπίκαιρα φυλάττοντες). Besides, should an enemy plan a secret and sudden attack (πολεμίων ἐφόδους κρυφαίας καὶ ἐξαπιναίας), what handier agents can be found for detecting or preventing their design than a standing force, armed and organized (τῶν αἰὲν ἐν ὅπλοις τε ὄντων καὶ συντεταγμένων) ... And must not those who possess a standing force impose on border states a strong desire for peace? For nothing equals an organized body of men, whether for protecting the property of friends or for thwarting the plans of enemies (10.4-7. Trans. E.C.Marchant).<sup>123</sup>

The crucial role τὰ ἐπίκαιρα played in safeguarding the countryside from surprise attacks is made explicit in the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon makes Socrates remark that it would be easy for Athens' enemies to plunder the countryside if the *phylakai* were removed (3.6.11; cf. *Cyr.* 3.2.1-3.4; 6.1.14).<sup>124</sup> In the Peloponnesian War, garrison troops

<sup>122</sup> Munn 1993, 27-32. See also Ober 1985a, 49-50; Harding 1988, 70.

<sup>123</sup> ἐν οὖν ἂν πρῶτον τοῦτ' εἴη τῶν προστεταγμένων τοῖς μισθοφόροις, ὥς πάντων ὄντας δορυφόρους τῶν πολιτῶν βοηθεῖν πᾶσιν, ἂν τι τοιοῦτον αἰσθάνωνται. γίγνονται δέ που, ὥς πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα, κακοῦργοι ἐν πόλεσιν· εἰ οὖν καὶ τούτους φυλάττειν εἴεν τεταγμένοι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν εἶδεῖν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὠφελοῦμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐργάταις καὶ κτήνεσιν οὗτοι ἂν εἰκότως καὶ θάρρος καὶ ἀσφάλειαν δύναιτο μάλιστα παρέχειν, ὁμοίως μὲν τοῖς σοῖς ἰδίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἀνὰ τὴν χώραν. ἱκανοὶ γε μὴν εἰσι καὶ σχολὴν παρέχειν τοῖς πολίταις τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τὰ ἐπίκαιρα φυλάττοντες. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ πολεμίων ἐφόδους κρυφαίας καὶ ἐξαπιναίας τίνες ἐτοιμότεροι ἢ προαισθῆσθαι ἢ κωλύσαι τῶν αἰὲν ἐν ὅπλοις τε ὄντων καὶ συντεταγμένων ... τὰς <δ> ἀγχιτέρμονας πόλεις οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ τοὺς αἰὲν ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντας καὶ εἰρήνης μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν; οἱ γὰρ συντεταγμένοι καὶ σῶζειν τὰ τῶν φίλων μάλιστα καὶ σφάλλειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δύναιτ' ἂν.

<sup>124</sup> The importance of border forts in providing security for the *chora* is clear from the continuing conflict during the Peloponnesian War and the fourth century between the Boeotians and the Athenians over the

protected Attica by attacking enemy raiders who sought to plunder the *chora*. Thucydides informs us that the Athenian garrison at Oenoe inflicted heavy losses on Corinthian raiders as they returned from Deceleia (Thuc. 8.98.2).<sup>125</sup> During the same conflict, Aristophanes' *Archarnians* has it that the Athenians react to the Boeotians' seizure of Dercetes' oxen at Phyle by sending Lamachus and a company of soldiers to guard the mountain passes so as to ward off an expected raid during the winter (1022, 1073-5).<sup>126</sup> The responded by Whether in times of war or peace, garrisons were also needed to deal with the threat of bandits and highwaymen, often unemployed mercenaries or dislocated peoples, who robbed citizens, stole their livestock, and carried off their property by reason of economic necessity or desire for plunder.<sup>127</sup> Given this, it is unsurprising that Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* makes his fictional Persian ephebes hunt down criminals (*kakourgoi*) and raiders (*leistai*) during their stint of garrison duty (1.2.12).<sup>128</sup>

There is reason to think that the primary military function of the ephebeia was to intercept this threat posed by marauding bands of plunderers.<sup>129</sup> The division of the ephebes into two distinct groups, the first garrisoning Piraeus (Munychia and Acte) and

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control of Panactum (see Thuc. 5.3.5; 5.35.5; 5.39.3; 5.42.1-2; Dem. 19.326), which was "the only defensible site viable for habitation" on the Scoúrta plain (Munn and Munn 1989, 122).

<sup>125</sup> While the garrisons were not strong enough to prevent the establishment of a fortified camp (*epiteichismos*) like Deceleia, they played an important role, alongside the cavalry, in protecting the *chora* from plundering raids issuing from the fort. For an overview of *epiteichismos* warfare in the Classical period, see Ober 1985a, 36-43; Westlake 1983, 12-24.

<sup>126</sup> For the value of Aristophanes' comedies as a source for the Archidamian war, see Hanson 1998, 136-44.

<sup>127</sup> For piracy and brigandage in Greece out of hunger, poverty, or for other reasons: Arist. *Pol.* 1.3.4, 1256a; 2.4.7, 1267a; Aeschin. 1.191; Isoc. 5.120-2; Plato. *Leg.* 823B, E; Xen. *Hipp.* 8.8. See also Mckechnie 1989, 101-141.

<sup>128</sup> Lysias provides an account of the metic Philon's career as bandit immediately after the fall of Athens in 404/3 (31.17-19). Garrison commanders apparently had the right to execute bandits and criminals who fell into their hands, if we can believe Lysias' claim that there was a special place at Phyle reserved for executing highwaymen (13.78: see Fisher 1999, 78-80). Munn 1993, 28, sums up the situation as follows: "Garrisons and patrols routinely provided a local armed presence to protect the citizenry against animal theft or other forms of raiding brigandage that might be attempted at any time in remote areas. In practical terms, these functions became indistinguishable from civil police duties, which were concerned with disputes of the sort likely to arise between fellow citizens as well as neighbors across a state boundary." This view should be qualified, however, as Hunter 1994, 129-153, discusses how communities in Attica relied on their own resources to repel thieves and other criminals such as the widespread use of towers in farmhouses (e.g. Dem. 47.56) as a defense against raiders. On these towers, see Pritchett 1991, 352-8.

<sup>129</sup> Aristotle in the *Politics* may in fact refer to the ephebeia in just this role when he mentions a *taxis* of *epheboi* (or *phrouroi*) being used to guard prisoners (6.5.7, 1322a). It is likely, though Aristotle does not say so, that these prisoners consisted of raiders and criminals apprehended by the ephebes in their patrols.

continuously patrolling the plains around the city and the second doing likewise along the border areas (i.e. from Eleusis to Rhamnous) ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5), would have significantly reduced the possibility of raiders escaping detection and hence decreased their ability to pillage the *chora* of Attica.<sup>130</sup> If we accept this, the tasks of the ephebes in Piraeus were (1) to repel raids which had managed to elude the border fortresses and penetrate into central and southern Attica (i.e. Xen. *Por.* 4.47; Aen.Tact. 23.7-8) and (2) to constitute a ready reserve of troops which could be sent, if needed, as reinforcements to the outlying areas of Attica (i.e. Ar. *Acharn.* 1022-3, 1073-7). The epigraphic evidence also suggests that ephebic contingents serving on the Attic-Boeotian frontier were sometimes required to perform stints of garrison duty in several φυλακτήρια in the course of the year – a practice unique to the ephebeia – which suggests that ephebes were concentrated in those (continually changing) “hotspots” on the border where raiders were most active.<sup>131</sup>

Let us now consider the circumstances which created this need for a standing army and led to the foundation of the ephebeia.

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<sup>130</sup> Scholars have misunderstood the crucial role which the contingent of ephebes stationed at Piraeus played in defending Attica because they have mistakenly assumed that these ephebes were only *peripoloi* in their second year of service. Scholars have followed Harpocration s.v. περίπολος in making this assumption (e.g. Forbes 1919, 146-7, 150; Pélékidis 1962, 39; Rhodes 1981, 506, 508; Faraguna 1992, 278; Burckhardt 1996, 71). Ober 1985a, 91: “In the second year of their service the ephebes were given a chance to practice their skills in the field [i.e. they did not patrol in their first year].” This view, however, is problematic for the following reasons: (1) The author uses περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν to make it explicit that the ephebes are stationed at the border forts (which he does not name) rather than in Piraeus. If so, περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν should not be taken to mean that the ephebes in their first year were not *peripoloi*. (2) Thucydides attests to the existence of *peripoloi* at Munychia (8.92.5), the very same place where ephebes were garrisoned in their first year (See p. 42). (3) If the ephebes at Munychia and Acte were not *peripoloi*, how could they have provided security for those living in the area of Athens (cf. Schol. on Thuc. 4.67)? We would then have to assume that the ephebes were limited to guarding Piraeus, as Marcellus 1994, 139-140, does: “The positioning of a full year-group of ephebes in the Piraeus had strategic reasons. The fleet was intended to ensure a steady grain supply for Athens, and the contingent of ephebes to provide a constant guard for the fleet.” See also Ferguson 1911, 9.

<sup>131</sup> In E5 the ephebes of Cecropis, dated to 332/1, are honored for their service at Eleusis and Rhamnous, while in E15, dated to 331/0 or 330/29, the ephebic contingent of Pandionis did their garrison duty at Eleusis, Phyle, and Rhamnous. The only author, to my knowledge, who refers to the rotation of tribal contingents for guard duty is Plato in his theoretical approach to the defense of the *chora* for his ideal city (*Leg.* 760A-763B). In this work he divides the *chora* into twelve sectors, each occupied by one tribe, which performs one month of guard duty in each sector. Each tribe rotates through all twelve sectors in the first year and then does the same in their second but in the opposite direction so that no part of the *chora* will be unguarded and the ephebes will have full knowledge of their homeland (760A-D). But Daly 2001, 361-5, has shown that Plato’s model does not reflect Athenian military practice.



## 2.6: Problems on the Border: The Ephebeia and Thebes' Destruction

In the summer of 335/4 a rumor spread among the Greeks that Alexander had been killed while he was campaigning against the Illyrians (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.3).<sup>132</sup> The Thebans, believing the rumor, overthrew the pro-Macedonian oligarchy, rebelled against Alexander, and besieged the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia.<sup>133</sup> Alexander responded by marching rapidly to Thebes, which forestalled any attempt by the Greeks to put up a united defense (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4-5).<sup>134</sup> In late September 335 Alexander and his allies (Phocians and Boeotians) defeated the Thebans in battle, captured the city by assault, and thoroughly sacked it.<sup>135</sup> Overall 6,000 Thebans are said to have been killed and 30,000 survivors captured (D.S. 17.14.1; Plut. *Alex.* 11.12; Ael. *V.H.* 13.7). On the next day Alexander convened an *ad hoc* council of the Corinthian League, including those who had just participated in the pillaging of Thebes, to determine the fate of the remaining Thebans. Passing judgment on the vanquished for their Medism in the Persian Wars and past crimes against his allies, the council, with Alexander's acquiescence, decided to retain the garrison on the Cadmeia, raze the city to the ground, sell the captives into slavery, forbid other Greeks from accepting Thebans as refugees, and distribute Theban land among Alexander's Boeotian allies.<sup>136</sup>

The sudden destruction of Thebes shocked and horrified the Greek world (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.1).<sup>137</sup> Panic broke out immediately in Athens when fleeing Thebans arrived with news of the disaster: the Athenians hastily abandoned their celebration of the

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<sup>132</sup> For a discussion of the following events and the sources cited, see Bosworth 1980, 73-91; Will 1983, 37-47; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 56-66; Rubensohn 1997, 99-123; Worthington 2003, 65-86.

<sup>133</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1-3, 6; D.S. 17.8.2-4; Ael. *V.H.* 12.57.

<sup>134</sup> After the revolt the Thebans appealed for help from the Arcadians, Argives, Eleans, and the Athenians (D.S. 17.8.5). An Arcadian force did march out and encamped at the isthmus of Corinth, but their general Astylus refrained from intervening until it was too late to do so (See Bosworth 1980, 76, on Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.1; D.S. 17.8.5-6). For these events, see also Hammand and Walbank 1988, 59-60.

<sup>135</sup> For the involvement of Alexander's allies in the sack of Thebes: Arr. *Anab.* 1.8.8; Just. 11.3.8; D.S. 17.13.5; Plut. *Alex.* 11.6.

<sup>136</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.6-10; D.S. 17.14.1-4; Just. 11.3.8-4.8. As Bosworth 1988a, 196, puts it: "The verdict was not Alexander's but it was the verdict he wished to be passed." See also Hamilton 1969, 30; Hammond and Walbank 1988, 62-5; Rubensohn 1997, 116-7, on Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9; Just. 11.4.5-7. The sale of the Thebans is said to have raised 440 talents (D.S. 17.14.4; cf. Cleitarchus FGrHist 137, F1).

<sup>137</sup> For the literary tradition of Thebes' destruction, see Worthington 2003, 65-9.

Eleusinian mysteries and evacuated the countryside in the expectation of an invasion.<sup>138</sup> They had good reason to be afraid. Not only had they encouraged the Thebans to revolt and supplied them with weapons after their rebellion, but they had also voted to send an army to help the Thebans, though the army never entered Boeotia and left the latter to their fate.<sup>139</sup> Desperate to soothe Alexander's anger, the Athenians sent a delegation to congratulate him for his safe return from Illyria and his punishment of the Thebans (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.3). Alexander, however, rejected this overture and demanded the surrender of prominent Athenians, including Demosthenes and Lycurgus, whom he considered as much to blame as the Thebans for the revolt and more generally for inciting resistance against himself and his father (Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4; 1.10.5; Just. 11.4.10).<sup>140</sup> The Athenians, however, refused to comply after debating the issue and sent another embassy under Demades and Phocion, who persuaded Alexander to drop his demand.<sup>141</sup> It is likely that Athens' glorious role in the Persian Wars (cf. Hdt. 7.139) brought about such lenient

<sup>138</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.2; Plut. *Alex.* 13.1; Plut. *Dem.* 23.3; [Demad]. 19.

<sup>139</sup> See Hammond and Walbank 1988, 57-9; Rubensohn 1997, 101-4. According to pseudo-Demades Demosthenes and Lycurgus spurred on the Athenians and the Thebans by confirming the rumors of Alexander's death, almost exhibiting "the body of Alexander on the podium" for the Assembly to see (17; cf. Just. 11.2.8). Demosthenes also seems to have accepted Persian funds (Aeschin. 3.239; Din. 1.10, 18; Plut. *Dem.* 20.5) and used them to equip all those Thebans who did not have hoplite armor (D.S. 17.8.5). On his motion the Athenians made an alliance with Thebes and voted to send an army (D.S. 17.8.6; Aeschin. 3.238-9). Sealey 1993, 203, is skeptical of the vote, but Tritle 1988, 117, shows that the opposition of Phocion and the other generals to Demosthenes' plans, attributed perhaps to their fear of Macedonian military might, restrained the Athenians from supporting the Thebans more actively in the revolt (Plut. *Phoc.* 17.1). When Alexander appeared in Boeotia with his army, direct Athenian military support was no longer possible (Plut. *Dem.* 23.2).

<sup>140</sup> Arrian says that Alexander's response was "friendly" (*Anab.* 1.10.4), but Plutarch is more credible in that Alexander turned his back on the ambassadors and cast away the decree (*Phoc.* 17.4). There are four extant lists of the men whom Alexander demanded: Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 17.2; *Dem.* 23.4; Suda s.v. Ἀντίπατρος). Bosworth 1980, 92-5, has analyzed them and has shown that Plutarch's *Demosthenes* is the most reliable (Demosthenes, Polyeuctus, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Moerocles, Demon, and Callisthenes). Will 1983, 98, denies that Lycurgus had engaged in anti-Macedonian activity, even though his name appears on all the lists (alongside Demosthenes and Charidemus) and the decree of Stratocles honors him for his resistance to Macedon ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C-D; see Heisserer 1980, 24-6; Bosworth 1985, 434-5).

<sup>141</sup> In the debate Phocion argued that it was enough for the Athenians to mourn Thebes and that those demanded by Alexander should willingly surrender themselves on behalf of Athens. Demosthenes, however, was successful in urging the *demos* not to submit to Macedon: D.S. 17.15.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 17.2-3; Plut. *Dem.* 23.4-5. The Athenians passed a second decree which stated that they would punish their leaders according to the law if they had done wrong: in the end Alexander insisted that Charidemus alone should be exiled (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6; D.S. 17.15.3-5; Plut. *Phoc.* 17.4-5).

treatment,<sup>142</sup> along with the strength of her fleet and her modernized fortifications, which would have made a siege of the city time-consuming and arduous.

Nevertheless, Thebes, as Alexander had intended, served as a potent deterrent for those who desired to cast off the Macedonian yoke.<sup>143</sup> Though “all he [i.e. Alexander] managed to produce in the minds of most Athenians was a hostile reaction and a steady hatred for himself in particular and for the Macedonian hegemony in general,”<sup>144</sup> Thebes was a constant reminder to the Athenians of the terrible consequences of rebellion against Alexander. Five years afterwards Aeschines vividly lamented Thebes’ fate, saying “but Thebes! Thebes, our neighbor, has in one day been swept from the midst of Hellas! (3.133: Θῆβαι δέ, Θῆβαι, πόλις ἀστυγείτων, μεθ’ ἡμέραν μίαν ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνῆρπασται).”<sup>145</sup> The loss of Thebes also deprived the Athenians of their most important ally and hence any chance of reforming the anti-Macedonian coalition which fought at Chaeronea. “Greece,” as pseudo-Demades declared, “has lost an eye in the annihilation of the Thebans’ city (65; cf. Hegesias FGrHist 142, F 12 Robinson).” Under these circumstances the Athenians realized that they had to accept Macedonian domination, albeit unwillingly, for the time being and hence adopted a more cautious policy towards Macedon, one in which an armed confrontation with Macedon had to be

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<sup>142</sup> Bosworth 1988a, 196-7: “Alexander had invoked the decrees of the Hellenic alliance against Thebes and he could hardly now take drastic action against the city which had dared and suffered most during the Persian Wars, least of all when he was about to assume the mantle of Athens and take revenge for her injuries.” Alexander made an effort during his reign to profess outwardly his respect for the city, beginning with the second Athenian embassy after Thebes, followed by the dedication of 300 panoplies after his victory on the Granicus, and the return of Iphicrates’ remains to Athens (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6; 1.16.7; 2.15.3). That he may have privately held a more negative opinion is perhaps suggested by an anecdote of Athenaeus, in which Gorgus offers to supply Alexander with the weapons needed for a siege of Athens (12.538B).

<sup>143</sup> D.S. 17.14.4: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀκολουθῶς τῇ τοῦ συνεδρίου γνώμῃ τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατασκάψας πολὺν ἐπέστησε φόβον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Plut. *Alex.* 11.11: τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκπλαγέντας πάθει τηλικούτῳ καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσιν. See also Polyb. 4.23.8; 38.2.13.

<sup>144</sup> Mitchel 1965, 189.

<sup>145</sup> Other orators too express similar sentiments, doubtless to exploit the horror and revulsion the Athenians still felt more than a decade afterwards for the annihilation of Thebes: παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες αἱ Θηβαίων ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διενεμήθησαν, πόλις ἀστυγείτων καὶ σύμμαχος ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνῆρπασται, ἀροῦται καὶ σπείρεται τὸ Θηβαίων ἄστυ τῶν κοινωνησάντων ὑμῖν τοῦ πρὸς Φίλιππον πολέμου (Din. 1.24; cf. [Demad]. 26; Hyp. *Epit.* 17). See also the attempts by Aeschines 3.239-240 and Dinarchus 1.10, 18-21 to convince their audiences that Demosthenes betrayed the Thebans so as to arouse hatred against him for contributing to the disaster (Worthington 1992, 139-143, 160-168).

evaded at all costs.<sup>146</sup>

The Athenian position after Thebes was further complicated by increased tension on the Boeotian border. As we have seen, Alexander's Boeotian allies – the Thespians, Plataeans, and Orchomenians – had eagerly participated in the sack of Thebes and had received her land as part of their spoils.<sup>147</sup> The sources inform us that they retained this land throughout the Lysurgan period and would later fight for the Macedonians against the Athenians in the Lamian War rather than give up the income they earned from it (D.S. 18.11.4; Hyp. *Epit.* 15-7). They also had good reason to be hostile to the Athenians. If the latter were to defeat the Macedonians and regain their full independence in foreign affairs, the Boeotians knew that the Athenians would not only restore Thebes and confiscate the Theban land now under their control (D.S. 18.11.4), but they would also deprive them of their newly regained autonomy because the Athenians had recognized Theban supremacy in Boeotia and would actively assist the Thebans should any dependent city attempt to succede from the Boeotian league.<sup>148</sup> The Athenians would have gained no favor from the Boeotians by providing a safe haven for Theban refugees, thus showing her continued support and sympathy for her ally.<sup>149</sup>

I contend that Alexander's Boeotian allies took advantage of the Athenians' fear and defensiveness in the aftermath of Thebes' destruction to plunder Attica in order to carry off valuable booty, such as livestock and other readily movable property (e.g. farming implements), to their own farms in Boeotia.<sup>150</sup> The Athenian countryside, which had remained inviolate from large-scale enemy incursions since Sphodrias' raid in 378

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<sup>146</sup> Atkinson 1981, 38: "Alexander's sack of Thebes cooled the hot-heads [i.e. Demosthenes] and from 335 the political scene seems to be characterized not so much by a division between pro- and anti-Macedonians as by a consensus that direct military action against Macedon was not a practical strategy, and that a more pragmatic policy was required."

<sup>147</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9; D.S. 18.11.3; Just. 11.4.7; Plut. *Alex.* 11.11.

<sup>148</sup> Philip had restored the cities of Orchomenos, Plataea, and Thespieae after Chaeronea as a counterweight to Thebes in the Boeotian league (D.S. 17.13.5; Paus. 4.27.10; 9.1.8; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 37.42), the same cities which Thebes had destroyed earlier in the fourth century (see p. 55, n. 213). For the terms of the Athenian-Theban alliance of 339/8, one of which stipulated that the Athenians were obligated to help the Thebans to maintain their dominance in the league, see Mosley 1971, 508-10, on Aeschin. 3.142.

<sup>149</sup> Demades persuaded Alexander to allow the Athenians to grant asylum to the refugees whom they had received in contravention of the League's edict (cf. D.S. 17.15.4; Aeschin. 3.156; Just. 11.4.10; Paus. 9.7.1).

<sup>150</sup> For these and other items likely to be plundered by raiders, see Hanson 1998, esp. 103-110.

(Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20-1), must have been lavishly furnished in comparison to the *chora* of Boeotia (cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 12.5), in which the inhabitants were still in the process of rebuilding their cities and restocking the newly acquired farms which had been devastated during the sack of Thebes.<sup>151</sup> If so, this border raiding would have provoked considerable alarm in Athens. Plato's observation that all *poleis* are in a state of undeclared war despite the appearance of nominal peace (*Leg.* 626A) certainly holds true for the hostile relationship which existed between those citizens who possessed land near the frontier.<sup>152</sup> The danger for the Athenians was that the Boeotians' raiding, if left unchecked, would enrage the border dwellers so much that they would advocate military conflict against their adversaries, a conflict which was not necessarily in the best interests of the *polis* (Arist. *Pol.* 1330a; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3). It is likely that such pressure compelled the Athenians to make armed expeditions to Drymus and Panactum between 346 and 343 in order to put a stop to excessive raiding on the Boeotian border (Dem. 19.326).

But any such campaign against the Boeotians in 335/4 would have carried unacceptable risks for the Athenians, since it would have violated the Common Peace, if both sides came to blows, and left Athens open to retaliation by the League.<sup>153</sup> Even worse, the Athenians could not rule out the possibility that the Macedonian garrison stationed on the Cadmeia (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9) would also become involved in any border confrontation, the very situation which the Athenians sought to avoid, since the *demos*

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<sup>151</sup> Arrian implies that the resettlement of the Plataeans and Orchomenians was not far advanced in 335/4, since their cities still needed to be fortified, among other construction work (*Anab.* 1.9.10; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 34; Plut. *Arist.* 11 for Plataea's walls). According to Pausanias the countryside around Thebes was looted and burnt by Alexander and his allies (9.25.10), perhaps as thoroughly sacked as Thebes itself, which was razed to the ground except for the temples, the houses of Pindar and his descendents, and the dwellings of Alexander's supporters (Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.9-10; Plut. *Alex.* 11.6; Ael. *V.H.* 13.7; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2.33). Given that the Macedonians and Phocians had also participated in the sack, the Boeotians would have had only a portion of the possessions which had existed on the Thebans' estates before the revolt.

<sup>152</sup> See also Plato's remarks on the perennial feuds and property disputes that kept this enmity alive among border dwellers (373D-E; 843A; 955B-C).

<sup>153</sup> Tod. II, no. 177 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 236 [338/7], lines 5-8, stipulates that cities are not to bear arms against those who participate in the Common Peace. It is likely that the Athenians, having seen "the rough justice of the victors" at Thebes (Bosworth 1988a, 195), would have had little confidence that they would receive a fair hearing in the *sunedrion* of the League of Corinth, especially after their own involvement in the recent rebellion, which may have killed as many as five hundred Macedonian soldiers (D.S. 17.14.1). Not only would they have regarded the Common Peace after Thebes' destruction as an instrument of Macedonian repression (see Hammond and Walbank 1988, 65), but they were also well aware that the League was hardly impartial when Macedonian interests were involved (see Bosworth 1988a, 191-2).

knew that Athens' land forces had little chance of defeating the qualitatively and quantitatively superior Macedonian army. Furthermore, any defeat would have had disastrous consequences for Athens, including the loss of territory, the imposition of a garrison, or a change in constitution, such as Thebes had suffered after Chaeronea and Athens herself would experience after her defeat in the Lamian War.<sup>154</sup> Lastly, armed conflict with Macedon would have endangered those Athenian citizens who served in the contingent of twenty triremes on Alexander's Persian campaign (D.S. 17.22.5) and whom Alexander held as hostages to ensure Athens' continued good behavior.<sup>155</sup>

There was, however, an alternative. If the Athenians could deal with the raids of the Boeotians more effectively, they could keep border tensions down to manageable levels and hence ensure that no Athenian army would be compelled to undertake a potentially risky campaign on the frontier. As Xenophon puts it in the *Hiero*, a large armed force constantly under arms and dedicated to the protection of the countryside not only results in better security for the *demos* from raids and surprise attacks but also compels neighboring states (τὰς ... ἀγχιτέρμονας πόλεις) to be more peaceful than they would otherwise be (10.4-7). While the numerical strength of the garrisons were periodically adjusted according to the perceived threat-level to the *chora*,<sup>156</sup> the unrelenting hostility of the Boeotians throughout the Lycurgan period would have created a need among the Athenians for a substantial reinforcement of the garrison troops already

<sup>154</sup> For Thebes, see p. 76, n. 86. For Antipater's settlement with Athens after the Lamian War, see p. 179-80.

<sup>155</sup> Blakewell 1999, 59, aptly sums up the nature of Athens' commitment to the Persian campaign: "Once Alexander's war in Asia got under way, the Athenians ... contributed some ships to Alexander's initial expedition in 334, and the ships were few and likely not the pride of the Athenian navy. The extent of Athenian participation [in] the Persian War was a one-time show of cooperation in the immediate aftermath of Thebes' destruction." Even so, the Athenians must have valued these citizens as much as those who fought as mercenaries in Persian service and whom Alexander captured at the battle of the Granicus in 334 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.6; Plut. *Alex.* 22). Alexander sent them off to Macedonia to do forced labor and the *demos* repeatedly petitioned him to free them; this was finally granted in 331 (Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.5; 3.6.2). It is therefore unlikely that the Athenians would have taken any overt action against Alexander so long as the contingent served in Asia, since they were well aware that Alexander's actions at Thebes had shown that "he would not shrink from extreme measures against rebels" (Badian 1994, 259).

<sup>156</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 1.4.10, 1360a: ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων, ἵν' εἴ τ' ἐλάττων ἢ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεῖους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον. See also Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.10

stationed in Attica before Thebes' destruction. Realizing that they would have to sustain these additional troops for the foreseeable future, the *demos* decided to undertake the unprecedented step of establishing a standing army, whose primary military function was to defend the *chora* of Attica.

But who would fight in this standing army? The Athenians could have hired mercenaries.<sup>157</sup> But, as Aeneas Tacticus recognized, a large force of mercenaries deployed in the homeland could pose as great a danger to the *polis* as the enemies they were hired to fight against (12.1-13.4). Not only was a mercenary army expensive to maintain, but also its reliability could never be taken for granted, since its continued loyalty depended upon the employer's ability to provide sustenance and pay rather than obedience to any constitution. Consequently, there was no guarantee that the mercenaries would fight effectively on Athens' behalf, would not plunder Attica for their own gain, or would not even be used to take over the state.<sup>158</sup> The Athenians, then, had to rely upon a portion of their citizen body to provide the necessary manpower. They could have raised an elite corps such as the one thousand Argive hoplites, attested between 421 to 418, who were maintained and trained at public expense.<sup>159</sup> But democratic ideology could never have allowed a standing force drawn from the wealthiest families, especially at a time when Athens was weak militarily and the *demos* feared that the democratic constitution was under threat.<sup>160</sup> The Athenians' suspicions of such corps were well grounded, since the picked Argives enlisted the support of the Lacedaemonians after the battle of

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<sup>157</sup> The Athenians hired mercenaries throughout the Classical period. For an overview, see Parke 1933.

<sup>158</sup> For the superior fighting quality and loyalty of citizen-soldiers over mercenaries, see Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 1116b. On several occasions mercenaries abandoned their employers on campaign if they were dissatisfied with the latter (e.g. Timoleon: Plut. *Tim.* 25; D.S. 16.78.5-6). Xenophon also mentions instances when the employers were not able to keep their mercenary contingents from raiding friendly territory (e.g. *Anab.* 7.1.7-20; *Hell.* 4.8.30). In the eyes of Greeks, Thracian peltasts had a reputation as bandits and indiscriminate plunderers, see Best 1969, 126-33, on Thuc. 7.27.1-2; Ar. *Acharn*, 137-73. For Isocrates' view of mercenaries as a threat to the stability of Greece, see Perlman 1976/7, 252-4. Aeneas Tacticus uses Heracleia as an example of how a large mercenary army can overthrow a city and establish a tyranny (12.5). For the career of Clearchus of Heracleia, see Parke 1933, 97-9. Given this, it is unsurprising that hired troops struck fear into the Greeks, such as the Phocians who lived in terror of Philip's mercenaries billeted among them (Dem. 19.81).

<sup>159</sup> Thuc. 5.67.2; D.S. 12.75.7; 12.79.1, 4; 12.80.2-3. For a discussion of these passages, see Pritchett 1974, 222-3.

<sup>160</sup> For Eucrates' Anti-Tyranny law of 337/6 and the cult of *Demokratia* in the Lycurgan period, see pp. 148-9.

Mantineia to subvert the democracy and established an oligarchy in its place (Thuc. 5.81.2; D.S. 12.80.2-3).

Instead, the Athenians used ephebes. From the fifth century onwards the youngest citizens, whether called *neotatoi* or *epheboi*, had traditionally functioned as a homeguard whenever the Athenians were threatened with invasion, but were not otherwise obliged to perform garrison duty (Thuc. 2.13.6-7; Aeschin. 2.167; Dem. 21.193). But why, then, did the *demos* prefer ephebes over the rest of the citizen body, given that Athenian citizens aged 20-50 routinely undertook military service on the frontier? First, the standing army was intended to operate *only* within the confines of Attica.<sup>161</sup> The ephebes were well suited for this role, because they, unlike their older compatriots, were not eligible for *strateia* except under exceptional circumstances (Thuc. 1.105.4-6; D.S. 15.63.2). Second, the citizens who served in this corps were required to devote all their time to their duties: i.e. they could not attend to their own affairs or participate in civic life throughout their stint of military service. Here too the ephebes were the obvious candidates, since they had little input into the running of the *polis* (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1; Lys. 16.20) and hence had the least political privileges to lose. Third, the *demos* had probably decided in advance how strong the corps needed to be to counter the Boeotians' raids. If so, it is likely that they could estimate from the published conscript lists of *eponymoi* ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7) that the number of ephebes, consisting of the first two conscript age-classes, was sufficient without calling up older citizens.

Though there is no certainty, I suggest that Epicrates' legislation (Harpocration s.v. Ἐπικράτης) was probably passed soon after the destruction of Thebes. I further suggest that his legislation not only obligated all citizens of ephebic age to undertake military service for two years, beginning in the next archon year, but also made their attainment of full citizenship rights contingent upon them completing their military service. Even if we accept this, it is improbable that a complex institution such as the ephebeia was the product of one Assembly. Rather, I suggest that after the ephebeia's foundation the *demos* would have had to meet on several occasions during the remainder

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<sup>161</sup> This is in contrast to the *epilektoi*, Athens' elite hoplite corps, which served on numerous campaigns overseas in the fourth century: see Tritle 1989, 54-9.



of 335/4 to determine such matters as how to provide the youths with the necessary skills to perform their duties, to define the responsibilities of the ephebic officials, and to decide upon the body of regulations which directed their activities (i.e. E2, lines 28, 54). The outcome of all these discussions was the ephebeia as we know it from the *Athenaion Politeia* and the ephebic inscriptions.<sup>162</sup>

## 2.7: Conclusion

The prevailing opinion of scholars is that the ephebeia was intended primarily to train Athenian citizens to fight more effectively against the Macedonian army. This view should be rejected, however, because the ephebeia, as we have seen, did little to revitalize the Athenian army which had been so decisively defeated at Chaeronea and this explanation cannot account for why the ephebeia began to operate in 334/3 but not earlier when such military training should have been a priority. The ephebeia should not be regarded as an inevitable consequence of the Macedonians' domination of Greece after 338/7, as scholars have assumed, but as an extraordinary solution to a border crisis in the aftermath of Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335/4. During this period of fear and confusion the Athenians sought to defend themselves against hostile Boeotian raids by employing a standing army of ephebes to ensure greater security for the *chora* of Attica. Seen in this light, the ephebeia should be considered another instance of the Athenians' willingness to do whatever is necessary, including the introduction of new institutions or offices, in order to ensure that the defensive system would continue to be effective against all threats.<sup>163</sup> While this chapter has discussed the circumstances which led to the

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<sup>162</sup> Lycurgus' contribution to these discussions is unclear, given that Harpocration's fragment tells us nothing. At the minimum he would have had to be consulted over the financial implications of the institution just as in other projects (see Mikalson 1998, 29; Humphreys 2004, 84), since his financial office controlled the allocation of funds (*merismos*) as the decree for Xenocles of Sphettus demonstrates (Merritt 1960, no. 3, line 10). Also, I suspect that the advice of Phocion, though no source connects him to the ephebeia, was constantly sought by the *demos* on the military aspects of the institution on account of his exceptional record of military service (he was *strategos* forty five times: Plut. *Phoc.* 8.1), the majority of which was probably spent as the general concerned with defense of the countryside (Munn 1993, 190-4).

<sup>163</sup> See Ober 1985a, 87-100; Munn 1993, 187-95. They argue that the creation of the office of στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇν χώραν, the adoption of conscription by *eponymoi* (replacing the earlier system of selective enlistment by *katalogos*), and the reform of the ephebeia (in the 370's) should be understood as an Athenian reaction to their defeat in the Peloponnesian War (Ober) or to their involvement in the Boeotian

creation of the ephebeia, many important questions still remain to be discussed concerning the institution itself as it functioned and matured throughout the Lycurgan Period, especially to what extent the ephebeia shared the goals of the Lycurgan program. These questions will be the focus of the remainder of this dissertation.

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War (378-375) (Munn), which prompted the Athenians to improve their border defense system. Though they are mistaken about the ephebeia, I agree with their assessment of the Athenians' readiness to adopt new military approaches to defense in the fourth century. As Munn 1993, 194-5, puts it: "The Boeotian War was the crucible out of which were forged the fourth-century Athenian standards for service in defense of Attica. Its effects can be traced in the writings of Xenophon and Plato, in the rhetoric of Demosthenes and Lykourgos, in the career of Phokion, and *in the institutions of this latter generation of Athenians* (my italics)."

## Chapter Three: The Ephebeia as a Military Institution

The Athenians, then, created the ephebeia in 335/4 in the aftermath of Thebes' destruction in order to protect Attica against Boeotian plundering expeditions. Beginning in the next year, ephebes played a pivotal role in the defense of the countryside (φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας): they were obligated to undertake two years of garrison duty in the Piraeus and the forts on the Athenian frontier ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5). The decision to entrust this vital task primarily to the youngest and most immature citizens with no combat experience (i.e. the first two *helikiai* of citizens eligible for military service) marked a decisive break with long-standing Athenian military practices in the Classical period.<sup>1</sup> It is my intention in this chapter to show how the Athenians managed to turn a given *helikia* of inexperienced youths into a standing army capable of carrying out their primary military function. Let us begin with the conscription of citizens for the ephebeia in the Lycurgan period, a matter of great controversy among scholars and one whose significance has been misunderstood.

### 3.1: Citizen Participation in the Ephebeia

Out of the twenty-eight inscriptions that comprise the Lycurgan ephebic corpus, seven have complete or sufficiently well preserved rosters so that a reasonably accurate estimate can be made of the number of ephebes for a tribe in a given enrollment year.<sup>2</sup> In chronological order, the estimates are as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Previously, citizens of different ages were conscripted at the same time to ensure that military contingents would have the appropriate mix of youthful vigor and veterans experienced in war (Christ 2001, 411). Youths called up for service in the ephebeia would have not had the benefit of guidance from older citizens in the ranks (see Hanson 1989, 89-95).

<sup>2</sup> Six other inscriptions have poorly preserved tribal rosters (minimum size of the ephebic contingents given in parentheses): **E6** (2+), **E7** (10+), **E15** (28+), **E21** (19+), **E23** (16+), **E24** (15+), **E25** (4+). I follow Hansen 1988a, 4, in regarding **E7**, the roster of Pandionis dated to 333/2, as "too fragmentary to be of any value" (*contra* Reinmuth 1971, 107). Two further inscriptions (**E8** and **E11**) have partially preserved rosters and are discussed below.

Inscription	Tribe	Enrollment Year	Ephebes <sup>3</sup>
<b>E2</b>	Cecropis	334/3	42-44
<b>E5</b>	Cecropis	333/2	52-54
<b>E9</b>	Leontis	333/2	38 <sup>4</sup>
<b>E10</b>	Erectheis	333/2	47-48 <sup>5</sup>
<b>E14</b>	Cecropis	332/1?	58-65
<b>E18</b>	Oineis	330/29?	55-56
<b>E20</b>	Leontis	332/1-326/5 <sup>6</sup>	62

Reinmuth's method of determining how many ephebes served annually during the Lycurgan period was to take a simple average of all the extant rosters and then multiply it by the ten tribes.<sup>7</sup> If we did this, the mean yearly enrollment for 334/3-323/2 would amount to 520 or more ephebes. But such a total would not take into account three important factors: (1) The seven inscriptions are dated mainly to the first few years of the institution. (2) Only four out of the ten tribes are represented (i.e. Cecropis, Leontis, Erectheis, and Oineis). The numerical strength of these tribes was not equal.<sup>8</sup> (3) The number of ephebes attested on the three Cecropis inscriptions grows from 42-44 in 334/3

<sup>3</sup> For the texts of these inscriptions and a discussion of the rosters, see the register of Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions in the appendix under the appropriate document heading.

<sup>4</sup> Two Leontid inscriptions are attested for the enrollment year of 333/2. Petrakos 2004, 167-76, reports that **E9** has a complete roster of 38 ephebes, correcting Reinmuth's 1971, 31-2, estimate of 40-44 ephebes from **E8**.

<sup>5</sup> Palagia and Lewis 1989, 334-5, have shown that **E11** (= *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2401) is also an inscription of Erectheis in the enrollment year of Nicocrates (333/2). The extant roster has less than half of the names (20+) attested on **E10**.

<sup>6</sup> It should be stressed that 332/1-326/5 is my tentative suggestion for this inscription, the date of which is highly controversial. For a discussion of possible dates ranging from 330/29 to 324/3, see pp. 219-221.

<sup>7</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 105-8.

<sup>8</sup> Two attempts have been made to determine the relative strength of the *phylae* in the Classical period. (1) Gomme 1933, 50, has compiled the number of *bouletai* attested epigraphically for each tribe in Kirchner's *Prosopographia Attica* and suggests the following order from the largest to the smallest tribe (*bouletai* in parentheses): Aigeis (1540), Leontis (1502), Cecropis (1314), Erectheis (1312), Pandionis (1223), Acamantis (1149), Oineis (1125), Hippothontis (1077), Antiochis (1058), and Aiantis (979). Gomme admits, however, that the sample size is too small to have any hope of accuracy and he falsely assumes that the demes' representation in the *phyle* was directly proportional to their population (see Hansen 1985, 61-3). (2) Traill 1975, 31-2, claims that the size of the demes (in terms of their *bouletic* quota) given up by the original ten tribes for the two new ones in the tribal reorganization of 307/6 is a more reliable indicator: i.e. Cecropis and Pandionis were the largest, followed by Erectheis, Aigeis, Leontis, Acamantis, and Antiochis, which were similar in size, then the "slightly smaller" Oineis and Hippothontis, and with the smallest tribe being Aigeis. Even if we accept Traill for 307/6, I am very doubtful whether we can assume the same population distribution in the Lycurgan period, since, for example, one or more of the *phyle* may have suffered particularly heavy losses during the Lamian War or in subsequent conflicts. Consequently I use Traill with some hesitation.

to 52-54 in 333/2 to 58-65 in 332/1-330/29. This apparent increase in ephebic enrollment is also reflected in the rosters of Leontis, perhaps a smaller tribe than Cecropis, which had 38 ephebes in 333/2 and 62 in one year during the period 332/1-326/5. Finally, though Eretheis was probably a larger tribe than Oineis, the latter's contingent of 55-56 ephebes in 330/29? exceeded the 47-48 of the former in 333/2.

In such case, I suggest that 450-500 ephebes served in the first two enrollment years of the institution (i.e. 334/3 and 333/2), which seems to have risen to perhaps 600-650 ephebes in subsequent years.<sup>9</sup> Hansen points out that these figures, especially for the three rosters of Cecropis (334/3-332/1), cannot be explained by a rising fertility rate in 354/3-352/1 nor by the assumption that more births occurred because one or more of these years was an intercalary year (i.e. 384 days long instead of 354 days in a normal year), but instead must reflect increasing citizen involvement in the institution.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, if we accept that citizen enrollment *did* increase in the late 330's, it is further evidence that the ephebeia was a new institution rather than the revivication of an older one.

Sekunda, however, argues that citizen enrollment remained relatively constant throughout the Lycurgan period.<sup>11</sup> For Sekunda the *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* attested on the ephebic inscriptions were not ephebes, as scholars have believed,<sup>12</sup> but were "young soldiers who have already passed through the ephebate and are 'squadded' with the new ephebes to 'show them the ropes' during basic training."<sup>13</sup> In his view, these ex-ephebic

<sup>9</sup> For similar figures, see Hansen 1988a, 4; 1988b, 190. Previously Hansen 1986, 48, had estimated c. 450-500 ephebes for a normal year, c. 500-550 for an intercalary year. Other estimates: Girard 1891, 288, 900-1000 ephebes; Beloch 1923, 400, 530 ephebes; Gomme 1933, 10, 500 ephebes; Reinmuth 1971, 106, 490+ ephebes; Pélékidis 1962, 292, 650-700 ephebes; Ruschenbusch 1988a, 139, 500 ephebes; Marcellus 1994, 22, c. 550 ephebes; Burckhardt 1996, 500 ephebes (or 600 later?).

<sup>10</sup> Hansen 1989b, 41. *Contra* Pélékidis 1962, 283-286. Any attempt to explain the variation in the rosters' size by intercalary years has to contend with Meritt's 1961, 4, observation that "the Athenians did not arrange their days, months, and years in a precisely regular or predictable pattern. Apparently they enjoyed liberty to add or not to add the intercalary year ... whenever and wherever they pleased."

<sup>11</sup> Sekunda 1992, 321-342.

<sup>12</sup> Leonardos 1918, 83, was the first to suggest that the *lochagoi* on the ephebic inscriptions were ephebes. Meritt 1940, 59-66, supposed that they were the same as the officers of the regular army (i.e. [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.3), but Roussel 1941, 222-6, has reaffirmed Leonardos' view. Merritt 1945, 234-9, later assumed that the *taxiarchos* Φιλοκλέης Φιλοθέου Σουνιεύς (E8, Col. I, lines, 21-2; Col. II, lines 15-6) was a regular officer, but Mitchel's 1961, 350-3, careful analysis has established that the *taxiarchos*, like the *lochagoi*, was also an ephebe.

<sup>13</sup> Sekunda 1992, 312.

*taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* should be subtracted from the rosters, resulting in an average of c. 470 ephebes per year.<sup>14</sup> But why would citizens who were *not* ephebes be included in ephebic rosters (e.g. **E5**, **E17**, **E20**) rather than listed separately with the other officials such as the *kosmetes*, *sophronistes*, *strategoi*, and *didaskaloi*? Sekunda offers no adequate explanation for this except that it was done “for administrative purposes.”<sup>15</sup> Moreover, strong counter-evidence is provided by **E2** and **E5**, the Cecropis inscriptions for the first two enrollment years of 334/3 and 333/2. In **E5**, Ἀταρβίων Τυννίου Αἰξωνεύς was one of the *lochagoi* honored for their ephebic service (lines 8-9). If Sekunda is correct, we should expect Atarbion to have been an ephebe in the previous year. But he is not listed among the seven ephebes of the deme Aixone (a complete list) in the roster of **E2**, lines 10-19.

Finally, Sekunda claims that his theory can account for the unusually large number of so-called “twin brothers” who appear on the rosters, namely that they should be understood as older brothers (i.e. ex-ephebes) serving as *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* alongside their younger siblings (i.e. ephebes of that year).<sup>16</sup> While the normal incidence of twins in most populations is 1% of births,<sup>17</sup> the roster of 62 ephebes of **E20** (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 15), an inscription of Leontis (332/1-326/5), has five pairs of ephebes who share the same patronymic and demotic.<sup>18</sup> But if we reject Sekunda’s hypothesis, how, then, do we explain the number of these “twins”? A plausible explanation is that not *all* these ephebes with homonymous fathers were twins, but some of them could have been instead brothers born in the same year (i.e. within the same twelve month period, about 3% of births) who were treated as if they were twins and

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<sup>14</sup> Sekunda 1992, 340-2.

<sup>15</sup> Sekunda 1992, 329.

<sup>16</sup> Sekunda 1992, 329-30.

<sup>17</sup> Hansen 1994, 480.

<sup>18</sup> Examples: **E5**, lines 42-3, 58-9; **E14**, lines 101-2, 105-6; **E20**, Col. I, lines 7-8, 9-10, Col. II, lines 17-8, 25-6, 29 and 32; **E21**, lines 24-5. For a discussion of **E20** and “twin brothers” generally, see Pélékidis 1962, 143-7; Reinmuth 1971, 72-3.

consequently served together in the ephebeia.<sup>19</sup> Scholars have advanced other possibilities that do not stand up to scrutiny.<sup>20</sup>

Did citizens of all census classes serve in the Ephebeia or were the *thetes* excluded? Scholars are divided on this question.<sup>21</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia*'s detailed description of citizen registration and the ephebeia implies that the former view is correct, since the author at no point says that the *thetes* did not undertake their military service alongside their wealthier compatriots (42.1-5). Gomme tries to explain away this silence by claiming that "we must assume that Aristotle forgot to state that they [i.e. the *thetes*] were excluded from the ranks of the epheboi (and of the arbitrators) because such a fact was well-known and obvious to his readers: an assumption in itself unsatisfactory."<sup>22</sup> Rhodes adds that the *thetes* could not have served because the ephebes were trained in hoplite warfare ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3).<sup>23</sup> The same passage, however, also says that the ephebes received instruction in non-hoplite weaponry. Nor should we assume that *thetes* served because the law that excluded them from magistracies was "a dead letter" in the Lysurgan period.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Hansen 1994, 303-4. Robertson 2000, 162-3, following Hansen, suggests that brothers close to each other in age would sometimes be included within the same class on account of having the same level of physical maturity.

<sup>20</sup> Reinmuth 1948, 215, supposes that youths who for some reason did not serve in the ephebeia when they had turned eighteen served at a later date. But why would an ephebe, who is free to participate in civic life, choose to give up his civic rights to do two years of ephebic service? This objection also applies to Traill's 1986, 13, theory that "the accumulated data suggest to me that brothers may indeed be listed in the same text *honoris familiaeque causa*, that, for the same or similar reasons, an ephebe may rarely be repeated in his following year." Two ephebes – Αρχέδικος Αρχέδικου Φλυεύς and Αριστόμαχος Δημοχάρους Μελιτεύς – appear to be listed on Cecropis inscriptions of successive enrollment years (333/2: E5, lines 48 and 50; 332/1? E14, lines 79 and 101). Traill 1986, 11, thinks that they are the same individuals, but they are probably homonymns, even though Αρχέδικος is an uncommon name (Clinton 1988, 30).

<sup>21</sup> All citizens: e.g. Ferguson 1911, 8; Forbes 1929, 128, 150-1; Pélékidis 1962, 113-4; Ridley 1979, 519, 531; Ruschenbusch 1979, 173-6; 1988a, 139-40; Hansen 1985, 47-50; Faraguna 1992, 276-7; Sekunda 1992, 345; Marcellus 1994, 11, 223; Burckhardt 1996, 35, 42. Citizens of hoplite census and above: e.g. Girard 1892, 622; Beloch 1923, 402; Gomme 1933, 11; Jones 1957, 82-3; Reinmuth 1971, 106; Rhodes 1980a, 194; 1981, 503; Osborne 1985, 44.

<sup>22</sup> Gomme 1933, 11.

<sup>23</sup> Rhodes 1981, 503.

<sup>24</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* makes it clear that *thetes* could hold any magistracy so long as they did not admit to their property class (7.4). Thus a *thete* could be selected for the office of Treasurer of Athena, though he was not a *pentakosiomedimnos* (47.1). For the Solonian property classes as "a dead letter," see Rhodes 1981, 146, 551; Hansen 1991, 107. Marcellus 1994, 156, uses the *Athenaion Politeia* as evidence that *thetes* participated in the ephebeia. But in Demosthenes' *Against Neaera*, delivered in 348, Theogenes was

Two additional arguments have been made for the inclusion of the *thetes*. First, the *demos* ensured that financial hardship would be no impediment for *thetes* because every ephebe received *trophe* during his two-year stint and was equipped with a state-funded spear and shield ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-4).<sup>25</sup> But the author says that the awarding of these arms occurred at the beginning of the ephebes' *second year* of service (τὸν δ' ὕστερον): they were of "valeur symbolique," since the ephebes must have already possessed their own arms when they performed "tactical maneuvers (τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις)" before the *demos* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).<sup>26</sup> This argument is therefore not decisive for or against the participation of *thetes*. Second, Marcellus maintains that it "is unlikely that Lycurgus ... or the *demos* would have spent such large amounts of public monies on a programme that excluded any group of citizens."<sup>27</sup> But this is unconvincing, because Xenophon says that the *demos* spent the same amount each year on the cavalry (*Hipp.* 1.19), even though only the wealthiest Athenians were eligible for cavalry service.<sup>28</sup>

Scholars who hold that *thetes* served also cite Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, which says "you have an oath, which all citizens swear, whenever you enroll upon the deme register and become ephebes" (76).<sup>29</sup> Ruschenbush argues that πάντες is decisive, because it shows that all citizens served.<sup>30</sup> Rhodes, however, considers the passage a "rhetorical exaggeration,"<sup>31</sup> while Hansen maintains that a "literal interpretation [of

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appointed by lot to be Basileus even though he was poor (59.72). This implies that the law formally excluding *thetes* from holding office ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 26.2) had already become a legal fiction a generation before the ephebeia.

<sup>25</sup> Hansen 1986, 48-9; Faraguna 1992, 277; Burckhardt 1996, 35.

<sup>26</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 114-5; Garland 1975, 175-6.

<sup>27</sup> Marcellus 1994, 158. How much did the ephebeia cost the *demos* each year? Ferguson 1911, 10, estimates 40 talents, while Hansen 1991, 310, suggests 25 talents. With the exception of the first enrollment year (i.e. 334/3), the minimum cost would have been nearly 22 talents for 500 ephebes, consisting of 20 talents spent on the *trophe* of 4 obols *per diem* for each ephebe in a non-intercalary year ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3) and 2 talents on a spear and shield at around 25 drachmas for each ephebe. For the cost of spear and shield, see van Wees 2004, 52, on *IG* XII 5647, lines 27-31.

<sup>28</sup> See Spence 1990, 180-230.

<sup>29</sup> ὑμῖν γὰρ ἔστιν ὅρκος, ὃν ὁμνύουσι πάντες οἱ πολῖται, ἐπειδὴν εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον ἐγγραφῶσιν καὶ ἔφηβοι γένωνται.

<sup>30</sup> Ruschenbusch 1979, 174. See also Pélékidis 1962, 113; Faraguna 1992, 276.

<sup>31</sup> Rhodes 1980, 194.



πάντες] is unwarranted.”<sup>32</sup> These scholars take ἔφηβοι to mean “the young men who undertake their ephebic service.” But ἔφηβοι, as we have seen, never had this meaning. Instead, Lycurgus’s mention of the *lexiarchicon grammateion* makes it clear that he is using ἔφηβοι in the technical sense of “those who have become citizens.”<sup>33</sup> The orator, then, is simply asserting as a fact that every newly enrolled citizen (= ἔφηβος) swore the ephebic oath (ὄρκος) at the beginning of their military service and we should not infer from this statement whether every citizen did or did not serve.<sup>34</sup> Consequently I suggest that this passage of Lycurgus is irrelevant to the question at hand.

Since the literary evidence is inconclusive, let us now compare the number of ephebes estimated previously with the population of Athens in the Lycurgan period. Unfortunately there is no consensus concerning fourth-century Athenian demography, with some scholars arguing that the citizen body totaled c. 21,000, others c. 31,000.<sup>35</sup> A recent discussion of the literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that the latter figure is more likely.<sup>36</sup> If so, then what percentage of the citizen population consisted of eighteen year olds? Recent studies have estimated from a variety of demographic data that around 3% of all male citizens of fourth-century Athens were eighteen years of age.<sup>37</sup> If we

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<sup>32</sup> Hansen 1988b, 191.

<sup>33</sup> See pp. 24-27.

<sup>34</sup> Similar sentiments are also expressed by Marcellus, 1994, 214.

<sup>35</sup> Diodorus Siculus (following Hieronymus of Cardia) says that 22,000 citizens were disenfranchised by Antipater’s imposition of a property qualification of 2,000 drachmas for citizenship in 322, leaving behind only 9,000 full citizens (18.18.4-5). Plutarch, however, says that 12,000 were disenfranchised (*Phoc.* 28.4). Scholars have tended to accept one of these sources and argue their position accordingly. A select bibliography of the debate: Gomme 1933; Pélékidis 1962; Reinmuth 1971; Ruschenbusch 1979; 1984; 1988a; 1988b; Rhodes 1980a; Hansen 1985; 1988a; 1988b; 1989a; 1994b; Sekunda 1992; Marcellus 1994.

<sup>36</sup> See Hansen 1985 whose argument is based upon the following sources: Plut. *Mor.* 843D-E (confiscated estate of Diphilus distributed among the citizenry); Dem. 25.51 (20,000 Athenian citizens); Ctesicles FGrHist 245, fr. 1 = Athen. 6.272C (census of Demetrius of Phalerum); D.S. 18.10.2 and 11.3 (mobilization of the Athenian expeditionary force against Antipater in the Lamian War); D.S. 18.15.9 (Athenian fleet of 170 ships). Hansen 1994 clarifies his arguments in response to Sekunda 1992, who favors 21,000 citizens. The former also argues that a citizen body of 21,000 is insufficient to ensure that there would be enough citizens to serve annually as *bouletai*. For a similar argument, see also Rhodes 1980a.

<sup>37</sup> Hansen 1985, 12, estimates ephebes were 3.35% of all males over 18. He assumes that the demographic of the early Roman empire was similar to that of Greece and that statistical data from Europe c. 1500-1750 should be used because it resembles Rome (10-11). Though he argues that European demographics from 1750 onwards are not reliable indicators for classical Greece, many scholars have used them and have arrived at a similar ratio: e.g. Ruschenbusch 1979, 173 n. 3, gives 3%, which is accepted by Rhodes 1980a,

accept this admittedly speculative figure, it would mean that on average c. 900-950 youths enrolled as citizens every year, of whom about half (450-500) served in the ephebeia in 334/3-333/2 and around two thirds (600-650) from 332/1 onwards. This suggests that the *thetes* must have also been included,<sup>38</sup> since approximately one third of the citizenry was probably of hoplite status.<sup>39</sup>

Scholarly opinion is also divided over whether *every* son of a cleruch also served.<sup>40</sup> Cleruchic involvement is attested for Samos. Strabo says that the philosopher Epicurus son of Neocles served in the ephebeia at the same time as the comic poet Menander, probably in the enrollment year of 323/2 (14.1.18, 638C; Diog.Laert. 10.14).<sup>41</sup> The ephebic corpus provides the names of three more cleruchs: Δημήτριος Εὐκλέους Αἰξωνεύς (E2, line 29); Ἡδύλος Δρύωνος Ἀλαεύς (E2, line 58); Ταυρέας Αἰσίου Σκαμβωνίδης (E20, Col. II, line 12).<sup>42</sup> This implies that all Samian cleruchs performed military service. At any rate it is hard to understand why the Athenians would have neglected to conscript the thousands of citizens on Samos when they needed to deploy as many ephebes as possible to defend the *chora* of Attica against Boeotian raiders.<sup>43</sup> Though we have no evidence of ephebes from the other cleruchies – Lemnos, Imbros,

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191. Burckhardt 1996, 40-1, considers various possible ratios, from 2-4% but settles for 3%. Some scholars suppose a higher ratio. Pélékidis 1962, 288-9, relies upon population data from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Italy and France for an estimate of 6.9%, while Jones 1957, 81-3, suggests 5% from Roman Africa and Carthage under the principate and early twentieth-century India (1901-10).

<sup>38</sup> Hansen 1985, 49.

<sup>39</sup> See the analyses of Hansen 1981, 19-24; 1988a, 23-5; Ober 1989a, 128-130. It should also be pointed out that if the population of Athens was c. 21,000 citizens and that 3% were ephebes (i.e. c. 630), citizen participation in the ephebeia must have included *thetes*.

<sup>40</sup> Hansen 1985, 50 (few served); Sekunda 1992, 316 (all served).

<sup>41</sup> For the date, see Marcellus 1996, 69-76. Epicurus cannot have been in the ephebeia after 322/1, because the cleruchs were expelled from Samos in that year (D.S. 18.18.9; Diog.Laert. 10.1).

<sup>42</sup> For the prosopography of Demetrios and Hdylos, see Clinton 1988, 24-6. Cargill 1983, 324-5, argues that Taureas, which is a Samian name, was an enfranchised Samian, but he should instead be regarded as a cleruch (Hansen 1985, 103, n. 170; Sekunda 1992, 315-6). [---]ὺς Καλλίου Εὐωνυμεύς appears on Reinmuth 1971 no. 16 = Hesp. 33 1964, 209, no. 54. Hansen 1985, 103, n. 170, suggests that he may be an ephebe from Samos. Given the strange layout of the inscription, it is highly likely that it does not belong to the ephebic corpus (Lewis 1973, 254).

<sup>43</sup> At least three groups of cleruchs were sent to Samos (D.S. 18.18 in 366/5; Schol. to Aeschin. 1.53 in 361/0; Philochorus FrGrHist 328 F 154 in 352/1), one of which was apparently 2,000 citizens strong (Strabo 14.1.18, 638C). The total size of the cleruchy probably numbered in the thousands, perhaps somewhere in the region of 6,000-12,000 (Shipley 1987, 14). Hansen 1985, 70-1, estimates that around 5,000 citizens were sent out to Samos and the Thracian Chersonese.

and Skyros – I suggest that they were also obligated to serve, even if most cleruchs resided on these islands rather than in Athens.<sup>44</sup> Beloch estimates that perhaps 150 cleruchs annually passed through the ephebeia,<sup>45</sup> but this cannot be confirmed or refuted.

It is less clear whether Athenian citizens who also dwelt outside of Attica but were not cleruchs would or could have sent their sons to Athens for the ephebeia. These include the large number of Athenians who lived permanently elsewhere in Greece or overseas as metics (e.g. Lyc. 1.29; Dem. 29.3; Lys. 31.9) or served as mercenaries in the Persian army (e.g. Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.5; 3.6.2).<sup>46</sup> Though many mercenaries would have left their wives and children behind in Athens, it is nevertheless highly likely that their families would have accompanied them while they served Darius.<sup>47</sup> If so, I suggest that the sons of Athenian metics and mercenaries were not required to participate in the ephebeia because their fathers were probably exempt from military service.<sup>48</sup> But this should not be taken to mean that *all* these youths did not serve, because we cannot dismiss the possibility that a few citizens, especially metics in Southern Greece, may have sent their sons back to Athens to register on the deme register and hence were called up for the ephebeia.

Can we account for the hundreds of ephebes who did *not* serve by assuming that some could never have performed military service because they, like their older

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<sup>44</sup> The nature of cleruchies is highly controversial. For some scholars, cleruchs were absentee landlords who lived in Attica (e.g. Brunt 1966, 81-4; Gauthier 1966, 65-6), while others argue that they resided on their plots (e.g. Gomme 1959, 64; Graham 1983, 167). The evidence of Thucydides concerning the cleruchs in Lesbos can be made to support both views: 3.50.2; 8.22-3, 100. See the recent discussion of Figueira 1991, 251-3, on these passages. Prosopographical research into an inscription (Samos Inv.No. J 352) from the *boule* of Samos suggests another possibility, that some cleruchs regularly traveled between Athens and Samos, while the majority continued to live on the island (see Habicht 1995, 273-304). For a detailed discussion of cleruchies, see Figueira 1991; Cargill 1995.

<sup>45</sup> Beloch 1905, 354.

<sup>46</sup> For an overview of Athenians as metics and mercenaries, see Hansen 1982, 179-82.

<sup>47</sup> For mercenaries and their families, see Trundle 2004, 141-2, on Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.8; 3.1.3; Isoc. 4.168; Plut. *Pel.* 27.

<sup>48</sup> See Christ 2001, 405, n. 33, on [Arist.] *Ath.Pol.* 53.5; Dem. 14.16. *Contra*: Sekunda 1992, 348. Given the scarcity of information, we cannot tell, however, whether Xenophon, who was living at Corinth, was exceptional in sending his sons to join the Athenian cavalry at the battle of Mantinea in 362 (Diog.Laert. 2.53-4).

compatriots, suffered from significant physical impairments and acute illnesses?<sup>49</sup> Based on comparative data from the conscription records of modern European states (8-15% unfit for 18-22 year olds), Hansen supposes that around 20% of all Athenian citizens aged 18-59 and “at least 10%” of ephebes were physically incapable of serving.<sup>50</sup> Other estimates, varying from 8-20%, do not draw a distinction between ephebes and non-ephebes.<sup>51</sup> The reliability of these conjectures, however, cannot be determined given the absence of evidence. Even so, I suspect that a number of ephebes – how many is unclear – was granted an exemption from the ephebeia on account of physical disability:<sup>52</sup> there was little point in conscripting lame or crippled citizens (or mentally incapacitated?) for the ephebeia if they were not mobile enough to patrol the mountainous border areas in their second year of service so as to hunt down marauding bands of plunderers ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-4).<sup>53</sup>

The evidence taken together suggests that there should have been no impediment for the *demos* to field a standing army consisting of perhaps three-quarters or more of all eighteen year-old citizens in a given enrollment year. The epigraphic evidence and the demographic data, however, suggest that not only did fewer citizens serve but also that citizen participation in the ephebeia seems to have increased significantly between 334/3

<sup>49</sup> Examples of physical ailments: Plut. *Phoc.* 10.2; Hdt. 7.229; Ar. *Ran.* 190-2. For physical incapacity as a bar to military service, see Baldwin 1967, 42-3; Christ 2001, 406-7.

<sup>50</sup> See Hansen 1985, 18-20 (citizens 20%); 49, 67 (Ephebes 10%+).

<sup>51</sup> Ruschenbusch 1988, 139 (10%); Sekunda 1992, 347-8 (less than 8%); Marcellus 1994, 218 (less than 20%); Burckhardt 1996, 42 (10%).

<sup>52</sup> No source mentions when or where ephebes were granted exemptions from service. I suggest that all ephebes marched as a body to Piraeus after they had sworn the ephebic oath during their tour of the temples ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3; Lyc. *Leoc.* 76). At this point the physically impaired ephebes approached the general of Piraeus (and later the generals of Munychia and Acte: **E20**), who had the authority to grant or deny exemptions (Lys. 9.4), and claimed an exemption from military service. The general may have also required the ephebe to swear before the *boule* that he was disabled (cf. cavalrymen before the *boule*: [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 49.4; see also Pélékidis 1962, 97). Successful ephebes were released from their obligation to serve. Afterwards they presumably attended to their own affairs over the next two years and could sit in the *ecclesia* until they registered on the *pinax ecclesiastikos* at the age of twenty (see p. 42 on [Dem]. 44.35). As Hansen 1986, 21, and Robertson 2000, 163-4, point out, infirm ephebes could not be denied their citizenship rights on account of not doing ephebic service, because Lysias 24, *On the Refusal of a Pension*, shows that handicapped citizens unable to work (and hence exempted from service in the army) not only retained their political rights but also received welfare payments from the state (see also Aeschin. 1.102-4).

<sup>53</sup> This perhaps implies that fitness standards were higher in the ephebeia than in the regular army, since Plutarch suggests that mobility-impaired citizens could fight effectively in hoplite battle (see Hanson 1989, 95; Edwards 1996, 89-90, on Plut. *Mor.* 217C; 234E).

and 332/1. With the exception of Hansen and Burckhardt,<sup>54</sup> scholars have not sought to explain this phenomenon.<sup>55</sup> I argue in the next section that the rise in the number of citizens who served can be understood if we consider how those who chose not to participate may have viewed the ephebeia in its first years of existence.

### 3.2: An Unwelcome Obligation? The Avoidance of Ephebic Service

When the newly enrolled citizens took the ephebic oath in the archonship of Ctesicles (i.e. 334/3), they, like previous generations of Athenians, swore to defend the fatherland, its boundaries, temples, and crops, against all outside threats (Eur. *Heracl.* 826-7).<sup>56</sup> These ephebes, who comprised the first age-class or *helikia* of citizens liable for conscription ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 53.4, 7), were compelled under the force of law to perform military service.<sup>57</sup> Failure to comply could result in a *graphe astrateias* for draft-dodging, a *graphe lipotaxiou* for desertion, or a *graphe deilias* for cowardice, of which the penalty was *atimia* or the loss of citizen rights.<sup>58</sup> As Aeschines points out, the fear of such a punishment spurred citizens to fight for Athens (3.175-6; also see Lys. 14.15). In addition to this legal pressure, the use of αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὄπλα in lines 6-7 of the ephebic oath makes it clear that they were under a moral and religious obligation to fight. Ephebes would have regarded it as shameful to shirk from their duties and hence disgrace their heroic ancestors, whom the funeral orations (*epitaphioi*) praised for their zeal in serving

<sup>54</sup> Hansen 1988b, 189-93; Burckhardt 1996, 42-3.

<sup>55</sup> Scholars have generally followed the method of Reinmuth 1971, 105-8, that averages the ephebic rosters so as to estimate an annual figure for the Lycurgan period. The flaw in this line of reasoning is that it does not take into account the rise in the number of ephebes in the first three years of the ephebeia. This clearly distorts the epigraphic evidence, even if a scholar recognizes that the ephebes “seem to rise over the first several years” (Marcellus 1994, 21-2; cf. 214, 223).

<sup>56</sup> For the quotation and discussion of the ephebic oath, see pp. 31-4, 166-7.

<sup>57</sup> Hansen 1988a, 190, argues that the “increase of ephebes of Kekropis from 42 to over 52 to 65 is itself a strong indication that the *ephebeia* was not a compulsory “Wehrdienst”, but a public training which was felt to be a civic duty and caught on rapidly (his italics).” His interpretation, however, depends upon a highly speculative reading of Lycurgus’ *Against Leocrates* 76, which wrongly assumes that the ephebeia existed prior to Chaeronea.

<sup>58</sup> For the penalty of *atimia*: Aeschin. 3.175-6; Lys. 14.9; Dem. 24.103. Examples of these *graphai*: Aeschin. 1.29; And. 1.74; Dem. 15.32; 24.103-5; 39.17. Citizens in their capacity as prosecutors brought these *graphai* against accused individuals: the latter were tried before a court, presided over by the generals (Lys. 15.1-2) of the defendants’ fellow soldiers who had served with them on campaign (Lys. 14.5, 15, 17). For a collection and discussion of these military *graphai*, see Pritchett 1974, 233-4; Hansen 1976, 55-6, 62, 66, 72, 91; Hamel 1998a, 63-4; Hamel 1998b, 361-405; Christ 2006, 59-62.

Athens in war and their willing self-sacrifice on behalf of freedom and the democracy.<sup>59</sup> no ephebe, given his highly developed sense of honor (e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.12.5-6, 1389a9-16; Xen. *Mem.* 6.4), would have desired to be mocked publicly as a coward, as Cleonymos was for throwing away his shield at some unknown battle, perhaps Delium in 424.<sup>60</sup>

But the ephebes of 334/3 differed from their predecessors in one crucial respect: they were the first enrollment class for the ephebeia. They were no longer required to guard the fortified points of Attica only when the homeland was threatened with invasion (e.g. Thuc. 2.13.6-7), but now had to undertake garrison duty for two whole years, the first spent in the Piraeus and the second on the Attic-Boeotian border ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5). For the first time, the youngest citizens were no longer free to do as they wished in peacetime, unlike previous generations (Thuc. 2.37.2; Isoc. 7.37; Plat. *Leg.* 624C-D), but were obliged to subordinate their own interests to that of the *polis*. While the previous section suggests that the majority of fit ephebes were ready and willing to do their stint of ephebic service, others would have had been less than enthusiastic for their new duties. Though we have no evidence for how ephebes viewed the ephebeia during the Lycurgan period, the notion that an unknown but significant number of ephebes would have been reluctant to serve and consequently would have sought to evade their civic obligations is nevertheless consistent with their older compatriots' attitude towards conscription and military service in the Classical period.<sup>61</sup>

As Aristotle astutely observes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, “all men, or most men, wish what is noble (τὰ καλὰ) but choose what is profitable (τὰ ὠφέλιμα) (8.13.8,

<sup>59</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.37.1; Lys. 2.18; Dem. 60.26, 28; Plato. *Menex.* 238C. For a detailed discussion of this genre, see Ziolkowski 1981; Loraux 1986.

<sup>60</sup> For Cleonymos, see Storey 1989, 247-61. His cowardice is the butt of jokes in Aristophanes' plays, all composed after Delium: *Nub.* 353-4, 67-80; *Vesp.* 592-3, 822-3; *Eq.* 1369-72; *Pax.* 673-8, 1295-1304; *Aves.* 289-90, 1473-81; *Plut.* 1295-1304.

<sup>61</sup> Christ 2004, 33-57; 2006, 45-142, has gathered a considerable body of evidence from comedy and tragedy which shows that draft-evasion and desertion by citizens, despite the idealized rhetoric of the funeral orations, were issues of some concern to the *demos* throughout the Classical period, as we can see from the double title of Eupolis' lost comedy *Astrateutoi* (The Draft-Dodgers) and *Androgunoi* (The Womanish Men) (see Storey 2003, 74-81, on frs. 31-41 Kock).

1162b34-6).<sup>62</sup> Given that perhaps half of the citizens registered in a given year would have come into their patrimony,<sup>63</sup> I suggest that some were so concerned about their property interests that they were ready to avoid the responsibility of serving Athens.<sup>64</sup> Certainly the subsistence level state-funded *trophe* of four obols *per diem* ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.3) would not have seemed fair compensation to those ephebes worried that their farms might suffer from a lengthy absence,<sup>65</sup> or even to poor *thetes* who depended upon a living as hired laborers.<sup>66</sup> Self-preservation may have motivated others, in that they desired to avoid dangerous situations such as Lamachus faced when he fought against Boeotian raiders (*Ar. Arch.* 1174-88). Two years of garrison duty in Attica would have also lacked the necessary inducements which had made overseas campaigns attractive to young citizen-conscripts, namely adventurism in foreign countries and the

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<sup>62</sup> For self-interest as a reason for citizens to avoid military service, see Christ 2006, 50-1.

<sup>63</sup> Strauss 1993, 67-8, argues that “only about half of the males who reached the age of eighteen would have a living father. Hence about half of the population of Athenian young men took control of the patrimony at the age of eighteen.” Both Strauss and Golden 1990, 111-2, apply Saller’s 1987 computer model of life expectancy in Rome to Athens. They assume an average life expectancy of c. 25 years and median ages of 25 and 15 years for the groom and bride respectively. For a discussion of *ephebos* and adulthood, see pp. 24-7.

<sup>64</sup> In Plato’s *Laws*, the citizens’ obsessive pursuit of wealth and the need to take care of their own possessions are the greatest hindrance for waging war (831C-832A).

<sup>65</sup> While scholars have discussed how prolonged campaigning overseas could have damaged some Athenian citizens’ property interests (e.g. Cox 1998, 155-61), no one, to the best of my knowledge, has considered how an ephebe’s anxiety about his estate may have affected his attitude towards ephebic service. Such concerns perhaps included long running disputes with his neighbors over his farm’s boundaries, water disputes, trespassing, and injury to property, among other things (See Klingenburg 1976, 21-62, on Plat. *Leg.* 842E-846D). He may have also feared that his absence would have encouraged thieves to ransack his estate or steal his crops, leaving him impoverished (cf. *Ar. Arch.* 230; *Dem.* 47.53-6; *Men. Dysc.* 109-21; *Theophr. Char.* 10.8). No source says who managed the ephebe’s estate in his absence, but it is likely that he entrusted one of his kinsmen to be the effective guardian of his property, such as his elder brother (e.g. *Lys.* 10.4-5) or his paternal uncle (e.g. *Lys.* 18.9). Even if the ephebe was lucky enough to avoid quarrelling with his siblings, unlike Chaerophon and his brother Chaerecrates (*Xen. Mem.* 2.3.1-10), or had no suspicion that his relations were embezzling whatever wealth he possessed, as Aphobus did to Demosthenes (*Dem.* 27), nevertheless he must have often been tempted to visit his farm to ensure that it was managed well, especially around harvest time (for farmers’ concerns during an agricultural year, see Hanson 1995, 152-64).

<sup>66</sup> Marcellus 1994, 157, argues: “one of the results of the ephebeia is that, like Lycurgus’ building programme, it would have produced a form of welfare (or workfare) for the city’s poor and young.” But the daily wage for laborers in the late fourth century seems to have ranged from one and a half to two and a half drachmas (Markle 1985, 293), considerably more than the four obols per day each ephebe received as their *trophe*, not *misthos* (Loomis 1998, 53-4). One suspects, then, that the poor would have regarded the ephebeia as less attractive financially than working in the numerous construction projects undertaken during the Lycurgan period.

prospect of booty (e.g. Thuc. 6.24.3; Eur. *Supp.* 232-7).<sup>67</sup> Finally, others may have been reluctant to bear what they considered to be an unfair burden of protecting the fatherland.<sup>68</sup>

If so, the most effective way for an ephebe to avoid military service was to claim that he was physically incapable of undertaking his duties,<sup>69</sup> namely by faking or exaggerating an injury or a long-term physical handicap, though perhaps not so blatantly as Aristogeiton did when he turned up at muster with both legs bandaged and leaning on a staff (Plut. *Phoc.* 10.2). In similar manner an ephebe could have also feigned a severe illness. That this strategy was not uncommon among the rest of the citizen-body is suggested by a fragment of Antiphon, which says that “illness is a holiday for cowards (87 B57 D-K: νόσος δειλοῖσιν ἑορτή).” Given that perhaps 15-20% of ephebes were physically unfit for service, as we have seen, a false claim concerning a physical disability would have sounded plausible when the ephebe presented himself before the general in the Piraeus. It is unlikely, however, that ephebes could have manipulated other exemptions, such as holding office or transferring from hoplite service to the cavalry, as older citizens sometimes did to avoid conscription.<sup>70</sup>

Some could have also tried to dodge the ephebeia either (1) by failing to appear when the ephebes had mustered for their military service or (2) by deserting their tribal contingents at the first opportune moment afterwards. Though these draft-dodging ephebes had little chance of successfully evading their obligations without being

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<sup>67</sup> See also van Wees 2004, 26-8.

<sup>68</sup> Lysias' *For the Soldier* suggests that Athenian citizens resented being called up for overseas campaigns too frequently and were reluctant to serve again unless others did likewise (9.4, 15). In Aristophanes' *Peace*, citizens show their annoyance at being called up yet again for military service while younger men stay at home (1180-1). In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Nicomachides complains that Antisthenes was elected general despite the fact that the former has served on numerous campaigns and the latter has not even gone once (3.4.1).

<sup>69</sup> Christ 2004, 58; 2006, 54-5.

<sup>70</sup> For a full list of exemptions and some citizens' abuse of them, see Christ 2006, 53-8. Burckhardt 1996, 42, argues that ephebes had the choice to join the cavalry as an alternative to the ephebeia. But Bugh's 1988, 168-9, discussion of the cavalry corps after Chaeronea suggests that Athenian citizens were recruited as *hippeis* after they had left the ephebeia. Evidence for Bugh's view perhaps comes from **E2**, an inscription of Cecropis, dated to 333/2. Νικήας Εὐκταίου from the deme Xypete (line 21) is later attested in a catalogue of *hippeis* c. 323/2 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1955, line 5). These inscriptions imply that Nicias had served in the ephebeia from 334/3 to 333/2 and had at some later date joined the cavalry. We have no way of telling, however, whether Nicias was typical or not.



noticed,<sup>71</sup> it should be pointed out that fear of detection did not prevent a substantial number of Athenian citizens from refusing to appear at muster for Myronides' expedition against the Boeotians in 457 (D.S. 11.81.5) nor from deserting Phocion's army while campaigning in Euboea in 350 (Plut. *Phoc.* 12.3). Furthermore, an ephebe could have also provided a plausible excuse for leaving the ephebeia: i.e. his absence was unavoidable because he was compelled to attend to his own affairs, such as prosecuting his guardians over his patrimony (Dem. 27.5; 30.15). Even if his excuse for absence was subsequently found to be false, he nevertheless had a good chance of escaping prosecution for his *astrateia* or *lipotaxion* because the sources suggest that politically prominent and/or wealthy individuals, not average citizens, were usually charged with these crimes by their personal enemies.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, the systematic prosecution of ephebes, resulting in their disenfranchisement if successful, would not only not have been in the interest of the *demos* but also contrary to the leniency normally shown to errant citizens (Dem. 22.51; Plat. *Leg.* 955B-C).<sup>73</sup>

How, then, did the *demos*, concerned about the lack of zeal some ephebes had for the ephebeia and hence the potentially ruinous consequences for the φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας, get them to serve? I suggest that before the next enrollment class of 333/2 the *demos* made it more difficult for ephebes to shirk their duty in an effort to increase citizen

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<sup>71</sup> When the ephebes were mustered together for the first time, probably in the Agora (see p. 166, n. 86), the *demos* would have already compiled a list of their names, set up on a bronze stele outside the *Bouleterion* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 53.4), perhaps soon after the *dokimasia* of the *boule* (Pélékidis 1962, 99). The ephebes present at this muster, I suggest, would have been marked off this list, revealing the names of those who did not turn up (Poll. 8.115). Desertion without detection after the muster would have also been difficult, since the tribal *sophronistes* would have known each member of his contingent on account of his close relationship with the ephebes on a daily basis ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3).

<sup>72</sup> E.g. Stephanos against Xenocleides in [Dem]. 59.27 and Demosthenes against Medias in Dem. 21.161-66. On the view that such prosecutions were selective, see Christ 2006, 61, 119-21.

<sup>73</sup> See Hansen 1991, 310; Christ 2006, 118-9. Even if the ephebe had avoided prosecution for his draft-dodging or desertion, he still had to contend with the negative consequences of his actions after he had left the ephebeia. Not only did the failure to serve mark out a man as disreputable in court, but a good record of military service was considered to be an important qualification for public office and political leadership (see Roisman 2005, 118, on [Lys]. 6.46; 16.17; 30.26), as we can see from Aeschines' effort to defend himself against Demosthenes' slander of his military record (Aeschin. 2.167-9; Dem. 19.112-3). If so, this consideration would have discouraged those who hoped for a public career from avoiding the ephebeia, namely those who had the necessary wealth and leisure to be politically active (Sinclair 1988, 191-6; Ober 1989a, 116-8). If we consider that the leisure classes to a large extent monopolized the political leadership of Athens, one suspects that such concerns would have had little effect on the vast majority of *thetes*.

participation in the ephebeia. This may have included exerting considerable social pressure upon ephebes at deme level not to play the coward and to comply with conscription.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, these demesmen (including the ephebes' fathers and kinsmen), who had known the ephebes intimately from childhood, would have played an important role in preventing them from falsely passing themselves off as physically unfit: Lysias 24 implies that demesmen were aware of each others' physical condition.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, if citizens could indeed challenge an individual's claim to an exemption, as Christ suggests,<sup>76</sup> demesmen may have been encouraged to expose those ephebes blatantly abusing exemptions from the ephebeia. Lastly, the *demos* may have introduced new regulations in 334/3 which prohibited ephebes from going to law except in matters pertaining to estates, heiresses, and hereditary priesthods so that they may have "no excuse for absence" from their military service ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5).<sup>77</sup>

The *demos* may have also sought to convince lukewarm ephebes not to put their private interests above their public obligations, just like their older compatriots (Isoc. 18.60; Lys. 31.5-7). If so, they would have aimed to instill enthusiasm in the ephebes for their compulsory military service so that they would be ready and willing to make themselves useful to the *polis* (e.g. Dem. 19.281; Isoc. 4.27). The *demos* did this, I suggest, by harnessing the ephebes' *philotimia*, which in Xenophon's opinion separates ordinary people from brute beasts and real men from human beings (*Hiero.* 7.3-4). The concept of *philotimia* is reciprocal: the *demos* encouraged citizens to undertake activities

<sup>74</sup> The importance of being perceived as brave and manly is well illustrated in Theophrastus' story of the coward calling upon his fellow demesmen and *phyletai* to see the casualty which he brought back with his own hands to camp (*Char.* 25.5-6).

<sup>75</sup> For the high degree of familiarity demesmen had for one another, see Whitehead 1986, 223-34.

<sup>76</sup> See Christ 2006, 54, n. 25, on Dem. 21.15.

<sup>77</sup> καὶ δίκην οὔτε διδῶσιν οὔτε λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα μὴ πρό[φ]ασις ἢ τ[ο]ῦ ἀπιέναι, πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλή[ρου], κἄν τ[ι]νι κατὰ τὸ γένος ἱερῶσύνῃ γένηται. While scholars have assumed that the above restrictions dated to the time of the ephebeia's creation/reform (e.g. Rhodes 1981, 509), it should be pointed out that the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* provides an outline of the institution as it appeared in c. 330 (p. 7, n. 10). This leaves open the possibility that the *nomoi* were introduced after 334/3 but before 330/29. It is unclear, however, whether the regulation that all ephebes were exempt from liturgies (καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσι πάντων) was also enacted alongside the other legislation mentioned in [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5. Given that citizens had previously been liable for liturgies once they had completed their *dokimasia* (e.g. the choregia in Lys.21.1 and the trierarchy in Dem. 21.154), this regulation may well have been an additional measure passed in 334/3 or later rather than in 335/4.

for their benefit on the understanding that the former would then award public honors (τιμαί) and gratitude (χάρις) to the latter in return for services rendered (e.g. Dem. 18.257; 20.103).<sup>78</sup> The ephebic corpus suggests that honoring corporations praised the ephebes for their *philotimia* in undertaking their guard duties that contributed to the security of Attica and in their scrupulous adherence to carrying out their orders.<sup>79</sup> But if the *demos* expected the ephebes to exert themselves in these activities in order to gain honor (Xen. *Hiero.* 7.1; *Mem.* 3.3.13), what kind of honors could have served as an incentive for reluctant ephebes to participate in the ephebeia?

Though the ephebeia apparently did not award prizes for valor (*aristeia*),<sup>80</sup> an ephebe could still distinguish himself from the rest of his tribal contingent by being made a *taxiarchos* (regimental commander) or *lochagos* (company commander), officers that are first attested epigraphically in the enrollment class of 333/2.<sup>81</sup> Their duties, however, are not stated in the sources. Were they the same as the *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* in the

<sup>78</sup> For *philotimia* in literature see Dover 1974, 229-34. Though the word originally had a pejorative connotation in the fifth and early fourth centuries (e.g. Thuc. 2.65.7; 3.82.8; 8.89.3), Whitehead 1983, 55-74, has shown that it had become one of the cardinal civic virtues by the middle of the fourth century. *Philotimia* is first attested epigraphically in *IG II<sup>2</sup> 223A*, line 11, dated to 342, and is common in honorary inscriptions in the Lycugran period (e.g. Schwenk 1985, no. 28 = *IG II<sup>2</sup> 338*, line 13, dated to 333/2). For further discussions on *philotimia* in fourth-century Athens, see also Sinclair 1988, 188-90; Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 283-4, 302-3.

<sup>79</sup> **E2** [333/2]: ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες Ἐλευσῖνι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμῳ[ς] ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν αὐτοῖς ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος προστάττει ... (lines 36-8). ἐπειδὴ καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμῳς ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος οἱ τῆς Κεκροπίδος ἔφηβοι ... (lines 45-7). ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἄρχοντος ἐνγραφέντες ... καὶ ὁ [σω]φρονιστὴς ... ἀποφαίνει αὐτο[υ]ς πειθάρχοντας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμῳς (lines 52-6). **E3** (332/1): ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δῆμοις ἐπαινεῖσαι αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκα τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἐλευσινίων (lines 7-8). Kirchner's restoration of φιλοτιμίας should be accepted, because the alternative – ἐπιμελείας – would make no sense given the use of ἐπεμελοῦντο for the ephebes in lines 5 and 6 of the inscription. **E24** (c. 331/0-322/1): ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμίας ... (lines 6-7).

<sup>80</sup> For the customary award of *aristeia* in Greek armies after battle, see Pritchett 1974, 276-90; Hamel 1998a, 64-70.

<sup>81</sup> In the ephebic corpus the *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* are always honored separately as a group, either in the heading or on the sides of the stones. They are also listed under their deme captions alongside their fellow ephebes. Instances of ephebic *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi*: **E5** (332/1), lines 6-10; **E7** (332/1), lines 14-8; **E8** (332/1), Col. I, lines 20-8, Col. II, lines 15-22; **E15** (331/0 or 330/29), lines 2-7; **E18** (329/8?), lines 70-9; **E20** (331/0-325/4), lines 1-5, Left side, lines 11-13; **E21** (331/0 or 324/3), lines 3-5, 9-11; **E22** (332/1-322/1), lines 3-15. It is likely, as Pélékidis 1962, 110, suggests, that the *sophronistes* selected these ephebic officers. Scholars claim that they were appointed at the beginning of the ephebes' second year (e.g. Pélékidis 1962, 109; Sekunda 1992, 335), but this is contradicted by the appearance of *lochagoi* on **E9**, which dates to 333/2, the first year of the Leontid ephebes' military service.

parent *phyle* ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 61.3)?<sup>82</sup> Mitchel makes this assumption when he suggests that the *taxiarchos* and *lochagoi* were cadet officers intended for future employment in the army.<sup>83</sup> Sekunda suggests that a *lochagos* commanded an ephebic *lochos* (company) with “the limited responsibility of ensuring that all recruits under his care turn up for training at the right place and time, and with the necessary equipment.”<sup>84</sup> Finally, Pélékidis supposes that the *lochagoi* led both ephebic and mercenary *peripoloi*.<sup>85</sup> It is hard to understand, however, why in this last case this duty should have been assigned to an ephebe rather than to a *peripolarchos*.<sup>86</sup> Whatever duties the ephebic *taxiarchos* and *lochagoi* may have had – perhaps they did have command responsibilities – I suggest that the rationale behind the creation of these offices for the ephebic year of 333/2 was as much to spur the ephebes’ *philotimia* as for any military function.<sup>87</sup>

The ephebeia also provided an opportunity for a *phyle* of ephebes to display its excellence in athletic competition by defeating rival tribal teams in the torch-race (*lampadedromia*) at various festivals and by setting up a dedication to commemorate its victory. Two such dedications have survived. (1) The *sophronistes* and the *gymnasiarchoi* of Eretheis erected **E10** (333/2 or 332/1) at Rhamnous,<sup>88</sup> probably after

<sup>82</sup> Mitchel 1961, 352, has shown that the ephebic *phyle* was regarded as an organization separate from the parent *phyle*. This is clear from **E8**, Col. I, lines 9-11, where the latter praises the former: δεδόχθαι τ[ῇ] Λεωντίδι ἐπαινέσαι τὴν Λεωντίδα φυλὴν τῶν ἐφήβων τῶν ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος.

<sup>83</sup> Mitchel 1961, 356-7. His main evidence that ephebic *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* had this role is Aeschin. 2.167 and Dem. 54.5. But, as we have seen in chapter one, the ephebeia did not exist before Chaeronea.

<sup>84</sup> Sekunda 1992, 329. While his claim concerning the *lochagoi*’s duties can neither be confirmed or denied, there is no positive evidence for his suggestion that an ephebic *phyle* could be subdivided into *lochoi* as the parent *phyle* could (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.3). Indeed, as Reinmuth 1971, 23, observes, the number of *lochagoi* on the ephebic inscriptions appears to have little correspondence to the number of ephebes on the rosters: e.g. **E5**, 7 *lochagoi* and 52 ephebes; **E8**, 5 *lochagoi* and c. 44 ephebes; **E18**, 5 *lochagoi* and c. 52 ephebes; **E20**, 12 *lochagoi* and 62 ephebes. Given this, it is unsurprising that Burckhardt 1996, 69-70, says that *lochagoi* led small troops of 5-10 ephebes, without further comment.

<sup>85</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 110.

<sup>86</sup> For a discussion of *peripolarchoi*, see pp. 42.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Burckhardt 1996, 70: “Aspiration auf eine solche Stelle, die einen aus dem Rest der Kameraden heraushob, war natürlich ein zusätzlicher Ansporn für eine pünktliche Erfüllung des Dienstes.”

<sup>88</sup> Lines 1-4 of the heading: [ὁ σωφ]ρονιστῆς Περικ[— — — — —]άσιος [καὶ οἱ τῆς Ἐρε]χθείδος ἐφήβων γ[υμ]νασίαρχοι ἀνέθεσαν, [οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος λαμπα]δι νικήσαντες [— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς, Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν. Palagia and Lewis 1989, 334-5, argue that [— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς and Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν are ephebes because the latter also appears in **E11**, line 9, another Eretheid inscription dated to the same year. This argument is not conclusive: (1) The Χαρικλῆς in **E10** may not be the same individual as in **E11** but a homonymous kinsman (Marcellus 1994, 16). (2) The first definite mention of

the ephebes of the *phyle* were victorious at the Nemesia.<sup>89</sup> If we consider that later evidence explicitly says that the Greater Nemesia included athletic contests (*SEG* 41.75 [c. 255], lines 8-9: τῶν μεγάλων Νεμεσίων τῶι γυμνικῶι ἀγῶνι), it is likely that the ephebes competed in the torch-race at the fourth-century festival as well.<sup>90</sup> The discovery of herms suitable for ephebic dedications and reliefs depicting victorious *lampadephoroi* at Rhamnous suggests that other tribes made similar offerings during the Lycurgan period.<sup>91</sup> (2) The ephebes and *sophronistes* of Aiantis dedicated **E6** (333/2 or 332/1) to Munichus at an unidentified festival.<sup>92</sup> Given the find spot (the Kerameikos) the torch-race could have been held at the Panatheneia, the Hephaesteia, or the Prometheia, since Aristophanes says that all three torch races passed through there (*Ran.* 131). Late evidence also tentatively suggests that ephebes competed in each of these festivals, along with that of Pan.<sup>93</sup> Evidence for the last festival may come from **E25** (c. 334/3-322/1), a dedication erected by the *lampadephoroi* of an unknown tribe at Marathon, if it is ephebic.<sup>94</sup>

While the torch-race certainly predated the Lycurgan period,<sup>95</sup> citizen involvement in these events was limited to youths who had sufficient wealth and leisure

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ephebic gymnasiarchs does not occur until the Hellenistic Period (see Reinmuth 1971, 53, on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1039, lines 29-30, dated to 73/2). (3) The “ephebes” do not appear on the roster, though they could have been listed in the two erasures on the stone. (4) Ephebes were not allowed to undertake liturgies [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.5. This restriction, however, may only apply to liturgies outside of the ephebeia.

<sup>89</sup> Pouilloux 1954, 111; Habicht 1961, 144, n. 3; Palagia and Lewis 1989, 344; Parker 1996, 254, n. 126.

<sup>90</sup> For the Nemesia at Rhamnous, see Stafford 2000, 94-6. Parker 1996, 246, suggests that the *gymnikon agon* may have even been an innovation of Lycurgan Athens.

<sup>91</sup> Palagia and Lewis 1989, 337-44, associate the base of **E10** with one (NM 313) of the four hip-herms of a youthful male figure dressed in a short chiton and chlamys, which they identify as either Hermes, an Athenian ephebe, or Munichus, the eponymus hero of the *helikia* of 333/2. The three other hip-herms (NM 314, 315, 316) and the two youthful heads thought to be from herms (NM 317, 318) probably also belonged to ephebic dedications which have not survived. Two fragmentary reliefs dated on stylistic grounds to the 330's have been found at Rhamnous (Rham. 531 [ex Athens NM 2332]; British Museum GR 1953.5.-30.1+ Rham. 530). These reliefs depict the procession of a team after a torch-race, perhaps at the Nemesia, and must have also been attached to victory *stelai*. For a discussion of these reliefs, see Palagia 2000, 403-8.

<sup>92</sup> Lines 1-6: [Αἰ]αντίδος ἔφηβ[οι οἱ] ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντ[ος][κ]αὶ σωφρονιστῇ Ἐπιχάρης Ἐπιγένους Οἰναῖος λαμπάδι νικήσαντες ἥρωι Μουνίχῳ ἀνέθεσαν.

<sup>93</sup> Two scholia on Dem. 57.43 (*Lex. Patm.* 142, 15-19; *Lex. Seg.* 228, 11-14) link ephebes to the torch-races at the festivals of Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Pan. Torch-races at these festivals and at the Panatheneia: Harpocration s.v. Λαμπάς; Suda s.v. Λαμπάδος; Schol. on Ar. *Ran.* 131, 1087; Hdt. 6.105. See Sekunda 1990, 153-4; Humphreys 2004, 114-5.

<sup>94</sup> For a discussion of **E25**, see p. 224-5.

<sup>95</sup> See the evidence gathered in Kyle 1987, 190-3.

to compete as *lampadephoroi*.<sup>96</sup> When the Athenians created the ephebeia, they incorporated the torch race into the institution not only because of its importance to the rituals of those festivals which the ephebes attended but also because the prospect of the honors gained from winning such races helped to motivate ephebes to do the duties required of them.<sup>97</sup> Unlike earlier victory dedications, however, the entire ephebic *phyle* was honored for the victory – **E10** has 47-48 ephebes under the heading ΛΑΜ[Π]ΑΔΗΦΟΡΟΙ – although only 10 ephebes would have actually competed in the race (cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1250, lines 13-22, dated to 350's or 340's). Since there is no evidence for specialized sports teams in the ephebeia until the second-century A.D.,<sup>98</sup> Humphreys is right to suggest that all ephebes were listed because everyone trained for the torch-races and was available to compete on the team.<sup>99</sup>

The effectiveness of the honors discussed above was probably limited in convincing unenthusiastic ephebes to serve, since not every ephebe could become a *taxiarchos* or *lochagos* and not every *phyle* could win the torch-race. What *did* make the ephebeia attractive to newly enrolled citizens, I suggest, is the extensive honors awarded by the *demos* and *boule*, the parent *phylae*, and individual demes, to those ephebes who had completed their military service. In **E2** (= *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156), dated to 333/2, which is the most detailed and informative of the Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions,<sup>100</sup> the ephebes of Cecropis were honored as follows (lines 26-62):

[Tribe] Callicrates of Aixone proposed: Since the ephebes of Cecropis in the archonship of Ctesicles show discipline and do all things that the laws assign them and obey the *sophronistes* elected by the people, praise them and crown them with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas for their good

<sup>96</sup> See p. 21.

<sup>97</sup> For the ritual aspects of the torch-race, see Parke 1977, 45-6, 171-3; Simon 1983, 53-4, 63-4.

<sup>98</sup> Ephebic sports teams (*sy(n)stremmata*) first appear in 140 A.D. (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2047) and continue to 255 A.D. (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2245). For a discussion of *sy(n)stremmata*, see Oliver 1971, 66-74.

<sup>99</sup> Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 15.

<sup>100</sup> It should be pointed out that few inscriptions have decrees inscribed on them (**E1**, **E3**, **E8**, **E14**, **E23**), of which only **E8** is relatively intact. The reason for this paucity was probably the expense of inscribing and erecting the stone, which was paid for by the *phyle*, as we can see from **E8**, an inscription of Leontis, dated to 332/1: [ἀναγράψαι δὲ] τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα[α τῆς φυλῆς τὸν γρ]αμματέα τῆς φυ[λῆς καὶ στῆσαι ἐν] τῷ ἱερῶϊ, τὸ [δ' ἀνάλωμα εἰς τὴν γρα]φὴν δοῦνα[ι τοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς τῆς φυλῆς, ἀναγράψαι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τ]ὸ [ἀν]άθημα (Col. II, lines 3-8).

order and discipline; and also praise the *sophronistes* Adeistus son of Antimachus of Athmonon and crown him with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas, because he took care of the ephebes of the tribe Cecropis with fine love of honor. And inscribe this decree on a stone stele and set it up in the sanctuary of Cecrops.

[Council] Hegemachus son of Chaeremon of Perithoedae proposed: Since the ephebes of Cecropis stationed at Eleusis take care of the things which the council and the people assign them with fine love of honor and they show themselves disciplined, praise them for their good order and discipline and crown each of them with an olive crown; and also praise their *sophronistes* Adeistus son of Antimachus of the deme Athmonon and crown him with an olive crown whenever he may submit his accounts; and inscribe this decree additionally on the dedication which the ephebes of Cecropis dedicate.

[Eleusis] Protias proposed: Decreed by the demesmen, since the ephebes of Cecropis and their *sophronistes* Adeistus son of Antimachus of Athmonon take care of the guarding of Eleusis with fine love of honor, praise them and crown each of them with an olive crown. And inscribe this decree on the dedication which the ephebes of Cecropis in the archonship of Ctesicles dedicate.

[Athmonon] Euphronius proposed: Decreed by the demesmen, since the ephebes of Cecropis enrolled in the archonship of Ctesicles show discipline and do all things that the laws assign them, and the *sophronistes* elected by the people shows that they are obedient and do all other things with love of honor, praise them and crown them with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas for their good order and discipline; and also praise their *sophronistes* Adeistus son of Antimachus of Athmonon, and crown him with a gold crown worth 500 drachmas, because he took care of both the demesmen and all the others of the tribe Cecropis with fine love of honor. And inscribe this decree additionally on the dedication which the ephebes of Cecropis and the *sophronistes* dedicate.

The stone suggests that the ephebes of Cecropis, probably towards the end of their stint in the ephebeia, were honored and crowned in four separate ceremonies – by the tribe of Cecropis, the *boule*, the deme of Eleusis, and the deme of Athmonon.<sup>101</sup> Other

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<sup>101</sup> Marcellus 1994, 22, referring to E2 and to ephebic decrees generally, suggests that “these crowns were bestowed as part of a ceremony marking the completion of their service.” It is more likely, however, that the four decrees on E2 were inscribed in *chronological* order, as Pélékidis 1962, 120-2, has argued. If so, this would mean that Cecropis passed the decree and crowned the ephebes first, which was followed (soon?) afterwards by the *boule* and the two demes. In E3 (333/2), the Eleusinians, in addition to awarding crowns, also exceptionally honored the *sophronistes* and ephebes of Hippothontis with a grant of *proedria* at the rural Dionysia: Lines 10-12: στεφανωῖ ὁ δῆμος ....8... τραγωιδῶν τ]ῶν [Δ]ιονυσίων καὶ

inscriptions suggest that ephebes were routinely honored in similar manner (e.g. **E5**, **E8**, **E14**; **E15**; **E23**). It is unclear, however, whether the ceremony at the *boule* was in fact the Lycurgan version of the *exititeria*: i.e. a formal review for all the ephebic *phylae* of an enrollment class held before the *boule* to commemorate their departure from the ephebeia.<sup>102</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* does not mention any such ceremony, but says that “when two years have passed, they are now with the others ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5).”<sup>103</sup> The epigraphic evidence is inconclusive. Though numerous inscriptions show that the *demos* and the *boule* crowned individual *phylai* throughout the Lycurgan period,<sup>104</sup> this does not exclude (nor does it confirm) the possibility that all of the *phylae* were present at one ceremony and were also honored separately.

Sometime after the ceremonies, probably in Boedromion,<sup>105</sup> the ephebes erected **E2**, which originally rested on a base and was presumably accompanied by a sculpture of some kind, “in the sanctuary of Cecropis (Line 35: ἐν τῷ τοῦ Κέκροπος ἱερ[ῶι])” on the Acropolis.<sup>106</sup> The function of **E2**, like other honorary decrees, was to be a monument of the *timai* awarded to the honorands for all time and a display of the ephebes’

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καλείτω αὐ[τὸν] ὁ δῆμαρχος καθάπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἔδωκεν τὴν προεδρίαν ... . For the restoration, see Mitchel 1984, 118, on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1187 (319/8), lines 10-14, and *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1193 (ca. 300), lines 13-17.

<sup>102</sup> For a discussion of the *exititeria* in the Hellenistic period, see Pélékidis 1962, 217-9. The term is unattested in the ephebic corpus until the third century, the earliest example being *Hesperia* 45 (1976), 297-9 (I 7181), line 25, dated to 205/4. Pélékidis 1962, 114, suggests that the *exititeria* developed from the armed review the ephebes held at the theatre before the *demos* at the beginning of their second year of service ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).

<sup>103</sup> διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.

<sup>104</sup> E.g. **E8**, lines 1-2: [τῷ ἡ]ρωὶ ὁ σ[ω]φρονιστ[ῆς] τῆς Λεωντίδος ἐπὶ] Ν[ι]κ[οκράτους καὶ οἱ ἔφηβοι] σ[τεφανωθέντ]ε[ς νν] ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς φυλῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνε[κα καὶ σωφρο]σύνης. **E22**, lines 1-2: [οἱ ἔφηβοι στεφ]ανωθέντες ὑπὸ [τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ] δήμου.

<sup>105</sup> Lycurgan inscriptions do not specify when the decrees were passed, but it was probably around mid to late Boedromion as in third-century ephebic decrees: e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 665 + I 3370 + I 6801 (266/5), Boed. 26; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 700 + I 2054 (259/8?), Boed. 30; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 787 (235/4), Boed. 18; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 794 (216/5), Boed. 14; I 7484 (214/3), Boed. 30. The Athenians preferred these dates because the next enrollment year of ephebes probably did not complete their tour of the temples until early Boedromion (see p. 164, n. 83).

<sup>106</sup> The majority of ephebic inscriptions are bases or fragments of bases which had a cavity cut into the top for a herm or tripod (**E5**, **E8**, **E9**, **E13**, **E14**, **E15**, **E16**, **E19**, **E20**, **E21**, **E26**, **E27**, **E28**). On **E22**, an inscription of Acamantis (332/1-322/1), a dowel secured the dedication. Ephebic inscriptions were usually set up in prominent public places, such as the entrance to the *temenos* of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis (see Clinton 1988, 22, on **E5** [332/1]) or in the Agora (see Traill 1986, 6, on **E14** [331/0?]).



*philotimia* towards the *demos* (cf. Dem. 20. 35-7, 64, 69).<sup>107</sup> While the language and phraseology of E2 and other ephebic inscriptions are for the most part typical of fourth-century Athenian decrees,<sup>108</sup> it must nevertheless have been a highpoint in an otherwise quiet life for many undistinguished ephebes of Cecropis to be praised for their contribution to the security of Attica and commended for those “cardinal virtues” which the *demos* considered desirable for citizens to possess.<sup>109</sup> Indeed, if we consider that the number of ephebes who served increased markedly from 450-500 in 333/2 to 600-650 in 332/1, it is highly likely that the enrollment class of 332/1, impressed with the honors the ephebes of 334/3 had received and spurred on by their own desire for distinction (i.e. their *philotimia*), sought to do the tasks assigned to them in exemplary fashion so that they too would gain such honors.<sup>110</sup> This eagerness to serve in turn ensured that there would be sufficient ephebes from 332/1 to defend Attica against Boeotian raids.

### 3.3: Military Discipline in the Ephebeia: Εὐταξία and Πειθαρχία

In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon, contrasting the fleet and the army, observes that “it is amazing that ... hoplites and cavalrymen, who seem to be the pick of the citizens for their noble character, are the most insubordinate (ἀπειθεστάτους) of them all.”<sup>111</sup> Later on in the same dialogue, he makes Socrates say “indeed in affairs of soldiers, where moral discipline (σωφροσύνη), good order (εὐταξία), and obedience (πειθαρχία) are

<sup>107</sup> Traill 1986, 3, restores lines 7-8 of E14 (331/0?) as follows: ἵνα ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν] ὅτι [ἐ]πίσταται [ἡ φυλὴ χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι κατ’ ἀξίαν — — — — — τ]ῆς χώρας. Cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 566 (*fin.* IV), lines 9-10; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 794 (279/8), lines 30-1. Traill also suggests εἰς φυλακὴν τ]ῆς χώρας, among other possibilities, for line 8. These restorations are likely, because the ὅτι clause, uniquely for the Lycurgan corpus, is probably a “manifesto-clause,” as Whitehead 1983, 63, calls it, in which the *phyle* (1) is declaring its gratitude for the ephebes’ efforts in protecting the *chora* of Attica and (2) is stating its desire for similar benefits from would-be *phyletai* in the future.

<sup>108</sup> For an overview of these aspects of Athenian honorary decrees, see Henry 1983; Veligianni-Terzi 1997.

<sup>109</sup> For a detailed study of ten “cardinal democratic virtues” attested epigraphically in Athens, see Whitehead 1993, 37-75. Five of these appear on ephebic inscriptions: *philotimia*, *eutaxia*, *arete*, *sophrosyne*, and *epimeleia*.

<sup>110</sup> See Burckhardt 1996, 65-7, for similar sentiments concerning the ephebes’ desire for end of year honors. For the importance of honor in Athenian society, see Sinclair 1988, 176-9.

<sup>111</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.19: Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι, τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιοῦτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὀπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων. See also [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.1.

most necessary, [the Athenians] pay no attention to these things.”<sup>112</sup> Xenophon should not be taken to mean that the Athenians degenerated into an armed mob whenever they went on campaign. While insubordination in the ranks was hardly unique to Athens, his remarks imply that it was not an infrequent occurrence in the Classical period, at least compared to the Spartans.<sup>113</sup> In the winter of 414/13, during the siege of Syracuse, Nicias is said to have written in a letter to the Athenians that “you [i.e. the *demos*] are by nature difficult to command (Thuc. 7.14.2: χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι).” The distinguished general Phocion, for example, could not control the Athenian army before the battle of Tamynae in Euboea in 349/8: Plutarch informs us that some citizens deserted the camp and made their way back to Athens (*Phoc.* 12.3).

Why didn’t Phocion punish his soldiers for their insubordination? The *Athenaion Politeia* makes it clear that as *strategos* he did have the authority to enforce discipline by imprisoning, expelling, or fining disorderly citizens (61.2).<sup>114</sup> Athenian generals, however, seem to have been reluctant to use these powers, if we can trust Lysias and Demosthenes. While the orators probably exaggerated the violent behavior of Simon and Conon’s sons respectively in order to arouse the juries’ anger against the defendants, it is likely that the generals’ reaction – to impose a light punishment for disobedience or to refrain from taking any disciplinary action – was not atypical in the circumstances.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.21: καὶ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς στρατιωτικοῖς, ἔφη, ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ εὐτακτεῖν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν, οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν.

<sup>113</sup> On *ataxia* in Athens and generally in Greece, see Pritchett 1974, 232-45 (collected testimonia); Hamel 1998a, 61; van Wees 2004, 108-113; Lendon 2005, 72-7.

<sup>114</sup> κύριοι δέ εἰσιν ὅταν ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ <ἐκ>κ[η]ρῦξαι καὶ ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν· οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ ἐπιβάλλειν.

<sup>115</sup> According to Lysias (*Against Simon* 45), a certain Simon was not only absent when the Athenians had set off for Corinth in 394, but he also, having caught up with them, got involved in a scuffle with his commanding officer, the tribal *taxiarchos*, and gave him a beating. For this, “he alone of the Athenians was dismissed from the army by proclamation (μόνος Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐξεκηρύχθη).” van Wees 2004, 109, remarks that this was a “mild penalty for such extreme insubordination” even though a dishonorable discharge would have publicly humiliated Simon. Carey 1989, 112; Todd 2007, 342, rightly suggest that Simon would have also been liable for a *graphe astrateias*, although Lysias does not say whether he was ever charged with the crime. In Demosthenes’ *Against Conon* 3-5, Ariston alleges that while he was undertaking garrison duty at Panactum, probably in 343 (see p. 54, n. 212), Conon’s sons spent their time getting drunk and abusing others in the encampment. When Ariston and other citizens in the neighboring tent complained to the *strategos*, the officer rebuked the young men verbally for their violent behavior. This had little effect, however, because Conon’s sons on the same night stormed into the

This attitude can be explained if we consider that they were officials annually elected by the very same citizens they were obliged to command ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 61.1).<sup>116</sup> Consequently a general would hesitate to inflict corporal punishment upon his fellow citizens lest his strict discipline make him unpopular and prevent his reelection when he returned to Athens.<sup>117</sup> Unable to coerce citizens,<sup>118</sup> he instead sought to convince them that good discipline was in their best interests, or to procure their willing obedience by impressing them with his superior excellence in war or by cultivating their goodwill with benefactions.<sup>119</sup> Despite this, the Athenians at times still refused to be swayed by his authority, knowing that the latter would turn a blind eye to their insubordination.<sup>120</sup>

But if military discipline in the modern sense did not exist in Classical Athens, how, then, are we to interpret the appearance of εὐταξία on two Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions?<sup>121</sup> The term originally had the meaning of “maintaining a good formation or battle-order” – for hoplites, εὐταξία denotes a well-ordered phalanx – but is often best

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tent and assaulted Ariston and his mess-mates. The *strategos* and the *taxiarchoi* then responded by breaking up the fight but took no further action. For these events, see Carey and Reid 1985, 78-80.

<sup>116</sup> χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας, στρατηγούς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ’ <ἐκάστης> φυλῆς ἓνα, νῦν δ’ ἐξ ἀπάντων. Xenophon recognized that generals (and presumably their subordinate officers) did not constitute a distinct officer class, as in modern armies, but rather were citizens invested with temporary authority (*Mem.* 3.5.21: τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν).

<sup>117</sup> Parke 1933, 78; Pritchett 1974, 243; Hamel 1998a, 62-3, 119-120. Xenophon’s *Anabasis* provides the best evidence that corporal punishment was capable of arousing considerable anger in a general’s command. When the mercenaries of the Ten Thousand had resolved to scrutinize the generals’ past conduct, Xenophon had to defend himself in a trial against several soldiers’ accusations that he had arrogantly beat them (5.8.1-25).

<sup>118</sup> Lendon 2005, 76: “To Greeks other than Spartans ... exact obedience seemed like the behavior of slaves, and beating treatment appropriate to slaves: the free citizen’s sense of aggressive individual autonomy constituted an obstacle to a strong ethical claim that leaders should be obeyed and that they had the right to enforce obedience with force.”

<sup>119</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.10; *Hipp.* 1.24; 6.1-6; *Cyr.* 1.6.21-5.

<sup>120</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.16: πότε δὲ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οἳ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων; Xen. *Oec.* 21.4: καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν, ἔφη, οἱ ἕτεροι τῶν ἐτέρων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε πονεῖν ἐθέλοντας οὔτε κινδυνεύειν παρέχονται, πείθεσθαι τε οὐκ ἀξιούντας οὐδ’ ἐθέλοντας ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλυνομένους ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι οὐδ’ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπισταμένους παρέχουσιν, ἂν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν συμβαίῃ.

<sup>121</sup> Εὐταξία and its cognates in the Lycurgan corpus: **E2** (333/2), lines 27, 31, 38-40, 53, 58; **E8** (332/1), Col. I, lines 7-8. For εὐταξία in the ephebeia, see Pélékidis 1962, 38, 181; Marcellus 1994, 149-54; Burckhardt 1996, 65; Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 112, 124-5, 132.

rendered in English as “discipline.”<sup>122</sup> In **E8**, a dedication of Leontis (332/1), εὐταξία occurs alongside πειθαρχία: ἐπειδὴ Φιλόθεος ὁ σωφ[ρον]ιστῆς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]φήβων ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]ίσκων καὶ φησιν εἶναι εὐτα[κτῶν]τας καὶ πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]ις καὶ ἑαυτῶι (Col. I, lines: 4-9). **E8** can be compared to a passage from the *Cyropaedeia*, where Xenophon calls the same group of soldiers οἱ εὐτακτοὶ or “the disciplined ones” in one sentence and οἱ πειθόμενοι or “the obedient ones” in the next (7.2.7-8). This suggests that the *demos*, like the cavalry commander in Xenophon’s *Hipparchus* (1.24),<sup>123</sup> sought to instill both discipline and obedience in the ephebes, so that it would increase the effectiveness of the corps in the field.<sup>124</sup>

I suggest that the *demos* had particular reason to be concerned about order in the ephebeia in the belief that young men, as characterized in Athenian literature throughout the Classical period, had a pronounced disposition towards physical violence, disorderly conduct, drunkenness, gambling, sexual excess, and thoughtlessness.<sup>125</sup> Though older Athenians were often prepared to overlook this socially disruptive behavior (Lys. 24.17; Dem. 25.88; 54.21),<sup>126</sup> despite their disapproval of such insolent and violent activity (Plat. *Leg.* 884), they could not afford to let “boys be boys” in the ephebeia. If we accept that discipline was less than ideal among older citizens, the *demos* may have little confidence that the *strategoi* of the Piraeus and the *chora* could have convinced the hundreds of armed ephebes under their command that all must play their part in enforcing εὐταξία and πειθαρχία in their *phyle* (cf. Xenophon’s exhortation to the Ten Thousand: *Anab.* 3.2.30-1). Moreover, the citizen body may have feared that if severe ill-discipline were to occur in the garrison forts, as we have seen with Conon’s sons at Panactum, the

<sup>122</sup> E.g. Xen. *Anab.* 5.8.13; *Cyr.* 8.5.14; Thuc. 6.72.4; 7.77.5. See Robert and Robert 1970, 453; Pritchett 1974, 236-8. It should be stressed that here I am only concerned with εὐταξία in a military context, not with “the broader societal connotations of the virtue, manifest as they are in diverse literary sources (Whithead 1993, 70).”

<sup>123</sup> εἰς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους μέγα μὲν τὸ [καὶ] λόγῳ διδάσκειν ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἐνὶ ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔργῳ [κατὰ τὸν νόμον] πλεονεκτεῖν μὲν ποιεῖν τοὺς εὐτάκτους, μειονεκτεῖν δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοὺς ἀτακτοῦντας.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.38: ἡ μὲν γὰρ εὐταξία σῶζειν δοκεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀταξία πολλοὺς ἤδη ἀπολώλεκεν.

<sup>125</sup> For these characteristics, see Dover 1974, 102-5; MacDowell 1990, 18-23; Fisher 1992, 97-99; Roisman 2005, 14-5, 171-2. E.g.: Dem. 19.194, 229; 21.18; 54.14; Is. 3.16-17; Isoc. 7.43, 47-9; 15.286-7; Lys. 20.3.

<sup>126</sup> For the tolerance of limited violence between youths in Athenian society, see Fisher 1998b, 75-7.

ephebes could degenerate into lawless bands which could plunder farms for their own gain (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.11; Plat. *Leg.* 762A) and hence could pose as much of a threat to the Athenian countryside as the marauding bands of raiders the ephebes were supposed to intercept.

To ensure that ephebes would be tightly controlled during their military service, the Athenians created specialized officers – one *kosmetes* and ten *sophronistai* (one for each tribe) – who served for two years and supervised one enrollment class of ephebes.<sup>127</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* says that the *kosmetes*, who is honored on several ephebic inscriptions,<sup>128</sup> was elected from the entire citizen body and makes it clear that he was the head official of the ephebeia.<sup>129</sup> The name of his office – “the orderer” – suggests that he was responsible in some way for maintaining *kosmos* or order in the institution.<sup>130</sup> Unfortunately, we know nothing about his duties in the Lycurgan period. Perhaps, I suggest, they included the disbursement of funds to the *sophronistai* and oversight over

<sup>127</sup> Controversy exists over the length of service for the *kosmetes* and *sophronistes*. They either served for two years and supervised one year class (Burckhardt 1996, 68-9), or were annual magistrates with supervision over two year classes (i.e. all ephebes in their first and second years: see Reinmuth 1971, 81), or oversaw the ephebes only in their first year, while the *strategoi* led them in the second (Pélékidis 1962, 104, 108). Of these suggestions, the first is the most likely, because the *Athenaion Politeia* mentions these officers in connection with one group of ephebes for the duration of their ephebic service (Clinton 1988, 28-9). The epigraphic evidence is consistent with this interpretation, since, as Rhodes 1981, 504, points out, the inscriptions erected at the end of the ephebes’ service honor only one *kosmetes* and *sophronistes*, not two. The recent discovery of E9, a dedication of Leontis (333/2), does not contradict Rhodes’s argument. While E9 does mention a different *kosmetes*, Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου Ἀρχαρνεύς, instead of ....8.... Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχαρνέως in E8 (332/1), the other Leontid inscription of the same enrollment class, the same *sophronistes* – Φιλόθεος Φιλοκλέου Σουνιεύς – is attested on both inscriptions. Petrakos 2004, 174-5, plausibly argues that Θουγείτων died in the first year of the ephebes’ service and was then replaced by the son of Αἰνησιστράτος in the second.

<sup>128</sup> E1 (333/2), a dedication of Acamantis, is unique in that it honors the *kosmetes* alone. Other attestations of the office: E4 (333/2), line 8; E7 (332/1), line 11; E8 (332/1), Col. II, lines 12-3; E17 (330/29 or later), line 2; E20 (331/0-325/4), Right Side, lines 7-10; E21 (331/0 or 324/3), lines 4-6; E18 (329/8?), Right Side, line 3(?).

<sup>129</sup> [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.2: [ὁ δῆμος χειροτονεῖ] κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας [φυλάς]. A minimum age for the *kosmetes* is not specified, but it was probably also forty years of age, just like the *sophronistes* (Rhodes 1981, 505). For the *kosmetes*, see Forbes 1929, 131-5; Pélékidis 1962, 104-6.

<sup>130</sup> Herodian defines the *kosmetes* in terms of *eutaxia* (s.v. κοσμηταί): οἱ τῶν ἐφήβων εὐταξίας προνοοῦντες. For the importance of order in Athenian society, see Roisman 2005, 192-9. He comments (192-3): “On the state and communal level, order—or even better, good order (*eukosmia*)—meant good laws, dutiful citizenship, and disciplined, decent personal behavior. Order protected society from descending into anarchy and uncivilized forms of existence. The quest for order, then, was an attempt to decrease the danger of threatening or unpredictable elements in the human environment.” For *kosmios*, or “orderly,” used with these meanings in oratory: e.g. Isoc. 3.38; Lys. 12.20; 19.16; 21.19.

their disciplinary activities, acting as a liaison officer between the ephebeia and the various magistrates, ensuring that the training was carried out correctly, planning and coordinating the tribal contingents in the various festivals in which the ephebes participated, and carrying out the orders of the *strategoi* with regard to the deployment of the ephebes in the Piraeus and the garrison fortresses.<sup>131</sup> The ephebes of Cecropis who had conducted themselves in an orderly fashion during their stint of military service were praised in **E2** (333/2) κοσμιότητος ἔνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας (lines 30-1, 39-40, 58; cf. ἐκόσ[μο]υν in **E3**, line 5, dated to the same year) – for their civic orderliness as well as for displaying good discipline in their ranks.

The *sophronistes*, like the *kosmetes*, was a publicly elected official.<sup>132</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* describes how the former was chosen:

And when the ephebes have been examined, their fathers, gathered together tribe by tribe, choose under oath three of their tribesmen who are more than forty years old, whom they consider to be the best and the most suitable to take care of the ephebes, and from them the people elects one of each tribe as *sophronistes* (42.2).<sup>133</sup>

The author makes it clear that the ephebes' fathers (and presumably the ephebes' guardians should they not have a father) determined the three candidates for the ten tribal

<sup>131</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 106-7; Marcellus 1994, 12; Burckhardt 1996, 69; Humphreys 2004, 92. That the *kosmetes* disbursed funds is suggested by Mitsos' likely restoration (on the basis of **E2**, lines 42-3) of **E1** (333/2), lines 20-1: ἐπε[ιδὸν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶ]. Forbes 1929, 131-5, assumes that the *kosmetes* had similar powers in the fourth century as he had in the later Hellenistic period, but this cannot be proven given the lack of evidence.

<sup>132</sup> For an overview of the *sophronistes*, see Forbes 1929, 128-131; Pélékidis 1962, 106-8. The office is mentioned in the following inscriptions: **E2** (333/2), lines 28-9, 31-2, 41-2, 47-8, 54-5, 58-9; **E3** (333/2), lines 1-2, 8-9; **E4** (333/2), line 3; **E9** (333/2?), lines unknown; **E6** (333/2 or 332/1), lines 3-4; **E5** (332/1), lines 1-2, 5-6; **E7** (332/1), lines 6-7; **E8** (332/1), line 1, Col. I, lines 4-5, 14-6, Col. II, lines 13-5, Col. III, lines 14-5; **E10** (333/2 or 332/1), line 1; **E16** (330/29), lines 2-3; **E6** (330/29 or later), line 2; **E18** (329/8?), Right Side, lines 1-2; **E20** (331/0-325/4), Left Side, lines 10-13; **E21** (331/0 or 324/3), lines 4-6.

<sup>133</sup> ἐπὶ δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἔφηβοι, συλλεγόντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν [κ]ατὰ φυλὰς, ὁμόσαντες αἰροῦνται τρεῖς ἐκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστήν. On **E2** (333/2), the election of the *sophronistes* is mentioned twice: τ[ῶ] σωφρ[ον]ιστ[ῆ] ... τῶι χειροτονηθέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου (lines 28-9) and ὁ [σω]φρονιστῆς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς (lines 54-5).

*sophronistai*,<sup>134</sup> but does not elaborate on what is meant by βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδαιοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων. A clue is the age requirement of the *sophronistes*, namely at least forty years old (ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων) – the same as *choregoi* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 56.3). This suggests that the fathers' perception of the candidates' moral character was an important factor in their selection, perhaps because the young were considered impressionable and hence easily corruptible (Aeschin. 3.245-6). This age-restriction is understandable if we consider the *demos*' assumptions, stated above, concerning the unruliness of youth, and the *sophronistes*' daily duties:

And it [i.e. the *demos*] also grants to the *sophronistai* a drachma per head for sustenance, and four obols per head to the ephebes: and each *sophronistes*, taking the pay for his own tribesmen, purchases the provisions for all in common (for they mess together by tribes), and takes care of all other things ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3).<sup>135</sup>

This intimate contact with the ephebes explains why he was almost always singled out for lavish praise and honors on ephebic inscriptions (with stress often placed on his ἐπιμελεία for the ephebes and towards the honoring corporation). Additionally, he usually had the honor of erecting the ephebic dedication alongside his former charges, and played a prominent role in the crowning ceremony at the end of the ephebes' and his term of service.<sup>136</sup> But what did τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων entail? Scholars

<sup>134</sup> Sekunda 1992, 337, wrongly supposes that only the fathers could be candidates.

<sup>135</sup> δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφ[ήν] τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμὴν α' ἐκάστῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐφήβοις τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἐκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστὴς ἕκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ κοινόν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλὰς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων.

<sup>136</sup> E.g. the heading of E5 (332/1), lines 1-4: [οἱ] ἐφ[ήβ]οι οἱ [τῆς Κεκ]ρ[ο]π[ίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους] ἄρχον[τος καὶ ὁ σ]ωφρονιστὴς αὐτῶν Περικ[λῆς] Περικλεί[δου] Πιθεὺς ἀνέθεσαν [ν]στεφ[ανώσαντες χρυσῶι στεφάνῳι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς. In E2 (333/2), Cecropis honors the *sophronistes* in the following manner (lines 31-4): ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σω[φρο]νιστὴν, Ἀδαιστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι [στεφάνῳι ἀπὸ] δ[ραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμελήθη] τῶν ἐφήβων τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς. In E3 (333/20, the Eleusinoi praise him in a similar manner (lines 8-9): ἐπ[αινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν ....8....] ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας [τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον]. Before he could receive such honors, however, the *sophronistes*, like other officials handling state funds, was required to submit his accounts for

have rightly inferred from his title of *sophronistes*, which means “discipline master,”<sup>137</sup> that he had the duty of instilling and maintaining σωφροσύνη or “moral discipline” in the ephebic *phyle* he supervised.<sup>138</sup> Apart from this the epigraphic evidence shows that ephebes were expected to be obedient to the *sophronistes*: e.g. **E2** (333/2), lines 28-9: τ[ῶι σωφρ]ονι[στ]εῖ πειθ[αρχο]ῦσιν.<sup>139</sup> Since εὐταξία is said to be the result of πειθαρχία,<sup>140</sup> the *sophronistes* must have also been entrusted with the task of making the ephebes εὐτακτοὶ or disciplined in the military sense as well as σώφρονες in a civic and moral sense.

Scholars have supposed that the *sophronistes* in the Lycurgan period had the right to inflict corporal punishment because a second-century A.D. relief depicts *sophronistai* wielding birches (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2122).<sup>141</sup> The office of *sophronistes*, however, was abolished at the end of the fourth century and was reintroduced in the reign of the Emperor Hadrian.<sup>142</sup> Support for this view comes from the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*, which probably dates to the late Hellenistic period although the author appears to have drawn from a late fourth-century source.<sup>143</sup> In the dialogue, Socrates describes an unfortunate youth’s experience in the ephebeia:

And whenever he enrolls among the ephebes, there are the *kosmetes* and worse fear, then there are the Lyceum and the Academy and the gymnasiarchy and the rods (ῥάβδοι) and miseries without measure (κακῶν ἀμετρίαι): and all the toil of the lad is subject to the

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audit: ἐπειδὴν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶι in **E2** (333/2), lines 42-3 (*Boule* awarding laurel crown); **E8** (332/1), Col. I, line 18 (Leontis awarding golden crown worth 1000 drachmas).

<sup>137</sup> Burckhardt 1996, 69, calls him a “Feldwebel” or “sergeant-major.”

<sup>138</sup> I defer a discussion of *sophrosyne*, a term associated with decent behavior and good citizenship, to pp. 160-4.

<sup>139</sup> Cf. the decree of Athmonon in lines 54-6: καὶ ὁ [σω]φρονιστῆς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς ἀποφαίνει αὐτο[υς] πειθαρχοντας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Xenophon’s formulation in *Agesilaus* (6.4): καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἰσχυροτέρα γένοιτο φάλαγξ ἢ διὰ τὸ μὲν πείθεσθαι εὐτακτος οὔσα, διὰ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα πιστῶς παροῦσα;

<sup>141</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 108; Rhodes 1981, 504. For a photo of the relief, see Graindor 1922, pl. lxiii. 79.

<sup>142</sup> *Sophronistai* are attested epigraphically from 334/3 (**E1-E4**) until Reinmuth 1971 no. 19 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1159, line 5, dated to 303/2. The office then reappears in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2044, lines 2-9, dated to 139/40 A.D. On these inscriptions, see Reinmuth 1971, 120.

<sup>143</sup> The *Axiochus* has been recognized as spurious since Diogenes Laertius (3.62). For a commentary on the dialogue, see Hershbell 1981. He dates it to the second or first century based on linguistic, historical, and philosophical evidence (12-21).



*sophronistai*, and to the selection of the Areopagus of those empowered over the young (366D-367A).<sup>144</sup>

The mention of *sophronistai* suggests the fourth-century institution.<sup>145</sup> It is unclear, however, whether this garbled passage belongs to the Lycurgan period or after the re-establishment of the democracy in 307/6.<sup>146</sup> Whatever the date, the role of the *sophronistes* in the *Axiochus* – πᾶς ὁ τοῦ μειρακίσκου πόνος ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σωφρονιστᾶς – is consistent with his daily oversight of the ephebes' activities as we have seen in the *Athenaion Politeia* and the Lycurgan ephebic corpus. As the tribal “discipline master,” the *sophronistes*, not the *kosmetes*, would have used the ῥάβδος to punish the youth for misbehavior during his military service.<sup>147</sup> If so, these beatings may have been responsible for the youth's κακῶν ἀμετρίαι. After all, if the *sophronistes*' virtuous behavior could not persuade errant ephebes, there was always fear of punishment. As Xenophon acutely observed, “fear makes men more attentive (προσεκτικωτέρους), more obedient (εὐπειθεστέρους), and more disciplined (εὐτακτοτέρους) (*Mem.* 3.5.5).”

If we accept this, why, then, did the *demos* allow the *sophronistes* to beat ephebes in order to enforce discipline when their older compatriots would have not tolerated such treatment should it have been meted out to them? The crucial factor is that the

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<sup>144</sup> ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἐφήβους ἐγγραφῇ, κοσμητῆς καὶ φόβος χειρῶν, ἔπειτα Λύκειον καὶ Ἀκαδημία καὶ γυμνασιαρχία καὶ ῥάβδοι καὶ κακῶν ἀμετρίαι· καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ μειρακίσκου πόνος ἐστὶν ὑπὸ σωφρονιστᾶς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους αἵρεσιν τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς.

<sup>145</sup> The author also included details belonging to the ephebeia of the late Hellenistic period, since attendance at the Academy is unattested in the ephebic corpus until the end of the second-century (see *Hesp.* 30 [1961], 15-7, line 4, dated to c. 100) and the gymnasiarchy, if the author means the ephebic liturgy, which is first mentioned in *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1039, lines 29-30, dated to 73/2. For the Lyceum, however, see the next section.

<sup>146</sup> Wallace 1989, 270, n. 63, dates the passage to the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum (317/6-307/6), because of the role of the Areopagus in selecting the young, although it contradicts the *Athenaion Politeia* (42.1-2). He incorrectly interprets τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους αἵρεσιν τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς to mean that the Areopagus chose the *sophronistai* (cf. 205). See also Ferguson 1911, 129, n. 1. Marcellus 1994, 176-81, claims that the “ephebeia under Demetrius of Phalerum was most likely an oligarchic imitation of the Lycurgan creation,” but the evidence adduced to support this assertion is unpersuasive.

<sup>147</sup> Marcellus 1994, 12, compares the *sophronistes* to the *gymnasiarchos* at Beroia, since the latter, according to an early second-century inscription found there, could thrash those under his charge, including ephebes, for disobedience, lack of discipline, and cheating in athletic contests (see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 65-8, on Face B, lines 8-10, 21-3, 70-1).

*sophronistes* was not conceived as a military officer but as a mature citizen acting *in loco parentis*.<sup>148</sup> The ephebes' fathers, by selecting the three "best" and "most suitable" *phyletai* as candidates for *sophronistes* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.2), had shown to the *demos* the men whom they were willing to entrust with the power to act as they would in educating their own sons for the duration of the ephebeia: i.e. the *sophronistes* could physically coerce ephebes so as to make them obedient just as a father disciplined his children.<sup>149</sup> The *demos*, by legitimizing the *sophronistes*' right to act in this manner, in effect granted him disciplinary powers similar to Spartan officers.<sup>150</sup>

But what about the ephebes who had suffered at his hands? Given that the *sophronistes* was an elected official, it is likely that some ephebes, angry at being beaten, would have sought to exact revenge upon him once he had left office.<sup>151</sup> If we consider the important role that the ephebes' fathers played in honoring the *sophronistes* for his services, however, moral and social pressure would have made it difficult for resentful ephebes to prosecute the latter. In *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1159 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 19), dated to 303/2, the tribe Pandionis honored the *sophronistes* Philonides for his good service. In lines 11-14, the inscription says that "the fathers of the ephebes declare before the tribe that he has taken care of the ephebes according to the laws."<sup>152</sup> This display of communal support for

<sup>148</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 2, 120.

<sup>149</sup> Plat. *Prot.* 325D: καὶ ἂν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθεται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. See also Ar. *Vesp.* 1296-7; *Nub.* 1399-1401; Plat. *Lys.* 208D-209; Xen. *Anab.* 5.8.18. For a discussion of fatherhood and corporal punishment as a means to correction, see Golden 1990, 64-5, 101; Strauss 1993, 82-3.

<sup>150</sup> Physical punishment by Spartan officers: e.g. Thuc. 8.84.2 (Astyochus); Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.11-17; 2.3.11; 2.6.9-14 (Clearchus); Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.18-9 (Mnasippus). See also Pritchett 1974, 238-43; van Wees 2004, 109-111; Lendon 2005, 74-7.

<sup>151</sup> Ephebes could not have gone to law during their military service because they were limited to cases concerning estates, heiresses, and hereditary priesthoods ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5). Instead, they, like older citizens, could have laid a complaint at his *euthuna* (Dem. 18.117; Aeschin. 3.23) or could have prosecuted him afterwards, perhaps on the grounds that a conviction for his abusive behavior would be in the best interests of the *demos* (Dem. 25.26; Aeschin. 1.192).

<sup>152</sup> ἀποφ[αίν]ουσιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν φυλὴν [οἱ] πατέρες τῶν ἐφήβων ἐπιμεμε[λ]ῆσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τῶν [ἐ]φήβων. Cf. E8, Col. III, lines 10-19, dated to 332/1, which may also be a decree of the ephebes' fathers: [ἐ]ψηφίσθαι δὲ τοῖς πατράσι τῶν τῆς Λεωντίδος, Παν[name ca. 6, patronymic ca. 8, demotic ca. 9, εἶπεν· ἐπειδ]ὴ Φιλόθεος [ὁ σωφρονιστῆς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς δικαίως ἐπιμεμέλ]ηται τῶν νεανίσκων καὶ χρήσιμον αὐτὸν παρέσχηκε[ν τοῖς ἐφήβοις τοῖς ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους, ἐπ]αινέσαι Φιλ[ό]θεον Φιλοκλέους Σουινᾶ καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν χρ[υ]σῶι στεφάνῳ ἀπὸ χιλίων δραχμῶν ἀρετῆς] ἔνεκα καὶ [σωφροσύνης τῆς εἰς τὴν φυλὴν, ἀναγράψαι δ]ὲ τόδε τὸ ψ[ή]φισμα εἰς τὸ ἀνάθημα ὃ οἱ ἔφηβοι τῶι ἡ[ρω]ι ἀνατιθέασιν]. One should not place too

the *sophronistes* in combination with the *demos*' recognition that exact obedience was virtuous for ephebes, I suggest, had two important consequences. First, it would have dissuaded vengeful ex-ephebes from going to law because they were afraid of incurring the wrath of their fathers and fellow demesmen.<sup>153</sup> Second, it reassured the *sophronistai* that they could discipline ephebes without fear of prosecution, provided that they had conformed to the regulations of the ephebeia and had not acted contrary to what the *demos* considered acceptable behavior.<sup>154</sup>

But the *demos*' efforts to instill εὐταξία and πειθαρχία in ephebes were not limited to the *sophronistes*' ability to inflict corporal punishment. In the *Cyropaedeia* Xenophon recommends competition as a means to improve discipline and obedience in the ranks because the awarding of prizes for excellence in soldiering spurs each soldier's *philotimia* (2.1.22-4). This should not be regarded as merely utopian military theory, because he had seen how the Spartan King Agesilaus had harnessed the competitive instincts of his soldiers at Ephesus in the spring of 395 so as to turn his allied army into a formidable military machine (*Hell.* 3.4.16; Cf. 4.2.5-7). As Lendon has pointed out, Xenophon sought to emulate the Spartan "ethos of competitive obedience," in which the Spartans competed amongst themselves to show their readiness to obey their commanders and the laws of the *polis* pertaining to their proper conduct on the battlefield.<sup>155</sup> It is unsurprising, then, that in the *Hiero* Xenophon advises the fictional tyrant to set up athletic events (ἄθλα) for the citizen body on the analogy of Athenian choral competitions (9.4-8). One of Xenophon's ἄθλα was the εὐταξία (9.6).

A generation after Xenophon, the Athenians established an ἄθλον εὐταξίας in the Lycurgan period.<sup>156</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417, recently reedited by Lambert,<sup>157</sup> suggests that there

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much weight, however, on this admittedly speculative restoration (pp. 200-1).

<sup>153</sup> For the importance of cultivating good relations in deme society, see Whitehead 1986, 223-31. Certainly an ephebe would have hesitated to jeopardize this relationship because he, for example, depended upon a cooperative network of family and friends for apprehending criminals and bringing them to justice (Hunter 1994, 134-9).

<sup>154</sup> The *demos* may have required the *sophronistes* to act with self-restraint in using the rod, since physical punishment may have also been intended to educate the offender (see p. 163).

<sup>155</sup> See Lendon 2005, 74-7.

<sup>156</sup> I do not mean to imply that the Athenians borrowed this idea directly from Xenophon, even though the latter in the *Cyropaedeia* makes his ephebes participate in public competitions in his fictional Persian

was a liturgy for the *eutaxia* in Athens, since the inscription contains a list of liturgists apparently of a single year, two from each tribe (with the exception of one from Hippothontis) under the heading of [ε]ὐταξίας, who had paid 50 drachmas (except for 49 from Chares of Aixone) towards the cost of the event (Col. I, lines 6-30). The archon is not preserved in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417, but Lewis argues that the date can be inferred from *SEG* 25.177, which records liturgists making dedications of *phialai*, each worth 50 drachmas, probably in the archonship of Aristophanes (i.e. 331/0).<sup>158</sup> He assumes that *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417 contained “the founding law” which stipulated that liturgists were required to dedicate *phialai* on the Acropolis (cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1560) and that the stone should be dated “a year or two earlier” than *SEG* 25.177.<sup>159</sup> But this date is less than secure. Even if the fragmentary text of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417 was a law rather than a decree, which is uncertain, we cannot deduce from this that the inscription dates to 333/2 or 332/1.<sup>160</sup>

Ephebes are not mentioned in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417, but a relief discovered on the Acropolis (NM 2958), probably dated to the 330s, does suggest that they competed in an event called the *eutaxia* at an unknown festival.<sup>161</sup> The relief depicts three figures, two of whom are full-sized: on the right there is a personification of the goddess Eutaxia, while a male figure occupies the center, who could be Demos, the tribal hero, or the eponymous hero of the *helikia*. On the left a smaller figure stands wearing a short *chiton* and *chlamys*, almost certainly an ephebe.<sup>162</sup> While the relief may belong to *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417, a more convincing explanation is that it honored ephebes for their victory in the *eutaxia*, as

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Ephebeia (1.2.12), since other writers who admired the Spartan military system also saw the value of armed competitions in encouraging excellence in the art of war (e.g. *Plat. Leg.* 829C, 830A-831A).

<sup>157</sup> Lambert 2001, 52-5, no. 4.

<sup>158</sup> Lewis 1968, 374-380, no. 51, pls. 111-112, reassembled *SEG* 25.177 out of three previously recognized fragments (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1575; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 4332; *Hesperia* 30 1961, 246, no. 42, pl. 44) and a new fragment. See p. 378 for his caveats concerning his restoration of Aristophanes in line two (ἐπ’ Ἀριστοφάνους ἄρχοντος).

<sup>159</sup> For the supposed relationship between *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417 and *SEG* 25.177, see Lewis 1968, 376-7.

<sup>160</sup> Wilson 2000, 44, n. 184, suggests a date for the *eutaxia* liturgy soon after 330, but does not discuss *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 417.

<sup>161</sup> For bibliography and a photograph of the relief, see Lawton 1995, 146, no. 150, pl. 79. Lawton dates the relief to the last quarter of the fourth century. Palagia 1975, 181-2, however, presents two good reasons for the 330’s: (1) The personified Eutaxia on the relief is labeled, implying that it is a recent creation. (2) The pose of Eutaxia is probably borrowed from the Democrazia crowning Demos on the relief of Eucrates’ anti-tyranny law, passed in 337/6 (for a discussion of this inscription and relief, see pp. 149).

<sup>162</sup> For the identification of these figures, see Palagia 1975, 181-2; Lawton 1995, 146; Lambert 2002, 122-3. Palagia also suggests that Athena stood on the missing part of the relief.

indicated by the tripod in the relief's background.<sup>163</sup> A reference to *eutaxia* is also found in *IG VII 4254* from Oropus,<sup>164</sup> dated to 329/8, in which the *demos* honors the ten *epimeletai* of the quadrennial Amphiaraea with golden crowns for their services at the festival and the games held during it (lines 1-39). Lines 39-45 contain the provision that at the next meeting of the *nomothetai* the *tamias tou demou* is to give 30 drachmas to "those in charge of the *agon*" which the law specifies should be allotted "to the one chosen for the *eutaxia* (τῶι αἰρεθέντι ἐπὶ τὴν εὐταξίαν)." Scholars are divided, however, whether *eutaxia* in this inscription refers to a competitive event at the festival or is used in the sense of keeping the festival goers in "good order."<sup>165</sup>

The ephebe on NM 2958 rests with his left hand on a hoplite shield. Given that the *hoplomachos* would have taught the ephebes how to march in phalanx formation and how to perform rudimentary hoplite drill, as we will see in the next section, the *eutaxia* probably involved tribal contingents competing against each other in these aspects of hoplite warfare.<sup>166</sup> The title of the contest suggests that those ephebes who had excelled in demonstrating good order in maneuvering their formation and exemplary discipline in obeying orders – the very qualities the *demos* was hoping to foster in the ephebes generally (i.e. **E2** and **E8**) – were victorious. Indeed, scholars have rightly associated the foundation of the *eutaxia* with the creation of the Lycurgan ephebeia on chronological

<sup>163</sup> For the possibility that *IG II<sup>2</sup> 417* and NM 2958 belonged together, see Lawton 1995, 146. Lambert 2002, 123, dissociates the two because of their different widths and since the relief "relates specifically to *Eutaxia*, the inscription lists the performers of other liturgies as well," confirming the doubts of Lewis 1968, 376, n. 25. Consequently the relief must have belonged to a victory dedication (Palagia 1975, 182; Lambert 2002, 123; Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 17).

<sup>164</sup> *IG VII 4254* = Schwenk 1985, no. 15 = Petrakos 1997, no. 298.

<sup>165</sup> The festival included gymnastic, equestrian, and other events (*IG VII 4254*, lines 16-8). *Eutaxia* as an *agon*: Davies 1967, 39; Palagia 1975, 182. Lambert 2001, 56, however, argues that *eutaxia* must refer to good order because *SEG 33.115* (c. 247), line 28, uses the term in this sense. This inscription, however, is inconclusive and can instead be taken as evidence for an *agon* (Humphreys 2004, 115, n. 17). Walbank 1982, 173-82, has recently published a fragmentary stone, *Agora I 7063* = *SEG 32.86*, which appears to contain regulations for a festival (see also Lambert 2005, no. 9). Line 38 reads ... ]σταθέντων [ἐ]πὶ εὐταξίαν ... , which Walbank compares to *IG VII 4254* and interprets as officials "appointed for the purpose of ensuring good order" (178). He dates the inscription to c. 329/8, while Tracy 1995, 101, associates the hand of *SEG 32.86* with the "Cutter of *IG II<sup>2</sup> 244*", whom he dates 340/39-c. 320. Walbank restores ἐν τῶι Ἀμφιαράῳ in line 33. Hansen 1985, 389, however, prefers the Bendida (*contra* Parker 1996, 246, n. 100), while Humphreys 2004, 117, suggests the Epitaphia.

<sup>166</sup> For the *eutaxia* as a hoplite contest of some kind, see Palagia 1975, 182; Marcellus 1994, 152; Humphreys 2004, 115

grounds and because of the term's appearance in the ephebic corpus.<sup>167</sup> Though the *eutaxia* appears to have had a brief existence in Athens,<sup>168</sup> it may have served as the template for similar competitions for youths or ephebes in numerous cities throughout the Hellenistic world in subsequent centuries.<sup>169</sup>

The evidence taken together suggests that the *demos* went to considerable lengths to ensure that the thousands of ephebes who passed through the ephebeia from 334/3 to 322/1 were sufficiently εὐτακτοί to carry out the duties assigned to them. But did the ephebeia change the citizens' attitude towards discipline in the ranks? In the debate before the Lamian War, Phocion responded to Hypereides' question of when should the Athenians go to war against Macedon with "whenever I see the young men (τοὺς νέους) willing to hold their places in the ranks (τὴν τάξιν βουλομένους φυλάττειν) [of the phalanx]" (Plut. *Phoc.* 23.2). Plutarch's account of the Athenian victory over Micion's Macedonians near Rhamnous during the Lamian War implies that Phocion's concerns were well-founded; the Athenian force, consisting largely of ex-ephebes, suffered from severe disciplinary problems before the battle (25.1-2).<sup>170</sup> These anecdotes suggest that once citizens had left the institution they were just as insubordinate as their ancestors: i.e. discipline in the ephebeia was an exception to the traditional Athenian laxity towards military service.

<sup>167</sup> Lambert 2001, 56-7; Humphreys 2004, 115.

<sup>168</sup> Lambert 2001, 56-7, argues that the *eutaxia* liturgy and hence the *agon* itself did not survive Demetrius of Phalerum's elimination of festival *choregiai* between 317/6 and 307/6 (*choregoi* are no longer attested after *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3055 and 3056, dated to 320/19: see Raubitschek 1943, 54-5). There is no evidence for the competition after the Lamian War.

<sup>169</sup> An inscription from Massalia, *IG* XIII 2445 (201/0), for instance, honors an ephebe for his victory in the *eutaxia*. For more examples, see Crowther 1991, 301-4; Lambert 2002, 122. See also the commentary of Gauthier and Hatzopoulos 1993, 104-5, on the *eutaxia* contest in the second-century inscription containing the gymnasiarchic law at Beroia.

<sup>170</sup> Our main source for the mobilization and deployment of Athenian forces in the Lamian War is Diodorus Siculus 18.10.2, who says that the *demos* conscripted all citizens up to forty years old for service in 323/2 and that three of the ten tribes were deployed for home defense. Given that the ephebes were not among the Athenians called up for overseas duty (i.e. 20-39) nor would have served in the three tribes (see Hansen 1985, 37 and 100, n. 125), their involvement in the war was probably limited to garrisoning the fortresses. It is possible, then, that over half of Phocion's army would have been ex-ephebes from the enrollment years 334/3-324/3. Plutarch relates two instances of ill-discipline: (1) Phocion is surrounded by citizens beseeching him on how best to take a hill occupied by the enemy. (2) Having drawn up his hoplites in the line of battle, one man breaks ranks, advances far ahead, flees once he sees the enemy, and then returns to his previous position. Phocion addresses this man as a *meirakion*, which suggests that he was under thirty and hence had performed ephebic service.

### 3.4: Military Training in the Ephebeia

Basic training has two clearly identifiable functions. Its most obvious task is to instill exactly what its name suggests, an adequate level of training in such things as weapon handling and minor tactics. Its second, though by no means less important, function is to inculcate the military ethos in recruits, and ensure that the individual values which prevail in most civilian societies are replaced by the group spirit and group loyalties which underlie all military organizations.<sup>171</sup>

The aim of this section is to understand why the citizens of Lycurgan Athens, who had hitherto regarded training for war as a private affair (Thuc. 2.39; Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5), decided to establish an institutionalized system of peacetime military training in the ephebeia? That is, why did the *demos* concede *in the case of ephebes* the reality of Plato's complaint that a man who takes up a shield could not become a skilled soldier on the very same day (*Resp.* 374D)? What follows is a tentative reconstruction of this program based upon our scanty knowledge of Greek military training in the Classical period.<sup>172</sup> In particular I have drawn heavily from two works of utopian literature dated to the 350's – Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia* – that were inspired by Spartan military practices and reflect fourth-century developments in Greek warfare.<sup>173</sup> Like previous scholarly discussions of the ephebes' training, I have assumed that the peculiar combination of skills the ephebes were taught – physical training, hoplite weaponry, and non-hoplite arms – were intended for use during their military service and in war generally.<sup>174</sup> With this understood, let us begin with the *Athenaion Politeia*'s brief description of the military training that the ephebes received during their first year of military service:

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<sup>171</sup> Holmes 1985, 36.

<sup>172</sup> For Greek military training in the Classical period, see Anderson 1970, 84-110; Pritchett 1974, 208-231; Ridley 1979, 530-548; Rawlings 2000, 237-249; van Wees 2004, 89-95; Lendon 2005, 106-114. For the lack of information, see Pritchett 1974, 208; Wheeler 1982, 229.

<sup>173</sup> See Morrow, 318-352, for Plato's training system in the *Laws*. For Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia*, see Anderson 1970.

<sup>174</sup> E.g.: Forbes 1929, 136-141; Pélékidis 1962, 108-9, 114-5; Ridley 1979, 531-3; Ober 1985a, 90-5; Marcellus 1994, 76-83; Burckhardt 1996, 44-7; Rawlings 2000, 237-41.

The people also elects two physical trainers (παιδοτρίβας) for them, and instructors (διδασκάλους) who teach the ephebes how to fight with hoplite weapons (όπλομαχεῖν), to fire the bow (τοξεύειν), to cast the javelin (άκοντίζειν), and to discharge the catapult (καταπάλτην άφιέναι) (42.3).<sup>175</sup>

The use of οἵτινες for the διδασκάλοι suggests that an indefinite number of military instructors, in addition to the two παιδοτρίβαι, were hired each year to train a given enrollment class.<sup>176</sup> In **E8** (332/1) the tribe of Leontis honors two instructors with laurel crowns because “they had taken care of the ephebes well.”<sup>177</sup> Though later ephebic inscriptions honored individual instructors by their respective titles – όπλομάχος, τοξότης, άκοντιστής, and (καταπαλτ)αφετής (e.g. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 665*, dated to 266/5) – the Lycurgan corpus usually called them διδασκάλοι regardless of their area of specialization.<sup>178</sup> Little else is known about their term of service,<sup>179</sup> apart from the fact that they, unlike the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai*, could be foreigners: e.g. Άγαθάνορα Συρακόσιον in **E5** (332/1), line 11.<sup>180</sup> Reinmuth claims that the ephebes in their second year periodically returned to the Piraeus to continue their training,<sup>181</sup> but the *Athenaion*

<sup>175</sup> [ό δήμος] χειροτ[ο]νεῖ δέ καί παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καί διδασκάλους, οἵτινες όπλομαχεῖν καί τοξεύειν καί άκοντίζειν καί καταπάλτην άφιέναι διδάσκουσιν.

<sup>176</sup> Forbes 1929, 136, and Pélékidis 1962, 108, claim that *demos* employed four instructors, one of each specialty. Given the paucity of information, we simply do not know how many the *demos* hired each year. Plato had recommended in the *Laws* that specialized instructors should be hired at public expense to train the citizen body (813D-E). For an overview of *paidotribai* and *didaskaloi* in the ephebeia, see Florek 1965.

<sup>177</sup> Col. I, lines 33-8: ἐπαινέσαι [δὲ καὶ] τὸς [δ]ιδ[ασκάλου]ς τῆς φυλῆ[ς ...6....]την Α[...7....]ν Παλλην[έ]α ...7....]ν Ἄρ[.]αίνέ[ο] Μεθων[αῖον καὶ στεφ]ανῶ[σαι] θ[α]λ[λο]ῦ στ[εφάνω]ι ὅτι καλῶς [ἐπ]εμεληθησαν τ[ῶν ἐφ]ή[βων].

<sup>178</sup> *Didaskaloi*: **E5** (332/1), lines 10-11; **E8** (332/1), Col. I, lines 33-8; **E15** (331/0 or 330/29), line 7; **E20** (331/0-325/4), Left Side, lines 14-7. *Akontistes*: **E18** (329/8?), Left Side, lines 5-6. *Paidotribes*: **E25** (334/3-323/2), lines 1-2. Reinmuth 1971, 23, argues that the four untitled individuals with patronymic and demotic listed in **E7** (332/1), lines 11-3, were *didaskaloi*. On **E14** (331/0?), line 115, a certain Μενάιος Θουδ<ό>του ἐκ Κοίλης could also be a *paidotribes* or a *didaskalos* (Traill 1986, 12).

<sup>179</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 108-9.

<sup>180</sup> According to Reinmuth 1971, 23, the epigraphic evidence shows not only that the four Pandionid *didaskaloi* listed in **E7** were different from the two Leontid *didaskaloi* mentioned in **E8**, even though both inscriptions are from the same enrollment class of 333/2, but also that these tribal *didaskaloi* should be regarded as distinct from those mentioned in the *Athenaion Politeia*. His assumption that the four Pandionid officials listed in **E7** were in fact *didaskaloi* is unproven. It is also hard to understand why the *phylae* and the *demos* should hire different instructors for the same training program.

<sup>181</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 80.



*Politeia* does seem to imply that the ephebes were not deployed sporadically on the border at this time (42.4: διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις).

The ephebes probably trained at the Lyceum,<sup>182</sup> though the gymnasium is unattested in the ephebic corpus until *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 900, line 17, dated to 185/4. From the fifth century onwards the Lyceum, because of its close proximity to Athens, had served as a muster point for the *polis*' hoplite forces before embarking on campaign.<sup>183</sup> This implies that the Lyceum possessed "an exercise ground which accommodated Athens' sizable land forces."<sup>184</sup> Furthermore, the *Vitae decem oratorum* and other sources suggest that Lycurgus had extensively remodeled the gymnasium, including the planting of trees and the construction of a new *palaestra*.<sup>185</sup> Mitchel argues that Lycurgus' primary motivation for enhancing the gymnasium's facilities was to "provide better places [for the ephebes] to drill and train."<sup>186</sup> Certainly the long-standing connection the Lyceum had with Athens' military forces makes it a more likely candidate than the otherwise unknown "gymnasium of the ephebes" in the Piraeus, as some scholars have supposed.<sup>187</sup> The presence of hundreds of ephebes attending the Lyceum on a daily(?) basis would also help to explain why Lycurgus chose to set up a stele in front of the *palaestra* he had built recording all his public acts as Athens' chief financial officer ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843F).

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<sup>182</sup> Mitchel 1970, 38; Faraguna 1992, 279-80; Humphreys 2004, 89, n. 32.

<sup>183</sup> Ar. *Pax.* 351-7; Schol. on Ar. *Pax.* 356; Schol. on Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.10; Suda s.v. Λυκεῖον; Hesych. s.v. Λυκεῖον. See also the discussion on drilling in Athens in pp. 16-7. For a collection of primary sources on the Lyceum, see Morison 1998, 240-260.

<sup>184</sup> Jameson 1980, 224.

<sup>185</sup> See Kyle 1987, 82-3, on Paus. 1.29; [Plut]. *Mor.* 841C-D; 852C; *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 457b, lines 7-8. For a discussion of the Lyceum in the Lycurgan period, see Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 39-40. For the excavations of the Lycurgan palaistra and garden, see Ritchie 1989, 250-60.

<sup>186</sup> Mitchel 1970, 38.

<sup>187</sup> E.g. Pélékidis 1962, 114, n. 2; 260, n. 1; Reinmuth 1971, 115; Ober 1985a, 90. This view depends upon Sundwill's plausible στήσ[αι ἐν τῷ γυμνασί]ωι τῶν ἐφήβων in line 30 of *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 478 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 19), dated to 305/4. This would mean that the ephebes trained in the Piraeus because the inscription's fragments were found there. This is not decisive evidence against the Lyceum, however, since the ephebeia underwent several important changes after the democracy's restoration in 307/6, such as the abolition of compulsory military service (suggested by the drop in enrollment to c. 370 ephebes for *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 478) and the reduction of its length to one year (Koehler's restoration in *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 478, line 10, of the archon Coroebus for the ephebes' enrollment year is certain). For these and other changes, see Reinmuth 1971, 108-115; Marcellus 1994, 183-6. We therefore cannot dismiss the possibility that the gymnasium was first used as the ephebes' headquarters after 307/6.

The Lyceum at any rate was the ideal place for the two *paidotribai* to oversee the ephebes' physical training.<sup>188</sup> As Plutarch puts it, military fitness is the aim of athletics and competition (*Mor.* 639E).<sup>189</sup> Utopian literature suggests what kind of militarily useful gymnastic exercises may have been taught to ephebes. Plato favored all round physical activity concentrating on exercises for the arms and legs: the former for strength and sturdiness when fighting at close quarters and the latter for pursuit and flight to and from battle (*Leg.* 832E-833A). He also rejected wrestling and boxing as sports useless for war (*Leg.* 796A; 814D),<sup>190</sup> though there is reason to think that wrestling was an important part of ephebic training.<sup>191</sup> In Aristotle's view the pentathlete, who displayed all-round prowess in jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, and wrestling, was the best adapted for war, since he had excellence in strength, stature, and swiftness of foot (*Rhet.* 1361B).<sup>192</sup> Aristotle, like other Classical Athenian writers, rejected the specialized nature of professional athletes' training programs as unsuited for citizens on account of the athletes' disproportionate physical development and excessive diet.<sup>193</sup>

In the *Laws* Plato recommends that citizens should exercise in full armor once a month and daily without armor (830D) and that all should compete in armed races which

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<sup>188</sup> For a discussion of *paidotribai* at Athens, see Kyle 1987, 141-5.

<sup>189</sup> For the connection between athletics and war, see Pritchett 1974, 213-15; Golden 1998, 23-8.

<sup>190</sup> It was proverbial that skill in boxing did not make a man a brave or skillful warrior. Xenophon, for instance, refers to the Thessalian boxer Boscus as one of the most cowardly of the Ten Thousand (*Anab.* 5.8.23).

<sup>191</sup> Plutarch attributed the Thebans' success at Leuctra to their expertise in wrestling (*Mor.* 639F). Some scholars have taken this seriously (e.g. Cawkwell 1983, 398-9; Pritchett 1985, 64), but it is difficult to see how hoplites could have had sufficient space to wrestle opponents to the ground in the phalanx (Lazenby 1990, 99). Nevertheless, their expertise in wrestling would account for the Thebans' superior bodily strength, obtained though constant training in the gymnasium, when fighting against the Macedonians before Thebes in 335/4 (D.S. 17.11.4). I suggest that when the Thebans had taken refuge in Athens afterwards (Aeschin. 3.156), they impressed the Athenians with their bravery and inspired Lycurgus to build a new *palaestra* at the Lyceum so that the ephebes too could acquire greater proficiency in wrestling. Plato probably rejected wrestling because he thought that the Spartans did not train assiduously in it (Plut. *Mor.* 233E). Plutarch, however, preserves an anecdote about a Spartan winning the wrestling at the Olympic games (*Lyc.* 22.4-5), which suggests the contrary.

<sup>192</sup> According to Cornelius Nepos, however, Epaminondas preferred agility over strength because he thought that the former was more advantageous in war: he advocated running and wrestling as good for military training (15.2.4-5).

<sup>193</sup> Fifth- and fourth-century Athenian writers often expressed a disdain for the excesses of athletes: e.g. Plat. *Resp.* 404A; Xen. *Symp.* 2.17; Eur. Fr. 282 Nauck *apud* Athen. 10.413D-F; Arist. *Pol.* 1335B6-12. For a discussion of these and other sources, see Kyle 1987, 127-54.

varied in length from one *stade* (ca. 200 m.) to sixty stades (12 km.) (833A-B).<sup>194</sup> One race is attested in Lycurgan Athens, namely the *lampadedromia*. If E25 (c. 334/3-322/1) is an ephebic inscription, we have evidence that the *paidotribes* at the Lyceum supervised the ephebes' training as *lampadephoroi*, just as their fifth-century ancestors did (Ar. *Ran.* 1087-8). Ephebes may have also received instruction in dancing the pyrrhic, though no epigraphic or literary source refers to this activity in the ephebeia. We know, however, that tribally organized teams of youths (alongside boys and men) competed in the pyrrhic at the Panatheneia: perhaps ephebes did the same in the Lycurgan period.<sup>195</sup> This involved the manipulation of the hoplite shield in defense, leaping, and swerving to avoid melee and missile attacks, imitating offensive movements with the spear, and marching in step while in formation.<sup>196</sup> The pyrrhic thus would have not only improved the ephebes' fitness, agility, and familiarity with hoplite weaponry but also instilled discipline in them.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> See Morrow 1960, 335.

<sup>195</sup> Pyrrhic held at the Panatheneia: Lys. 21.4; Isae. 5.36; Ar. *Arch.* 988-9; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2311 (c. 380), lines 72-4. See Wheeler 1982, 231; Kyle 1987, 36-37, 50, 132; Lonsdale 1993, 137-9; Fisher 1998a, 92, n. 59.

<sup>196</sup> On the pyrrhic, see Borthwick 1967, 18-23; 1970b, 318-331; Poursat 1968, 550-615. Plato's version, probably borrowed from the Athenian pyrrhic (Wheeler 1982, 231), "imitated the avoidance of all blows and missiles by side movements and feints and leaps on high and crouching (*Leg.* 815A)." Maneuvering the shield is also attested in Euripides depiction of the pyrrhic (*And.* 1129-36) and in Philo. *Gymn.* 19 (the Spartan version). Despite Downes 1904, 101-6, the pyrrhic also included the use of offensive weapons, since Poursat's study of Attic vases has shown that the warriors danced nude except for shield, helmet, and spear. Plato also has the dancers brandishing bows and javelins (*Leg.* 815A), but there is no visual evidence to confirm this (Wheeler 1982, 232; *contra* Rawlings 2000, 255, n. 72). A commemorative relief (*AM* 1338) for a victorious pyrrhic chorus at some unknown festival, dated to the 320's, depicts eight dancers in two rows of four to the right of the *choregos*. A fragmentary relief (*AM* 432), dated to c. 323 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3026), also depicts multiple pyrrhicists. For these inscriptions, see Lonsdale 1993, 143-4.

<sup>197</sup> Socrates is reputed to have said that "those who dance best are the best in war" and likened dancing to armed maneuvers which improved the dancers' physical condition and discipline (Athen. 14.628E-F; cf. 14.629C). Xenophon held that dancers learn discipline by showing obedience to their trainers and likened the duties of *choregoi* to *strategoi* (*Mem.* 3.4.3-6; 3.5.18). The *choregos* Phrynichos was apparently elected *strategos* (c. 460) because his lyrics were well suited for the pyrrhic (Ael. *Var.Hist.* 3.8). Some scholars have argued that the pyrrhic constituted military training at Athens (e.g. Borthwick 1970, 320; Ridley 1979, 545-8; Winkler 1990, 41-44, for ephebes), but, as Anderson 1991, 30, points out, the dancers could "hardly have reproduced the figures of dance in actual battle." Certainly some armed dances such as those described in Xenophon's *Anabasis* 6.1.5-13 should be considered as no more than pantomimes and entertainment (Wheeler 1982, 230). Lonsdale 1993, 162-8, argues that the pyrrhic was a qualification rite for the ephebeia. This is unconvincing, however, because the *Athenaion Politeia* says that the ephebes trained *after* they had entered the institution.

Though the exact nature of the ephebes' gymnastic exercises is unclear, the reasons for establishing this physical training program are readily comprehensible. The ephebes' effectiveness in their patrolling and garrisoning duties, which in their second year consisted of traversing the rough terrain on the Athens-Boeotian border ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.3; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.25), was dependent upon them being in good physical condition. A given enrollment class of ephebes, however, would not have been considered to be in their physical prime (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5). Even worse, perhaps a fair proportion would have been out of shape, perhaps no more so than their older compatriots (Plut. *Mor.* 192C-D; Plat. *Leg.* 556C-D). Since there is no reason to think that ephebes would have been more enthusiastic about physical training than the reluctant Epigenes was in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.12.1-8), the *demos* probably had little choice but to hire *paidotribai* to improve their fitness.

The ephebes' military training also included formal instruction in hoplite arms under the *hoplomachoi*.<sup>198</sup> Scholars infer from the *Athenaion Politeia*'s use of ὅπλομαχεῖν that these instructors taught ephebes *hoplomachia* or the art of fencing with hoplite weapons,<sup>199</sup> skills hitherto limited to the wealthy few who could afford their costly fees.<sup>200</sup> The effectiveness of such specialized weapons training was limited when fighting in formation (Plat. *Lach.* 182A), because there was little chance of missing the enemy and fighting was a matter of courage rather than skill (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.16; 2.3.9-11).

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<sup>198</sup> On *hoplomachoi*, see Wheeler 1982, 223-233; 1983, 1-20. The main sources for *hoplomachoi* are Plat. *Lach.* 179E-184C; *Euthyd.* 271B-273C; Xen. *Mem.* 3.1. For the continued importance of citizen hoplites as the defenders of Athens in the Classical period, see Hanson 1996, 291-312; Burckhardt 1996, 154-257. The ephebes were equipped with the hoplite spear (δόρυ) and shield (ἀσπίς) ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4), while Athena is depicted in hoplite armor on the relief of E4 (333/2), a dedication of Antiochis or Erectheis, and on the stele of the ephebic oath at Archarnae (*SEG* 21.519). For a discussion of these reliefs, see Lawton 1995, no. 40 with pl. 21 and no. 143 with pl. 76.

<sup>199</sup> Wheeler 1982, 225: "Weapons training and the skills of individual attack and defense thus seem to be the meaning of *hoplomachia* [his italics]."

<sup>200</sup> Anderson 1991, 29; Marcellus 1994, 79; Rawlings 2000, 242; van Wees 2004, 94; Lendon 2005, 110. Euripides' mention of the "Thessalian Trick" employed by Eteocles against Polynices in the *Phoenician Women* (1380-1420), however, implies that many Athenians were familiar with this maneuver. The "Thessalian Trick" was achieved by stepping back with the left foot and drawing the shield against the body, then stepping forward with the left foot and driving home the weapon (a sword in the case of Eteocles: Eur. *Phoen.* 1407-13) into the gap between the opponent's shield and body. For this scene, see Borthwick 1970a, 15-21. In Plato's *Laches* (178A-181C), which has a dramatic date of 421-18 and was composed in the late fifth or early fourth century (See Hoerber 1968, 95-105), the wealthy Lysimachus and a large crowd saw *hoplomachoi* put on a public display of *hoplomachia*, presumably to attract business.

But should the hoplite engage in single combat, whether in pursuit or defense, his expertise in *hoplomachia* allowed him to overcome one adversary easily or even several at once (Plat. *Lach.* 182A-B). Consequently one could argue that *hoplomachia* would have been useful for ephebes when fighting raiders individually or in small groups, just as Lamachus did in Aristophanes' *Archarnians* (1174-88).<sup>201</sup> If we accept this, how did the ephebes train? Perhaps they competed against each other in armed combat in the Lyceum, both as soloists and in teams consisting of two to ten men per side as in Plato's *Laws* (833E). Another possibility is that they participated in mock battles, perhaps similar to the one described in Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* (2.3.17-20).

The *hoplomachoi* also instructed the ephebes in unit tactics, because the *Athenaion Politeia* says that "when the assembly is held in the theatre [where] the ephebes demonstrate their parade ground drill to the people (42.4)."<sup>202</sup> Scholars correctly take τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις to mean that the ephebes displayed their skill at maneuvering in formation.<sup>203</sup> To do this, the *hoplomachoi* must have taught the ephebes the following: (1) How to maintain good order in the phalanx: as Aristotle puts it, "a hoplite formation is useless without cohesion (*Pol.* 1297b20-1)." (2) How to form up in a battle-line, to move forward without falling into confusion, to turn about-face in good order, to change formation from line into column and vice-versa, and perhaps even to countermarch the phalanx.<sup>204</sup> (3) How to drill their spears in unison: the sources attest that well-drilled hoplites were impressive to behold and inspired fear and respect in the enemy on account of their excellent discipline.<sup>205</sup> Drilling had the additional benefit of reinforcing the

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<sup>201</sup> Rawlings 2000, 243: "The skills of *hoplomachia* [his italics] appear most relevant to small-scale combat, either aboard warships, or during raids and ambushes on land."

<sup>202</sup> τὸν δ' ὕστερον ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης, ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις.

<sup>203</sup> Rhodes 1981, 508; Anderson 1991, 28; Rawlings 2000, 238; Dillery 2002, 462.

<sup>204</sup> For these maneuvers, see Anderson 1970, 94-110. In book two of the *Cyropaideia* Xenophon demonstrates how raw recruits could have been trained in unit tactics (e.g. 2.2.6-9; 2.3.21-24; 2.4.1-6). His inspiration was Spartan parade ground drill, which he discusses in chapter 11 of the *Lacedaimonion Politeia*.

<sup>205</sup> Anderson 1970, 84-93, has shown from the visual and literary evidence that hoplites were drilled in a few standard spear movements (e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.25-7; *Hell.* 2.4.12): (1) In the "slope position" the spear was carried upon the right shoulder. (2) The hoplite, when charging the enemy, held his spear in the "underhand position" ready for the underhand thrust. (3) After the initial charge the hoplite reverted to the "overhand position," where he held his spear over his shoulder and delivers a downward blow. (4) Hoplites

ephebes' *esprit de corps*. Smith observes that such training preserves "the physical integrity of the unit both in the stress of battle and at other times; it makes an equally important contribution to the development of a group *mentalité*."<sup>206</sup>

This hoplite drill did not aim to professionalize Athens' citizen soldiers in an effort to catch up with the Macedonian military machine, as scholars have supposed,<sup>207</sup> but to prevent a decline in the fighting ability of the phalanx.<sup>208</sup> The last group of Athenian citizens to have fought in a pitched battle was the contingent of 6,000 at Chaeronea (D.S. 16.86.5). But citizens after 338/7 had no opportunity to hone their martial skills in this manner because the Common Peace forbade the Athenians from making war against other Greek states (Tod. II, no. 177, lines 5-8). Should the Common Peace be prolonged, the proportion of the citizen body with combat experience would decrease, through normal mortality, to less than half within a decade of Chaeronea.<sup>209</sup> Clearly such an inexperienced citizen army would have stood little chance against the well-drilled Macedonian phalanx (Poly. *Strat.* 4.2.7). The *demos*, realizing this, hired *hoplomachoi* to drill the ephebes in the hope that their newly acquired military skill (ἐπιστήμη) in mass-warfare combined with their courage (ἀνδρεία) would make them more formidable in combat (cf. the Syracusans in Thuc. 6.69.1; 6.72.4).<sup>210</sup> Seen in this light, the military review held in the Panathenaic stadium may have also played an

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at rest grounded their shields against their knees and leaned their spears against their bodies. The ephebes presumably would have been required to perform these spear movements to a high standard, perhaps similar to that of Chabrias' troops, whose mastery of hoplite drill deterred Agesilaus from battle (see Anderson 1963, 411-3 on D.S. 15.32-33). As the Athenians were well aware, generals were hesitant to fight if their troops could not drill properly, as Iphicrates was when he, having ordered his army to lower spears, heard more noise from the chattering of teeth than the clanging of spears (Poly. *Strat.* 3.9.8).

<sup>206</sup> Smith 1990, 155.

<sup>207</sup> See pp. 69-75.

<sup>208</sup> The ephebes, after all, could have only used their newly acquired skills in hoplite warfare against similarly-equipped opponents in pitched battle, not against small groups of raiders on the mountainous border areas of Attica. The phalanx preferred level and clear ground (Hdt. 7.9b1), because hoplites relied upon each others' shields for their collective defense (Thuc. 5.71.1; Plut. *Mor.* 220A). On rough ground, however, hoplites had little hope of maintaining their formation (Poly. 18.31.5; Arist. *Pol.* 1303b). For the ground suitable for hoplite warfare, see Pritchett 1985, 76-85. For a "blow by blow" account of hoplite warfare, see Hanson 1989, 135-218; Lazenby 1991, 87-109.

<sup>209</sup> See the demographic table of Hansen 1985, 12.

<sup>210</sup> As Xenophon observes, "I think every man's nature acquires more courage [in war] by learning (μαθήσει) and practice (μελέτη) (*Mem.* 3.9.2)."

important role in reassuring the *demos* that the ephebes would fight bravely against the Macedonians should conflict break out in the future ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).<sup>211</sup>

Raaflaub claims that the ephebeia “in its military aspects, it always was exclusively a preparation for hoplite service.”<sup>212</sup> This is incorrect, because the *Athenaion Politeia* says that ephebes were also taught how to use the bow, javelin, and catapult (42.3). For most scholars, this is proof that “the ephebes were trained to fight interchangeably in hoplite equipment, with the bow, with the javelin, and with the catapult.”<sup>213</sup> Ober argues that the inclusion of non-hoplite weapons training was motivated by the need to provide ephebes with the necessary skills to defend the Athenian frontier:

Training with the javelin, the typical weapon of the peltast, suggests that the ephebes were ready to fight in mountainous regions as peltasts. The ephebes were also trained to become skillful in weapons and techniques necessary for holding fortified positions. Projectile weapons (javelins and arrows) could be used effectively from fortress walls, and by the second quarter of the fourth century catapults were being used to defend fortresses.<sup>214</sup>

If the ephebes were instructed in peltast tactics – the very antithesis of hoplite warfare (Thuc. 4.126.5-6) – it would mean that the training program, like the one Plato proposed for the citizens of his ideal state (*Leg.* 813D-E; 834A),<sup>215</sup> was intended to create citizen-soldiers equally adept at fighting as hoplites in the phalanx and as missile-wielding warriors in the rugged border areas of Attica.<sup>216</sup> i.e. in two of the three troop types necessary for success in fourth-century warfare (Xen. *Oec.* 8.6; Poly. *Strat.* 3.9.22). The implication is that the *demos* had overcome their disdain for the lightly armed infantryman’s womanish weapons and cowardly tactics and had finally grasped the

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<sup>211</sup> For an assessment of the ephebes’ fighting abilities in the Lamian War, see p. 181, n. 163. See also Phocion’s defeat of Micion (p. 134).

<sup>212</sup> Raaflaub 1996, 157.

<sup>213</sup> Lendon 2005, 113.

<sup>214</sup> Ober 1985a, 90-1.

<sup>215</sup> For Plato’s training system, see Morrow 1960, 327-37.

<sup>216</sup> Hansen 1985, 49; Faraguna 1992, 277; Marcellus 1994, 76-83; Burckhardt 1996, 46; Rawlings 2000, 237-41.

advantages to be gained from equipping youths as light troops for border defense, just as Xenophon had recommended a generation earlier (*Mem.* 3.5.25-7).<sup>217</sup> If we accept this, the ephebes must have been issued with the *pelta*, the light wicker shield that gave the peltast his name (Arist. Fr. 498 Rose; Plat. *Prot.* 350A),<sup>218</sup> during their stint of military service.<sup>219</sup> Given that the peltast depended upon his lack of armor to flee from his adversaries,<sup>220</sup> an ephebe could not have fought effectively as a skirmisher while burdened with the hoplite shield (*aspis*), because it would have limited their mobility, made them prone to stumbling on difficult ground, and quickly worn them out after running a short distance.<sup>221</sup>

As with the ephebes' physical exercise and hoplite training, the *Athenaion Politeia*'s brief description tells us nothing about their instruction in non-hoplite arms. We have epigraphic evidence, however, which suggests that they practiced casting the javelin.<sup>222</sup> They probably devoted just as much time to learning the bow and the catapult: certainly the complexity of late fourth-century artillery required careful training before the operator could fire it with a reasonable degree of accuracy.<sup>223</sup> Perhaps the ephebes

<sup>217</sup> E.g.: Thuc. 4.40.2; 4.126.5-6; Eur. *Her.Fur.* 159-64; Plut. *Mor.* 234E. For these and other sources, see Hanson 1989, 13-6; Spence 1993, 168-72.

<sup>218</sup> For the equipment of the peltast, see Best 1969, 3-16.

<sup>219</sup> Rawlings 2000, 238-9.

<sup>220</sup> Peltasts, like other types of light troops, would attack with their missiles, preferably from rough terrain, until their enemies retaliated by charging them. They would then escape rather than fight at close quarters. A typical battle would consist of peltasts advancing and retreating in accordance with the reaction of the enemy: Thuc. 3.97.3-98.4; 4.30.4-37.5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2-5; Xen. *Anab.* 6.3.6-9. For the fighting manner of lightly armed infantrymen, see Best 1969; Anderson 1970, 111-140.

<sup>221</sup> On the *aspis* generally, see Hanson 1989, 65-9. Blyth's 1982, 5-21, reconstruction of a fragmentary *aspis* from the Museo Gregoriano suggests that it weighed at least 13.5 lbs. It required considerable physical effort to hold the shield in a chest-high position: Ar. *Nub.* 987-9; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9. Also see the experiments of Donlan and Thompson 1976, 339-43. It limited the hoplite's mobility: D.S. 15.44.2; Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.47; *Hell.* 4.3.23. It did not protect the hoplite's right side (Thuc. 5.71.2; Plut. *Mor.* 220A) and it was difficult to maneuver (Cartledge 1977, 13, n. 17; *contra* Krentz 1985, 53-4). Overall the *aspis* was unsuited for individual combat (see Holliday 1982, 94-7). Scholars are therefore wrong to assume that ephebes could have both carried the *aspis* and fought as light armed troops (Hansen 1985, 49; Faraguna 1992, 277; Marcellus 1994, 81).

<sup>222</sup> An inscription from Oropus (*IG* VII 444 = Petrakos 1997, 267-8, no. 348), dated c. 335-322, says that "the Athenian [name unknown] son of Autolycus, [having defeated] the ephebes in the javelin at the Amphiaraeum:" i.e. the ephebes competed in the javelin at Oropus. In **E18** (329/8?), a dedication of Oineis, the *akontistes* Kephisippus (Left Side, lines 8-9) perhaps was honored because the ephebes gained victory with the javelin at an unknown festival. For javelin-throwing in athletics and war, see Harris 1963, 26-36.

<sup>223</sup> Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* preserves an anecdote where a man accidentally fired a catapult when he only intended to show how it worked (1111a6). On the skill and extensive practice required to operate a



honed their skills by competing against one another in each of these projectile weapons, just as Agesilaus offered prizes for peltasts and archers at Ephesus in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16).<sup>224</sup> If we consider that lightly armed infantrymen would have had to train assiduously from boyhood to gain sufficient expertise in the javelin and bow so that they could hold their own in a skirmish against their opponents (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.16; D.S. 15.85.4-5), the ephebes' skills after one year of training must have been rudimentary in comparison to the professional light troops Athens recruited from Thrace and the less well-developed areas of Greece.<sup>225</sup> The ephebes may have only required a basic proficiency in the javelin and bow, however, to fight effectively against Boeotian raiders in the Athenian countryside.

These limited skills could have also been employed to protect Athens' fortresses, as Ober suggests.<sup>226</sup> But the defense of fortified positions would have contributed little to the φυλακή τῆς χώρας against bands of plundering marauders because the latter could have easily avoided the garrisons on the frontier and would have had nothing to gain (i.e. booty) from attacking the forts directly.<sup>227</sup> Indeed, the ephebes could have used them if and only if an invading force had brought the Athens-Piraeus enceinte or the border fortresses under siege. But what potential enemy could have prompted this concern? The obvious candidate is Macedon. The threat of Macedonian invasion was a distinct

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catapult effectively in combat, see Marsden 1969, 67-8. Unless a catapult was set up at the Lyceum, the training probably took place at the Piraeus, where catapult frames are known to have been stored in the Lycurgan period (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627, Col. B, lines 328-41, dated to 330/29; see also *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1467, Col. B, lines 48-56, dated c. 338-326, from the Acropolis). If so, the *demos* probably appointed a καταπαλταφετής of proven experience and long-standing service to Athens, such as Ἡρα[κ]λείδης Μυσός καταπαλταφέτας (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 9979 = *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> III 1249, dated to the 340's), whose gravestone was erected in the Piraeus.

<sup>224</sup> In the *Laws* Plato proposed contests for archers, peltasts, stone throwers, and slingers, in which prizes would be awarded to those who performed best (834A).

<sup>225</sup> Thracians, Aetolians, Locrians, and Acarnanians were noted for their skill with the javelin or sling (Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.2; Thuc. 2.81.2; 3.95.3; Eur. *Phoen.* 139-40; Poll. *Onom.* 1.140). Since these peoples produced an abundant supply of peltasts and slingers, Athens, like other Greek cities, routinely hired them as mercenaries or called upon them as allies throughout the Classical period rather than devote considerable resources over many years to train their own citizens: see Parke 1933; Best 1969. Plato is probably thinking of the Athenians' lack of familiarity with missile weapons when he recommends that children should attend javelin-throwing and archery lessons from the age of six (*Leg.* 794C-D; cf. 813D-E).

<sup>226</sup> See also Anderson 1991, 28.

<sup>227</sup> Ober's 1985a, 111-29, survey of roads on the Athenian frontier suggests that "a good number of ways into Attica were available to potential invaders (128)." Raiders thus had a good selection of routes and could bypass fortifications altogether unless garrisons sallied out against them or *peripoloi* intercepted them (see Munn 1993, 15-32).

possibility should war break out with Alexander, even though Athens managed to escape an actual invasion on three separate occasions in 338/7, 336/5, and 335/4 (Aeschin. 3.131; D.S. 17.4.6-9; Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.2-6). If so, the ephebes' training in missile weapons should also be seen in the light of the measures taken during the Lycurgan period to strengthen Athens' land defenses against a possible invasion, alongside the refurbishment of the *polis*' fortifications and the construction of an arsenal of 50,000 missiles on the Acropolis (Plut. *Mor.* 852C).

### 3.5: Conclusion

Citizens of every census class, including cleruchs, were required to serve in the ephebeia. But not all citizens initially wanted to participate, despite the institution's importance for the defense of Attica, because two years of continuous military service conflicted with their personal interests. The *demos* persuaded reluctant ephebes to serve by appealing to their *philotimia*. Ephebes could aspire to become a *taxiarchos* or *lochagos*, distinguish themselves by winning the *lampadedromia*, or be honored at the end of their stint of service. Having mobilized nearly every available citizen for home defense, the ephebeia made two important innovations to turn a given *heliakia* of ephebes into a militarily capable fighting corps. First, the ephebes were subject to strict military discipline at the hands of the tribal *sophronistes*, who could inflict physical punishment upon them without fear of prosecution. Indeed, the epigraphic evidence shows that the *demos* expected the ephebes to observe εὐταξία and πειθαρχία during their stint of service. Second, the *demos* established a peacetime military training program in which specialized instructors taught the ephebes physical training, hoplite weaponry, and non-hoplite arms. Its primary purpose was to make the ephebes more effective in defending Attica against hostile raids.

## Chapter Four: The Lycurgan Ephebeia:

Conversely a good soldier must be a good citizen. Equally important with more extensive military training, therefore, is training in citizenship, – the cultivation of a sense of responsibility for the common weal, of behavioral discipline, of morals, of all that is implied in εὐκοσμία, κοσμιότης, and σωφροσύνη. Lycurgus, we may assume, took measures to transfer his logic into action and thus initiated modifications in the ephebeia which were eventually to transform it from a purely military, into an educational organization.<sup>1</sup>

Reinmuth's position is representative of scholarly opinion in that certain aspects of the ephebeia cannot be explained purely in terms of its military function. Scholars have long recognized that "the fourth-century ephebeia also included a kind of civic novitiate, a system of moral and religious training in preparation for the full exercise of the rights and duties of citizenship."<sup>2</sup> Indeed, the *communis opinio* is that it was "reformed" because there was a need to educate the youngest citizens in the Lycurgan period.<sup>3</sup> While scholars assert that the ephebeia also functioned as an institution with educational characteristics, there is no consensus as to what kind of *paideia* the ephebes received.<sup>4</sup> This confusion is understandable if we take into account that the literary and epigraphic evidence for the ephebes' non-military activities are scattered and difficult to interpret.<sup>5</sup> The purpose of this chapter is therefore to reconstruct, tentatively, this system

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<sup>1</sup> Reinmuth 1971, 130.

<sup>2</sup> Marrou 1956, 151.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Ober 2001, 203: "Before the 330s, the Athenians had employed as border-guards young citizens, who were probably called ephēboi. But beginning in 335/4, the ephebeia came to include a stronger educational component. Upon turning eighteen, Athenian citizen-males were now inducted into a two-year program that conjoined military training and moral education."

<sup>4</sup> Examples of scholars' contrasting positions: Mitchel 1970, 37 (intensive indoctrination in patriotism); Faraguna 1992, 278 (ephebeia designed to instill civic virtues); Marcellus 1994, 86 (military training as a medium to providing an extensive education in moral virtue); Ober 2001, 203 (no evidence for civic and moral education apart from the *sophronistes*); Humphreys 2004, 120 (education through ritual).

<sup>5</sup> This is in contrast to the Hellenistic ephebeia, where the epigraphic evidence attests that the ephebes played a conspicuous role in the public life of Athens, in that they competed and celebrated most of the *polis'* major cults and festivals, met and provided an honor guard for foreign dignitaries, studied under various philosophers, and attended the Assembly and the theater of Dionysus. For a discussion of these activities, see Pélékidis 1962, 211-256.

of youth education, to ascertain its goals, and to establish why the Athenians under Lycurgus' administration should have thought it necessary to create it.

#### 4.1: Lycurgus' *Paideia* of the Young

In the spring of 337/6, soon after the establishment of the League of Corinth and a few months before Philip's assassination, Eucrates proposed a law that sought to prevent the overthrow of the democracy and the installation of tyranny in Athens.<sup>6</sup> What prompted the Athenians to pass a law that superseded Demophantus' anti-tyranny decree, dated to 410/9 (Andoc. 1.96-8)?<sup>7</sup> It is possible that they feared a pro-Macedonian coup in Athens, despite the guarantee given in the Common Peace that all *poleis* would retain their constitutions (Tod. II, no. 177, lines 12-14).<sup>8</sup> While there is no evidence to suggest that Philip in fact intended to establish a tyranny in Athens,<sup>9</sup> the *demos* nevertheless may have been anxious since he had subverted the constitutions of several *poleis* and set up partisan regimes throughout Greece after Chaeronea.<sup>10</sup> Eucrates' legislation, then, should probably be regarded as a warning to Philip and his partisans in Athens, real or imagined,<sup>11</sup> that the *demos* was determined to protect the constitution against all threats.

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<sup>6</sup> Meritt 1952, 355-9, no. 5 = *SEG* 12.87 = Schwenk 1985, no. 6. See Engels 1989b, 189-92; Sawada 1996, 82-4, for a bibliography on this law, which was passed in the month of Elaphebolion (February/March) of 336. Eucrates son of Aristotimus of Piraeus, may have been the same man as the "Eucrates from Piraeus" executed with Hyperides and Demosthenes after the Lamian War in 322 (Luc. *Dem.Enc.* 31). The stele specifies that two copies were erected, one by "the entrance into the Areopagus where one goes into the Bouleuterion," the other in the *ecclesia* (lines 22-7). There is no literary reference to the law.

<sup>7</sup> Ostwald 1955, 103-28, has compared Eucrates' law to previous anti-tyranny legislation, including that of Demophantus (120-3). The law contains two main clauses. The first says that it is lawful to kill anyone who attempts to set up a tyranny or supports such an attempt (lines 7-11). The second prohibits the Areopagites from meeting during an anti-democratic coup. Should they do so they will lose their citizen rights and their property will be confiscated (lines 11-22).

<sup>8</sup> Some scholars argue that the law is intended to prevent the Areopagites from collaborating with Philip to overthrow the democracy (e.g. Meritt 1952, 355-9; Ostwald 1955, 119-28), but the Areopagus' activities before and after Chaeronea cannot be considered anti-democratic, unpatriotic, or sympathetic to the king (Mossé 1973, 78; Wallace 1989, 182-3). Nor, as Schwenk 1985, 40-1, points out, does the law in any way limit the Areopagus' powers but prevents "the Council or any of its members from giving (or being forced to give) legal sanction in case of tyranny."

<sup>9</sup> Sealey 1958, 71-2; Mossé 1973, 77.

<sup>10</sup> For Philip's pro-Macedonian regimes after Chaeronea, see Roebuck 1948, 73-92; Hammond and Griffith 1979, 604-23.

<sup>11</sup> In the *Against Philippides*, delivered sometime in 338-336 (Whitehead 2000, 29-30), Hyperides accuses Phillippides and his associates of waiting for "opportunities to harm the city" (8). Whatever the truth of this

That the citizens of Lycurgan Athens continued to fear Macedonian autocracy and the threat it posed (in their eyes) to the democracy is suggested by the increased prominence of Demokratia in the late 330's,<sup>12</sup> though it is unclear whether the *boule*'s dedication of her statue in the Agora in 333/2 points to the beginning of a new cult or the revitalization of an existing one.<sup>13</sup>

The Athenians had good reason to fear Macedon if we consider that Alexander's hold over Athens tightened during this period. After the destruction of Thebes the Athenians' main hope for liberation depended upon the Persians under Darius III defeating Alexander. This was dashed, however, by Alexander's decisive victories at Issus in 333 and Gaugamela in 331.<sup>14</sup> Aeschines laments the demise of the Persian king, who was once the lord of all Asia but now flees for his life (3.132). While Alexander was triumphant in Asia, the Spartan king Agis III initiated an uprising against Macedon early in 331. This revolt was short-lived, since Antipater, Alexander's regent in Europe, defeated Agis and his allies at the battle of Megalopolis in the spring of 330.<sup>15</sup> Despite the bellicosity of some Athenians and the *demos*' open sympathy for Sparta, Demosthenes and Demades persuaded them to stay out of the conflict,<sup>16</sup> since an armed

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charge, Hyperides was clearly playing upon the *demos*' concerns that some citizens were plotting with Philip to subvert the democracy (Ostwald 1955, 124-5; Wallace 1989, 180).

<sup>12</sup> *SEG* 12.87 has a relief depicting a personified Demokratia crowning a seated Demos. For this relief, see Lawton 1995, no. 40, 100; Blanshard 2004, 1-15. Lawton, 2003, 123-7, associates her appearance on the relief with other anti-Macedonian and pro-democratic iconography after Chaeronea.

<sup>13</sup> Raubitschek 1962, 238-43, has published a fragment of her base (*SEG* 32.238). Palagia 1982, 99-113, initially identified the statue of Demokratia with *Agora S* 2370, but later preferred *Agathe Tyche* instead (1994, 113-22). For the location of the statue, see Palagia 1982, 112, on *EM* 12749, dated to 306/5-301. The *strategoi* are known to have sacrificed to Demokratia, between the Eleusinia (Metageitnion) and the Asclepieia (17 Boedromion), in 332/1 and 331/0 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1496, lines 131-2, 140-1). This has led some to suggest these sacrifices were made on 12 Boedromion, on the anniversary of the restoration of the democracy in 403 (Oliver 1960, 164-6; Raubitschek 1962, 239; Mikalson 1974, 53, on Plut. *Mor.* 349F). Others, however, argue that the cult began when the *boule* dedicated her statue, probably her cult-statue, in 333/2, since the first *known* sacrifice to her is attested in 332/1 (Mitchel 1970, 44-5; Versnel 1995, 385).

<sup>14</sup> The expectation of Demosthenes, and perhaps among the *demos* as a whole, was that the Macedonians would be "trampled underfoot by the Persian cavalry" at Issus in 333 (Aeschin. 3.164). Worthington 2000, 94-5, argues that Demosthenes may have harbored similar hopes for Gaugamela.

<sup>15</sup> For a full discussion of Agis' war, see Badian 1967, 170-92; 1994, 258-92. For Sparta's allies, see McQueen 1978. For the chronology of the conflict, see Badian 1994, 268-77.

<sup>16</sup> While the speaker in the *On the Treaty with Alexander* ([Dem.] 17), dated to 331/0 (see p. 60, n. 13), urges his compatriots to declare war on Alexander, Demosthenes counseled non-intervention: he apparently made a token gesture of support for Agis, but then "cowered down" (Plut. *Dem.* 24.2) and did nothing (Aeschin. 3.166-7; Din. 1.35). Even so, the *demos* still agitated to mobilize the fleet to aid Agis, probably in

confrontation with Antipater would have endangered the lives of those citizens serving on the twenty triremes which the *demos* had sent to Alexander for his campaign against Darius (D.S. 17.22.5).<sup>17</sup> While the decision not to get involved was justified given Agis' rapid defeat, though Athens' support may have made a difference to the outcome of the rebellion,<sup>18</sup> the *demos*' refusal to challenge Macedon showed that the city was now impotent in international affairs (Lyc. *Leoc.* 50; Aeschin. 3.134).<sup>19</sup>

The Athenians, unsurprisingly, did not want to be reminded of this unpalatable fact.<sup>20</sup> A few months after Agis' defeat, Aeschines reopened his long-delayed suit against Ctesiphon.<sup>21</sup> As Sawada has shown, Aeschines' renewed attack on Demosthenes should not be seen as a confrontation between pro- and anti-Macedonians but made out of personal enmity.<sup>22</sup> Even so, their speeches provide an insight into how the *demos* perceived Macedonian hegemony in 330. Demosthenes had little to say about the complex events from 336 to 330 (18.253, 270). Instead, he concentrated on Athens' staunch and unyielding opposition to Philip before and at Chaeronea in which the Athenians fought nobly, if unsuccessfully, in the cause of Greek freedom (18. 139-210). Aeschines, however, talked at length about Demosthenes' role in the downfall of Thebes,

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early 331 (Blackwell 1999, 58, n. 79), but Demades quashed this by threatening to use the Theoric fund for the venture instead of distributing the money to the citizenry for the Choes festival (See Mitchel 1962, 219-21, on [Plut]. *Mor.* 818E-F).

<sup>17</sup> St Croix 1972, 376-8; Badian 1994, 259. Diodorus Siculus attributes the Athenians' neutrality to Alexander's benevolence (17.62.7), which may refer to the Macedonian king's decision to return the tyrannicides and the citizens captured at the battle of the Granicus as a reward for Athens' non-involvement in the rebellion (See Badian 1967, 183, on Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.2; 3.16.8). Sealey 1993, 207, unconvincingly suggests that the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia was sufficient to deter Athens from going to war (*contra* Cawkwell 1969, 179).

<sup>18</sup> See Blackwell 1999, 57, on Aeschin. 3.165.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Cawkwell 1969, 176: "The Persian Empire was ended; the great revolt of Agis was over. No obstacle remained to Macedonian domination without end. With Thebes gone, and Sparta gone, and the heart of Greece crushed, what future in mid 330 could an Athenian see?"

<sup>20</sup> How would the *demos* have perceived Alexander's dedication of 300 Persian panoplies to Athena after the battle of the Granicus in 334, along with the following inscription that read "Alexander son of Philip and the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians from the barbarians dwelling in Asia" (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.7; Plut. *Alex.* 16.8)? While the Athenians could not have refused such a gift, most would have found it offensive because they were desiring a Persian victory and they knew that Alexander had enslaved those compatriots fighting as mercenaries for the Persians (Mitchel 1970, 8). They may have also regarded it as a blunt warning that they would suffer the same fate should they be foolish enough to oppose him (Green 1991, 181; Hurwit 1997, 254).

<sup>21</sup> Harris 1995, 140-2, 173-4; *contra* Burke 1977, 330-40.

<sup>22</sup> Sawada, 1996, 60-71.

Sparta, and Persia – the most powerful opponents of Macedon – in an effort to stir ill-will against him (3.159-167). Though there were other reasons for Aeschines' heavy defeat (less than 20% of the votes: Plut. *Dem.* 24.2-3),<sup>23</sup> Worthington convincingly argues that he badly misread the jurors' minds and earned their wrath in recounting how Alexander's military supremacy in Greece and Asia had quickly ended all prospects for independence.<sup>24</sup>

For Lycurgus, the *demos*' nostalgia for the past could be used in a different way, namely to reassert the greatness of Athens despite Alexander's hegemony over Greece. But how? In a fragment of the *Against Cephisodotus concerning the Honors to Demades*, Lycurgus praises Pericles' conquests, his building program, and the immense funds stored on the Acropolis (Conomis Fr. 9.2), while in the *Against Leocrates* he extols his ancestors for defeating the Persians and their leadership over the Greeks (72-3). While he was in no position to match his ancestors' military accomplishments under Pericles' dynamic leadership, he nevertheless hoped to revive his compatriots' civic pride and patriotism by emulating the culture and magnificence of the city's golden age.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, he had the financial means and will to carry out an extensive building program comparable to that undertaken in the fifth century, thus demonstrating Athens' power and wealth to his fellow countrymen.<sup>26</sup> The *demos*, frustrated by their inability to regain their independence in the late 330s, could be diverted from the painful present by their admiration for his program of urban renewal, which aimed to adorn Athens' somewhat

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<sup>23</sup> See also Harris 1994, 142-8.

<sup>24</sup> Worthington 2000, 99-100.

<sup>25</sup> For Periclean Athens as Lycurgus' political and cultural ideal, see Mitchel 1970, 3-52; Humphreys 2004, 77-129. He was hardly unique in his veneration for its achievements: [Dem]. 13.28; Dem. 22.76; 23.207; 24.284; Aeschin. 2.105; Isoc. 5.146; 15.307; Din. 1.37. Cf. Perlman 1961, 156-7: "[Pericles] is practically the only politician for whom the orators have nothing but praise ... the period of his leadership is a period of glory and prosperity, unlike the periods which preceeded or succeeded it. Apart from the Persian wars, this is an epoch of Athenian history of which Athenians ought to be proud. There can be no doubt that here is not only a widespread popular conception of past history, but also an expression of Athens' aspirations to obtain a position of a great power and the leadership of Greece in the fourth century."

<sup>26</sup> For Lycurgus as comptroller of Athens and an outline of his activities, see pp. 62-4. Cf. Mitchel 1970, 48: "Only if we consider that Athens had completed no significant building since the Erectheion and the temple of Athena Nike, can we duly appreciate the Lycurgan building program. Hurwit 1997, 255: "Lykourgos' building campaign did not, then, emerge out of nothing. Still, for sheer scale and concentration of resources, labor, and energy, Athens had seen nothing like it since the Periklean golden age (Lykourgos' obvious model and inspiration)."

rundown city landscape in a manner befitting a people who still aspired to be the leaders of the Greek world ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C: ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν).<sup>27</sup>

Alongside the extensive public works undertaken during his administration, Lycurgus sought to educate the younger generation on the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. As he himself puts it in the *Against Leocrates*:

If you vote against this man [i.e. Leocrates], you will not only chastise him, but also turn all the younger men toward virtue (τοὺς νεωτέρους ἅπαντας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν). For there are two things with which to teach the young (τὰ παιδεύοντα τοὺς νέους): the punishment of wrongdoers and the rewards that go to good men. Turning their attention to two alternatives, they shun the first out of fear and desire the second for the sake of a good reputation (10).<sup>28</sup>

In Lycurgus' view the Athenians excel all other men in their piety to the gods, respect for their parents, and patriotic devotion to their country (*Leoc.* 15). His conception of the loyal and virtuous citizen is made clear in his lengthy civics lesson, for the benefit of the young (*Leoc.* 93-9, 106), on the importance of patriotic self-sacrifice, an unswerving obedience to the laws, and a deep reverence for the cults of Athens (*Leoc.* 75-130).<sup>29</sup> For Lycurgus, the military buildup after Chaeronea – the strengthening of the city's fortifications, navy, and naval infrastructure ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852C)<sup>30</sup> – would have been of little use if citizens were to act like the cowardly and treasonous Leocrates, who

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<sup>27</sup> For vacant lots in Athens, temples needing to be repaired, slums near the Pnyx, and the decrepit condition of the city's public buildings before the Lycurgan period, see Dem. 3.29; 23.206-8; [Dem]. 13.28-30; Xen. *Por.* 2.6; 6.1; Aeschin. 2.81-2. Cf. Isoc. *Anti.* 234: τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον Περικλῆς καὶ δημαγωγὸς ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ ῥήτωρ ἄριστος οὕτως ἐκόσμησε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὥστ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοὺς εἰσαφικνουμένους εἰς αὐτὴν νομίζειν μὴ μόνον ἄρχειν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

<sup>28</sup> οὐ μόνον τοῦτον νῦν κολάσετε κατεψηφισμένοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νεωτέρους ἅπαντας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψετε. δύο γάρ ἐστι τὰ παιδεύοντα τοὺς νέους, ἢ τε τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία, καὶ ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διδομένη δωρεά· πρὸς ἐκάτερον δὲ τούτων ἀποβλέποντες, τὴν μὲν διὰ τὸν φόβον φεύγουσι, τῆς δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

<sup>29</sup> Hyperides declared that Lycurgus was “second to none ... as a speaker” (4.12), while the *Vitae decem oratorum* suggests that his speeches were generally well received (841B; 842F). Ancient literary critics had divergent opinions of his style (see collected testimonia in Conomis 1970, 31-2). For a discussion of Lycurgus' rhetoric, see Allen 2000, 5-33; Whitehead 2006, 132-51. Although Hermogenes noted his tendency to digress with stories, historical events, and poetry (π. ἰδεῶν Rabe p. 402, 14), we cannot be certain whether Lycurgus' other speeches also contained “civic lessons” due to their fragmentary nature.

<sup>30</sup> See pp. 77-80.



abandoned Attica rather than face the expected Macedonian invasion after Chaeronea (*Leoc.* 16, 39-42). The goal of his educational program, I suggest, was to convince the young that they should place their devotion to the *polis* above all other considerations (*Leoc.* 101), so that they would not hesitate to risk their lives to defend the constitution and to fight against the Macedonians, just as their compatriots did at Chaeronea (*Leoc.* 47), to regain their freedom.

In the passage quoted above, Lycurgus, like other litigants, claims that his adversary's conviction would benefit the *demos* because it would encourage them, especially the young, to be better citizens.<sup>31</sup> As his contemporary Aeschines observes, "you know well, Athenian gentlemen, that not just the wrestling-schools or educational institutions or musical training educate the young (παιδεύει τοὺς νέους), but more important by far are the public proclamations [of Athens' democratic institutions]" (3.246).<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, Plato recognizes that the decisions of the *ecclesia*, lawcourt, and theater, consisting of praise and blame for things said or done, exerted a far greater influence upon the behavior of young men than whatever formal schooling they had received at their fathers' expense (*Resp.* 492A-D).<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Lycurgus' belief in the important role that these institutions played in educating young citizens may have provided an additional impetus behind his refurbishment of the theater of Dionysus,<sup>34</sup> the buildings associated with the *Heliaea* and the *dikasteria* in the Agora,<sup>35</sup> and perhaps also the Pnyx.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Ober 1989a, 161-3; Allen 2000, 20-1; Rubinstein 2000, 165-6. Examples of litigants making similar claims: Dem. 19.342-3; 22.37; 25.53; 54.43; Isoc. 20.18, 21; Din. 1.17; Lys. 1.47; 15.9; 22.19-21.

<sup>32</sup> Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι οὐχ αἱ παλαῖστροι οὐδὲ τὰ διδασκαλεῖα οὐδ' ἡ μουσικὴ μόνον παιδεύει τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ δημόσια κηρύγματα.

<sup>33</sup> For the educational function of these institutions, see Loraux 1986, 144-5; Ober 1989a, 158-65; Garland 1990, 133; Strauss 1993, 83.

<sup>34</sup> Lycurgus rebuilt the theater of Dionysus (Hyp. Fr. 118 Sauppe; [Plut]. *Mor.* 841D; 852C), where he transformed the wooden seating and stage into a stone auditorium and a *skene* with a marble façade (Travlos 1971, 537-52; Townsend 1982, 90-142). He also passed a law stipulating that bronze statues of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides were to be set up in the theater and ordered that official copies of their plays should be stored in the state archive and that actors should not be permitted to use other versions ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841F). Richter 1962, 24-9, argues that the statues of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides Pausanias (1.21.1-2) observed in the theater of Dionysus were in fact the Lycurgan originals or later copies.

<sup>35</sup> Mitchel 1970, 40-1, supposes that Lycurgus was responsible for changing the bronze of the dicastic *pinakia* to boxwood ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 63.4), but Kroll 1972, 103, shows that this change began c. 350

The ephebes, however, could not have gained the educational benefits of Athens' democratic institutions. While Lycurgus, who portrayed himself as the moral guardian of the city,<sup>37</sup> sought to educate the younger generation by impeaching those citizens guilty in *his* eyes of unpatriotic, impious, or immoral behavior ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841E, 843D-E),<sup>38</sup> the ephebes could not have listened to his (or anyone else's) arguments since they were too young to serve on a jury ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 63.3). Nor could they have profited from the experience in communal decision making (such as the awarding of honors for public benefactors) under Lycurgus' energetic leadership by sitting in the *ecclesia* because they were prohibited from participating in public life until they had completed their stint of military service ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.5: διε[ξ]ελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυνεῖν ἐτῶν, ἤδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν).<sup>39</sup> While some scholars argue from Hellenistic ephebic inscriptions and late literary sources that fourth-century ephebes not only had seats reserved for them in the *bouleutikon* but also played a prominent role in various aspects of the Great Dionysia, there is no evidence to suggest that they did in fact attend the festival in the Lycurgan period and hence draw useful moral lessons, as Lycurgus intended,<sup>40</sup> from the plays performed there.<sup>41</sup>

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instead. Excavations suggest that some minor features of the Rectangular Peribolos and buildings A-D may have been rebuilt or extended in the Lycurgan period (see Boegehold 1995, 99-113).

<sup>36</sup> The date of Pnyx III has been controversial, but scholars who have recently reexamined the archeological evidence argue that construction should either be dated to the 340's or to the period after Chaeronea (Engels 1992, 22-6; Rotroff and Camp 1996, 263-94).

<sup>37</sup> For Lycurgus as Athens' self-appointed "public prosecutor" (Lyc. *Leoc.* 5-6), see Allen 2000, 17-8; Humphreys 2004, 106-7.

<sup>38</sup> Lycurgus preferred to use the procedure of *eisangelia* (impeachment) to prosecute unworthy citizens. For a discussion of *eisangelia*, see Hansen 1975. While Leocrates escaped conviction by one vote (Aeschin. 3.252), Lycurgus convicted the *strategos* Lysicles for his role in the defeat at Chaeronea (D.S. 16.88.1-2), the Areopagite Autolycus for sending his family away after the battle (Lyc. *Leoc.* 53), and Menesaechnus for breach of ritual connected with a *theoria* to Delos (*Berl.Pap.* 11748). He also supported the impeachments against Lycophron for adultery (Hyp. 1 Fr. 3) and against Euxenippus for taking bribes when he slept at the Amphiaraeum to bring back the god's message (Hyp. 4.12). Hyperides objected to *eisangelia* being used for such crimes as adultery and the over-pricing of flute-girls (4.1-8). This complaint could be taken as an oblique criticism of Lycurgus (see Whitehead 2000, 196-7, on Hyp. 4.12). Lycurgus' abuse of *eisangelia*, originally intended for serious offences (Hyp. 4.7-9), may have prompted the *demos* to change the law in the late 330's to prevent speakers from impeaching citizens for frivolous offenses (Hansen 1975, 12-31).

<sup>39</sup> The first certain instance of ephebes attending the *ecclesia* is IG II<sup>2</sup> 1006 [122/1], lines 20-1. For other examples, see Pélékidis 1962, 273-4.

<sup>40</sup> Humphreys 2004, 104-5, suggests that Lycurgus exploited Athens' rich dramatic heritage in an effort to educate the young. Not only does the *Against Leocrates* contain many poetic references and quotations but

It is for this reason, I argue, that the *demos* incorporated “educational features” into the ephebeia that they believed would instill normative civic values in a given enrolment class of ephebes that would enhance the informal *paideia* that the latter would have received from undertaking their two years of military service,<sup>42</sup> and the presumably favorable impression they gained by admiring the achievements of the Lycurgan period – the city’s wealth, military might, and fine buildings – which demonstrated Athens’ vitality and importance.<sup>43</sup> Marcellus claims that “Lycurgus aimed at nothing short of wholesale indoctrination of all new citizens in proper civic, religious, and philosophical values.”<sup>44</sup> We cannot be certain, however, as to what role he may have played in determining the nature of the ephebes’ *paideia*, because we have no explicit evidence for the extent of his involvement in the ephebeia.<sup>45</sup> Even so, if we accept that Lycurgus and

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Lycurgus also declares that Euripides should be praised for the *Erechtheus* because the poet believed that the subject matter – Praxithea’s willing sacrifice of her daughter – would serve as the finest example for the *demos* to study and hence would implant *philopatria* in their souls (*Leoc.* 100). Apart from Euripides’ *Erechtheus*, Lycurgus quotes Homer, Tyrtaeus, the epigrams of the Spartans at Thermopylae and the Athenians at Marathon, and two unknown poets (*Leoc.* 92, 103, 107, 109, 132). For a discussion of poetic quotations in fourth-century Attic oratory, see Perlman 1964, 155-79.

<sup>41</sup> Second-century inscriptions, beginning with *SEG* 15.104 (127/6), line 25, attest that the ephebes played a leading part in the procession of Dionysus from Eleutherae to the theater, offered a bull for sacrifice, and then sacrificed it in the theater (for a detailed discussion of the evidence, see Pélékidis 1962, 239-47). Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 59-61, assumes that they performed these activities in the fifth century, while Goldhill 1987, 59, is justifiably more cautious. Winkler 1990, 38, argues that the ephebes were allocated seats in the *bouleutikon* of the theater from the late sixth-century onwards. Given the epigraphic evidence for the ephebes’ involvement in the Great Dionysia, however, it is more likely that the sources are referring to this practice in the Hellenistic period (Poll. 4.122; Hesych. s.v. βουλευτικόν; schol. on Ar. *Av.* 794).

<sup>42</sup> The ephebeia would have promoted an egalitarian *ethos* and reinforced the notion of citizen equality – key democratic concepts (see Raaflaub 1996, 139-74) – since the ephebes, regardless of their social class, fought with the same equipment (hoplite spear and shield), performed the same duties, and were bound to observe the same body of regulations (νόμοι) throughout their military service ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.3-5; **E2** [333/2], lines 28, 54). Furthermore, the ephebes, drawn from every geographical region of Attica, would have gained a hitherto unprecedented familiarity with their fellow *phyletai* during their stint in the ephebeia, perhaps contributing to increased social stability and cohesion in the citizen body, since it appears that “the phylai did not in fact maintain a particularly intimate associational life” outside of the institution (Jones 1999, 172).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Mitchel 1970, 49: “Under the strong and skilful guidance of Lykourgos she [i.e. Athens] made the most of the unprecedented peace to recover her strength and pride and to renew those manifestations of vigorous public life which had in the past made Athens great, famous, and admired.”

<sup>44</sup> Marcellus 1994, 155.

<sup>45</sup> Parker 1996, 254, opines that “no source brings Lycurgus himself into an association of any kind with the institution; but the concern to train up the young shoots of the land as ‘shield-bearing inhabitants, reliable in (any) hour of need’ seems quintessentially Lycurgan.” For Lycurgus’ (suspected) contribution to the creation of the ephebeia in 335/4, see p. 97, n. 162. The direct evidence is limited to his mention of Epicrates’ “law concerning the ephebes” (Harp. s.v. Ἐπικράτης = Lyc. Fr. 5.3 Conomis), the content of

the *demos* would have shared similar concerns for the education of the youngest citizens, it is possible that the opinions he puts forth in the *Against Leocrates* may provide some insight into how the Athenians under his administration sought to turn the ephebes towards “the path of virtue,” as Xenophon puts it (*Mem.* 2.1.21). Let us begin with the so-called “Platonic” aspects of the ephebeia, which scholars have attributed to Lycurgus’ education.

#### 4.2: The Ephebe as σώφρων πολίτης

The *Vitae decem oratorum* maintains that Lycurgus was a student of Plato and Isocrates before he embarked upon his public career ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841B; 848D).<sup>46</sup> Although the highly speculative nature of this text concerning the *paideia* of other famous orators does not inspire much confidence,<sup>47</sup> other ancient literary sources do suggest that Lycurgus, presumably as a youth, did in fact attend the Academy.<sup>48</sup> We cannot dismiss the possibility, then, that Lycurgus, like other ambitious and wealthy young men, did come to Plato to complete his education because he desired to be instructed in skills thought to be conducive towards a successful career as a statesman

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which next to nothing is known (see pp. 65-9). The restoration of the ephebeia after the overthrow of the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum in 307 and the re-establishment of the democratic government under Habron, Lycurgus’ son (See Marcellus 1994, 181-6, on *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 478; 556; 1159), who had performed his military service over twenty years before (E18 [329/8?], lines 6-7, 72-3), may suggest a somewhat closer connection between Lycurgus and the institution than is attested in contemporary sources. For an overview of the short-lived democracy, see Habicht 1997, 67-81, while Habron’s administration is discussed in Merker 1986, 47-50.

<sup>46</sup> ἀκροατῆς δὲ γεγόμενος Πλάτωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τὰ πρῶτα ἐφιλοσόφησεν· εἴτα καὶ Ἰσοκράτους τοῦ ῥήτορος γινώριμος γεγόμενος ἐπολιτεύσατο ἐπιφανῶς, καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων καὶ δὴ πιστευσάμενος τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν χρημάτων.

<sup>47</sup> The author, for example, presents three possibilities concerning Aeschines’ education: either Plato and Isocrates were his teachers, or he studied with Leodamas, or he received no formal training at all (840B, F). Harris 1995, 28, has shown that the last is correct.

<sup>48</sup> In his Commentary on Plato’s *Gorgias*, the sixth-century A.D. Alexandrian philosopher Olympiodorus says that Lycurgus was Plato’s student and adds that “Philiscus, who wrote the life of Lycurgus, says that Lycurgus was great and accomplished many things successfully which are impossible for one to accomplish unless he has heard the arguments of Plato” (Olympiod. in Plat. *Gorg.* 515C [Norvin 197.4-5 and 198.1-4]). This Philiscus was probably the man of the same name from Miletus, who apparently wrote Lycurgus’ biography and was himself a student of Isocrates (Suda s.v. Φιλίσκος; [Plut]. *Mor.* 836C; Dion.Hal. *Ep. ad. Amm.* 120). Diogenes Laertius, citing the third-century Peripatetic author Chamaeleon as his authority, likewise claims that Lycurgus was Plato’s pupil (3.46). For these sources, see Morrow 1960, 9; Renehan 1970, 218.

and legislator.<sup>49</sup> Corroboration for this view comes from Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates* where scholars, despite Zeller's claim that none of Plato's ideas are to be found in the speeches of any orator,<sup>50</sup> show that the orator's rhetoric and argumentation to some extent reflect the language and concepts of the Platonic corpus.<sup>51</sup> The biographical tradition that he had a philosophical education also puts into perspective his friendship with individuals linked to the Academy and the Lyceum and his interest in their activities during his administration.<sup>52</sup> Finally, the anecdote (if true) that Lycurgus hired "sophists" to educate his sons attests to the high esteem he had for philosophers in Athens in the late 330's or early 320's ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842D).

The prevailing scholarly opinion is that philosophical treatises such as the *Laws* were not only important for the development of political theory in fourth-century Greece but also exerted an influence (how much is unclear) on the programs of prominent statesmen said to have been Plato's students who put his theories into practice in the field of *Realpolitik*.<sup>53</sup> Scholars have thus argued that Lycurgus implemented policies derived in

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<sup>49</sup> For the Academy and its activities, see Field 1933, 30-47; Morrow 1960, 3-13; Saunders 1986, 200-210; Monoson 2000, 137-45. Zeller 1919, 30, n. 64, has collected and discussed the ancient sources (esp. Plut. *Adv. Colot.* 1126A) for those statesmen reputed to have been "students" of the Academy. Brunt 1993, 300, n. 32, observes that the "admirers of Plato would have had a natural temptation to give him credit for the development of other Athenians of his time who were also admired."

<sup>50</sup> Zeller 1919, 420.

<sup>51</sup> Renehan 1970, 223-7, draws the following parallels: both authors quote Tyrtaeus and claim that he was an Athenian by birth (*Leoc.* 106-7 vs *Leg.* 629A-E, 660E), employ images of birds defending their young (*Leoc.* 131-2 vs *Leg.* 814B), and assert that some crimes deserve punishments worse than death (*Leoc.* 8, 134 vs *Leg.* 854E, 869B, 881A). For Allen 2000, 29-31, Lycurgus' argument that poetry played a vital role in teaching the young (*Leoc.* 95, 100) was influenced by Plato's belief concerning the pedagogical value of fictional stories (*Leg.* 663D-664A; *Resp.* 377C). As Humphreys 2004, 104-5, points out, however, Plato would not have approved of Lycurgus' assertion that poetry was superior to the laws in making citizens virtuous (Plato. *Leg.* 721A-E, 722D-723D; Lyc. *Leoc.* 100-2).

<sup>52</sup> Lycurgus is said to have assaulted and imprisoned a tax-collector for enforcing the metic-tax on Xenocrates, the successor to Plato as head of the Academy ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842B-C). Mitchel 1965, 198, n. 5, suggests that Lycurgus was responsible for setting up Socrates' statue, sculptured by Lysippus, outside the Pompeium (D.L. 2.46), but Alexander is a more likely candidate (Pollitt 1986, 53). Lycurgus perhaps encouraged Aristotle to open his school at the Lyceum (Tracy 1995, 13), though no source associates the former with its foundation (Lynch 1972, 68-105) and the Lyceum was probably rebuilt as a training ground for the ephhebeia (pp. 136-7). Even so, Lycurgus seems to have maintained some connection with Aristotle's school, because Democles, pupil of Theophrastus, defended Lycurgus' children against Menesaechmus after his death ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842D-E).

<sup>53</sup> Plato's personal involvement in Syracusan affairs and the role of the Academy in dispensing political and constitutional advice to tyrants, kings, and several *poleis* has convinced the majority of scholars that the philosopher's ideas had, and were intended to have, an influence on the practical politics of fourth-century

some way from the teachings of contemporary political philosophy, especially Plato, in the ephebeia. Wilamowitz certainly assumed such a relationship when he bluntly asserted that “Platons Gesetze haben die ephebie erzeugt.”<sup>54</sup> But can we actually demonstrate Platonic influence in the institution? Should we assume, for instance, that Lycurgus had taken Plato’s proposals *in toto* concerning youth military service and modified them for the ephebeia (Plat. *Leg.* 760B-763C, 778E)?<sup>55</sup> To attribute the ephebes’ two years of garrison duty and their training under specialized instructors ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3-5) to Plato is unconvincing, however, because these aspects of the institution, as I have argued in earlier chapters, should instead be seen in the light of Athenian military practices in the Classical period and the need of the *demos* to defend Attica against bands of raiders after Thebes’ destruction in 335.<sup>56</sup>

For scholars, the existence of *syssitia* is proof that Lycurgus, who admired Sparta and her system of citizen training (Lyc. *Leoc.* 105-9, 128-9), was inspired by Plato’s recognition of the important educational role the *syssition* played in Sparta and Crete and his adoption of the institution for his ideal state (*Leg.* 842B).<sup>57</sup> Reinmuth thus claims that the “provision that the epheboi live and train together continuously for two years and eat in a common mess ... was the translation into fact of Lycurgus’ ideal of the citizen, at one remove from Plato’s *Laws*.”<sup>58</sup> Indeed, Murray goes so far as to suggest that Plato’s arguments were ultimately responsible for the *syssitia* in the ephebeia, even if Lycurgus

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Greece (e.g. Fields 1930, 43-5; Marrow 1960, 7-9; Saunders 1986, 202-3; Monoson 2000, 145-53; *contra* Brunt 1993, 282-342). Marcellus 1994, 124-8, argues that fourth-century philosophers such as Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle had an effect on political events and institutional development through their former students. Ober 2001, 194-202, sees various fourth-century democratic reforms as a response to published educational works of Plato and other philosophers. Finally, some scholars have even sought to establish a direct relationship between philosophical ideas and historical events (e.g. Dusanic 1980, 111-44; Williams 1982, 173-83).

<sup>54</sup> Wilamowitz 1893, 194.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Forbes 1929, 114: “It is natural ... that if Athens created the ephebeia with Plato’s *Laws* in mind, it should adapt the philosopher’s recommendations to make them more feasible from a practical point of view.”

<sup>56</sup> See pp. 89-90 (garrison duty and Thebes’ destruction) and 135-46 (military training in the ephebeia).

<sup>57</sup> For a detailed discussion of *syssitia* in Plato’s *Laws*, see Morrow 1960, 389-98.

<sup>58</sup> Reinmuth 1967, 49. Cf. North 1979, 124: “It seems as though an effort was being made to secure for the young Athenians some of the advantages supposedly conferred on their Spartan counterparts by the *syssition*, the common mess.” Rhodes 1981, 507: “Ephebic service in the time of A.P. was a full-time occupation (and eating together by tribes was perhaps a conscious imitation of the more extensive Spartan ἀγωγή).”

had actually introduced them.<sup>59</sup> The notion that Lycurgus incorporated Spartan-like *syssitia* into the ephebeia should be rejected, however, because συσσιτοῦσι ... κατὰ φυλάς ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3) probably means no more than “the ephebes dine together by tribes,” just like Ariston’s σύσσιτοι in Demosthenes’ *Against Conon* (54.4) or the Athenians who messed together at Phyle in 404/3 (Lys. 13.79). Moreover, given that the *sophronistes* received a daily state-funded *trophe* for his fellow *phyletai* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3), how else would he have fed them but as a group?<sup>60</sup>

Scholars also ascribe the creation of the ten tribal *sophronistai*, who, as the epigraphic evidence shows, were responsible for teaching *sophrosyne* to the ephebes under their care,<sup>61</sup> to Lycurgus’ education under Plato. The following view is representative:

It can scarcely be an accident that the Athenian statesman Lycurgus, whom tradition represents as a pupil of Plato, seems to have considered it his function to “sophronize” the demoralized state of which he was the chief financial officer and effective leader for twelve years (338-326). One of the ways he sought to achieve his purpose was through the institution of the officers known as *Sôphronistai* ... Their function was to supervise the morals of the ephebes during their period of training. In Platonic terms, the young men would be learning to convert a natural tendency toward *sophrosyne* into a civic virtue which it was the purpose of the *Laws* to instill.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Murray 1991, 89.

<sup>60</sup> If so, this invalidates an argument often raised against an early ephebeia, namely that Plato assumes in the *Laws* that *syssitia* are not Athenian, but Spartan and Cretan institutions peculiar to these states (see Bryant 1907, 85; Forbes 1929, 118-9; Marcellus 1994, 30, on 666E; 780B).

<sup>61</sup> In *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1159 (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 19), dated to 303/2, the fathers of Pandionis honor the *sophronistes* Philonides for taking care of the ephebes “with fine *sophron* and good order” (lines 9-11), while *sophrosyne* appears on **E8**, a dedication of Leontis (332/1), where the ephebes are praised ἀρετῆς ἐνε[κα καὶ σωφρο]σύνης (line 2; cf. the *lochagoi* in Col. I, lines 30-1). Merritt 1945, 238, restored σωφροσύνης in **E7** (332/1), line 8, but Lewis’ 1973, 256, reading of ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰ]ς is more convincing (see p. 197).

<sup>62</sup> North 1979, 109.

North assumes that the kind of *sophrosyne* taught to the youngest citizens was the one found in the texts of Plato and other writers.<sup>63</sup> But even if Lycurgus was a “serious” student of philosophy ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842C), as Renehan suggests,<sup>64</sup> we do not know his views on *sophrosyne*, since the term is unattested in the Lycurgan corpus,<sup>65</sup> let alone to what extent he agreed with Plato’s educational theories in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, North does not consider why the *demos* should have agreed to the office of *sophronistes* if the average citizen, who would not have had the benefit of a higher education,<sup>67</sup> would have known little if anything about Plato’s theoretical treatment of the concept. As Burn rightly observes, “Plato is on most matters excellent evidence for what the ordinary Athenian did not think.”<sup>68</sup> Consequently, I suggest that we can explain the *sophronistes* by examining the meanings of *sophrosyne* that the citizens of Lycurgan Athens would have readily understood, namely the cardinal democratic virtue reflected in

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. North 1979, 125: “That Lycurgus is represented by tradition as a pupil of both Isocrates and Plato helps explain his concern for civic virtues and perhaps accounts for the prominence of *sophrosyne*, evinced by the very name *sôphronistês*, as well as by the stock phrases employed in the honorary inscriptions.” Though *sophrosyne* is prominent throughout the Classical period, Plato played a decisive role in its development as a philosophical virtue (*Resp.* 427C; *Leg.* 631C-D). Contemporaries, notably Isocrates and Xenophon, were heavily influenced by Plato’s treatment of the virtue in his philosophical texts, especially in his ideal constitution. For a detailed discussion of *sophrosyne* in Greek literature, see North 1966, 1-257, esp. 150-96 (Plato); Rademaker 1994, esp. 293-353 (Plato).

<sup>64</sup> Renehan 1970, 229. Brunt 1993, 285, 287, draws an important distinction between the majority of students who “were seeking primarily to be trained as statesmen and legislators” and others who “immersed themselves in Plato’s dialectic and metaphysics.” Lycurgus probably belongs to the first group.

<sup>65</sup> For the absence of *sophrosyne* in Lycurgus’ *Against Leocrates*, see Allen 2000, 20.

<sup>66</sup> Marcellus 1994, 85-137, outlines the development of philosophical-critical ideas on state education during the Classical period in order to demonstrate the various ideas Lycurgus (and his supporters) may have come into contact with as a student of Plato and during his own studies after leaving the Academy that may have influenced the creation, function, and organization of the *ephebeia*. The major flaw in this approach is that we know little about Lycurgus’ own philosophical beliefs and consequently should not assume that a given aspect of the *ephebeia* was an adaptation of Plato’s theories, such as the “*ephebic*” *syssition* discussed above.

<sup>67</sup> Throughout the classical period a youth’s education and moral instruction were largely in the hands of his father, whose wealth and inclination determined the kind, length, and effectiveness of his *paideia* (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.2; Plat. *Meno* 93D-94C; *Prot.* 326C). Studies on formal education in Athens stress that while the vast majority of citizens received some kind of schooling until their early teens, few would have had sufficient wealth to pay for lessons in rhetoric or philosophy (Girard 1891, 63-270; Marrou 1956, 63-146; Beck 1964, 72-187).

<sup>68</sup> Burn 1936, xii.



the speeches delivered by fourth-century orators, without philosophical refinement, in the law-courts and the *ecclesia*.<sup>69</sup>

How, then, is the σώφρων πολίτης – often best translated as a “moderate” or “self-controlled” citizen – portrayed in Attic oratory? The following passage of Demosthenes, dated to 325, suggests that the *demos* regarded the practice of *sophrosyne* as essential for the well-being of the *polis*:

For all the solemn and fine things by which the city is adorned and kept safe – moral-discipline (σωφροσύνη), the respect of your young for parents and elders, good-order – prevail by the assistance of the laws against what is disgraceful, namely shamelessness, audacity, and impudence (25.24).<sup>70</sup>

The “moderate citizen” is characterized as one who has a modest personal lifestyle, is quiet and inoffensive to his fellow citizens, does not initiate litigation, resists bribes, and exercises self-control over his physical appetites, such as gluttony, anger, and sex (Lys. 1.38; 21.19; Is. fr. 131 Sauppe; Dem. 38.26-7; Aeschin. 1.136-7).<sup>71</sup> He is also a loyal democrat who obeys the laws and endeavors to make himself useful to the state, in contrast to the cowardly and servile oligarch (Dem. 24.75; 25.97).<sup>72</sup> It is understandable, then, that Aeschines would include *sophrosyne* as one of the five qualities that distinguish the *demotikos* from the oligarch (3.169-70). The orators also associate *sophrosyne* with military valor, linking self-control to the courage (*andreia*) and excellence (*arete*) of

<sup>69</sup> For *sophrosyne* in oratory, see North 1966, 135-42; Dover 1974, 59-60; Rademaker 2004, 233-50; Roisman 2005, 176-85. As a cardinal virtue of the Athenian democracy, see Whitehead 1993, 37-42, 70-2.

<sup>70</sup> πάντα γὰρ τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ δι' ὧν ἡ πόλις κοσμεῖται καὶ σώζεται, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἡ πρὸς τοὺς γονεάς καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὑμῶν παρὰ τῶν νέων αἰσχύνη, ἡ εὐταξία, τῇ τῶν νόμων προσθήκη τῶν αἰσχυρῶν περίεστιν, τῆς ἀναισχυντίας, τῆς θρασύτητος, τῆς ἀναιδείας.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Rademaker 2004, 246: “Thus, we see how, for the citizen of the Athenian πόλις, σωφροσύνη is linked to an extensive ideology of civic morality. The σώφρων defendant in the orators is in many respects a blameless citizen. He is orderly in his desires and therefore also moderate in his expenses ... He refrains from injustice and violence against his fellow citizens. And in general, he is not a litigious person but leads a quiet and dignified life far from the courts.”

<sup>72</sup> North 1966, 135-6, argues that *sophrosyne* as a political term had originally been associated with an aristocratic or oligarchic form of government but was later appropriated by the *demos* as a democratic virtue from the second half of the fifth century onwards, especially after the unrestrained rule of the Thirty. Indeed, Aeschines described the restored democracy and hence the peace from civil strife as σωφρόνως πολιτεύεσθαι (2.176; cf. the citizens being σωφρονέστατοι in Isoc. 18.46).

citizens in battle (Aeschin. 2.151; Dem. 18.215-6; Hyp. 6.8). Though all Athenians were expected to be *sophrones politai*, the literary evidence suggests that *soprosyne* “is the virtue proper to the young ... to all those members of society of whom obedience is required.”<sup>73</sup> i.e. the younger generation should act modestly and respectfully in the presence of their parents and elders (Dem. 25.88; 61.20-1; Aeschin. 2.180).

Lycurgus (or his associates) may have persuaded the *demos* to establish the *sophronistes*, whose task was to oversee the ephebes’ moral and civic education, because they could not participate in public life and hence gain the educational benefits of Athens’ democratic institutions. Though we cannot be certain, it is possible that he may have modeled the *sophronistes* on Plato’s “superintendent of education,” who supervised the *paideia* of the children and youths of his utopian state (*Leg.* 765D, 936A).<sup>74</sup> Perhaps subscribing to the Platonic view that virtue can be taught through social conditioning (Plat. *Prot.* 327E; cf. τὰ παιδεύοντα in Lyc. *Leoc.* 10),<sup>75</sup> he may have argued that this official, who was intimately involved with the ephebes’ daily activities ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3), was in a position not only to subject them to strict military discipline,<sup>76</sup> but also to make them virtuous citizens by instilling *soprosyne*, the cardinal virtue associated with decent conduct and loyalty to the democracy. The *demos*, concerned about the moral welfare of the ephebes, found Lycurgus’ proposal attractive provided that they could select mature citizens who in their eyes had already demonstrated their excellence as *sophrones* and thus could be trusted to cultivate *soprosyne* in the ephebeia.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>73</sup> North 1966, 131, n. 24.

<sup>74</sup> For this office in Plato’s *Laws*, see Morrow 1960, 324-5.

<sup>75</sup> Morrow 1960, 300: “Can virtue be taught?” is a question that must have concerned Plato as much as it did the Socrates’ whom he portrays in the early dialogues as almost obsessed by it. Plato’s answer is that virtue can be taught, but not primarily by admonition, nor by explanation and proof of principles, as one would teach a science ... No virtue or technical skill can be acquired except by long practice, by a process of habituation.”

<sup>76</sup> When the Athenians created the ephebeia in 335/4, they, fearing that the ephebes might engage in socially disruptive behavior during their military service, entrusted a newly-created official with the task of rendering them εὐτακτοὶ and εὐπειθεῖς so that they could carry out their assigned duties (e.g. E8 [332/1], Col. I, lines 4-9). For discipline in the ephebeia, see pp. 124-31.

<sup>77</sup> In the previous chapter I argued that the perception of a citizen’s moral character, especially by the ephebes’ fathers, was an important factor in his selection as *sophronistes* (see p. 127 on [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.2). If we also consider Aeschines’ comment that a man was considered to be most *sophron* from forty years old onwards (1.11), the very age of the *sophronistes* (ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων), it is

But how was *sophrosyne* taught to the ephebes, given that we are told nothing about the *sophronistes*' educational activities?<sup>78</sup> If Allen is right to suggest that Lycurgus agreed with Plato's theory of reformatory punishment, it is likely that the *sophronistes*, who had the right to beat ephebes for disobedience and other forms of misbehavior ([Plat]. *Axioch.* 366D-367A), was also expected to use corporal punishment to educate the offender so that he would act in a more moderate manner in the future.<sup>79</sup> The *sophronistes* may have also served as "model of *sophrosyne*" for the ephebes,<sup>80</sup> in that the latter, who were regarded as sufficiently mature to be able to distinguish between right and wrong (Aeschin. 1.18; Is. 9.20), would imitate his virtuous behavior in the mess-hall, at the gymnasium, and in whatever activities he and his charges undertook

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likely that his reputed self-control made him and the other candidates βελτίστους εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων. A passage from Hyperides' *Against Demosthenes*, delivered in 324/3, is consistent with this view. In this speech he says that whereas the defendant on account of his age should be educating "the younger of the speakers," the latter are instead making men over sixty *sophron* because of Demosthenes' acceptance of Harpalus' bribes (5.22: οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν). If Whitehead 2000, 427-8, is right to take this as an allusion to the ephebeia, though Hyperides' "terminology is less than precise," it shows that the older man (i.e. the *sophronistes*) was expected to teach the young (i.e. the ephebes) *sophrosyne*, not vice versa.

<sup>78</sup> Ober 2001, 203.

<sup>79</sup> Allen 2000, 17-21, has analyzed Lycurgus' use of κολάζειν, ψυχὴ, and κάλλιστον in the *Against Leocrates* and the orator's claim that the only just ground for prosecuting wayward citizens like Leocrates is for the public good, not from personal enmity (5-6, 31-2). She argues that Lycurgus' view of punishment reflects Platonic principles concerning reformatory punishment (e.g. Plat. *Leg.* 731D; Prot. 323D-324B; Gorg. 476D-478D) where the goal was "to educate [the] wrongdoer to virtue (*arete*) and to make the soul of the wrongdoer καλὴ, noble or fine" (21). Certainly Plato conceives of the *Sophronisterion* or "House of Correction" as a place where criminals stay for five years and are released if they are of sound mind (see Morrow 1960, 491, on Plat. *Leg.* 908E). In the law-court, the *demos* would have been familiar with speakers urging the *demos* to punish their opponents so that they would be an example to citizens so that they would be σωφρονέστεροι in their behavior (e.g. Lys. 1.35; 14.12; Dem. 22.68; 24.18). For a list of such instances, see North 1966, 137, n.47; Allen 2000, 20, n. 21.

<sup>80</sup> It is possible that Lycurgus, whom Hyperides characterizes as a *sophron* man (Fr. 118 Sauppe: οὗτος ἐβίω ... σωφρόνως), was himself considered by his contemporaries to be a model of *sophrosyne* during his lifetime, comparable to Pericles and other great Athenian statesmen of the past (Isoc. 15.111; 16.28). The orators praise the modest private dwellings of Aristides and Miltiades (Dem. 3.25) and the dignified posture of Aristides, Pericles, and Themistocles, while speaking in the Assembly (Aeschin. 1.25; 3.257). See Schmitz-Kahmann 1939, 1-38. According to the *Vitae decem oratorum*, Lycurgus was restrained in his private life in that he wore the same cloak in the winter and summer and only occasionally wore sandals ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842C). But Plutarch describes Phocion (lack of shoes and did not wear a mantle unless extremely cold), also reputed to have been Plato's student, in similar fashion (Plut. *Phoc.* 4.1-2). Tritle 1988, 10, considers this description to be a literary *topos* created after Phocion's death. Williams 1982, 25, n. 74, however, suggests that Phocion modeled his behavior on Socrates (i.e. Plat. *Symp.* 219B-220B).

during their two years of military service.<sup>81</sup> While the Athenians sought to make the ephebes virtuous citizens by training them in *sophrosyne*, the latter's *paideia* was not limited to the *sophronistes* but also included the enigmatic "tour of temples," about which little is known. It is to this "educational feature" of the ephebeia that we must now turn.

### 4.3: The Tour of Temples: Patriotism, Glory, and Self-Sacrifice

According to the *Athenaion Politeia*, the ephebes began their stint of service with a tour of the sanctuaries (τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον) under the command of the newly elected *kosmetes* and *sophronistai* (42.3). The author, unfortunately, does not say whether the tour was confined only to the city or also included the rural areas, nor does he specify what places were visited.<sup>82</sup> We cannot even be certain at which time it occurred, though perhaps a date in late Metageitnion or early Boedromion (i.e. late July to early August) can be inferred from later ephebic inscriptions.<sup>83</sup> Despite the lack of information, Pélékidis suggests that the tour consisted of the following:

Les éphèbes visitaient les sanctuaires de l'État, surtout ceux qui se trouvaient sur l'Acropole et dans l'Agora: peut-être aussi les éphèbes de chaque tribu visitaient-ils le sanctuaire du héros éponyme de la tribu ... Au sanctuaire d'Aglauros, un de ceux qu'ils visitaient, les éphèbes prêtaient serment en présence du cosmète et des sophronistes et d'autres magistrates (sans doute les neuf archontes, les stratèges et les prytanes) qui représentaient la ville.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.8: διδάσκουσι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ σωφροσύνην· μέγα δὲ συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ μανθάνειν σωφρονεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅτι καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὁρῶσιν ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν σωφρόνως διάγοντας.

<sup>82</sup> Parker 1996, 255, assumes that it was limited to Athens, while Mikalson 1998, 42, thinks that the ephebes toured Attica. Faraguna 1992, 278, and Humphreys 2004, 89, are unsure. Garland 1990, 183, suggests that they visited the "principal sanctuaries in the city."

<sup>83</sup> Pélékidis' 1962, 219-20, analysis of the Hellenistic ephebic corpus, dating from the second-century onwards, shows that the first event celebrated by ephebes was the festival of Artemis Agrotera (e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1011, line 7; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1028, line 8; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1040, lines 5-6), which took place on 6 Boedromion (see Mikalson 1975, 50-1, on Plut. *Mor.* 849E). He plausibly extrapolates from this observation that the tour in the Lycurgan period must have ended by this date (111). Marcellus 1994, 13, 198-201, has reexamined the evidence for third- and second-century ephebic activity in Boedromion and suggests that the ephebes in Lycurgan Athens began their military service towards the end of Metageitnion and that the tour also occurred at this time or slightly later.

<sup>84</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 111.

There is reason to think that the ephebes during their visitation of the temples came to the Aglaurion, located in a cave on the east side of the Acropolis (Paus. 1.18.2),<sup>85</sup> and swore the ephebic oath (Dem. 19.303). First, Lycurgus says that all citizens took it when they enrolled upon the *lexiarchicon grammateion* and became ephebes (*Leoc.* 76) and the *Athenaion Politeia* implies that all newly registered citizens were called ephebes after they had successfully passed the *dokimasia* before the *boule* (42.1-2).<sup>86</sup> Second, a scholium of Ulpian on Demosthenes 19.303 says that the ephebes “swore the oath at the *temenos* of Aglauros in full armor (ἐν τῷ τεμένει αὐτῆς ... μετὰ πανοπλιῶν ὥμνυον).” Given that the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai* would have issued these arms to the ephebes at the initial muster, probably in the Agora, the latter must have sworn it while they toured the sanctuaries.<sup>87</sup> Reinmuth is perhaps right to suggest that “all young men took this oath when they became ephebes ... in the sanctuary of Aglauros, perhaps the first step in the ‘circuit of temples’ which in Aristotle’s account was the first order of business [after the muster] for the whole body of ephebes under the guidance of their supervisors.”<sup>88</sup>

<sup>85</sup> For the location, see Dontas 1983, 48-63, on *SEG* 33.115. The identification of the cult with the east side of the Acropolis has been controversial, but no convincing argument has been made to disassociate the stele and its base from the findspot. A summary of recent scholarship on the Aglaurion is found in *SEG* 46.137.

<sup>86</sup> See pp. 24-7, for a discussion of the meaning of *ephebos* and the attainment of citizenship. Some scholars, however, reject Lycurgus in favor of Pollux, who says that the ephebes εἰκοστῷ δὲ ἐνεγράφοντο τῷ ληξιαρχικῷ γραμματείῳ, καὶ ὥμνυον ἐν Ἀγραύλου (8.105; cf. Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι; schol. on Aeschin. 1.7), which has been taken to mean that the oath was taken at the end of the ephebes’ first (Forbes 1929, 147-8) or second year (Burckhardt 1996, 58). But Pollux’s testimony should be rejected because he is probably confusing the *pinax ecclesiasticus*, which the ephebes would have registered upon after they had completed the ephebeia, with the *lexiarchicon grammateion* (see Whitehead 1986, 104; Hansen 1986, 14, on [Dem]. 44.35).

<sup>87</sup> The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* provides no details of the muster except that the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai* had “gathered the ephebes together (συλλαβόντες δ’ οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους)” before they embarked upon their tour (42.3). The muster, I suggest, took place at the center of Athens’ civic life, the Agora, which had sufficient space to accommodate 500 or more ephebes (for citizen participation in the ephebeia, see pp. 99-109). Certainly the monument of the ten eponymous heroes, probably remodeled ca. 330 (see Rotroff 1978, 196-209, on *Agora I* 7475), would have been an appropriate place for the ephebes to gather in their tribal contingents for the first time if we consider that the bronze stele listing their names was set up beside its base ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 53.4). For a discussion of this monument, see Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 40-2. The issuing of arms at the initial muster should be distinguished from the symbolic gifting of arms to the ephebes at the ceremony at the beginning of their second year of service (see p. 104 on [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4).

<sup>88</sup> Reinmuth 1952, 42.

The oath stipulated that the ephebes had to stand their ground in battle (*SEG* 21.519, lines 6-8: οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ τὰ ἱερὰ ὄπλα οὐδὲ λείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅπου ἂν στειχίσω).<sup>89</sup> It also “bound young men to the territory of Attika at the time of their eligibility for military service and identified that service with loyalty to comrades, obedience to the laws, and protection of the boundaries of the land of Attika.”<sup>90</sup> In particular the ephebes swore to protect the sacred sites of Attica and to honor the ancestral religion (*SEG* 21.519, lines 8-9, 16: ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ... τιμήσω ἱερὰ τὰ πάτρια). Though we are not told about the ceremony at the Aglaurion, it is possible that the priestess would have recounted the myth of Aglauros, whom Merkelbach calls “die Sondergötten der Epheben,” to the ephebes.<sup>91</sup> According to Philochorus she had willingly leapt from the Acropolis to her death in order to save Athens by fulfilling Apollo’s oracle, which foretold that the war with Eumolpus would end after someone sacrificed himself for the city (*FGrHist* 328 F105).<sup>92</sup> As Kerns points out, “Aglauros, then, who as a heroine continued to have a special interest in victory, had given her life for the city; the ephebes, young and unmarried like her, had to be prepared to do the same.”<sup>93</sup>

The content of the oath, then, made it clear to the ephebes what the *polis* expected from them, namely patriotism, piety, bravery and sacrifice in battle, obedience, and respect for tradition.<sup>94</sup> But if we accept that the youngest citizens had sworn this oath

<sup>89</sup> For the text and translation of the oath, see p. 31-2.

<sup>90</sup> Cole 1996, 229-30.

<sup>91</sup> For the gods invoked in the oath, see Merkelbach 1972, 277-83; esp. 279 on Aglauros. He has also shown how some gods reflect the military aspects of the ephebeia (Enyo, Enyalios, Ares, and Athena Areia), or the youth of the oath takers (Thallo and Auxo), or the crops grown within the *chora* of Attica (the *horoi*, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, and fig-trees). See also Graf 1985, 265-8.

<sup>92</sup> For a discussion of this fragment, see Dantas 1983, 61; Oikonomides 1990, 13-4.

<sup>93</sup> Kerns 1990, 330. For Aglauros as a model of patriotic loyalty and self-sacrifice for citizens in battle, see Larson 1995, 40-1, 102; Cuchet 2006, 300-3. Boedeker 1984, 108-9, claims that Aglauros is derived from *agraulos*, “spending the night in the field,” or *agraulia*, a noun used in a military context in later writers (D.S. 16.15; Dion.Hal. 6.44).

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Lycurgus’ claim that Leocrates violated each of the oath’s provisions (*Leoc.* 77-8): “It is a fine and solemn oath, gentlemen of the jury. Leocrates has violated it in all respects. Indeed, how could a man be more sacrilegious or a greater traitor to his country? How could anyone disgrace his arms more by refusing to take them up and make a defense against our enemies? How has he not deserted the man beside him and his place in the line of battle if he has not offered his body for duty? Where could he have defended what is

from at least the fifth century onwards (Plut. *Alc.* 15.7-8), why did the *demos* make them visit a number of sacred sites in addition to the Aglaurion, a practice first attested in the Lycurgan period, rather than proceed at once to the Piraeus and begin their garrison duty ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.3)? The tour, I argue, was intended not only to make the ephebes familiar with various sanctuaries, as scholars have supposed,<sup>95</sup> but also to educate them on the importance of keeping to the ephebic oath. For Lycurgus the oath held the democracy together and collectively the oaths of the archon, juryman, and private citizen were the essential components of the *politeia* (*Leoc.* 79).<sup>96</sup> I further suggest that the *demos* created the tour because they were concerned that those ephebes who tried to evade their assigned duties in the ephebeia would not be willing to fight for Athens should they have to face a Macedonian army which had decisively defeated its most formidable rivals on Mainland Greece: i.e. the Athenians in 338, the Thebans in 335, and the Spartans in 330.<sup>97</sup>

If so, how did the tour convince a given enrollment year of ephebes that they should not break the ephebic oath, thus avoid revealing themselves to the *demos* as shameless perjurers deserving the gods' vengeance and as traitors to their country, just like Leocrates (Lyc. *Leoc.* 76-9: φανερώς ἐπιώρκηκεν ... προδότης τῆς πατρίδος)? The ephebes' *paideia* may have consisted of "a program of intensive indoctrination in patriotism," as Mitchel puts it.<sup>98</sup> They were perhaps taught that *philopatria* was a sacred obligation between them and the nurturing mother earth and that it was the responsibility of every citizen to fight in defense of the *patris* so that the tombs of his ancestors and the

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sacred and profane if he did not face danger? With what greater treachery could he have betrayed his country? For his part, the country was given up to the hands of the enemy."

<sup>95</sup> Forbes 1929, 146: "Under the leadership of the *kosmetes* and *sophronistai*, Aristotle tells us, the first official act of the ephebi was to make the round of the temples and pay their respects to the gods." Rhodes 1981, 505: "The purpose of this tour of temples was presumably to instill in the ephebi a sense of devotion to the cults of Athens." Burckhardt 1996, 57: "So gesehen, hat der Tempelrundgang der Epheben einen erzieherischen Charakter. Durch eine mehr oder weniger eingehende Vorstellung der Tempelbauten und der darin – von Staats wegen – verehrten Götter sollte also wohl die Identifikation der jungen Männer mit ihrer Stadt gefördert werden."

<sup>96</sup> καὶ μὴν ὧς ἄνδρες καὶ τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς δεῖ μαθεῖν, ὅτι τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν ὄρκος ἐστί. τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης. These oaths are discussed in Cole 1996, 236-7; Mikalson 1998, 15-7.

<sup>97</sup> For the lack of zeal some ephebes had for the ephebeia. See pp. 110-2.

<sup>98</sup> Mitchel 1970, 37.

temples of the ancestral gods will be kept free from harm.<sup>99</sup> Indeed, Lycurgus, who characterizes Leocrates as the antithesis of the patriotic citizen, accuses him of impiety because he has done “everything in his power to ravage the sanctuaries and destroy the temples” and of maltreatment of his parents because he has neglected them “by obliterating their tombs and depriving them of their ancestral rites” (Lyc. *Leoc.* 147).<sup>100</sup> Given this, the ephebes, whose patriotism “was to be grounded upon piety to the city’s gods,”<sup>101</sup> would have been made well-aware that if they broke the oath they would endanger the very places they had visited.<sup>102</sup>

But what did the ephebes do at these sanctuaries? Jackson suggests that they gazed at the spoils of Athens’ victories – captured arms, shields, helmets, and corselets – which had been dedicated by their ancestors during the previous two centuries.<sup>103</sup> For the ephebes, these conspicuously displayed spoils would have been not only impressive to behold,<sup>104</sup> but also indisputable proof of the Athenians’ martial prowess at a time when they could boast of no military success against Macedon: collectively the spoils supported Lycurgus’ claim that the *polis* was “an example of noble deeds for the Greeks ... our ancestors surpassed other men in courage” (*Leoc.* 83).<sup>105</sup> They could have admired, for example, the sword of Mardonius captured at Plataea in 479 and hung up in the Parthenon or the panoplies Demosthenes had brought back from Olpae in 426/5 and

<sup>99</sup> For patriotism in ancient Greece from Homer to the end of the Classical period, see Cuchet 2006, esp. 7-28, 111-74, 223-317 (294-7 on Lycurgus; cf. Parker 1996, 252-3, on Lyc. *Leoc.* 1, 15, 25).

<sup>100</sup> ἄσεβείας δ’ ὅτι τοῦ τὰ τεμένη τέμνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς νεῶς κατασκάπτεσθαι τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν γέγονεν αἴτιος, τοκέων δὲ κακώσεως {ὅτι} τὰ μνημεῖα αὐτῶν ἀφανίζων καὶ τῶν νομίμων ἀποστερῶν.

<sup>101</sup> Parker 1996, 255.

<sup>102</sup> If the ephebes first came to the Aglaurion, as Reinmuth suggests, did they also visit the *temenos* of the Attic Charities – Thallo, Auxo, and Hegemone – who had their cult on the Acropolis (Habicht 1982, 89)? If so, it is possible that the shrines of those deities and heroes invoked as witnesses in the ephebic oath constituted the core of the tour’s itinerary, as Bock 1941, 47, suggests.

<sup>103</sup> Jackson 1991, 235. For the dedication of armor from Homer to the Hellenistic period, see Rouse 1902; Pritchett 1974, 240-295.

<sup>104</sup> Captured arms and armor were displayed in a variety of ways, such as being hung from walls or nailed to posts and doors (Eur. *Tro.* 571-6; Paus. 2.21.4; 10.14.3; D.S. 12.70.5). Perhaps Alcaeus’ vivid and wondrous description of martial equipment hanging in a great hall provides an indication of how the ephebes may have perceived the spoils in the temples they visited (fr. 167 Page). See also Lippman, Scahill, and Schultz 2006, 551-64.

<sup>105</sup> τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει μέγιστον ἡ πόλις ὑμῶν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων παράδειγμα τοῖς Ἕλλησι γέγονεν· ὅσον γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ πασῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχαιοτάτη, τοσοῦτον οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἀρετῇ διενηνόχασιν.



dedicated in various temples (Dio.Chrys. *Or.* 2.36; Paus. 1.27; Thuc. 3.114.1). Given that the Athenians would have publicly vowed to the gods before setting off on campaign that they would dedicate a *dekate* of the captured arms and armor in their temples should they be victorious in battle (Aesch. *Sept.* 265-78a), these spoils may have strengthened the ephebes' belief that Athens had already received divine help in war and such assistance could be expected in the future (Lyc. *Leoc.* 82; Dem. 18.153).<sup>106</sup> Furthermore, the *demos*, by glorifying the excellence of Athens in war, may have hoped that the ephebes, desiring to win such honors for themselves, would also strive to emulate their predecessors on the battlefield.<sup>107</sup>

Did the ephebes tour the tribal sanctuaries, located mainly around the Acropolis and Agora,<sup>108</sup> as Pélékidis suggests?<sup>109</sup> A case could be made for their inclusion if we take into account that Lycurgus both argued that mythical (i.e. not necessarily true) tales should be used to teach the young (*Leoc.* 95: εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυθωδέστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν ἅπασιν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀκοῦσαι) and that he used the myths of Codrus and the daughters of Erechtheus as examples of self-sacrifice that Athenians should emulate (*Leoc.* 84-7, 98-100; cf. the daughters of Hyacinthus Fr. 10.8).<sup>110</sup> His contemporaries seem to have had a similar approach: (1) Demosthenes' *epitaphios* for the dead at Chaeronea stresses how the citizens of each tribe had found inspiration in the self-sacrifice of the ten eponymous heroes and their descendents (60.27-31). (2) Phocion urges the Athenians who had been demanded by Alexander after Thebes' destruction to

<sup>106</sup> For military vows and the *dekate* in Greek warfare, see Pritchett 1971, 93-100; 1979, 230-9. Jackson 1991, 237-9, argues that vows generally included the promise to dedicate spoils to the gods in the event of victory.

<sup>107</sup> Jackson 1991, 236: "the spectacle of temples decorated within and outside with fine arms and armour could have been, for good or ill, a strong encouragement to fight when the city required them to do so." Both Lycurgus and Demosthenes urge the young to exert itself to reach the lofty standards, especially their military successes, established by their famous ancestors (Lyc. *Leoc.* 108-10; Dem. 15.35). Were the ephebes also required to gaze at Alexander's spoils on the Acropolis, discussed above (see p. 150, n. 20)? If so, the sight of 300 captured Persian panoplies could have served as a reminder to the ephebes that Athens' hopes for independence would depend upon their ability to defeat the Macedonians militarily (i.e. they too would have to capture the latter's armor in battle).

<sup>108</sup> Jones' 1999, 156-61, thorough study of the epigraphic evidence has shown that shrines of the eponymous heroes were all situated in Athens except for Hippothoon at Eleusis.

<sup>109</sup> Pélékidis 1962, 111.

<sup>110</sup> For Lycurgus' utilization of myth, see Vielberg 1991, 49-68.

sacrifice themselves voluntarily just as the daughters of Leos and Hyacinthus did to save the *polis* from ruin (D.S. 17.15.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 17.2-3).<sup>111</sup> It is possible, then, that the *sophronistai* were required to bring their charges to the shrines of the eponymous heroes where they heard inspiring tales of self-sacrifice and other heroic deeds undertaken by their mythical ancestors on behalf of Athens.

The ephebes may have also visited the *Demosion Sema*, Athens' national cemetery, where the Athenians had buried those citizens who had fought and died on behalf of the *polis* throughout the Classical period, as part of their civic education.<sup>112</sup> The reason, I suggest, for visiting these tombs, each with an epigram and a stele inscribed with the names of the war-dead arranged by tribe,<sup>113</sup> was to demonstrate that previous generations of Athenians had stayed faithful to the ephebic oath and had patriotically sacrificed their lives in battle. It would have been impressed upon the ephebes that should they die for the fatherland their courage would be commemorated with an *epitaphios* delivered before the assembled *demos* and with an imposing and magnificent monument (Thuc. 2.34; Plat. *Menex.* 234C).<sup>114</sup> As Lycurgus puts it, “you, O Athenians, alone know how to honor brave men (τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας)” (*Leoc.* 51). Furthermore, the ephebes, by seeing the tomb of the 1,000 citizens killed at Chaeronea (Lyc. *Leoc.* 142; Paus. 1.29.13),<sup>115</sup> the very men whom Lycurgus called “the crown of the fatherland

<sup>111</sup> These examples are discussed in Parker 1995, 251-2.

<sup>112</sup> The main literary source for the tombs (dated 491-ca. 200) in the *Demosion Sema* is Paus. 1.29.1-16. For an analysis of his observations, see Pritchett 1985, 145-51. Clairmont 1983, 29-45, has reconstructed the public burial ground and shows that it not only included the war-dead but also other honored Athenians and foreigners. See also Patterson 2006, 48-56. Should we include the *Demosion Sema* in the tour, given that the *Athenaion Politeia* says τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον (42.3)? We do have later evidence that the ephebes competed in funeral games held at Marathon and before the city polyandreion, the cenotaph erected in honor of the war-dead of Marathon, and that this tomb was located in the *Demosion Sema* (see Matthaiou 2003, 190-202, on *Agora* I 7529 [unpublished], lines 15-7, dated to 176/5). Moreover, if E25 is an ephebic inscription, this suggests that the ephebes may have competed in torch races nearby the burial-mound at Marathon. Perhaps they also visited the city polyandreion during the tour. They may have even given heroic honors to the *marathonomachoi*, just as their descendants did in the Hellenistic period (e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1006 [122/1], line 26). For the possibility that the Marathon war dead were the recipients of cult from the fifth century, see Loraux 1986, 29-30, 39-41; Whitely 1994, 213-3, esp. 230, on the *Demosion Sema*.

<sup>113</sup> For a discussion of the thirty extant casualty lists, see Smith 1919, 351-364; Bradeen 1964, 16-62; 1969, 145-59.

<sup>114</sup> For the public funeral and *epitaphios*, see Loraux 1986, esp. 15-76.

<sup>115</sup> Bradeen 1964, 55-8, no. 16, has reconstructed this monument and concludes that it was of fifth-century type, perhaps modeled on the tomb of those slain at Coroneia in 447/6. Apart from the fragment of the

(στέφανον τῆς πατρίδος)” because they had died heroically in the defense of Greek liberty (*Leoc.* 46-50),<sup>116</sup> would have understood that they too, like their older compatriots, would be expected to sacrifice themselves should Athens revolt and attempt to cast off the Macedonian yoke.

Let us now discuss the participation of the ephebes in the cults and festivals of Attica during the Lycurgan period.

#### 4.4: The Ephebes as Pious Citizens

Forbes observes that “Athens knew the value of a religious spirit in her sons, and found the period of ephebic service useful for inculcating an attitude of reverence toward the gods.”<sup>117</sup> This is certainly true for the ephebes of Lycurgan Athens, although they are not praised “for the sake of their piety towards the gods (εὐσεβείας ἔνεκεν τῆς πρὸς θεοῦς)” like their descendents in the Hellenistic period (e.g. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 900 [185/4], line 7). The literary and epigraphic evidence suggest that Lycurgus, as the current holder of the venerable priesthood of Poseidon Erechtheus ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843E-F), was deeply concerned about encouraging piety among the citizen body, especially the young. Not only “did he speak on many occasions about sacred matters [to the *demos*]” ([Plut]. *Mor.* 843D: εἶπε δὲ καὶ περὶ ἱερῶν πολλάκις),<sup>118</sup> but in the *Against Leocrates* he also stresses that the cultivation of divine favor was indispensable for the continuing prosperity of Athens (e.g. 15, 25-6, 146).<sup>119</sup> Given his belief that the gods oversee all human affairs and punish wicked behavior (e.g. the pious young man saving his elderly father in *Lyc. Leoc.* 94-7), it is understandable that the Athenians under his

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casualty lists (*Agora* I 6953), an epigram is partially preserved on the base (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 5226). See also Pritchett 1985, 222-6.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Whitehead 2006, 143: “For Lycurgus the battle of Chaeronea and its aftermath had been the ultimate testing-ground of the caliber of all patriotic Athenians.”

<sup>117</sup> Forbes 1929, 146.

<sup>118</sup> The titles and content of his fragmentary speeches (esp. *On the Priestess* = Fr. 6.1-22 Conomis; *On the Priesthood* = Fr. 7.1-6 Conomis; *Against Menesaichmus* = Fr. 14.1-11 Conomis) do suggest that “Lycurgus discussed in some detail matters of ritual and regularly offered the jury lessons in Athenian cult and myth history” (Mikalson 1998, 25). For a commentary on these fragments, see Conomis 1961, 107-25, 140-8.

<sup>119</sup> Mikalson 1998, 11-20, 32, argues that Lycurgus’ beliefs about the gods, sacrifices, and (im)piety, were “common and familiar to Athenian audiences.” Whitehead 2006, 142-7, shows how religion (alongside patriotism) permeates the *Against Leocrates*.

administration devoted substantial resources to the revitalization of the city's traditional cults with the objective of increasing citizen participation in them.<sup>120</sup>

The prevailing scholarly opinion is that the ephebes' involvement in the religious life of the *polis* would have been less extensive than in the Hellenistic period because the Lycurgan ephebeia "was, in this period, primarily and fundamentally military, not religious."<sup>121</sup> That scholars should hold this view is understandable if we consider that the fourth-century corpus, unlike Hellenistic inscriptions (especially those dating from the late third century onwards), do not provide an itinerary of the ephebes' religious activities – sacrifices, processions, athletic competitions, and numerous other responsibilities – during their stint of military service.<sup>122</sup> Furthermore, while the *Athenaion Politeia* emphasizes the military aspects of the ephebeia, such as their training under specialized instructors and garrisoning the fortified points of Attica (42.3-5), third- and second-century inscriptions strongly suggest that the military importance of the institution declined at the very time when the prominence of religious activity on the honorary decrees increases.<sup>123</sup>

Scholars, however, have failed to understand that geographical considerations, namely the difficulty involved in gathering together more than 1,000 ephebes stationed at

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<sup>120</sup> For a detailed discussion of Lycurgus' activities, see Mitchel 1970, 34-47; Parker 1996, 242-253; Mikalson 1998, 11-45; Humphreys 2004, 83-120. Parker 1996, 243, observes that "it is hard to define his religious policy more precisely than as one of encouraging the worship of the gods to flourish as the centre of a flourishing state." If we can trust the *Vitae decem oratorum*, Lycurgus reacted to Alexander's desire to be given divine honors by remarking that "what kind of god would he be when those coming out of his sanctuary will have to purify themselves" (*Mor.* 842D)?

<sup>121</sup> Mikalson 1998, 42. Cf. Marcellus 1994, 19: "Because the ephebic decrees of the fourth century do not record ephebic participation in festivals, scholars have supposed that the organization became decreasingly military as time passed, and that, by comparison, ephebic festival activity in the fourth century was minimal." See also, Faraguna 1992, 278-80; Parker 1996, 254-5; Humphreys 2004, 89-92.

<sup>122</sup> For the Hellenistic ephebeia, see Dumont 1876, Vol. I, 249-305; Pélékidis 1962, 211-56; Launey 1987, 890-7; Mikalson 1998, 172-85, 243-9, 253-5. The most substantial and informative inscriptions are as follows: *SEG* 29.116 (214/3); *SEG* 26.98 (205/4); *SEG* 15.104 (127/6); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1006 (122/1); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1008 (118/7); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1009 (116/5); *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1011 (106/5).

<sup>123</sup> Though military and physical training was still part of the curriculum during the Hellenistic period, the ephebeia ceased to be a significant fighting force on account of the small citizen enrollment, varying between 20 and 50 for the third century, and eventually rising to an average of 100-150 by the late second-century (Pélékidis 1962, 165, 182; Tracy 1979, 177-8; 1982, 158-9). This is compared to 450-650 ephebes enrolled annually in Lycurgan Athens (pp. 99-101). Whereas the ephebes were praised for their guard duty on Munychia in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 665 (266/5), line 12, by the end of the century it is clear, as Tracy 1979, 176-7, points out, that the "corps of ephebes acted in the main ... as a small, select honor guard at the most important religious festivals and public meetings."

Piraeus and along the Attic-Boeotian frontier ([Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.3-5), would have also played a crucial role in limiting the number of festivals that the ephebes could *collectively* take part in. Certainly the ephebes of Pandionis, for example, who were stationed at Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Phyle during their second year of military service (**E15** [331/0 or 330/29], lines 9-10; cf. Rhamnous and Eleusis in **E5** [333/2]), could not have carried out their assigned garrison duties effectively if they were also required to attend a long and detailed program of cults and festivals spread throughout Attica. Consequently, the *demos* may have encouraged the ephebes, wherever they were deployed, to frequent the local sanctuaries and to involve themselves as far as possible in the numerous events of the deme's sacred calendar.<sup>124</sup> If we accept this, the ephebes of Pandionis may well have participated in the cult of Zeus Soter in the Piraeus and the cult of Artemis at Phyle, as scholars have suggested,<sup>125</sup> but no evidence for such activity has survived.

Contemporary evidence, however, suggests that the ephebes celebrated the Panatheneia, the most important event on Athens' religious calendar.<sup>126</sup> In 324 or earlier Dinarchus prosecuted the metic Agasicles for bribing the Halimousians to allow him to be registered illegally as a citizen (Harp. s.v. Ἀγασικλῆς).<sup>127</sup> In a fragment of the *Against*

<sup>124</sup> Mikalson's 1977, 424-35, analysis of the sacred calendar of Erchia (*SEG* 21.151) suggests that fourth-century demes had a varied and extensive annual program of cults and sacrifices. For a brief study of the five deme *fasti* to have survived, four of which are incomplete, and deme religion generally, see Whitehead 1986, 176-222. One suspects that demesmen of Piraeus, Rhamnous, Eleusis, and Phyle would have been receptive to including the ephebes in their religious activities, especially if we take into account that two of these demes seem to have followed at a local level Lycurgus' enthusiasm for revitalization of the state cults (Eleusis in Schwenk 1985, no. 43 [334/3]; Piraeus in Schwenk 1985, no. 76 [324/3]). Perhaps the "participation of the ephebes in cult ... developed spontaneously out of the initiatives of the ephebes' *kosmêtai* and *sôphronistai*, of deme officials and priests, and of those who drafted new regulations of new festivals" (Humphreys 2004, 92).

<sup>125</sup> Pouilloux 1954, 110, n. 1; Reinmuth 1971, 35; Humphreys 2004, 91.

<sup>126</sup> For the Panatheneia, see Parke 1977, 33-50. The decree of Stratocles says that Lycurgus "prepared adornment for the goddess [i.e. Athena] – solid gold Victories, processional vessels made out of silver and gold, and golden adornment for 100 basket carriers" ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852B: καὶ παρασκευάσας τῇ θεῷ κόσμον, Νίκας τε ὀλοχρύσους πομπεῖα τε χρυσὰ καὶ ἀργυρὰ καὶ κόσμον χρυσοῦν εἰς ἑκατὸν κανηφόρους). He is also credited with the completion of the Panathenaic stadium in time for the Great Panatheneia held in 330 ([Plut]. *Mor.* 852B): he persuaded a certain Deinias to donate the land for it ([Plut]. *Mor.* 841D) and then built the stadium with the help of 1,000 draft animals provided by Eudemus of Plataea, who was honored for his contribution (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 351 = Schwenk 1985, no. 48, [330/29]).

<sup>127</sup> The *terminus ante quem* for Dinarchus' prosecution of Agasicles is 324 because Hyperides' *For Euxenippus*, which mentions an "Agasicles from Piraeus" who bribed the demesmen from Halimous (3.3), should be dated 330-324. For the date and Agasicles' offense, see Whitehead 2000, 155-7, 179-80.

*Agasicles*, preserved in Harpocration, Dinarchus alleges that “... [Agasicles’ sons] who will ascend to the Acropolis as ephebes instead of *skaphephoroi*, beholden not to you for their citizenship but to this man’s money.”<sup>128</sup> As Clerc points out, Agasicles was apparently trying to pass off his sons as citizens by including them among the ephebes marching in the Panathenaic procession rather than among the *skaphephoroi*, metics who carried offerings of cakes and honeycombs.<sup>129</sup> We are not told what role the ephebes played, but perhaps they marched in arms alongside other citizens of military age (Thuc. 6.56; Dem. 4.26; 21.17).<sup>130</sup> They may have also competed in the torch-race, since we cannot dismiss the possibility that the Panatheneia was the festival where the *lampadephoroi* of Aiantis defeated their rivals in either 333/2 or 332/1 (E6).

The ephebes also took part in the cult of Nemesis at Rhamnous.<sup>131</sup> In E17 (= IG II<sup>2</sup> 4594a),<sup>132</sup> dated to 330/29 or later, a certain “Theophanes, son of Hierophon, of the deme Rhamnous, made a dedication to Hermes, having been crowned by the ephebes and the *sophronistai* and *kosmetai*” (lines 1-2).<sup>133</sup> The most convincing explanation for why the ephebes and their officers of three successive enrollment years (333/2 to 331/0) honored Theophanes is that the latter had made some unspecified but substantial contribution towards the expenses of the Nemesia.<sup>134</sup> Evidence that they competed in the

<sup>128</sup> Harp. s. v. σκαφηφόροι: Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ Κατὰ Ἀγασικλέους (= Fr. 16.5 Conomis) φησὶν· οἱ ἀντὶ σκαφηφόρων ἔφηβοι εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἀναβήσονται, οὐχ ὑμῖν ἔχοντες χάριν τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ τῷ τούτου ἀργυρίῳ, ἀντὶ τοῦ μέτοικοι.

<sup>129</sup> Clerc 1892, pp. 162-3; See also Whitehead 1977, 50, 87.

<sup>130</sup> The literary and epigraphic evidence for the ephebes’ participation in the Panatheneia in the Hellenistic period is discussed in Pélékidis 1962, 254-5. Cf. Heliod. *Aeth.* 1.10: Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων ἀγομένων, ὅτε τὴν ναῦν Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ γῆς τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ πέμπουσιν, ἐτύγχανον μὲν ἐφηβεύων, ἄσας δὲ τὸν εἰωθότα παιᾶνα τῇ θεῷ καὶ τὰ νενομισμένα προπομπεύσας, ὥς εἶχον στολῆς αὐτῇ χλαμύδι καὶ αὐτοῖς στεφάνοις ἔρχομαι οἴκαδε ὥς ἐμαυτόν.

<sup>131</sup> For a reconstruction of the temple of Nemesis and the history of the cult, see Miles 1989, 133-249.

<sup>132</sup> See Pouilloux 1954, 106-7; Pélékidis 1962, 123; Reinmuth 1971, 39-41, for a discussion of this inscription.

<sup>133</sup> [Θε]οφάνης Ἱεροφῶντιδος Ῥαμνούσιος Ἑρμεῖ [ἀν]έθηκεν στεφανωθε[ις] ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν σοφρονιστῶν καὶ τῶν κοσμητῶν.

<sup>134</sup> Pouilloux 1954, 107, 110, claims that Theophanes was honored because he supplied oil to the ephebes as they exercised in the gymnasium and arranged athletic contests for them during their garrison duty at Rhamnous. See also Pélékidis 1962, 123; Reinmuth 1971, 39-41. But this would mean that all ten *phylae* would have been permanently stationed at Rhamnous. This assumption is contradicted by E2 (333/2), which explicitly states that the ephebes of Cecropis undertook garrison duty at Eleusis (lines 36-7, 45-7), with no mention of Rhamnous. The implication is that these ephebes had come temporarily to Rhamnous for some other important event, most likely the Nemesia. If so, Theophanes may have defrayed some of the

games held during the goddess' annual festival comes from **E10**, a dedication of the *sophronistes* and the *gymnasiarchoi* of Erechtheis in 333/2 or 332/1 to commemorate the ephebes' victory in the torch-race.<sup>135</sup> The ephebes celebrated the Nemesia, I suggest, because Nemesis was associated with Athens' victory at Marathon, the goddess who was considered by the Athenians to have brought retribution upon the Persians for their *hubris* against the city (Paus. 1.33.2-3; Aristid. 13.13).<sup>136</sup> The *demos* may have hoped that the ephebes, by gaining her favor, would also obtain her help in defeating the Macedonians should conflict break out.

Furthermore, the ephebes may have participated in festivals held in honor of Amphiaraus at Oropus, whom the *demos* honored with a golden crown because "the god takes fine care of the Athenians and other persons who visit the shrine for the sake of the health and safety of all those in the country" (*IG* VII 4252 [332/1], lines 11-15). Certainly the dedication of three inscriptions (**E19**, **E20**, and **E26**) at the Amphiaraeum suggests that the ephebes routinely came to Oropus at the very time when the epigraphic evidence attests to considerable Athenian activity at the sanctuary, including the establishment of a new and magnificent quadrennial Amphiaraea.<sup>137</sup> While no inscription can be securely dated to a year in which this penteteric festival was held (i.e. 329/8 and 325/4) before Athens lost Oropus again after the Lamian War,<sup>138</sup> the ephebes' involvement in it is

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expenses for the festival (such as oil), or even donated sacrificial victims, as a certain Elpinikos did in 236/5 (*SEG* 24.155, lines 27-31).

<sup>135</sup> For the Nemesia as the occasion for **E10**, see pp. 116-7.

<sup>136</sup> Miles 1989, 137-8; Stafford 2000, 88-9.

<sup>137</sup> In 333/2 Pytheas of Alopeke was honored for repairing the fountain and water supply at the sanctuary (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 338 = Schwenk 1985, no. 28). In the following year the *demos* crowned the Atthidographer Phanodemus of Thymitadae, who had drafted regulations for the new quadrennial Amphiaraea, made a contribution towards the festival, and carried out various improvements to the Amphiaraeum (*IG* VII 4253 = Schwenk 1985, no. 41). Finally, in 329/8, the *demos* awarded golden crowns to the ten *epimetelai*, among their number Lycurgus, Demades, and Phanodemus, who had supervised the first celebration of the festival (*IG* VII 4254 = Schwenk 1985, no. 50).

<sup>138</sup> For some scholars, **E20** (= Reinmuth 1971, no. 15), a dedication of Leontis set up at the Amphiaraeum, is decisive proof that the ephebes attended this penteteric festival in 329/8 or 325/4 (e.g. Reinmuth 1971, 69-72; Lewis 1973, 255; Faraguna 1992, 278; Tracy 1995, 25-6; Parker 1996, 254, n. 126). The date of this inscription is extremely controversial, however, and cannot be determined with any certainty given the prosopographical information. A detailed discussion of the date occurs in the appendix and concludes that it should be assigned 331/0-325/4 (pp. 219-21). Though Petrakos 1997, 270, no. 352, dates the enrollment year of **E19** to the archonship of Εὐθυκρίτης (328/7), only ρι is preserved of the archon's name.

nevertheless likely if we consider that (1) the *eutaxia*, an exclusively ephebic competition, may have been an event during the Amphiaric games (*IG* VII 4254, lines 16-8, 45) and (2) *IG* VII 444 (= Petrakos 1997, 267-8, no. 348), dated to c. 335-322, show that they competed in the games of an unknown festival at Oropus, perhaps the quadrennial Amphiaraea.

Did the ephebes celebrate the Eleusinian Mysteries?<sup>139</sup> Despite the lack of contemporary evidence,<sup>140</sup> scholars assume that they would have played a role similar to the Hellenistic period, when they are honored in second- and first-century inscriptions for escorting the sacred objects from Eleusis to the City Eleusinion and back again, lifting up bulls at the sacrifice, and dedicating a *phiale* to Demeter and Kore in the sanctuary at Eleusis.<sup>141</sup> But it is difficult to know how much we should extrapolate from these decrees for the Lycurgan ephebeia, especially if the Hellenistic festival program as attested in third century and later inscriptions may have been established only after 229, when Athens had regained her independence from Macedon.<sup>142</sup> Certainly we should not

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Consequently we cannot rule out that the archon was Ἀριστοφάνης (331/0) or Ἀριστοφῶν (330/29) instead. **E26** is highly fragmentary and can only be dated to 333/2-322/1.

<sup>139</sup> Lycurgus' administration is credited with initiating or completing several building projects at Eleusis, the most prominent of which was the ongoing work on the portico of Philon to the west of the Telesterion (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1670-71 and 1675). Lycurgus himself was closely involved in the financing of the projects, such as payments to an architect and a teamster at Eleusis (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672, line 11; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1673, lines 64-5). He also appears to have taken great interest in the Mysteries, including the completion of the Plutonium and repairs to the city Eleusinion in the Agora (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672, lines 162-9, 182-3). He apparently passed a law to forbid women from riding wagons on the procession to Eleusis and bought off sycophants who aimed to prosecute him when his wife violated it ([Plut]. *Mor.* 842A-B; cf. Dem. 21.158 for similar behavior). A horse-race was also added to the Eleusinia (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1672, line 261). For *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1670-3, 1675, see Clinton 1972, 83-113. Lycurgus' activities are discussed in Parker 1996, 245-6, 248; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 18-21, 52-4.

<sup>140</sup> The earliest inscription to mention the ephebes' involvement in the Mysteries occurs around the middle of the third century, if the restoration of οἱ τῶν Μυστηρίων ἐπιμεληταί in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 700 + *Agora* I 2054 (259/8?), line 13, can be trusted. The first certain instance is found in *SEG* 29.116 (214/3), line 13.

<sup>141</sup> For these practices, see Dumont 1876, 260-7; Pélékidis 1962, 220-3. Examples: *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1006, lines 9-10, 74; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1008, lines 7-9; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1009, lines 7, 13-4; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1028, lines 6-7, 10, 29-30. Cf. Humphreys 2004, 90-1: "it is natural to suppose that those stationed at Eleusis took part from the beginning in the procession which escorted the holy objects of the Mysteries on their way to Athens and back again, as they certainly did in later centuries." See also van Straten 1995, 110-2, for the lifting of the bull as an ephebic activity in the fifth century as in the second.

<sup>142</sup> Mikalson 1998, 183-4, 292. It is dangerous to assume, for example, that the ephebes in the Lycurgan period led the armed procession at the festival of Artemis Agrotera at Agrai, which commemorated the goddess' role in Athens' victory over the Persians at Marathon (Parke 1977, 54-5; Jameson 1991, 210-1), because this activity is attested in several late Hellenistic inscriptions (Pélékidis 1962, 219-20).



assume, as Dillon does,<sup>143</sup> that the reference to “ancestral practices” in *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 1078, lines 10-1, an ephebic decree dating to c. 220 A.D., is proof that the ephebes took part in the Mysteries during the 330’s and 320’s.<sup>144</sup> Even so, it is possible that they did indeed attend this festival, given their involvement in the Panatheneia, Nemesia, and the Amphiaraea. This is the limit of our knowledge concerning the ephebes’ fourth-century religious activities.

#### 4.5: The Abolition of the Ephebeia

The evidence taken together suggests that the objective of this educational program was two-fold. First, it was intended to produce moderate, law-abiding, and pious citizens who were devoted to the preservation of the democracy. Second, it aimed to increase their patriotic fervor so that they would be eager for glory and be willing to sacrifice themselves for Athens should war break out again with Macedon.

The ephebes’ commitment to these goals was perhaps symbolized by their distinctive uniform: the *chlamys* or short-cloak and the *petasos* or broad-rimmed hat ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.4; Poll. 10.164).<sup>145</sup> Circumstantial evidence suggests that this garb was adopted because the *demos* considered Theseus, Athens’ national hero, whom scholars have called the “Athenian ephebe par excellence” or the “ephebe of ephebes,”<sup>146</sup> an appropriate role model for the ephebeia. Not only is Theseus often depicted as a young man wearing the *chlamys* and *petasos* on Classical vase paintings,<sup>147</sup> but the color of the ephebes’ cloak – apparently black – was also associated with him at some point during the ephebeia’s existence, perhaps beginning in the Lycurgan period.<sup>148</sup> For the ephebes,

<sup>143</sup> Dillon 1997, 240, n. 7 & 8.

<sup>144</sup> *Contra* Mylonas 1961, 246.

<sup>145</sup> For the *chlamys* and *petasos* in the ephebeia, see Pélékidis 1962, 115-6.

<sup>146</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 112; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987, 135. For Theseus as the archetype of the ephebe, see Strauss 1993, 105-6; Walker 1995, 94-6.

<sup>147</sup> Brommer 1982, 144; Sourvinou-Inwood 1987, 132-4.

<sup>148</sup> The *chlamys* was colored black for an unknown period until it was changed to white at Herodes Atticus’ expense in the second-century A.D. (Philostrat. 2.550; *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 2090 [165/6 A.D.], lines 5-11; cf. the black, white, and crimson cloaks in Artemid. 1.54). As Roussel 1941, 163-5, has shown, an etiology is provided for the black *chlamys* by *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 3606 (c. 176 A.D.), which honors Herodes for his generosity, namely that it was worn to commemorate Theseus’ failure to change his sails from black to white (thus leading to the death of his father Aegeus) when he returned from Crete (lines 18-22). Scholars assume that the ephebes

who lived in “the land of Theseus” and were the “sons of Theseus” (Soph. *Oed.Tyr.* 1066; Aesch. *Eum.* 1026), the hero embodied the vigor of adolescence in service of the community, because he unified Attica, founded the democracy, liberated Athens by slaying the Minotaur, and defended the *chora* against other invaders (Thuc. 2.15; Soph. *Oed.Tyr.* 422-9; Isoc. 10.18-37).<sup>149</sup> Given the lack of evidence, however, we cannot determine how large a role, if any, the cult of Theseus played in the ephebeia.<sup>150</sup>

In the fall of 323 the patriotism of the ephebes and their older compatriots was put to the test when Hyperides and Leosthenes persuaded the *demos*, despite the opposition of Phocion, to break the Common Peace and fight against Antipater for their freedom. The situation seemed favorable because Alexander’s death in midsummer had created the impression of Macedonian disunity and the Athenians had every expectation of assembling a strong coalition of Greek states to supplement their own formidable military strength.<sup>151</sup> For a while the coalition had some success against Antipater, but when

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wore the black *chlamys* in the Lycurgan period (e.g. Garland 1990, 183; Lambert 1996, 151), but the *Athenaion Politeia* does not mention the color and it could have been adopted at a later date. Despite this, Vidal-Naquet 1986a, 106-28, claims that the ephebes wore black in recognition of the Athenian Melanthus’ trick (*apate*) in defeating the Theban King Xanthus, thus linking the ephebeia to the Apatouria, the festival held in honor of Theseus (*contra* Maxwell-Smart 1970, 113-6; Vidal-Naquet’s response to his critics is found in 1986b, 126-44). Lambert 1993, 144-52, however, argues convincingly against the Melanthus-Xanthus story as a foundation myth for the ephebeia. Burckhardt 1996, 53-7, also shows that the institution cannot have served as a rite of passage from boyhood to adulthood, as Vidal-Naquet supposes, because the ephebes first become citizens and then perform their military service. For an analysis of the weaknesses in Vidal-Naquet’s structuralist approach, see Ma 1994, 49-80.

<sup>149</sup> For Theseus as democrat and warrior, see White 1995, 83-111, 143-169. The ephebes may have been shown Euphranor’s painting (c. 350) of Theseus standing between Demos and Demokratia in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (Paus. 1.3.3-4; Pliny. *Nat.Hist.* 35.129), which may be the inspiration for the relief on Eucrates’ anti-tyranny law (Oliver 1960, 164-6; *contra* Blanshard 2004, 6). They may have also visited the Stoa Poikile at some point during their military service, which had a painting that depicted the victory of the Athenians with Theseus over the Amazons (Paus. 1.15.4). Given that the Stoa Poikile, with its patriotic paintings and the prominent display of Spartan shields captured at Sphacteria in 425/4, seems to have functioned as a victory monument (Harrison 1972, 353-78; Francis 1990, 91-5), the presence of Theseus would have served to emphasize his martial prowess to the ephebes.

<sup>150</sup> According to Philochorus, Theseus had at least four sanctuaries situated around Athens (FGrHist 328 F18). The main shrine, which was (re)built by Cimon to house the hero’s bones (Plut. *Cim.* 8.5-7; *Thes.* 36.1-4; Paus. 1.17.2-6, 3.3.7), was located somewhere in the center of Athens but has not been positively identified (White 1995, 22). Mitchel 1970, 38, suggests that this Theseum may have functioned as the headquarters of the ephebeia, but we do not know whether the ephebes frequented the shrine or celebrated the Theseia at this time, although later evidence attests that the festival was annually attended by their descendants in the Hellenistic period (Pélékidis 1962, 229-35; Kennell 1999, 249-62).

<sup>151</sup> For the debate over whether Athens should go to war, see Tritle 1988, 124-7, on Plut. *Phoc.* 22.1-4, who shows that Phocion’s opposition was based upon his assessment that the city’s resources were insufficient

reinforcements arrived from the east in the following year, the combined forces of Antipater and Craterus destroyed Athens' naval power at Amorgus and decisively defeated the Greeks at the battle of Crannon in Thessaly, forcing the Athenians and their allies to sue for peace.<sup>152</sup> As we would expect, the ephebes' role in the Lamian War was limited to carrying out their assigned garrison duties within the borders of Attica ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 42.3-5).<sup>153</sup> Apart from facing Micion's invasion of Rhamnous in the summer of 322 (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1-2), they do not appear to have fought against the Macedonians during the conflict.

With Athens defenseless and Antipater's army encamped at Thebes (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.3), the *demos* sent Demades and Phocion, probably in late August 322, to ask for terms.<sup>154</sup> Antipater demanded the Athenians' unconditional surrender and imposed a harsh settlement so that the city would no longer have the power to contest Macedonian hegemony. The *patrios politeia* of Solon was to be restored, in which only those Athenians who possessed property worth at least 2,000 drachmas had full citizen rights (D.S. 18.18.5).<sup>155</sup> Demosthenes, Hyperides, and other anti-Macedonian leaders were to be delivered to him (Plut. *Dem.* 28.2; *Phoc.* 27.3). A garrison was to be installed on Munychia at Piraeus (D.S. 18.18.5). The *demos* had little choice but to comply with these

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to bring victory against Macedon, which had more money, ships, and soldiers. But, as Sealey 1993, 215, points out, the *demos* may have counted upon exploiting (1) the lack of an unquestioned center of authority at Babylon in the wake of Alexander's death and (2) the widespread resentment in Greece at Macedonian rule on account of the exiles' decree promulgated in 324.

<sup>152</sup> The main literary sources for the Lamian war (June 323-August 322) are D.S. 18.8-18; Plut. *Phoc.* 23-9; *Dem.* 27-31; Hyp. *Epit.* 6. See also Hammond and Walbank 1988, 107-17; Tritle 1988, 123-9; Tracy 1995, 23-9; Habicht 1997, 36-42.

<sup>153</sup> For the youngest citizens (and oldest) being ineligible for *strateia*, except under extraordinary circumstances, in the Classical period, see pp. 35-8.

<sup>154</sup> According to Plutarch, Crannon was fought on the seventh of Metageitnion, or on the second of August 322/1 (*Cam.* 19.5). After the battle Antipater captured several cities in Thessaly by storm and negotiated settlements with others, so that when he reached Boeotia, he had concluded peace treaties with all the Greek states that had opposed him except for Athens and Aetolia (D.S. 18.6-8). It is unclear how long this march southwards took, but it does perhaps suggest a date for the Athenian embassy at the end rather than the middle of Metageitnion.

<sup>155</sup> This regime was characterized as an oligarchy when Polyperchon proclaimed a restoration of the short-lived democracy in 318/7 (*IG II*<sup>2</sup> 448, line 61). Tritle 1988, 136, asserts that it "was a moderate democracy, not an oligarchy," but Williams 1982, 98, is probably right to call it a "moderate oligarchy."

demands (Plut. *Phoc.* 27.1).<sup>156</sup> The details of the altered constitution remain obscure, although the disenfranchisement of c. 22,000 citizens would have necessitated changes to the day-to-day running of the state.<sup>157</sup> The appearance of the *anagrapheus*, an important official with wide-ranging administrative responsibilities, however, does suggest that the oligarchy took power at the start of 321/0.<sup>158</sup>

Did the ephebeia survive the aftermath of Athens' defeat?<sup>159</sup> While no member of the corpus of Lycurgan inscriptions can be dated to 321/0-319/8, some scholars have nevertheless supposed that the institution would have continued to function in the same manner as described in the *Athenaion Politeia* except for a substantial decline in the number of ephebes required to serve, in proportion to the reduction in the citizen body.<sup>160</sup> But Mitchel's analysis of *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1187, dated to 319/8, in which the *strategos* Dercylus of Hagnous was honored for educating the boys in Eleusis (lines 4-5), strongly suggests that the Eleusinians had improvised an informal "ephebe-style [military] training" for their sons because the ephebeia had been suspended for the duration of the oligarchy.<sup>161</sup> Marcellus, accepting Mitchel's interpretation, further claims that Antipater was responsible for the institution's suppression because he "would have remembered the

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<sup>156</sup> The Athenians were also required to relinquish Oropus (D.S. 18.56). Antipater, however, referred the issue of Samos to Philip Arrhidaeus and his regent Perdiccas (Errington 1975, 51-71).

<sup>157</sup> Diodorus Siculus says that 9,000 retained their full citizenship rights, while 22,000 citizens were disenfranchised (18.18.4-5; cf. 12,000 in Plut. *Phoc.* 28.4). For the citizen population of fourth-century Athens as c. 31,000 rather than c. 21,000, see p. 155. Various reconstructions of the reformed constitution are discussed in Ferguson 1911, 22-7; Gerke 1976, 90-7; Tritle 1988, 131-7; Wallace 1989, 201-4.

<sup>158</sup> The epigraphic evidence for the *anagrapheus* and his duties is discussed in Dow 1963, 37-54; Williams 1982, 117-8, 121-9.

<sup>159</sup> For a discussion of this topic, see Pélékidis 1962, 155-7; Marcellus 1994, 171-6.

<sup>160</sup> E.g. Ferguson 1911, 22 (ephebes cut by four-sevenths); Pélékidis 1962, 157 (enrollment declines from 600-700 to around 300 ephebes).

<sup>161</sup> Mitchel 1964, 346-8. He is inconsistent, however, because he also leaves open the possibility that the ephebeia was curtailed. Kirchner dates *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1187 to the middle of the fourth century, but Mitchel has shown that it should be assigned to 319/8 because Dercylus was the *strategos* of the countryside in that year (Plut. *Phoc.* 32.5). He explains the substitution of *paidēs* on the stone for *epheboi* as follows: "in voting their thanks, the fathers perhaps thought it unsafe to put up an ephebic inscription of the familiar type or even to refer to their sons as ephebes, and so they merely thank Dercylus for seeing that the boys got their training" (348). Marcellus 1994, 174, has also drawn attention to *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1199, dated to 320/19 (Whitehead 1982, 37-8), in which the deme of Aixone honored an unknown number of *sophronistai* for their involvement in the festival of Hebe (lines 17-20). He suggests this festival had previously been part of the ephebes' program (see also Humphreys 2004, 91) and that the demesmen had appointed their own *sophronistai* to oversee the youths who attended it after the ephebeia's suspension. But there is no evidence that the ephebes in fact celebrated the festival in the Lycurgan period.

new programme which trained those citizens who had besieged him at Lamia, and who had at one point demanded his unconditional surrender.”<sup>162</sup> Williams points out, however, that if “Antipater was so concerned about the effectiveness of Athens’ hoplites that he abolished the ephebic program, we should not expect him to make a hoplite franchise the essential governing element in Athens.”<sup>163</sup>

A more convincing explanation, I suggest, is that the ephebeia was discontinued at some point in 322/1 because the oligarchs regarded a standing army of more than one thousand ephebes as a threat to the new regime on account of their steadfast loyalty to the democracy and unwavering hostility to Macedon.<sup>164</sup> Certainly the ephebes would have had little enthusiasm, if not open disdain, for the oligarchy, since most were to be disenfranchised and Demades had condemned the leading anti-Macedonian hawks to death in accordance with the treaty (Plut. *Dem.* 28.2; Arr. *Succ.Al.* 1.13).<sup>165</sup> The ephebes, like their older compatriots, would have also resented the presence of foreign soldiers on Attic soil – the Macedonians under Menyllus had occupied Munychia hill on 20

<sup>162</sup> Marcellus 1994, 173. See also Mitchel 1964, 347.

<sup>163</sup> Williams 1982, 119, n. 316. A further flaw in Marcellus’ argument is that it is difficult to determine to what extent the ex-ephebes’ fighting skills contributed to the initial successes of the Greeks on land against the Macedonians and their allies because the Athenians fought as part of a coalition and depended heavily on the Thessalian cavalry and Leosthenes’ generalship (D.S. 18.11.3-5; 18.12.2-4; Hyp. 6.11-13; cf. D.S. 18.16.4-17.5). Tritle 1988, 126, argues that “the ephebic corps trained since Chaeronea was inexperienced and Phocion perhaps feared that they were little match for Macedonian and Greek veterans who had conquered the East. It is probably to these youths that Phocion referred in his reply to Hypereides [i.e. Plut. *Phoc.* 23.2].” In this passage Phocion, however, is quite specific that he is concerned about the Athenians’ *ataxia* (see Pritchett 1974, 244). If we consider that the Athenians defeated Micion by themselves (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1-2), it is likely that the ex-ephebes in Phocion’s force retained enough of their military training, though few of them would have attended military reviews after leaving the ephebeia (Isoc. 7.82), to compensate for their lack of combat experience.

<sup>164</sup> Was the ephebeia abolished in 322/1 or 321/0? Marcellus 1996, 69-76 = 1994, 225-31, convincingly argues that Menander was born in the archonship of Sosigenes (342/1), began his military service along with Epicurus in 323/2 (Strabo 14.1.18), and produced his first play at the City Dionysia in March 321. He also claims that “Menander and Epicurus were among the final year group to complete the two-year Lycurgan programme” (1996, 74). His evidence is ἐδίδαξε δὲ πρῶτον ἔφηβος ὢν ἐπὶ Διοκλέους ἄρχοντος (Anon. Kaibel, *CFG* I, no. 9, line 71; cf. Ameinias the ephebe in *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2323a [312/1], lines 46-7). As we have seen, however, ἔφηβος never meant “a young man who undertakes his ephebic service,” but a youth who has attained civic maturity and hence is capable of military service (see pp. 23-8). If so, the anonymous source is suggestive but not conclusive evidence that the ephebeia was only abolished at the beginning of the archonship of Archippus (i.e. 321/0).

<sup>165</sup> Antipater vigorously hunted down and killed the condemned men, including Demosthenes and Hyperides (Plut. *Dem.* 28.3-30.5; *Phoc.* 29.1; [Plut.] *Mor.* 846E, 849B; Arr. *Succ.Al.* 1.13-4). Williams 1982, 110: “The extremes to which his subordinates went to catch and destroy Athens’ leaders aroused a great deal of sympathy for his victims and dislike for the cruel and vindictive spirit of his purge.”

September 322 – whose task was to ensure that the *demos* complied with Antipater's demands.<sup>166</sup> It is understandable, then, that the oligarchs would have hesitated to allow hundreds of ephebes to be deployed on the Acte ([Arist.] *Ath.Pol.* 42.3), situated a short distance from Munychia, lest they make an attempt to expel the garrison by force and try to restore the democracy.<sup>167</sup> Nor could they have ignored the danger posed by those ephebes stationed on the Attic-Boeotian frontier, because Thraybulus' successful resistance movement by disaffected democrats had begun in Phyle against the Thirty in 404/3 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2-10).

#### 4.6: Conclusion

The educational aspects of the ephebeia had their origins in the *demos*' concern for the Macedonian threat to the constitution, Lycurgus' desire to teach the younger generation about the importance of patriotism, piety, and right moral conduct, and the latter's realization that the ephebes, whom Demades calls "the spring of the *demos*" (fr. 68 de Falco: ἔαρ ... τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ἐφήβους),<sup>168</sup> were at their age unable to take part in those public institutions (i.e. the Assembly, law-courts, and theater of Dionysus) which were considered to be so vital in shaping the behavior of all citizens, especially the younger generation. The ephebes' *paideia*, as far as we can tell from the limited and often ambiguous evidence, consisted of instruction in *sophrosyne* under the guidance of the *sophronistes*, a tour of Athens' temples at the beginning of the ephebeia, and participation in an indeterminate number of cults and festivals in both years of their

<sup>166</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1: ἐφάνη δ' ὑπερήφανον τὸ πρόσταγμα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξουσίας ὕβρει χρωμένης ἐπίδειξις ἢ πραγμάτων ἔνεκα γιγνομένη κατάληψις. Phocion, anticipating this reaction, had entreated Antipater not to install the garrison, but the latter refused and would only rescind the order if the former would guarantee that Athens would not stir up any trouble (Plut. *Phoc.* 27.4-5). Although Menyllus, a friend of Phocion's, had avoided a heavy-handed approach in his dealings with the Athenians, the *demos* had found the Macedonian soldiers, who were a constant reminder of the city's subservience to Antipater, so distasteful that they voted to send Demades in late 320/19 to negotiate its removal (Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1-4, 30.4-6; *Dem.* 31.3-4; Arr. *Succ.Al.* 1.14-5). A year later Dercylus of Hagnous unsuccessfully tried to capture Nicanor, Menyllus' successor (Plut. *Phoc.* 32.3).

<sup>167</sup> The oligarchs may have been concerned that the ephebes would try to emulate the heroism of Thrasylbulus, who had seized the Munychia from the Thirty, a feat which played a crucial role in the downfall of the oligarchy (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.10ff.).

<sup>168</sup> For this fragment, see Loraux 1975, 11-2.

military service. The goal of this “educational system,” as we have seen, was to cultivate the ephebes’ devotion to the state, to make them virtuous and upright citizens dedicated to the defense and continuation of the democracy. If so, this commitment may help to explain why the ephebeia was abolished by the pro-Macedonian oligarchy (321/0-319/8) established after Athens’ defeat in the Lamian War.

## Conclusion

The ephebeia was probably created in the aftermath of Alexander's destruction of Thebes in September 335. The Athenians, alarmed at the border raiding by his Boeotian allies and seeking to avoid a military confrontation with the Macedonians at all costs, were compelled to raise a standing army whose primary military function was to protect the *chora* of Attica. The *demos* chose to use ephebes, newly enrolled citizens, of all census classes for this new infantry corps because the latter had traditionally acted as a homeguard whenever Athens was threatened with invasion and were ineligible for *strateia* except under extraordinary circumstances. Epicrates' legislation, perhaps passed soon after Thebes' destruction, may have been responsible for the ephebeia's foundation. Though the ephebeia as a state-funded organization was an innovation of the Lycurgan period, several aspects of the institution were a formalization of practices dating back at least to the second-quarter of the fourth century. Aeschines' *peripoleia* shows that *ephebos* and *peripolos* antedated the ephebeia. An analysis of these terms shows that they had the same technical meanings as in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*. Moreover, it is clear that the youngest citizens also swore the oath of citizenship (known as the ephebic oath after the fifth century), performed garrison duty, and competed as *lampadephoroi* throughout the Classical period.

The decision to entrust the defense of the countryside to the youngest citizens with no combat experience and a reputation for socially disruptive behavior, however, marked a decisive break with long-standing Athenian military practices in the Classical period. The *demos*, concerned about these issues, established for the first time a publicly funded mass training system, where specialized instructors taught the art of war to the ephebes. They also sought to impose strict discipline on the ephebes, granting the *sophronistes* the right to use physical punishment to chastise disorderly individuals. This official, who also served as a quartermaster, played a key role in ensuring that the ephebes would carry out their assigned duties, although the *kosmetes* was in overall charge of the institution. For the thousands of citizens who passed through the ephebeia



during the Lycurgan period (334/3-322/1), however, two years of garrison duty demanded that they had to put their public obligations before their private interests. Some ephebes, however, were unwilling to make this sacrifice and consequently avoided military service. The *demos*, realizing this, solved this problem by appealing to their *philotimia*, so that ambitious ephebes could distinguish themselves as *lochagoi*, win torch races, or be awarded with various honors at the end of their stint of service.

The *demos* was also concerned that the ephebes could not gain the educational benefits of the city's democratic institutions because they were forbidden, with few exceptions, from participating in the public life of Athens. Fearful for the survival of the democracy and frustrated by their continued subservience to Macedon, the Athenians under Lycurgus' administration incorporated educational features into the ephebeia so that the ephebes, under the supervision of the *sophronistes*, would learn the importance of patriotism, piety, and self-control. From 334/3 onwards, then, the ephebeia ensured that Attica would be well defended against raiders and sought to make the ephebes virtuous citizens. Indeed, the objective of their *paideia* was to cultivate their devotion to the democracy and to ensure that they would fight vigorously against the Macedonians should the long hoped-for opportunity to rebel present itself. This came in 323, after Alexander's death, when the Athenians revolted against Antipater in the Lamian war. Following Athens' defeat, a pro-Macedonian oligarchy was installed, which abolished the ephebeia for the duration of the oligarchy (321/0-319/8) because the institution was perceived as a threat to the new regime on account of the ephebes' unwavering loyalty to the democracy and their unyielding hatred of Macedon.

## Appendix: The Corpus of Lycurgan Ephebic Inscriptions

In a peculiar sense the study of the Athenian ephebia, not only in the fourth century B.C., but in every period must be the study primarily of the ephebic inscriptions. Apart from Aristotle's brief description, our knowledge of the institution rests not on statements about it, but largely on inferences and deductions from the inscriptions themselves.<sup>1</sup>

This is a register of twenty-eight ephebic inscriptions, published and unpublished, which date from the inception of the institution to the outbreak of the Lamian War (i.e. 334/3-323/2). The inscriptions are arranged in chronological order. Though many of these documents cannot be assigned to a specific year because they lack an archon date, they are nevertheless included in the corpus if they satisfy the following criteria: (1) The format of a typical ephebic inscription in the Lycurgan period consists of a heading, a number of general decrees by honoring corporations or (more commonly) no decree, and a roster of the ephebes' names followed by a patronymic arranged under deme captions.<sup>2</sup> While Hellenistic and Roman examples of the ephebic corpus have a similar format, Lycurgan inscriptions are distinctive in that they honor the ephebes of a *single* tribe, whereas the former commemorate all the ephebes who had served in the ephebeia on the same inscription.<sup>3</sup> (2) To the best of my knowledge no ephebic inscription dating after the Lamian War has been found outside of the Athens-Piraeus enceinte. Consequently those inscriptions with findspots in frontier areas such as Rhamnous, Oropus, Eleusis, Panactum, and Marathon, must date prior to the abolition of the ephebeia by the end of 322/1.

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<sup>1</sup> Reinmuth 1971, ix.

<sup>2</sup> For this format, see Reinmuth 1955, 226, classifications 1a and 1b. Two inscriptions (**E10** and **E21**), however, have rosters which omit the patronymic but include the demotic after each ephebe's name, with the result that the ephebes lack deme captions. **E18**, on the other hand, organizes the ephebes by demes but lists only the names of the ephebes, not their patronymics.

<sup>3</sup> Reinmuth 1948, 213, suggests that there was insufficient space available on the stones to fit every ephebe on the same roster because citizen enrollment in the Lycurgan period was far greater – c. 450-500 in 334/3-333/2 and 600-650 thereafter – than in subsequent periods. This is supported by the fact that the earliest inscription to list all ten *phylae* is *IG II<sup>2</sup> 478*, dated to 305/4, when service in the ephebeia was reduced to one year and the enrollment of c. 372 ephebes was much reduced in comparison to the preceeding period (see Reinmuth 1971, 86-117).

I have drawn extensively upon two scholarly studies for the compilation of this register. The first is Reinmuth, whose *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century B.C.* (Leiden 1971) contains fifteen Lycurgan ephebic inscriptions, superseding the nine Pélékidis had available in his *Histoire de l'éphébie attique: des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1962). The second is Petrakos, who has recently published two epigraphic collections, namely his *Οἱ Ἐπιγραφές τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ* (Athens 1997) and *Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ Ῥαμνοῦντος*. Vol. II. (Athens 1999). These have several ephebic inscriptions, some of which were the fruit of Petrakos' lengthy excavations at Rhamnous and Oropus. I have not attempted to provide an extensive bibliography for each inscription; the reader is therefore encouraged to consult Reinmuth and Petrakos whenever possible, along with the *SEG* references if cited. In addition to these authors, I have also drawn upon those works that have either suggested a different restoration for Reinmuth's texts (e.g. Mitchel 1984) or have added a new member to the corpus (e.g. Traill 1986). Lastly, I must thank Mark Munn, who has found three new unpublished inscriptions at Panactum and has made them available for me to study.

Information concerning the corpus is presented in the following manner. Each document is given a number (in bold type) and a title representative of its content, followed by its date.<sup>4</sup> After this the find spot (with the inscription's catalogue number in parentheses), a select bibliography, and a brief description of the stone are provided. The

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<sup>4</sup> Unlike previous collections, I provide two dates, whenever possible, for the inscriptions in the corpus. The first is the date of the ephebes' enrollment in the ephebeia, the second is the date of the inscriptions' erection. The reason for this is that scholars have sometimes not drawn this distinction. The confusion is clearly demonstrated by the belief among some scholars that the first enrollment class for the ephebeia occurred in 335/4 because they reckon that the earliest attested inscriptions (**E1-E4**) were erected in 334/3, not 333/2 (e.g. Wilamowitz 1893, 194; Sekunda 1992, 331; Habicht 1997, 16; cf. Bertosa 2003, 374). When the Athenians created the ephebeia, they had to keep track of two distinct groups of ephebes from the same tribe who were serving at the same time. To avoid confusion they designated each year group by the archonship in which they were enrolled (Girard 1892, 624; Reinmuth 1970, 77; Clinton 1988, 29). The full formulae is shown in **E1**, a dedication of Cecropis, lines 52-3: οἱ [ἔφηβοι] οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἀρχοντος ἐνγραφέντες, "the ephebes enrolled in the archonship of Ctesicles." It follows, then, that the inscription was erected in the next year, in the archonship of Nicocrates (333/2: Pélékidis 1962, 122), since the ephebes are honored for their garrison duty at Eleusis (lines 37, 46 cf. [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.4). Reinmuth 1970, 102, maintains that all ephebic inscriptions were erected in their second year. But those inscriptions that honored the ephebes for their success in the torch races (**E10**, **E12**, **E24**) were perhaps erected in the same year as their victory. Clinton 1988, 29, suggests that they were erected at the end of the ephebes' first year, but there is reason to think that ephebes competed in the torch races and other events throughout their term of service (see pp. 116-8, 173-7).

text of the document, if published, is then given, though I have not included a critical apparatus. Lastly, I discuss certain aspects of the inscription in the notes. The topics for discussion are limited to the date, the number of ephebes in the roster (if there is uncertainty), and aspects of the text which affect the inscription's interpretation and have proved controversial among scholars. It should be stressed, however, that I have not examined any of the corpus in person, but have instead relied upon photographs provided by Reinmuth, Petrakos, and others. Given this limitation, the substantial restorations which I have proposed for three inscriptions (**E8**, **E16**, **E19**) should therefore be regarded as tentative.

### The Corpus:

#### **E1:** *Dedication to the Kosmetes of Acamantis.*

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment Year: 334/3 (Archon restored). Inscription: 333/2.
<u>Find Spot:</u>	No. 79, K.Lbake Street in Athens (EM 13354a).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Reinmuth 1971 no. 1 = Mitsos 1965 (1967), 131-2.
<u>Description:</u>	White marble stele with smooth finish on right preserved side. Rough picked back. H. 0.35 m.; W. 0.23 m. L.H. 0.004 m.
<u>Text:</u>	Stoichedon 35 (lines 14-26).

- [ἐπὶ Νικοφῆμο] ἄρχοντος  
 [— — — — — — — — —]ο Εἰρεσίδης εἶπε-  
 15 [ν· ἐπειδὴ ὁ κοσμητὴς τῶν ἐφ]ήβων Αὐτόλυκος κ-  
 [αλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμε]λήθη τῶν νεανίσκ-  
 [ων, δεδόχθαι τῇ Ἀκαμαντίδ]ι φυλῇ ἐπαινέσ-  
 [αι Αὐτόλυκον ....9.....Θο]ρίκιον φιλοτιμ-  
 [ίας ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῇ]ς περὶ τοὺς ἐφή-  
 20 [βους καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ σ]τεφάνωι ἐπε[ι]-  
 [δὴν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶι ὧν ἐπεμελή]θη, ἀρετῆς κ[α]-  
 [ὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ἔνεκα· τὸ δὲ ψήφισ]μα τόδε ἀνα-  
 [γράψαι τὸν γραμματέα τῆς φυλῆς ἐ]στήλην ἐν  
 [τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀκάμαντος ἐφ' ἧς γέγρα]πται τὸ  
 25 [ψήφισμα περὶ τὸς ἐφήβους ἐπὶ Μόλωνο(?)]ς ἄρχο-

[ντος -----

Notes: I have not included the text for *EM* 13354 because it is not an ephebic inscription. For the rejection of Mitsos' restoration of Νικοφήμο in line 13 in favor of Mitchell's Κτησικλέους, see pgs. 9-10.

## E2: *The ephebes of Cecropis*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2.

Find Spot: Acropolis (EM 7743).

Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 2 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1156.

Description: Stele of Pentelic marble, broken upper left hand side. Originally on a base. H. 1.02 m.; W. 0.51 m.; Th. 0.12 m. L.H. 0.005 m.

Text: Stoichedon 47-54 (lines 26-63).

	— — — — — ου	
	— — — — — — — — — — ους	
	— — — — — — — — — — νίππου	
	— — — — — — — — — — άδ[ο]υ	
5	— — — — — Μνησιθέου	
	— — — — — Ήγησιφάνους	
	[...μα]χος Γλαυκέτου	
	[....]ανόδωρος Λυσιστράτου	
10	[Κα]λλίας Καλλιιάδους	
	Ἀντιφῶν Ἐπιτρόπου	
	Χρέμης Σμικύθου	
	Αἰξωνῆς·	
	Εὐκλῆς Εὐκλείδου	
	Μελάνθιος [Ἄ]ριστείδου	
15	— — — — —	
	[— — — — —]μοκρίτου	
	[— — — — — — — — — — κ]ράτους	
	[ <i>demoticum</i> ]	
	[....8....]νος Φυρομάχου	
20	[Χαιρέστ]ρατος Χαιρίωνος	
	[....]οτος Δημητρίου	
	[...]γένης Σάβωνος	
	[Ἄ]ντισθένης Ἀντιφάτους	
	— — — — — ου	
	— — — — — — — — — — ους	
	— — — — — — — — — — νίππου	
	— — — — — — — — — — άδ[ο]υ	
	— — — — — Μνησιθέου	
	— — — — — Ήγησιφάνους	
	[...μα]χος Γλαυκέτου	
	[....]ανόδωρος Λυσιστράτου	
	[Κα]λλίας Καλλιιάδους	
	Ἀντιφῶν Ἐπιτρόπου	
	Χρέμης Σμικύθου	
	Αἰξωνῆς·	
	Εὐκλῆς Εὐκλείδου	
	Μελάνθιος [Ἄ]ριστείδου	
	Θεότιμος Θεοπόμπου	
	Ἀμφίστρατος Φιλημονίδου	
	Δημοκλείδης Δημέου	
	Θεόδοτος Αἰσχροῦ.	
	Ἐπικράτης Εὐκράτους	
	Ζυπεταιόνες·	
	Νικίας Εὐκταίου	
	Ξενοφῶν Μνησιιάδου	
	Πιθῆς·	

- Δαιδαλίδαι· Τεισαμενὸς Κίρου  
 25 Φιλόξενος Φιλονόμου Αὐτοκλῆς Χαρίππου  
 Καλλικράτης Αἰξωνεὺς εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Κεκροπί-  
 δος οἱ ἐπ[ὶ Κτη]σ[ι]κλέους ἄρχοντος εὐτακτοῦσιν καὶ π[ο]ιοῦσ[ιν]  
 πάντα ὅ[σα αὐτ]οῖς οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσιν καὶ τ[ῶι σωφρ]ονι[στ]-  
 εἰ πειθ[αρχο]ῦσιν τῶι χειροτονηθέντι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, ἐπ[α]ιν[έ]σ[ι]-  
 30 αι αὐτ[οὺς κα]ὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπ[ὸ] Ἰ<sup>Α</sup> δραχ[μ]ῶν  
 κοσμι[ό]τη[τ]ος ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρο-  
 νιστὴν, Ἀδειστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι  
 στεφάνωι ἀπὸ Ἰ<sup>Α</sup> δραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἐπεμελή[θη]  
 τῶν ἐφήβων τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς. ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφ[ι]-  
 35 σμα ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ καὶ στήσαι ἐν τῶι τοῦ Κέκροπος ἱερ[ῶι].  
 Ἠγέμαχος Χαιρήμονος Περιθοίδης εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ  
 τῆς Κεκροπίδος ταχθέντες Ἐλευσῖνι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμω[ς ἐπ]-  
 ιμελοῦνται ὧν αὐτοῖς ἡ βουλή καὶ ὁ δῆμος προστάττει κα[ὶ] εὐτ[ι]-  
 40 ἀκτους αὐτοὺς παρέχουσιν, ἐπαινέσαι αὐτοὺς κοσμιότη[τος]  
 ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι ἑ[καστον]  
 αὐτῶν· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν Ἀδιστ[ον Ἀντι]-  
 μάχου Ἀθμονέα καὶ στεφανῶσαι θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι ἐπε[ιδαν τὰ]-  
 ς εὐθύνας δῶι· ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνάθημα  
 ὃ ἀνατιθέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Κεκροπίδος· *vacat*  
 45 Πρωτίας εἶπεν· ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δημόταις, ἐπειδὴ καλ[ῶς καὶ φι]-  
 λοτίμως ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσίνος οἱ τῆς Κεκροπί-  
 [δ]ο[ς ἔφηβ]οι καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς αὐτῶν· Ἀδιστος [Ἀν]τι[μ]ά[χου Ἀθμο]-  
 [νεὺς, ἐπαι]νέσα[ι] αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶσαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν θαλλοῦ  
 [στεφάνωι]. ἀναγ[ρ]άψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τὸ ἀνάθημα, [ὃ ἀνα]-  
 50 [τι]θέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Κεκροπίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέ[ους]  
 [ἄ]ρχοντος· *vacat*  
 Εὐφρόνιος εἶπεν· ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δημόταις, ἐπειδὴ οἱ [ἔφηβοι]  
 οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλέος ἄρχοντος ἐνγραφέντες εὐτακτοῦσιν [καὶ]  
 ποιοῦσιν πάντα ὅσα οἱ νόμοι αὐτοῖς προστάττουσιν, καὶ ὁ [σω]-  
 55 φρονιστὴς ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεὶς ἀποφαίνει αὐτο[υς]  
 πειθάρχοντας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως, ἐπ[αι]-  
 νέσαι αὐτοὺς καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ Ἰ<sup>Α</sup> δρα[χμ] -  
 ῶν κοσμιότητος ἕνεκα καὶ εὐταξίας· ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν  
 σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν Ἀδιστον Ἀντιμάχου Ἀθμονέα, καὶ στεφ-  
 60 ανῶσ(αι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ) Ἰ<sup>Α</sup> δραχμῶν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως  
 ἐπε-  
 μελήθη τῶν τε δημοτῶν (καὶ τῶν) ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν τῆς Κεκροπίδος  
 φυλῆς· ἐπιγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνάθημα ὃ ἀνατι-  
 θέασιν οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Κεκροπίδος καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς· *vacat*  
*vacat*  
 65 ἡ φυλή· ἡ βουλή· Ἐλευσινιοι· Ἀθμονῆς.

Notes: 30 ephebes are preserved on the roster, arranged in two columns. In the first, 8 names appear, one belonging to the deme Daidalidai and 7 to two unknown demes (lines 16-25). In the second, 22, 11 to an unknown deme, 7 to Aixone, 2 to Xypete, and 2 to Pithos (lines 1-25). Following Clinton's 1988, 27, tentative suggestion that the 11 ephebes in column two are from Halai Aixonides (hence adding a line for the deme caption), this leaves room for a minimum of 20 ephebes in column one if the six remaining demes of Cecropis are also represented. If we consider that Melite, Athmonon, and Phlya had 4(?), 5, and 7 ephebes respectively in **E5**, an inscription of Cecropis dating to the next enrollment year (i.e. Nicocrates), it is likely that these demes were also present (in similar numbers?) in **E2**. Did Sypalettos, Trinemeia, and Epieikidai send contingents? In **E5** Sypalettos and Epieikidai had no ephebes and Trinemeia had one. We cannot be certain, however, whether one, two, or three of these demes were present in **E2**. Given this, probably 42-44 ephebes served in the phyle of Cecropis for 334/3-333/2. Other estimates: Gomme 1933, 67, (43-45 ephebes) – accepted by Pélékidis 1962, 121; Reinmuth 1971, 7, 107. Hansen 1988a, 3, n. 4, and Sekunda 1992, 331-2, suggest c. 42 ephebes.

**E3: *The ephebes of Hippothontis.***

Date: Enrollment: 334/3 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2.  
Find Spot: Eleusis (Eleusis Inv.No. 84).  
Bibliography: Mitchel 1984, 115-8, reedits Reinmuth 1971 no. 3 = *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1189. *SEG* 34.106.  
Description: White Pentelic marble fragment of the top front of a base(?).  
H. 0.16 m.; W. 0.23 m.; Th. 0.15 m. L.H. 0.01 (lines 1-3), 0.005 m. (lines 4-13).  
Text: Stoichedon 57 (lines 1-3), 62 (lines 4-13).

[οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Ἱπποθωντίδος φυλῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[έους ἀρχοντος καὶ ὁ  
σ]-  
[ᾠφρονιστῆς στεφανωθέντες ὑ]πὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ  
Ἐλευσινί]-

- [ων Δήμητρι καὶ Κόρει ἀνέθηκα]ν.  
 [ἔδοξεν Ἐλευσινίοις ....8.... ε]ἶπεν. ἐπειδὴ οἱ τῆς Ἰπποθ[ωντίδος ἔφηβοι  
 καλ]-
- 5 [ὥς τῆς φυλακῆς Ἐλευσῖνος ἐπε]μελοῦντο καὶ ἐκόσ[μο]υν καὶ [πάντων ὧν  
 οἱ νόμοι π]-  
 [ροσέταττον αὐτοῖς ταχθέντες] Ἐλευσῖνι ἐπεμελοῦντο καὶ [τῷ  
 σωφρονιστῇ π]-  
 [ειθαρχόντες, ἐψηφίσθαι τοῖς δ]ημόταις ἐπαινέσαι αὐτοὺς κα[ὶ] στεφανῶσαι  
 αὐ]-  
 [τοὺς φιλοτιμίας ἔνεκα τῆς εἰς] τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἐλευσινίων, ἐπ[αινέσαι δὲ  
 καὶ τὸ]-  
 [ν σωφρονιστὴν αὐτῶν ....8....] ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας [τῆς εἰς τὸν  
 δῆμον]
- 10 [καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῷ στεφά]νωι καὶ ἀνειπεῖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγ[ῶνι ὅτι  
 στεφανῶϊ]  
 [ὁ δῆμος ....8... τραγωιδῶν τ]ῶν [Δ]ιονυσίων καὶ καλείτω αὐ[τὸν ὁ  
 δήμαρχος κα]-  
 [θάπερ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἷς ὁ δῆμ]ος ἔδωκεν τὴν προεδρίαν [.....17.....]  
 [.....25.....]ιτο[...7...οισουσι.[ .....19.....]

Notes: Reinmuth 1971, 11, restores the heading as follows: [τοῖν θεοῖν οἱ ἔφηβοι καὶ ὁ  
 σωφρονιστῆς τῆς] | [Ἰπποθωντίδος φυλῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[έους ἄρχοντος] | [  
 στεφανωθέντες ὑ]πὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δ[ήμου τοῦ Ἐλε] | [υσινίων ἀνέθηκα]ν.  
 But Mitchel points out that the stone has a flat top (cf. Lewis 1973, 255), and suggests  
 that the first line of the prescript should be discarded (Reinmuth assumed another line of  
 text above ...) λῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Κτησικλ[...]. Tracy 1995, 115, notes that an erasure occurs  
 after the first καὶ in line 5 and “continues as far as the stone is preserved.” He also doubts  
 the reading of the imperfect ἐκόσ[μο]υν, which is unparalleled in Attic inscriptions. No-  
 one, however, has proposed an alternative. Marcellus 1994, 236, plausibly suggests  
 [ἄλλα πάντα ποιοῦντας φιλοτίμως] instead of [τῷ σωφρονιστῇ πειθαρχόντες]  
 in lines 6-7 because Mitchel reports a “lower tip of a slanting stroke which might indicate  
 a lambda or alpha.”

**E4:** *The ephebes of Antiochis or Erectheis.*

Date: Enrollment: 334/3 (Archon restored). Inscription: 333/2.

Find Spot: Unknown (EM 2802a).



Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 4 = Mitchel's 1964, 349-50 re-edition of *IG II*<sup>2</sup> 2970. *SEG* 22.148 = 39.234 = 41.138.

Description: Left side of a Pentelic stele ornamented with a relief of an armed Athena. H. 0.57 m.; W. 0.24 m.; Th. 0.12 m. L.H. 0.01 (lines 1-2), 0.005 m. (lines 3-10).

Text: Non-Stoichedon (lines 1-2), Stoichedon 46 (lines 3-11).

[...9....]ς ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ Κ[τη]σι[κλέους ἄρχοντος ἀνέθε]-  
[σαν τῶι ἥρω?]ι σ[τεφανωθέν]τες [ὑπὸ τ]ῆς [βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου.]  
*infra cymatium*  
[σωφρο]νιστῆ[ς] Ἄφρ[.....32.....]  
[..5...]σαρ[...κλ[.]ο[.....10..... στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶι Πειραι]-  
5 [εἰ Κόν]ων Τιμοθέ[ο]υ [Ἀναφλύστιος στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ]-  
[Σώφιλ]ος Ἀ[ριστο]τέ[λους Φυλάσιος .....19.....]  
[..5...]ην[.....39.....]  
[..5...] κο[σμη]τῆς .....33.....]  
[...νευς [...δ]ε[.....35.....]  
10 [...5...]ιο[...στ[.....35.....]  
— — —

Notes: There is space for nine letters before the sigma on line one, clearly the genitive of a tribal name. Antiochis (Mitchel) or Erectheis (Reinmuth) are possibilities. It cannot be Cecropis, because a different *sophronistes* is attested on **E2**, lines 31-2, 41-2, 45-6, 58-9. The inscription is in poor condition. Lines 3-10 list a group of officials, but only the *sophronistes* Ἄφρ[...], the *strategos* of the Piraeus Κόν]ων Τιμοθέ[ο]υ [Ἀναφλύστιος, the *strategos* of the *chora* Σώφιλ]ος Ἀ[ριστο]τέ[λους Φυλάσιος, and an unnamed *kosmetes* can be made out from the fragmentary text. Since **E1** also dates to the archonship of Ctesicles, line 8 should be restored as κο[σμη]τῆς Αὐτόλυκον ....9.... Θορίκιον. It is possible that ...]σαρ[...κλ[.]ο[..... (lines 3-4) and ...]ην[... (lines 7-8) may have been *didaskaloi*. A roster of ephebes probably followed from line 9 onwards.

**E5:** *The ephebes of Cecropis.*

Date: Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 332/1.

<u>Find Spot:</u>	Eleusis (Eleusis Inv.No. 1103).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Clinton 1988, 20-21, publishes the text of Reinmuth 1971 no. 5 = Travlos 1954 (1957), 70-71. <i>SEG</i> 41.107.
<u>Description:</u>	Base (H. 0.29 m.; W. 0.663 m.; Th. 0.54 m.) of blue-gray Hymettian marble preserved all on all sides (smooth except for rough-picked bottom) with rectangular cutting (W. 0.355 m.; B: 0.275 m.; D. 0.07 m.). L.H 0.005-0.008 m. (lines 1-11), 0.005 m. (lines 13-73).
<u>Text:</u>	Stoichedon 52 (lines 1-11), Non-Stoichedon (lines 12-74).

<p>[ο]ἰ ἔφ[ηβ]οι οἱ τῆς Κεκ[ρ]ο[π]ίδος οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρ[χ]ον[τος καὶ ὁ σ]-  ωφρονιστῆς αὐτῶν Περικ[λῆς] Περικλεί[δου] Πιθεὺς ἀνέθεσα[ν στεφ]-  ανώσαντες χρυσῶι στεφάνωι ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰ-  ς ἑαυτοὺς στρατηγὸν τοῦ Πειραιῶς Κόνωνα Τιμοθέου Ἀναφλύστιο&lt;ν&gt;  5 καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλον Ἀριστοτέλους Φυλάσιον καὶ τὸν σω-  φροντιστὴν Περικλέα Περικλείδου Πιθέα καὶ τὸν ταξιάρχον Σύνβ-  ουλὸν Εὐβούλου Φλυέα καὶ τοὺς λοχαγοὺς Θράσιππον Φρυναίου Ἀθ-  μονέα, Εὐβουλὸν Εὐβούλου Φλυέα, Ἐπικράτην Ἀρχεδήμου Πι[θ]έα, Ἀτα-  ρβίωνα Τυννίου Αἰξωνέα, Στέφανον Αἰσιμίδου Ἀλαιοῖα, Ἀριστ[όμ]αχον  10 Δημοχάρους Μελιτιά, Σίμωνα Θεοκλέους Ἀθμονέα καὶ τοὺς διδασκ-  αλοὺς Χαιρέστρατον Παλληνέα, Ἀγαθάνορα Συρακόσιον. <i>vacat</i></p>	
Col. I: <i>vacat</i>	Φλυῆς
[Π]ιθῆς	Σύνβουλος Εὐβούλου
Ἐπικράτης Ἀρχεδήμου	Εὐβουλὸς Εὐβούλου
Ἀρχίας Θρασύλλου	Φαι[δ]ρίας Π[ό]δωνος
15 Ἀπολλοφῶν Ἀπολλοφάνους	45 Φιλό[δ]ημος Νικομάχου
Εὐφράνωρ Εὐθυδίκου	Φειδόστρατος Ἀμεινοκλέους
[Ἀ]ρχίνος Παντακλέους	Τιμωνίδης Ἀθηνόκλεους
[..]αρχὸς Βιόττου	Ἀρχεδίκος Ἀρχεδίκου
[Ἀθμ]ονῆς	Μελιτῆς
20 [Θράσ]ιππος Φρυναίου	50 Ἀριστόμα[χ]ος Δημοχάρους
[Σίμ]ων Θεοκλέους	Εὐθύδομος Ἐπικράτους
[...6...]τρατος Μνησιμάχου	[....]..NE..[— — —]
[....ca.9.....] Λυκίσκου	[— — — — ? — — — —]
	[.....ca.13.....]...Υ
Col. II: <i>vacat</i>	Col. IV: Ἀλαιοῖς
25 Αἰξωνῆς	55 Στέφανος Αἰσιμίδου
Ἀταρβίων Τυννίου	Σωκράτης Σθενοκράτους
	Στήσαρχος Νικομάχου

	Καλλίας Δεινοκράτους		Ἡδύλος Δρύωνος
	Πολυκράτης Φανίου		Βρύων Δρύωνος
	Δημήτριος Εὐκλέους	60	Ἄρεσ[ί]ας Ἀταρβίδου
30	Κλεόστρατος Κλε<ο>φάντου		Σωσικράτης Σωσίππου
	Δίφιλος Ναυσιχάρου[ς]		Ἐπίγονος Διοδώρου
	Φιλήρατος Παν<α>ρίστου		Εὐβου[λο]ς Φιλοκλέους
	Ζυπεταιόνες		Ἐπικράτης Σημιάδου
	Τιμόστρατος Μένωνος	65	Ν[.]αι[.]ος Ἱεροφῶντος
35	Ἡγίας Ἀγαπαίου		Καλλιάδης Καλλίου
	Χ[ί]ωνίδης Ἐριώτου		Φιλόστρατος Νικοβούλου
	[— — — — — — — — —]		Σωκράτης Εὐκράτους
Col. III: <i>vacat</i>			Εὐθήμων Εὐκλέους
	Μενεκλῆς Μένωνος	70	Λύσις Τιμ[— — — — — — —]
	Τρινεμῆς		Καλλ[ί]στ[ρ]ατος[— — —]
40	Θουγένης Φιλοκλέου		[— — — — — — — — —]
			[— — — — ? — — — — —]
Right Face:			
	ὁ δῆμος	ἡ βουλή	ἡ φυλή
75	Ἐλε[υσίν]ιοι	Ῥαμνούσιοι	

Notes: 52 names are arranged in four columns. Clinton 1988, 27, suggests that Columns III and IV each had one more name under the demes of Melite and Halai Aixonides respectively, for a potential total of 54 ephebes. Reinmuth 1971, 16, 107, for some reason gives two totals – 52 and 48. Hansen 1988a, 3, prefers the former figure.

#### **E6: *The ephebes of Aiantis.***

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2 or 332/1.
<u>Find Spot:</u>	South of the propylon to the Pompeion in Kerameikos (Kerameikos Inv.No. I 64).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Reinmuth 1971 no. 6 = Habicht 1961 (1962), 143, no. 2. <i>SEG</i> 21.680.
<u>Description:</u>	Marble fragment (H. 0.17 m.; W. 0.325 m.; Th 0.232 m.), smoothed top and sides (rough picked back) but broken below, with a rectangular cutting for a dedication (H. 0.15 m.; W. 0.16 m.; D. 0.08 m.). L.H. 0.01 m. (lines 1-6), 0.007 m. (lines 7-9).
<u>Text:</u>	Non-Stoichedon.

[Αἰ]αντίδος ἔφηβ[οι οἱ]  
 ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντ[ος]  
 [κ]αὶ σωφρονιστῆς Ἐπιχάρης  
 Ἐπιγένους Οἰναῖος λαμπάδι  
 5 νικήσαντες ἥρωι Μουνίχῳ  
*vacat* ἀνέθεσαν *vacat*  
 Οἰναῖοι *vacat*  
 [Π]ολυμήδης Πολυφίλου ////  
 [κα]ὶ Πυθόδωρ[ος Ἀπ]ολλοδώρου  
 10 — — —

Notes: The names of two ephebes are preserved, uniquely conjoined by *kai*, of the deme Oinoe (lines 7-9). The *Oinaioi* were probably placed first in the roster because the *sophronistes* Ἐπιχάρης Ἐπιγένους was from that deme (lines 3-4).

**E7: The ephebes of Pandionis.**

Date: Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon restored). Inscription: 332/1.  
Find Spot: Unknown (*EM* 3590).  
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 8 = Merritt 1945, 234-9, a re-edition of *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2976. *SEG* 21.682.  
Description: Fragment of Pentelic marble stele, broken on all sides except for bottom (H. 0.22 m.; W. 0.19 m.; Th. 0.07 m.). L.H. 0.005 m.  
Text: Non-Stoichedon.

— — —  
 [— — — — —]ου  
 [— — — — —]δου  
 [— — — — —]ίδου  
 [— — — — —]οφῶντος  
 5 [— — — — —] Λυσίου  
*two lines uninscribed*  
 [ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος οἱ ἔφηβοι τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρο]-  
 [νιστῆς ἀνέθησαν στεφανωθέντες χρυσῶι στ]εφ[άν]ῳ [ὑπὸ τῆ]ς φυ[λῆς]  
 [ἀρετῆς εἰς τὴν φυλὴν καὶ σωφροσύν]ης ἕνεκα *vacat*  
 [στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῇ χώρᾳ Σώφιλον Ἀριστ]οτέλους [Φυλάσ]ιον *vacat*  
 10 [στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιεῖ Κόνωνα] Τιμοθέου [Ἀναφλ]ύστιον *vacat*  
 [κοσμητὴν ....8.... Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα<sup>ν</sup> [Μν]ῆσον Ἀρίστω[νος]

- [demotic ca. 9, name ca. 9, patronymic ca. 9 Π]αιανιέα, [Χ]α[ρί]αν Ἀρκέωνος  
 [demotic ca. 10, name ca. 10, patronymic ca. 8]ους Μυρρινούσιον *vacat*  
 [λοχαγὸν name ca. 9, patronymic ca. 10 Παι]ανιέα, λοχαγὸν Εὐκλεία *vacat*  
 15 [patronymic ca. 12, demotic ca. 12 λοχαγ]ὸν Αἰσχύλον Πυθέου Παιαν[ιέα],  
 [λοχαγὸν name ca. 11 patronymic ca. 11] Ὡαθεν, λοχαγὸν Ἐτεοκλέα<sup>ν</sup> [ννν]  
 [patronymic ca. 12, demotic ca. 12, λοχαγ]ὸν Φανόστρατον Φανίου νν [ννν]  
 [demotic ca. 8, λοχαγὸν name ca. 9, ..ca. 5...]γίτου Παιανιέα. *vacat*  
*vacat*

Notes: Merritt restored Nicocrates in line 6 because line 11 probably should be taken as κοσμητὴν ....8.... Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα, who is attested as *kosmetes* in that year (E8, Col. II, lines 12-3). Reinmuth rightly rejected Merritt's restoration of line 6 (ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος ὁ ταξιάρχος ἔφηβοι τῆς Πανδι]ονίδος καὶ ὁ σωφ[ρονισ]), because the latter did not know that the *taxiarchos* was an ephebe (Mitchel 1961, 347-57). The former, however, should have placed οἱ first in line 6 rather than in its present position, because the archonship formula is always in the attributive position (Mitchel 1961, 351, n. 9; Clinton 1988, 30, n. 13). Lewis 1973, 256, has examined the photo of the inscription (Reinmuth 1971, Plate VIII) and offers an alternative reading for lines 7-8: σ]τεφανῶ[σαντε]ς χρ[υσ]ῶι σ[τ]εφ[άνωι ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας τῆς εἰ]ς ἑαυτ[οὺς] (cf. E5, lines 2-4). I concur with Lewis upon my own scrutiny of the photo.

The bottom part of the roster is preserved, which consists of five incomplete names from column II (lines 1-5). Reinmuth 1971, 22-3, estimates that there would be room for 30-32 names if the profile of a human head sketched on the stone at a later date was in fact a bust. Since it is unclear whether the 7 *lochagoi* were also included in the roster, this would mean that the contingent numbered at least 36 ephebes. Traill 1975, 32, n. 20, however, has disputed Reinmuth's assumption concerning the drawing and has shown that we cannot determine the size of the stele from the sketch, because we do not know whether the latter was a face, a bust, or even an entire body. Given that the ephebes were separated into two columns, presumably of equal length, the roster as it stands had at least 10 ephebes but there is no way of determining the overall size of the contingent. For a similar situation, see E15.

**E8: The ephebes of Leontis.**

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 332/1.
<u>Find Spot:</u>	Agora Section Σ ( <i>Agora</i> Inv.No. I 3068 <i>a</i> , 3068 <i>b</i> , 3068 <i>c</i> ).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Reinmuth 1971 no. 9 = Merritt 1940, 59-66, No. 8.
<u>Description:</u>	Base of Hymmetian marble with a cutting for a dedication. Inscription consists of fragments which form a composite group ( <i>a</i> : H. 0.63 m.; W. 0.57 m.; Th. 0.345 m.) and two more fragments which form the upper right half ( <i>b</i> : H. 0.13 m.; W. 0.18 m.; Th. 0.082 m. and <i>c</i> : H. 0.25 m.; W. 0.13 m.; Th. 0.11 m.). L.H. 0.01 m. (lines 1-2), 0.006 m. (col. I, lines 3-38; col. II, lines 3-38, col. III, lines 3-19).
<u>Text:</u>	Stoichedon 72 (lines 1-2), 26 (col. I-II), 34 (col. III, lines 3-9), 42 (col. III, lines 15-8).

[τῶι ἥ]ρωι ὁ σ[ω]φρονιστ[ῆς τῆς Λεωντίδος ἐπὶ]  
Ν[ι]κ[οκράτους καὶ οἱ ἔφηβοι] σ[τεφανωθέντ]ε[ς νν]  
ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς φυλῆς  
ἀρετῆς ἔνε[κα καὶ σωφρο]σύνης. *vacat*

- Col. I: Θεόδωρος Θεοδώρου Λευκονο[εὺς]  
εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Φιλόθεος ὁ σωφ[ρον]-  
5 ιστῆς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς τ[ῶν ἐ]-  
φήβων ἀπαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν ν[εαν]-  
ίσκων καὶ φησιν εἶναι εὐτα[κτῶν]-  
τας καὶ πειθομένος τοῖς τ[ε νόμο]-  
ις καὶ ἑαυτῶι, δεδόχθαι τ[ῇι Λεω]ν-  
10 τίδι ἐπαινέσαι τὴν Λεωντίδα φυ-  
λὴν τῶν ἐφήβων τῶν ἐπὶ Νικοκράτ-  
ους ἄρχοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρ-  
υσῶι στεφάνωι ἕκα[στ]ον αὐτῶν ἀρ-  
ετῆς ἔνεκα, ἐπαιν[έσ]αι δὲ καὶ τὸν  
15 σωφρονιστὴν Φι[λόθ]εον Φιλοκλέ-  
ους Σουνιᾶ καὶ σ[τε]φανῶσαι χρυσ-  
ῶι στεφάνωι ἀπ[ὸ χι]λίων δραχμῶν  
ἐπειδὴν τὰς ἐ[ὐθύ]νας δῶι ἀρετῆς  
ἔνεκα τῆς ε[ἰς τὴν] φυλὴν καὶ τοὺς  
20 ἐφήβους, [ἐπαιν]έσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν τα-  
ξίαρχον [τῆς φ]υλῆς Φιλοκλέα Φ[ιλ]-  
οθέου Σ[ουνι]ᾶ καὶ τοὺς λοχαγο[ύς]

- Πανδαί[την Π]ασικλέος Ποτάμ[ιον]  
 Ἐπικρά[την] Πεισιάνακτος Σ[ουνι]-  
 25 ᾱ Καλλι[ιχάρ]ην Καλλιφάνος [Σουνι]-  
 ᾱ Νικό[ξεν]ον Νικοκλέος Χ[ολληίδ]-  
 ην Τι[μοκρ]άτην Τιμοκλέος Π[οτάμ]-  
 ιον κ[αὶ στ]εφανῶσαι χρυσῶι [στεφ]-  
 άν[ωι ἔκα]στον αὐτῶν ἀπο πεν[τακο]-  
 30 [σίων δρα]χμῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ σω[φροσ]-  
 [ύνης ἔνε]κα, δοῦναι δὲ αὐτοῖς [κα]ὶ  
 [ἀνάθημα] ἀναθεῖναι [ἐν] τῶι ἱε[ρ]ῶι  
 [τοῦ ἥρω, ἐ]παινέσαι [δὲ καὶ] τὸς [δ]ιδ-  
 [ασκάλου]ς τῆς φυλῆ[ς ...6...]την Α-  
 35 [...7....]ν Παλλην[έα ...7....]ν Ἀρ-  
 [..]αινέ[ο] Μεθων[αῖον καὶ στεφ]ανῶ-  
 [σαι] θαλ[λο]ῦ στ[εφάνωι ὅτι καλ]ῶς [ἐ]-  
 [π]εμεληθῆσαν τ[ῶν ἐφ]ή[βων] *vacat*  
 Col. II: [ἀναγράψαι δὲ] τόδε τὸ ψήφισμ[α τῇ]-  
 [ς φυλῆς τὸν γρ]αμματέα τῆς φυ[λῆς]  
 5 [καὶ στῆσαι ἐν] τῶι ἱερῶι, τὸ [δ' ἀνάλ]-  
 [ωμα εἰς τὴν γρα]φὴν δοῦνα[ι τοὺς ἐ]-  
 [πιμελητὰς τῆς φυλῆς, ἀ]ναγράψαι  
 [δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα εἰς τ]ὸ [ἀν]άθ[ημα νιν]  
 [στ]ρα[τ]η[γὸς ἐπὶ] τῶι Περαι[εῖ Κόνω]-  
 10 ν Τιμοθέο Ἀναφλύστιος [στρατηγ]-  
 ὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλ[ος Ἀριστο]-  
 τέλος Φυλάσιος κοσμη[τῆς ...5...]  
 [...] Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχ[αρνεὺς σω]-  
 [φρονι]στῆς [Φιλόθ]εο[ς Φιλοκλέου]  
 15 [ς Σουνι]εὺς ταξίαρχος Φιλοκλέη]-  
 [ς Φιλ]οθέου [Σουνι]εὺς λοχαγοὶ Πα]-  
 [ν]δαίτης Πα[σικλέος Ποτάμιος Ἐπ]-  
 [ικράτης Πει]σιάνακτος Σουνι[εὺς]-  
 [ς Καλλιχάρ]ης Καλλιφάνους Σουν]-  
 20 [ι]εὺς Νι[κ]ό[ξενος Νικοκλέους Χολ]-  
 [ληίδης Τι]μοκράτης Τιμοκλέος Π]-  
 [ο]τάμιος [ἔφηβοι· .....13.....]  
 [...]ης Σω—————  
 [...]υγε—————  
 25 [...]Ι—————  
 [...]ΙΗ—————  
 [...]Ρ—————  
 ἐς Κι—————  
 οδώρου Πρε[σ]βυ[χάρης ....9.....]  
 30 υς Σαννείδης [...7....Ποτάμιοι]  
 καθύπερθεν [...16.....]





Παν[δαίτης Πασικλέος Ποτάμιος] is by no means certain (Pélékidis 1962, 125, n. 4). My suggestion is that the fathers of the ephebes passed the decree. Certainly they played an important role not only in selecting the candidates for *sophronistes* ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 42.2) but also in assessing the *sophronistes*' performance at the end of his term of office in the ephebeia (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1159, lines 11-14, dated to 303/2). For these matters, see pgs. 130-1. The proposed text for Col. III, lines 10-4, is as follows:

[ἐψηφίσθαι δὲ τοῖς πατράσι τῶν τῆς Λεω]ντίδος, Παν[.]-  
 [name ca. 4, patronymic ca. 8, demotic ca. 9, εἶπεν· ἐπειδ]ῇ Φιλόθεος [ὁ σ]-  
 [ωφρονιστῆς τῆς Λεωντίδος φυλῆς δικα]ίως ἐπιμεμέ[λ]-  
 [ηται τῶν νεανίσκων καὶ χρήσιμον αὐτὸ]ν παρέσχηκε[ν]  
 [τοῖς ἐφήβοις τοῖς ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους, ἐπ]αινέσαι Φιλ[ό]-

This restoration avoids Merritt's problematic τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς, which only occurs here, and replaces it with τῶν νεανίσκων, which is used as an alternative to ἔφηβοι in Col. I, lines 3-5. For αὐτὸ]ν instead of ἑαυτὸ]ν with χρήσιμον ... παρέσχηκε[ν] + dative, see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 428 (p. 336/5), lines 4-5; *Agora* 16.104[1] (318/7), lines 17-8; *SEG* 37.86 (303/2), lines 12-3.

The roster is partially preserved. The ephebic *taxiarchos* and *lochagoi* are honored first (Col. II, lines 15-22), followed by the remaining ephebes (Col. II, lines 22-38, Col. III, lines 3-9), which is unfortunately fragmentary. Reinmuth 1971, 31-2, estimates that there is sufficient space in columns II and III for perhaps 38 ephebes. To this the ephebic *taxiarchos* and *lochagoi* must be added, because their names do not appear to have been repeated in the roster (cf. **E15**), in contrast to some ephebic inscriptions (e.g. **E5**). Reinmuth thus estimates c. 44 ephebes, a number accepted by most scholars (e.g. Hansen 1988a, 4). See, however, **E9** below.

**E9: The ephebes of Leontis.**

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment Year: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2?
<u>Find Spot:</u>	Rhamnous.
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Petrakos 1996 (1997), 19. Petrakos 2004, 167-176. <i>SEG</i> 46.237.
<u>Description:</u>	Tetragonal "Hermiac" marble(?) base. No further details.

Text: Petrakos provides some details of the stone's layout but no transcript. This is a summary of his description. The text is stoichedon. There are no decrees. Under the heading, on the front face of the base, there are painted wreaths that honor the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Περαιῶς Κόνων Τιμοθέου Ἀναφλύστιον, κοσμητῆς Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου Ἀρχαρνεύς, σωφρονιστῆς Φιλόθεος Φιλοκλέου Σουνιεύς, and ταξίαρχος Φιλοκλῆς Φιλοκλέου Σουνιεύς. Three *lochagoi* (unnamed but appear on **E8**, Col. I, lines 22-8) and two *didaskaloi* follow (unnamed). Beneath these officials is a roster of ephebes with patronymics and arranged under deme captions. It is complete and numbers 38 ephebes (according to Petrakos) who have the same names as the preserved portion of **E8**'s roster. On the left and right sides of the base there were 7 more *didaskaloi* inscribed, 4 (all foreigners) and 3 (all Athenians) respectively. If so, **E9** corrects Reinmuth's estimate of forty-four ephebes for **E8**.

Notes: Petrakos dates the inscription to 333/2 because the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ χώρῃ Σώφιλος Ἀριστοτέλους Φυλάσιος is not honored on the stone. This would mean that **E9** was erected before **E8**. He also suggests that Θουγείτων Ἀριστοκράτου Ἀρχαρνεύς had died in that year and was then replaced as *kosmetes* by ....8.... Αἰνησιστράτου Ἀχαρνεύς, who is attested on no other inscription for the ephebes enrolled in the archonship of Nicocrates (Petrakos misspells his patronymic as Μνησιστράτου).

#### **E10: *The ephebes of Erectheis.***

Date: Enrollment: 333/2 (Archon). Inscription: 333/2 or 332/1.

Find Spot: Below the east retaining wall of the *temenos* of Nemesis at Rhamnous (*EAM* 313 N).

Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 13 = Pouilloux 1954, 111, no. 2. Petrakos 1979 (1981), 68-9, no. 21, joined two fragments to *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3105, showing that the stone, despite the doubts of Pélékidis 1962, 119, n. 1, and Lewis 1973, 256, was an ephebic inscription. Petrakos 1999, 84-5, no. 98. *SEG* 31.162 = 34.208 = 37.233 = 39.185.

Description: Rectangular cutting on a rounded base (diam. 42 cm.; H: 27 cm.) with moldings top and bottom. Palagia and Lewis 1988, 337-344, suggest that one (NM 313) of the four hip herms (NM 314, 315, 316) found alongside the base fitted into the cutting. L.H. 0.009 m.

Text:

[ὁ σωφ]ρονιστῆς Περικ[— — — — —]άσιος  
[καὶ οἱ τῆς Ἑρε]χθεΐδος ἐφήβων γ[υμ]νασίαρχοι ἀνέθεσαν,  
3 [οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτους ἄρχοντος λαμπάδι νικήσαντες  
[— —]ανδρος Τιμ[— — —] Εὐωνυμεύς, Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν.

ΛΑΜ[ΤΙ]ΑΔΗΦΟΡΟΙ

Col. I:

6 Ἀγακλῆς Περγασῆ  
[— — — — —]  
Ἀρχάγαθος Λανπτρ  
9 Σόλων Ἀγρυλῆθεν  
Πυθοκλῆς Λανπτρε  
Δημοκρίνης Περγα  
12 Δικαιοκράτης Περ  
Χαριναύτης Λαν  
Φιλήμων Ἀγρυλῆ  
15 Ἀριστοκλῆς Λανπ  
Φιλοχάρης Ἀναγυ  
*vacat*  
*vacat*

Col. III:

Ὑπέρβολος Παμ  
30 Φιλοκλῆς Ἀνα  
Ἀριστίων Περγας  
Τελένικος Περγας  
33 Εἶδων Ἀγρυλῆθεν  
Φίλιππος Ἀναγυρά  
Φιλόδημος Λανπτ  
36 Ἀντίφημος Περγας  
Ἀντιφάνης Κηφισι  
Φιλόνεως Περγασῆθ  
39 Νικίας Κηφισιεύς  
Φανοτέλης Εὐων  
*vacat*

Col. II:

[— — — — —]  
18 φανόμα[χος — — —]  
Ἀλκιμαχίδης Περ  
Κίμων Περγασῆ  
21 Τιμοκράτης Κηφι  
Σωσίβ<ι>ος Εὐωνυμ  
Διοκλῆς Λανπτρε  
24 Ἰέρων Λανπτρε  
Πολυκράτης Εὐων  
Ξενοφῶν Λανπτ  
27 ἐπικράτης Εὐων  
[---π]είθης Λαμ  
*vacat*

Col. IV:

ἐπικράτης Ἀναγ  
42 Θηραμένης Κηφισι  
Φίλων Λανπτρ  
Θεόφιλος Ἀ<να>γυρά  
45 Ἀγνωνίδης Κηφισι  
Φιλόστρατος Λαμ  
Κάλλιπ<π>ος Λανπτ  
48 Γλαῦκος Εὐων  
Νικόφημος Εὐω  
Φιλωνίδης Εὐων  
51 Κηφισογένης Κηφ  
Πολυμήδης Λανπτ

Col. V:

Λεωχίδης Εὐων  
*vacat*

Notes: 46 names arranged in five columns (left to right) are attested on the victory stele, plus two erasures in lines 7 and 17. Palagia and Lewis 1988, 333-4, argue that the gymnasiarch Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξιμένου Περγασῆθεν in line 4 is the same person as the ephebe in **E11**, line 9. For a discussion of this gymnasiarchy, see pg. 116, n. 88. If both gymnasiarchs were in fact ephebes, they should then be added to the stele's roster, bringing the total to 48. Petrakos 1999, 84-5, no. 98, has Χαιρέφιλος Περγ in line 7 instead of the erasure.

**E11:** *The ephebes of Erectheis.*

Date: Enrollment: 333/2 (= **E10**). Inscription: 332/1.  
Find Spot: Unknown (*EM* 4112).  
Bibliography: Palagia and Lewis 1989, 334-5, associated *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 2401 with *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3105, proving that it belongs to the ephebic corpus. *SEG* 39.184.  
Description: Fragment of Hymettian marble stele (H. 0.25 m.; W. 0.11 m.; Th. 0.09 m.). L.H. 0.005-0.006 m.  
Text: Non-Stoichedon. Names restored through comparison with **E10**.

Col. I:	Col. II:
[— — — — ο]υ	[— — — — — — — — ]
	Περγασε[ῖς καθύπε(ρθε)]
	Ἀλκιμαχίδης Α[— — — — ]
5	Χαιρέφιλος Ν[— — — — ]
	Φιλόνεως Φίλοσ[— — — — ]
	Κίμων Κίμωνος
	Τελénικος Τελε[— — — — ]
	Περγασεῖς ὑπέ(νερθε)
10	Χαρικλῆς Ἀλεξ[ιμένου]
	Ἀριστίων Ἀριστονί[κου]
	Δικαιοκράτης Εὐμ[— — — — ]
	[Δ]ημοκρίνης Δημοκρ[— — — — ]
	Ἀντίφημος Θερσίου
	Ἀγακλῆς Πασικλεί(δου)
15	Λαμπρεῖς [καθ]ύπε(ρθε)
	Ἰέρων Λυσίου

Ξενοφῶν Θεοδότου  
 [Φί]λων Θεοδώρου  
 [Φ]ιλόδ[ημος] Φρύνωνο[ς?]  
 [Διοπεί]θης Διοπείθου  
 [Διοκλ]ῆς Διοκλείδου  
 [Χα]ρινάυτης Χαριξένο[υ]  
 [Κάλλ]ιππος [Δ]ιοπε[— — — —]  
 [— — — — — — — —]ο[— — —]

Notes: 20 ephebes are listed under three demes (Lower Pergase, Upper Pergase, and Upper Lamptrai). Palagia and Lewis 1989 conjecture that the extant text was column two of the roster and the document originally contained about 50 names under ten deme captions, although **E10** would have had a maximum of 48 ephebes.

**E12:** *The ephebes of Acamantis?*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-333/2 (Prosopography). Inscription: 333/2-332/1.

Find Spot: South of Propylaea of Pompey in Kerameikos (Kerameikos Inv.No. I 64).

Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 7 = Habicht 1961 (1962), 147, no. 3. *SEG* 21.680.

Description: Fragment of Pentelic marble stele with margin on right but otherwise broken. H. 0.08 m.; W. 0.195 m.; Th. 0.127 m. L.H. 0.006 m.

Text: Non-Stoichedon.

— — —  
 [— — — — — χρυσῶι στε]-  
 [φάνωι ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα τ]-  
 ῆς εἰς ἑαυτοῦ[ς στρα]-  
 τηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶι Π[ειραι]-  
 εῖ Κόνωνα Τιμοθ[έου]  
 Ἄν[α]φλύστιον, στρ[α]-  
 5 [τηγὸν ἐ]πὶ τῇι χώρῃ  
 [Σώφιλον Ἀρισ]τοτέλ-  
 [ους Φυλάσιον — — — — —]

— — —

Notes: Habicht dates the stele to the enrollment year of 333/2 since Konon and Sophilos appear on other ephebic inscriptions in the archonship of Nicocrates (e.g. **E5**, lines 4-5; **E7**, lines 9-10; **E8**, Col. II, lines 9-12). But, as Reinmuth points out, these *strategoi* also held the same offices in the previous year (**E4**, lines 4-6). Habicht also plausibly suggests Acamantis because the tribe had an altar nearby dedicated to its eponymous hero at the Dipylon gate (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 4983*). Given the likelihood that the stone had several columns of text to the left (cf. **E8**), this inscription should perhaps be regarded as an *anathema* erected at the end of the ephebes' service rather than a victory-dedication in the torch race, as scholars have supposed (e.g. Humphreys 2004, 115).

**E13:** *The ephebes of Oineis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 332/1 (Archon?). Inscription 331/0.  
Findspot: Rhamnous (Rhamnous Inv.No. 1143).  
Bibliography: Petrakos 1993 (1994), 7; 1993 (1996), 30. *SEG* 43.61 = 44.177.  
Notes: Fragments of a circular base for a small bronze tripod. No text and no further details.

**E14:** *The ephebes of Cecropis*

Date: Enrollment Year: 332/1? (Prosopography). Inscription: 331/0?  
Find Spot: The vicinity of the Library of Pantinos. Base perhaps stood in the Agora.  
Bibliography: Traill 1986, 3-5. *SEG* 36.155.  
Description: Two-block base of seven fragments of Hymettian marble (six from upper block, one the lower block). Dimensions of fragments: *a* = *Agora* no. 990, H: 0.15 m.; W: 0.2 m.; Th: 0.09 m.; L.H. 0.006-0.007 m.; *b* = *Agora* no. 2301, H: 0.097 m.; W: 0.185 m.; Th: 0.323 m.; L.H. 0.006 m.; *c* = *Agora* no. 2259, H: 0.13 m.; W: 0.16 m.; Th: 0.281 m.; L.H. 0.006 m.; *d* = *Agora* no. 7459, H: 0.157 m.;

Text: Fragments of (multiple?) decrees shows that **E12** was similar to **E2** and **E8**. Little of the main text, however, can be recovered. Upper Block: Non-Stoichedon c. 90 (lines 1-8). Lower Block: Non-Stoichedon.

[ ————— ] ὁθα[ι]

[ ————— ] κυρίαν εἶναι

[ ————— ] ἀνάλ(?)ωμα τ[ὸ] παρὰ [...]

[ ————— ] οἱ φυλ[έ]ται ἐψήφ[ισαν ν]

[ ————— ] πειθαρχοῦσιν(?) αὐτῶι· ἐπ[αινέσ]αι ν

[δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοχαγοὺς(?) τῆς Κεκροπίδος φυλῆς τοὺς ἐπὶ — — — — —  
ἄρχοντος καὶ στεφανῶσαι ἕκαστον αὐ]τῶν [χρ]υῶι στε-  
[φάνωι ἀπὸ πεντακοσίων(?) δραχμῶν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὴν  
φυλὴν ἵνα ἅπαντες εἰδῶσιν] ὅτι [ἐ]πίσταται  
[ῆ φυλὴ χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι κατ' ἀξίαν — — — — —  
τῆς χώρας. νν

	Col. I:	Col. II:
10	[Ἀλαιεῖς]	[Ἀθμονεῖς]
	<i>lacuna?</i>	<i>lacuna?</i>
	[-----]	Τει[-----]

	[— — — — — ο]υ		Μνη[— — — — —]
	[— — — — — ]ου		Εὐφ[ρό]νιος [— — — — —]
	[— — — — — ]του	65	Ἀρι[σ]τώνυμο[ς — — — — —]
	[— — — — — ]νος		Αὐτ[ο]μένης [— — — — —]
15	[— — — — — ]δόκου		Αἰ[σχ]ραῖος Χ[— — — — —]
	[— — — — — ]ιάδου		Θε[ός]ενος Μελ[— — — — —]
	[— — — — — ] Φ<α>ιδρίου		<i>vacat</i>
	[— — — — — ]ς Φυρομάχου	70	<i>vacat</i>
	[— — — — — ]ν Ἡφαιστοκλέου		[Φ]λυε[ῖς]
20	[— — — — — ]σιος Εὐφραίου		[...]κλείδη[ς ...]εἰ[— — — — —]
	[— — — — — ]ς [..ιος] Θεοφίλου		[Ἀρί]μνηστ[ο]ς Ἀριμ[νήστου]
	[Αἰξ]ωνεῖς		[...]ελος Κηφισο[δώρου(?)]
	[— — — — — ]ς Φ[— — — — —]	75	[Νι]κήρατος Εὐβ[ούλου]
	[— — — — — ]		Ἀπήμαντος Ἀπημ[άντου]
25	[— — — — — ]		Πολύστρατος Πολυ[στράτου]
	[.]ι[.]θ[.]ιος [— — — — —]		Ἀνθεμίων Ἀντιλ[όχου]
	Ἐκφ[α]ν[τ]ος [— — — — —]		Ἀρχέδικος Ἀρχε[δίκου]
	Καλλίας [— — — — —]	80	Ἀ[— — — — —]
	[Ε]ργ[ο — — — — —]		[ <i>vacat?</i> ]
30	[— — — — — ]		[ <i>vacat?</i> ]
	Λυσ[— — — — —]		[Πιθεῖς](?)
	[.]π[— — — — —]		[— — — — —](?)
	[— — — — — ]θου	85	[— — — — —](?)
	Κ[— — — — — ]ράτου		[— — — — —](?)
35	Ε[— — — — — ] Μεταλ[ήξι]δος		[— — — — —](?)
	Ν[— — — — — ]οκλέους		[ <i>vacat?</i> ]
	Σ[— — — — — ] Σωσ[... ]μο[υ]		[ <i>vacat?</i> ]
	<i>vacat</i>	90	[Επιεικίδαι] (?)
	<i>vacat</i>		[— — — — —](?)
40	<i>vacat</i>		[ <i>vacat?</i> ]
Lower Block:			
	[Τρι]νεμεῖς		[ <i>vacat</i> ]
	[— — — — — ]ου		<i>vacat</i>
	[— — — — — ]ο[δ]ώρο(υ)	95	<i>vacat</i>
			<i>vacat</i>
			Μελιτεῖς
			Κηφισοφῶν Πυθοδώρου
			Παυσανίας Χαριδήμου
		100	Ἱερώνυμος Ἱερωνύμου
			Ἀριστόμαχος Δημοχάρου
			Δημοχάρης Δημοχάρου
			Θεόδωρος Θεοδώρο[υ]
			Πυθόδωρος Ἀγωνίππου
	<i>vacat</i> of ten lines		



55	Συπαλήττιοι	105	Εὐφημος Θάλλου
	[Ε]ὐθύβουλος Διογένους		Ἡγήσιππος Θάλλου
	<i>vacat</i>		<i>vacat</i>
	<i>vacat</i>		<i>vacat</i>
	<i>vacat</i>	110	<i>vacat</i>
	Δαϊδαλίδαι		Ζυπεταῖονες
	<i>vacat c. 0.13 m. to bottom</i>		Ἀσωπόδωρος [Ι]σχομάχου
			Ἰσχομάχος Ἀριστομάχου
			Λυσικράτης Χιωνίδου
		115	Μεναῖος Θουδ<ό>του ἐκ Κοίλης
			<i>vacat ca. 0.085m. to bottom</i>

Line 115: *lapis* ΘΟΥΔΩΤΟΥ

Notes: Traill 1986, 12-3, suggests a date of “332/1 B.C. or shortly after” because he supposes that two ephebes – Ἀρχέδικος Ἀρχε[δίκου] Φλυεύς (line 79) and Ἀριστόμαχος Δημοχάρου Μελιτεύς (line 101) – also appeared in the Cecropis inscription of the previous year (E5, lines 48, 50). But this is probably incorrect (see pg. 103, n. 20). Nevertheless, if [Νι]κήρατος Εὐβ[ούλου] Φλυεύς (line 75) is the brother of Euboulos and Suneboulos in E5 (lines 42-3), it is likely that the ephebes enrolled in one year during the period 332/1-330/29, possibly in 332/1. Traill’s careful reconstruction of the stone has found physical evidence of 58 ephebes arranged in two columns on the right side of the upper block under eight deme headings, of which Halai Aixonides, Athmonon, and Trinemeia have been fully restored. The editor has also conjectured that there is sufficient space for two more deme contingents – Pithos and Epieikidai (Col. II, lines 83-87, 90-1) – which total 5 ephebes and that one more should be added to the lists of Halai Aixonides and Athmonon. If so, the size of the contingent was 58-65 ephebes.

**E15:** *The ephebes of Pandionis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 332/1 or 331/0 (Prosopographical). Inscription: 331/0 or 330/29.

<u>Find Spot:</u>	Petrakos 1982 (1984), 161, no. 6, confirms that the stone came from Rhamnous. Pouilloux had wrongly suggested Sounion ( <i>EM</i> 4211).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Reinmuth 1971 no. 10 = Pouilloux 1954, 107, no. 2. <i>SEG</i> 34.150. Petrakos 1999, 88-9, no. 101.
<u>Description:</u>	Base (H: 0.535 m.; W: 0.42 m.; Th: 0.24 m.) of local marble broken on all sides with a cutting (W: 0.165 m.; B: 0.115 m.; D: 0.04 m.) on the top for a herm. L.H. 0.007 m.
<u>Text:</u>	Stoichedon 43 (lines 1-8), Non-Stoichedon (lines 9-22).

	[...ΙΛΛ. ΡΟ.....20.....ΦΗΜ.....11.....]			
	[.]ΚΛΓΛΙΟΓΛΙ.....10..... Ἀν]τικλείδη[ν] Ἀντικλέο[υς]			
	[λο]χαγὸν Κλεαίνε[τον..5...]δρου Κυδαθ[η]ναίεα λοχ[αγὸ]-			
	[ν....8....]νην Διοφῶν[τος Π]ρασιέα λοχαγὸν Ἡγε[...5...]			
5	[...9.....]τωνος Κυ[δ]α[θ]ην[αι]έα λο[χ]αγ[ὸ]ν Σάτυρον Ἐ[...]			
	[...6...Παι]ανιέα λοχαγὸν [...]φιλον [Σω]κράτους Κυ[δαθ]-			
	[η]ναίεα δι]δασκάλο[υς Κάλ]λαιο[χρ]ον Καλλίου Παιανιέ[α]			
	[...8....]ητων Φιλοκρά[τ]η[ν Σ]ωστρ[ά]το[υ] Φρεάρριον [...]			
	<i>vacat</i>			
10	[ἡ βου]λή	Ῥαμνού-	Ἐλευσί-	Φυλάσι-
	[ὁ δῆ]μος	σιοι	νιοι	οι
	<i>vacat</i>			
	Col. I:		Col. II:	
	[Πρασ]ιεις		[— — — — —]	
	[— —]ΛΙΟ[.]ΛΗ[...Σ		[— — — — —]	
	[— —]Γ-Ο[— — — — —]		[— — — — —]	
	[— —]Φιλιστῖωνος		ΛΗΝ[— — —]	
15	[— —]ος Ζωπύρου		[— — — —]ωνος[— —]	
	[— —]ωρ Θεοφαντου		Ἀντ[— — —]	
	[— —]ς Δημητρίου		ΑΝΤΙΣ[— — —]	
	[— — — — —]		ΛΑΚΡ[— — — —]	
	[— — — — —]		ΑΙΝ[— — — —]	
20	[— — — — —]		[— — — — —]	
	[— — — — —]		[— — — — —]	
	[— — — — —]		[— — — — —]	
	Col. III:			
	[Κυδ]αθηναίεις			

Ἀ[ρ]κέδημ[ο]ς Εὐξένου[υ]  
 Ἰσόδημος Ἰσιφίλου[υ]  
 Ἀντιχάρης Ἀντικλέου[ς]  
 15   [.5...]οτης Αἰνησίου  
       [Ἡ]γητο[ι]κῆς Φιλέου  
       [.]ΥΑ— — — —  
       Ἀντιγένη[ς...]ων[ος]  
       Πρώταρχ[ο]ς ΛΙΧΙΡΑ  
 20   Μεγ[.]ων [Φ]ορμίωνος  
       Φανόμα[χ]ος Μ[.]ν[— —]  
       [— — ]ρ[ — —]τη[.]ομο[ — —]

Notes: The enrollment year cannot be 333/2 as there is already a different year-class of ephebes – E7 – attested for that year, nor is 334/3 likely because ephebic *lochagoi* occur from 333/2 onwards. If the official of unknown title Φιλοκρά[τ]η[ν Σ]ωστρ[ά]το[υ] Φρεάρριον (line 8) is the same man who was diaitetes in 329/8 (Davies 1971, no. 13374F: *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1925, lines 5-6), then the enrollment year was c. 332/1-331/0. Reinmuth suggests ca. 332/1 and Pouilloux “environs de 330.” Petrakos 1999, 88, dates it to 333-324.

Two textual problems need to be discussed in lines 7-8. Pouilloux’s edition of the text has δι]δασκαλο[ν whereas Peek 1942, 21, no. 24, had earlier suggested γυμ]νασίου[ρχο]ν. Reinmuth’s examination of the inscription confirmed Pouilloux’s reading, but he suggests “with some hesitation” the accusative plural instead of the singular because if we accept the latter and the restoration Κάλ]λαισ[χρ]ον, this would leave a space between the two words. But this also creates a problem (as Reinmuth is well aware), since only one name is attested after δι]δασκάλο[υς before Reinmuth’s reading of [...8....]ητων in line 8. If correct, this would rule out Pélékidis’ 1962, 151, suggestion of ἐπὶ τῶν ἐφ]ήβων. Reinmuth instead restores [ἐξ ἐπιμελ]ητων, which would then mean that one of the *epimeletai* who maintained the fortress at Rhamnous (cf. E20, Left Side, lines 7-9) was also a *didaskalos*. Reinmuth 1971, 37, confuses these *epimeletai* with those who oversaw the Amphiareion (*IG* VII *Addenda* 4253; cf. Lewis 1973, 255). Though it should be stressed that Reinmuth’s restorations are less than secure, I cannot suggest any viable alternative, unless we assume that a name has dropped

out of the text after Παιανιέ[α] and that the official in line 8, whatever he is, is not a *didaskalos*.

The inscription lists at least five ephebic *lochagoi* at the bottom of a list of officials (lines 3-7) with perhaps Ἀντικλείδη[ν] Ἀντικλέο[υς] in line 2 being another ephebic officer (Reinmuth suggests a *lochagos* or a *taxiarchos*; Sekunda 1992, 337, rules out the former). These ephebes are not mentioned in the roster at the bottom of the inscription. Reinmuth 1971, 36, argues that with “three columns of names the extant stone would yield space for 30-33 names and demotics. If eight of the ca. ten demes of Pandionis were represented, 22-25 epheboi might have been listed which with the inclusion of the taxiarch and the five lochagoi would give a total of 28-31 epheboi for Pandionis in this year.” Elsewhere he gives another total – 55 ephebes – without explanation (23)! Reinmuth’s estimate must be regarded as a *minimum*, however, because the bottom edge of the stone is broken and consequently there is no certain way to determine the size of the tribal contingent.

**E16: *The ephebes of Aigeis***

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment Year: 331/0. Inscription: 330/29.
<u>Find Spot:</u>	Rhamnous ( <i>EM</i> 4218).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Petrakos 1982, vol. I, 336. Schwenk 1985, no. 46. Stanton 1996, 344-5; Petrakos 1999, 85-6, no. 99. <i>SEG</i> 34.151 = 35.239 = 46.248 = 49.192. Petrakos joined fragments to <i>IG</i> II <sup>2</sup> 1181, showing that it was ephebic and from Rhamnous (Kirchner supposed a deme decree from Sounion).
<u>Description:</u>	Front side of base of Pentelic marble with moulding on the top (H. 0.53 m.; W. 0.29 m.; Th. 0.197 m.). L.H. 0.006 m.
<u>Text:</u>	Non-Stoichedon.

Front:  
οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς Αἰγίδιδ[ο]ς οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀριστοφάνους ἄρχον-  
[τος] καὶ ὁ σωφρονιστὴ[ς] τοῦ]των Θαρρίας Θαρριάδου

3 [Ἐρχιεὺς —————] ἔθυσεν ἐφ' ὑγίαι καὶ σωτη-  
 [ρίαι —————] νιδο[...τ]οῦ δήμου.  
 [—————] Λ[.] ΣΜ[...]  
 Right Side:  
 [—————] ΟΛΕΟΥ[—————]  
 [—————] Φ[.] Ρ[.] ΟΥ[—————]  
 3 [—————] ΝΟ[—————]

Notes: Petrakos does not include Kirchner's reading of ΕΚΑ in line 5. What is the singular subject of ἔθυσεν? I suggest that it was the *sophronistes* and consequently line 3 could be restored as [Ἐρχιεὺς ἀνέθεσαν. Θαρρίας δὲ] ἔθυσεν. If so, for whose health and safety (ἐφ' ὑγίαι καὶ σωτη[ρίαι]) Tharrias is sacrificing? It could be the Rhamnousians, if we assume that the ephebes of Aegeus were stationed at the fort in their second year of service, although Nemesis is a possibility. Much about the inscription is unclear: there is no ready explanation for —] νιδο[...τ]οῦ δήμου, even if we adopt the following reading νιδο[ς καὶ τ]οῦ δήμου.

**E17: A dedication to Hermes.**

Date: Inscription: 330/29 or later (Archon).  
Find Spot: Western side of Southern slope at Rhamnous (*EM* 12698).  
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 11 = *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 4594a. Petrakos 1984 (1988), 208-9; 1999, 86-7, no. 100. *SEG* 12.165 = 31.179 = 38.188.  
Description: Fragment of Hymettian marble base (H: 0.2 m.; W: 0.647 m.; Th: 0.57 m.) with cutting for a socle of a statue or column. Ornate lettering. L.H. 0.019 m. (lines 1-2), 0.006-0.01 m. (lines 3-5).  
Text: Non-Stoichedon.

[Θε]οφάνης Ἱεροφῶντιδος Ῥαμνούσιος Ἑρμεῖ [ἀν]έθηκεν στεφανωθε[ῖς]  
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν σοφρονιστῶν καὶ τῶν κοσμητῶν.

*in coronae oleaginae*

ἐφηβοὶ	ἐφηβοὶ	ἐφηβοὶ
οἱ ἐπὶ Νικοκράτου	οἱ ἐπὶ Νικήτου	οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀριστοφάνου
ἄρχοντος	ἄρχοντος	ἄρχοντος

Notes: A unique inscription in that the ephebes and ephebic officials from three enrollment years are collectively honoring a citizen who was not part of the ephebeia (the inscription alludes to no office). While is not ephebic, it should nevertheless be included in the corpus because of its connection with the ephebeia. Petrakos dates the dedication to 331/0, but this is the ephebes' enrollment year, not the end of their military service. Consequently the inscription must be dated to 330/29 or after.

**E18:** *The ephebes of Oineis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 330/29? (Proposography). Inscription: 329/8?  
Find Spot: Bedrock at bottom of Valerian Wall in Agora (*Agora* Inv.No. I 5250).  
Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 12 = Pritchett 1949, 273-8.  
Description: Stele of Hymettian marble (H: 1.154 m.; W: 0.3 m.; Th: 0.152 m.), complete except for the top front, with crowning bead molding and a cutting for a herm (H. 0.114 m.; W 0.06 m.). L.H. 0.007 m.  
Text: Non-Stoichedon.

Col. I:		Col. II:	
[demoticum]		[— — — — —]	
[— — — — —]		[— — — — —]	
[— — — — —]		40	[Ἀχαρνεῖς]
5	[— — — — —]		[Σώστρατος]
	Νικομένης		Εὐθoinos
	Βουτάδαι		Τιμοκλῆς
	Ἄβρων		Ἴπποθέρης
	Θεαῖος	45	Ἀριστοφάνης
10	Τυρμεῖδαι		Θεόφιλος
	Δημοφάνης		Λέων
	Φυλάσιοι		Δημόφιλος
	Ἀριστοφῶν		Εὐθύμαχος
	Διότιμος	50	Ἀριστοτέλης
15	Λεπτίνης		Κηφισογένης
	Σωκράτης		Ναυκύδης
	Αὐτοκλῆς		Ἀντιφάνης
	Ἐπικράτης		Διόδωρος

20	Περιθοῖδαι Φιλέας Ὅηθεν Ἀριστόδημος Νέων Δήμων	55	Ἐχέμυθος Φίλιππος Μνησίας Δημοκῆδης Δεισίθεος
25	Καλλιφῶν Ἀγαθοκλῆς Λακιάδαι Κτησίας Θεόπομπος	60	Λυσικράτης Ἡγήτωρ Εὐθυκλῆς Πυθοκλῆς Ὀλυμπιόδωρος
30	Θριάσιοι Εὐβουλος Τελεσίβουλος Εὐβουλος Χιωνίδης	65	Κοθωκίδαι Δορκεύς Ἀριστόνικος Ἄβριππος Μνησικλῆς
35	Πτελεάσιοι Εὐπόλεμος Σωσίπολις		
70	<i>vacat</i> Κηφισογένην Ἀχαρνέα <i>vacat</i> Ἄβρωνα Βουτάδην	75	<i>vacat</i> Χιωνίδην Θριάσιον <i>vacat</i> Σώστρατον Ἀχαρνέα
		79	Φίλιππον Ἀχαρνέα
3	Right Side: Χειμέα σωφρονιστήν <i>vacat</i> Φίλιππον	6	Left Side: Ναυκύδην Διογένους <i>vacat</i> Φιλημονίδην στρατηγόν <i>vacat</i> Κηφίσιππον
		9	ἄκοντιστήν

Notes: The prosopographical details of the inscription on the ephebes Habron, probably Lycurgus' son, of the deme Boutidai (Col. I, lines 8, 72-3), Pythocles Arcarneus (Col. II, line 63), and the *sophronistes* Chemeus, suggest a date c. 330/29 (Pritchett 1949, 273, 275; Reinmuth 1971, 44-5; Merker 1986, 42). The identification of Φίλιππον, without

patronymic, on Right Side, line 3, is unclear. He cannot be an ephebe because Φίλιππον Ἀχαρνέα is attested on Left Side, lines 78-9. Hence he must be the *kosmetes*, a *strategos*, or a *didaskalos*, but it is impossible to determine this (Reinmuth 1971, 48). The extant roster lists 52 ephebes, organized into two columns with 25 under two unknown demes (one of which must be Acharnae on account of its huge contingent of twenty-four ephebes), and the remainder under nine demes. Pritchett 1949, 273, suggests that there is enough space for up to six more ephebes or demotics between the molding and the top of the roster. Reinmuth 1971, 49-50, suggests that two of the three unrepresented small demes (Louisa, Hippotomadai, and Epikephisia) supplied contingents. We cannot be certain, however, whether all three did, so I estimate 55-56 ephebes for Oineus in this year.

**E19:** *The ephebes of an unknown tribe.*

<u>Date:</u>	Enrollment Year: 331/0 or 330/29 or 328/7. Inscription: 330/29 or 329/8 or 327/6.
<u>Find Spot:</u>	Oropos (Oropos Inv.No. A 395).
<u>Bibliography:</u>	Petrakos 1980, 28, no. 5. Petrakos 1997, 270, no. 352.
<u>Description:</u>	Fragmentary base of white marble (H. 0.115 m.; W. 0.16 m.; Th. 0.145 m). L.H. 0.012 m.
<u>Text:</u>	Petrakos' photograph of the fragment (1997, plate 41) suggests that it was non-stoichedon.

[Οἱ ἐφηβεύσαντες ἐπὶ Εὐθυκ]ρί[του ἄρχοντος οἱ τῆς]  
 [— — — ἴδος καὶ ὁ σ]ωφρονιστῆ[ς — — — — —]  
 [— — — — — ἀνέθ]εσαν τῷ Ἀμ[φιάρῳ στεφανῶ]-  
 [θέντες ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς] καὶ τοῦ δή[μου].

Notes: Petrakos' restoration of οἱ ἐφηβεύσαντες should be rejected because it is unattested in the ephebic corpus until the third century (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 665* [266/5], line 7). Given that ..]ρί[. must be part of an archon's name rather than a tribe's, the following are possible, each used in prescripts in the Lycurgan period: (1) [οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς tribe ca.



8-10 οἱ ἐπὶ ..ca.1-5..]ρι[....ca.3-9... ἄρχοντος (cf. **E2** and **E5**) or (2) [tribe ca. 8-10 ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ ..ca.1-5..]ρι[....ca.3-9... ἄρχοντος (cf. **E4** and **E21**). Petrakos dates the inscription to the archonship of Εὐθυκρίτης (328/7), though he does not explain why we should choose Εὐθυκρίτης over the other two candidates for archon, namely Ἀριστοφάνης (331/0) and Ἀριστοφῶν (330/29). All three archon-dates are possible, however, because only the heading is preserved and we do not have any prosopographical information. Nor can we determine which tribe is being honored for their military service. With these caveats in mind, I suggest the following restoration, having examined Petrakos' photograph:

[Οἱ ἔφηβοι οἱ τῆς tribe ca. 8-10 οἱ ἐπὶ Ἀ]ρί[...6-8... ἄρ]-  
 [χοντος ἐνγραφέντες καὶ ὁ σ]ωφρονιστῆ[ς name ca. 9]  
 [patronymic ca. 9, demotic ca. 9 ἀνέθ]εσαν τῶι Ἀμ[φιαρά]-  
 [ῶι στεφανωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς] καὶ τοῦ δή[μου].

**E20:** *The ephebes of Leontis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 332/1-326/5 (Prosopography); Inscription: 331/0-325/4.

Find Spot: East of statue base for Agrippa in the Amphiarraion at Oropus (Oropus Inv.No. 344).

Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 15 = Leonardos 1918, 73-100, nos. 95-7; Petrakos 1997, 270-281, no. 353. *SEG* 37.233 = 39.186.

Description: Limestone base with molding top and bottom (H. 0.73 m.; W. 0.485 m.; Th. 0.335 m.). Nine circles on the left and right sides honor nine officials. L.H. on Face 0.012 m. (line 1), 0.004-0.007 m. (lines 2-84). L.H. on sides 0.008 m.

Text: Non-Stoichedon.

ΛΟΧΑΓΟΙ  
 Ἡγέστ[ρ]ατος Κλείππου, Ἀ[γ]νίας Μακαρτά[τ]ου, Πασιφῶν Παντήνορος  
 Ἀρχέπολις Παντήνορος, Παράμυθος Ἀντιγένου, Σωσίστρατος  
 Σωσιστράτου, Λυσανίας Μόλωνος, Δ[ω]σί[θ]εος Ἀντιγένου,

5	Φο[ρ]ύσκος Τιμοκράτου, Σωσικλῆς Σωσιστράτου, Τιμήσιος Σημωνίδου. Col. I: Φρεάριοι Εὐπολις Καλλιάρχου Ἀλκίμαχος Καλλιάρχου Διόδωρος Καλλιάρχου Πασιφῶν Παντήνορος	Col. II: <i>vacat</i> Ποτάμιοι ὑπένερθεν Παράμυθος Ἀντιγένου Ἐπικράτ[η]ς Ἀριστοκράτου
10	Ἀρχέπολις Παντήνορος Ἑρμιππος Πυθέου Εὐπολις Καλλιάρχου Ξενοκράτης Ἀντιρήτου Σώστρατος Φιλοκλήδου	Σκαμ[β]ωνίδαι Δωσίθεος Ἀντιγένου Ταυρέας Αἰσίμου Ποτάμιοι καθύπερθεν Δημοφάνης Ἀρ[ι]στ[ο]φάνου
15	Ἀρχιάδης Ἀρχίππου Θρασυκλῆς Θράσωνος Πυθόδωρος Δημ[ο]κλέους Σμικρίας Ἐπι[...ο]υ [Υ]β[ά]δ[ι]αι	Αἰθαλίδαι Ἐξώπιος Φαιδρίου Ποτάμιοι Δειραδιῶται Πύρρος [Π]ανγκλέους [Φ]ιλόφρων Πανγκλέ[ου]ς
20	Μενεστρατίδης Ἱπποστράτου Λύκαιος Λυκαίου Φρύνιχος Φρυναίου Ἥγίας Ἥγιου Ἀπολλόδωρ[ος] Λυσιστρ[άτ]ου	[...]μων Ξενο[κ]λ[έ]ους [Ε]ὐάνδρος [Ε]ὐάν[δρ]ου Σωσιγένης Σώ[σο]υ Σουνιε[ῖς]
25	Χολλεῖδαι Λυσίστρατος Λυσικρ[ά]τους φί[...]ος Αἰσχίνου Ἀμύντης Σωδάμου Ναῦσις Γνάθωνος	Ἥγ[ε]στρατος Κλείππου Σωσικλῆς Σωσ[ιστ]ρά[τ]ου Σωσίστρατος [Σωσις]τ[ρά]του Τ[ιμ]ήσιος Σ[ημωνίδ]ου Ναυσίφιλος Κίμωνος Διονύσιππος Εὐαγγέλου
30	Ἐκαλεῖς Λυσιφῶν Φιλί[σ]κου Πήληκες Ἱεροκλῆς Φεί[δ]ωνος φιλῖνος Χαιρεστράτου	Μειδωνίδης Περικλέους Ἀρχέδειπνος Νικοδήμου Θάλλιππος Εὐαγγέλου Δημοφῶν Εὐξένου Δειραδιῶται
35	Κήττιοι Λυσίστρατος Ε[ὐ]ξένου Ἀπιτελίδης Φιλοκράτου Σμίκυθος Ξενοκλέους Σωσίστρατος Σω[σ]τράτου	Λυσανίας [Μ]όλωνος Λευκονοῆς Φο[ρ]ύσκος Τιμο[κρ]άτους Δήμαρχος Ἀριστάνδρου Θαρρέας Σατύρου Ζαιρεφῶν Καλλιστράτου Καλλίστρατος Σωτέλου
40	Τιμόστρατος Τιμοκράτου Ἐπικράτης Σπο[υ]δίου Col. III: <i>vacat</i> ἐξ Οἴου Ἄγνίας Μακάρου Στράτων Στρατωνίδου	
10	Εὐπυρίδαι Εὐκτίμενος Εὐκτιμένος Κολωνῆς	

Αἰσχύλος Πρωτομάχο  
Θεόδωρος Ἀμφιμάχο[υ]

Left Side:		
[τούς]δε ἔστεφ[ά]νωσαν οἱ ἔφηβοι·		
	στρατηγὸν τὸν	σωφρονιστὴν
3	ἐπὶ τεῖ χώραι	
	<i>in a circle</i>	<i>in a circle</i>
	Λεωσ(θ)ένην	Θυμοχάρην
	Λεωσ(θ)ένου	12 Δημοχάρου
6	Κεφαλήθεν	Λευκονέα
	<i>in a circle</i>	<i>in a circle</i>
	ἐπιμεληταὶ	διδάσκαλον
	οἱ ἐν τοῖς	15 Πυθα[— —]
9	[φ]ρουρίοις	[.ca.5...]οκλέου
		Δεκελέα
	<i>in a circle</i>	
	18 Λυσίστρατον	
	Εὐξένου	
	Κήττιον	

Right Side:		
τούςδε ἔστεφάνωσαν οἱ ἔφηβοι		
	<i>in a circle</i>	<i>in a circle</i>
	στρατηγὸν	στρατηγὸν
3	ἐπ[ί] τῷ Πειραεῖ	12 ἐπὶ τει Ἀκτεῖ
	Δικαιογένην	Φερεκλείδην
		Φερεκλέους
6	Κυδαθηναέα	15 Περιθοίδην
	<i>in a circle</i>	<i>in a circle</i>
	κοσμητὴν	ἐπιμελητὴν
	Φιλοκλέα	Νικόδωρον
9	Φορμίωνος	18 Φιλοθήρου
	Ἐροιάδην	Ἀχαρνέα

Notes: Lewis 1973, 255, observes that “the inscription is certainly incomplete as it stands, with dedicatory formula.” A variety of dates have been proposed: Pélékidis 1962, 138-143, dates it somewhere between 330-322. Other estimates fall into this range. Bosworth 1988a, 293-4, favors a date of 329/8 (see also Tracy 1995, 25-6, 93, 119), while Gomme 1933, 69, argues for 327/6-326/5 and Leonardos 1918, 96-7, the *editio princeps*, suggests 324/3, as does Reinmuth 1971, 69-72. The inscription was first dated to 324/3 because Dikaiogenes of Kydathenaion is attested as *strategos* of the Piraeus (Right Side, Col. I,

lines 2-6) and there is epigraphic evidence that he held the same office in 325/4 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1631, lines 214-5). But Dikaiogenes was also *strategos* in 324/3 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1631, lines 380-1), although his area of responsibility, if he had one, is unspecified. Also, if Dikaiogenes was *strategos* of the Piraeus in 325/4, then Λεωσ(θ)ένης Λεωσ(θ)ένου Κεφαλήθεν, who is honored as *strategos* of the countryside (Left Side, lines 2-6), almost certainly the same man who led Athenian forces in the Lamian War (see Davies 1971, 342-4, no. 9142), must have served in this capacity in 324/3. But Leosthenes could not have been *strategos* of the countryside and have commanded the mercenaries at Taenarum at the same time (D.S. 17.111.3), because the former office was exclusively concerned with defense of Attica ([Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 61.1). Nor could he have held this office in the next year (323/2), since he had died by the summer of 322 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1631, lines 601-2).

Another reason to suppose a date of 324/3 is the identification of the *kosmetes* Φιλοκλῆς Φορμίωνος Ἐρσιόδης (Right Side, lines 6-10) with the Philocles (patronymic and deme unknown) who was *strategos* at the Munychia in 325/4 and who was prosecuted for allowing Harpalus to enter Athens against the orders of the *demos*, found guilty, and then exiled (Din. 3 *Against Philocles*, *passim*; Dem. *Ep.* 3.31-2). While Dinarchus does say that Philocles was removed from the “care of the ephebes (ἐπιμελεία τῶν ἐφήβων)” (3.15), this Philocles should nevertheless be regarded as a separate individual from the *kosmetes* because (1) ἐπιμελεία can refer *any* official serving in the ephebeia (e.g. **E5**, lines 1-11: for ἐπιμελεία as a virtue “for those who trained or looked after ephebes,” see Whitehead 1993, 68-9), (2) Philocles is a common name in Athens (Gomme 1933, 68; Tracy 1995, 25, n. 22), and (3) any attempt to link Philocles the *kosmetes* and the *strategos* results in chronological difficulties which cannot be resolved (Reinmuth 1971, 73-6; Worthington 1986, 63-76; 1989, 80-2).

The above suggests that the ephebes cannot have been enrolled in 325/4 or 324/3. What, then, is the date of the inscription? Bosworth 1988a, 294, and Tracy 1995, 24-5, argue that it should instead be dated to 329/8, on the occasion of the first penteteric festival at the sanctuary of Amphiaraus at Oropus. But it is just as likely that the ephebes were enrolled in the archonship of Chremes (326/5) and had made the dedication at the

second pentatelic festival in 325/4. This is in fact Reinmuth's supposition, though he incorrectly dates the festival to 324/3 (1971, 70-1; Lewis 1973, 255, corrects Reinmuth to 325/4). There is no compelling reason, however, to prefer one particular date over any other. Consequently I date the inscription to 331/0-325/4, with the ephebes' enrollment year occurring between 332/1 and 326/5 (it cannot be 333/2 because **E8** dates to that year and it must date after 333/2 because ephebic *lochagoi* are attested).

**E21:** *The ephebes of Hippothontis.*

Date: Enrollment: 332/1 or 325/4 (Archon restored). Inscription: 331/0 or 324/3.

Find Spot: Panactum (Panakton 1991-350).

Bibliography: Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn). *SEG* 38.67.

Description: Rectangular marble base (H. 0.39 m.; W. 0.54 m.; Th. 0.37 m.) smoothed (right side broken and lower left side of face eroded) with a rectangular cutting for a dedication (W. 0.22 m.; B. 0.18 m.; D: 0.047 m.).

Text: (Description) A heading of two lines followed by four(?) wreaths which honor an unknown official, probably a *strategos*, followed by the *sophronistes*, the *kosmetes*, and the ephebic *taxiarchos*. Underneath these officials, in the center of the stone, are two more wreaths, each of which honors an ephebic *lochagos*. The roster is organized into two columns, one to the right of and the other below the *lochagoi*, in which 19 names are preserved. Hansen 1994, 302, n. 24, for some reason gives c. 34 names on the roster.

Notes: Munn's restoration for the prescript is [Ἱπποθων]τιδὸς [ἔφηβοι οἱ ἐπὶ Νικ[οκράτους ἄρχοντος Διὸς νν [κο]ύροις ἀ[νέ]θε[σαν]. The enrollment year cannot have been 333/2, however, because the *kosmetes* in the archonship of Nicocrates is ....8.... Αἰνησιστρά]του Ἀχαρνέα (**E8**, Col. II, lines 12-3), not Κτησικλῆν Κόπρειον honored in wreath no. 3. Through private correspondence, Munn has informed me that the average center-to-center distance for the first two lines is 1.29 cm. I suggest that this would leave a distance of about 16.5-17 cm, or 13-15 letters between the sigma

and the kappa in line one. If so, Nicetes (332/1) or Anticles (325/4) are possibilities. The prosopographical details on the ephebes (esp. Μνησίθειος Κόπ[ρειος] and his family c. 350-260: see Traill 1995-2004, nos. 656325-656340) do not allow us to determine which archon-year is correct.

**E22: *The ephebes of Acamantis.***

Date: Enrollment Year: 333/2-323/2 (Ephebic Officers). Inscription: 332/1-322/1.

Find Spot: Northwest of Theater and South of Citadel Wall at Rhamnous (*EM* 13200).

Bibliography: Reinmuth 1971 no. 14 = McLeod 1959, 121-6. Petrakos 1999, 89-90, no. 103.

Description: Upper right corner of white sugary marble pillar crowned with cavetto capital. Top is rough picked, sides and back smoothly finished. Dedication secured with dowel hole. H. 307 m.; W. 0.155m; Th. 0.216 m. L.H. 0.007 m. (lines 1-2), 0.005 m. (lines 3-15).

Text: Non-Stoichedon.

[οἱ ἔφηβοι στεφ]ανωθέντες ὑπὸ  
 [τῆς βουλῆς καὶ το]ῦ δήμου vac.  
*infra abacum*  
*vacat*  
 [ταξίαρχ]ος  
 [—————]κου Θορίκιος  
 5 [λοχαγ]οί  
 [—————]ου Προσπάλτιο[ς]  
 [—————]Ἀγνούσιος  
 [—————]ο]υς Χολαργεύς  
 [—————]κρ]άτους Θορίκιος  
 10 [—————]Κ]εφαλήθεν  
 [—————]ο]υ[ς] Χολαργεύς  
 [—————]Σ]φήττιος  
 [—————]ς Θορίκιος

15      [— — — — — ἐκ Κ]εραμείων  
           [— — — — — — — — — Θ]ορίκιος  
           *vacat*

Notes: Preserves the heading and a list of ephebic *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi*. This suggests that the ephebes were enrolled c. 333/2-324/3 because ephebic officers are attested from the archonship of Nicocrates.

**E23:** *The ephebes of Leontis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan).

Find Spot: Panactum (Panakton 1988-1).

Bibliography: Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn). *SEG* 38.67.

Description: Fragment of marble stele left edge preserved but other three sides broken (H. 0.24 m.; W. 0.12 m.; Th. 0.055-0.06 m.). L.H. 0.0055 m. (lines 1-9, 22-29), 0.004 m. (lines 10-21).

Text: (Description) Non-stoichedon. One column is preserved which lists 16 ephebes under five deme headings (Deiradiotai, Kropidai, Sophon Chenarchou, ex Oiou, and Potamioi). These show that the ephebes come from Leontis. If there were two columns on the stone, then the contingent would have numbered at least 32 ephebes and perhaps many(?) more. Above the roster is the fragmentary text of two decrees. This suggests that the dedication was similar to the more substantial ephebic inscriptions of **E2**, **E8**, and **E14**. The genitive of the name σ]τρατου appears in line 6, which could be the patronymic of the *sophronistes*, but this is uncertain.

Notes: The date of the inscription is unclear. The ephebe Θεοτιμίδης Ἀστυνόμου ἐξ Οἴου (line 22) (Traill 1995-2004, no. 510143) apparently belongs to a family known epigraphically in the fourth- and third-centuries and whose names alternate between Astynomos and Lysiades (for a summary of the family tree, see *SEG* 32.559). Theotimides' father Astynomos son of Lysiades was active c. 350-310 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1553; 3831) and his grandson of the same name was a *proxenos* honored at Thermon c. 280-260 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 3832). The son Lysiades son of Astynomos is unattested but was perhaps born in

the late 350's. If so, Theotimides may have been the younger son of this Lysiades and perhaps born c. 350-342.

**E24:** *The ephebes of Leontis.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan).

Find Spot: Panactum (Panakton 1992-400).

Bibliography: Unpublished (courtesy of Mark Munn).

Description: Fragment of Pentelic marble stele with broken top and left. Right side rough picked with front face worn (H. 0.315 m.; W. 0.205 m.; Th. 0.095 m.). L.H. 0.006 m.

Text: (Description) Non-stoichedon? The (bottom?) of the roster lists 15 ephebes under seven demes (Hybadai, Paionidai, Aithalidai, Pelekes, Euripidai, Kolones, and ex Oiou) and one unknown deme. While the find spot and the arrangement of the roster shows that the inscription is Lycurgan, the prosopographical details are insufficient to date the stone with greater precision.

**E25:** *The ephebes of an unknown tribe.*

Date: Inscription: 334/3-322/1? (Lycurgan).

Find Spot: Marathon.

Bibliography: Mastrokostas 1970, 19. Michaud 1970, 919. *SEG* 32.106.

Description: Rectangular stone base with top right hand side broken (H. 0.81 m.; W. 0.43 m.; Th. 0.34 m.).

Text: Non-Stoichedon.

οἶδε ἀνέθεσαν Σ[— — —]  
ωνος παιδοτριβοῦν[τος]  
Μοσχίων Κλεομέδ[ων]  
Πείσων  
5 Οὐλιάδη[ς — — — — —]  
*vacat*



Notes: Mastrokostas suggests a fourth-century date for the inscription. A candelabra was found nearby with a relief of *lampadephoroi* on each side, suggesting that the victorious tribal team of the unknown tribe dedicated **E25** after a torch-race. He identifies the stone as follows: “Στάμου λιθίνη Βάσις ... φέρουσα ἀνάθεσιν ἐφήβων.” Michaud 1970 and Marcellus 1994, 250, concur, though the latter has misgivings. There is no mention, however, of ἔφηβοι, unlike **E6** and **E10**. This leaves open the possibility that it could be pre-Lycurgan (cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1250). But if it is ephebic, it must date to the Lycurgan period, because later ephebic inscriptions are not attested outside of Athens. After the heading a roster lists four ephebes(?) arranged in two columns without patronymics and demotics. The contingent may have come from Aiantis, given that it was found at Marathon, which is a deme of that tribe.

**E26:** *The ephebes of an unknown tribe.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan).  
Find Spot: Amphiarraion at Oropos (Oropos Inv.No. 563).  
Bibliography: Petrakos 1980, 26, no. 12. Petrakos 1997, 281, no. 354. *SEG* 31.435.  
Description: Fragment of the top of a Pentelic marble base (H. 0.44 m.; W. 0.165 m.; Th. 0.105 m.). L.H. 0.014 m.  
Text:

οἱ ἐφηβ[εύσαντες — — —]

Notes: Petrakos’ alternative reading of οἱ ἐφηβ[οι οἱ τῆς — — ἰδος — — ], should be preferred to the above restoration (see **E19** above).

**E27:** *The ephebes of an unknown tribe.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan).

Find Spot: South of Tower C of the south gate at Rhamnous (Rhamnous Inv.No. 930).

Bibliography: Petrakos 1990 (1993), 29, no. 12. Petrakos 1999, 90, no. 104. *SEG* 41.139.

Description: Fragment of a “Hermiac” Pentelic marble base with incisions at the top and at right-hand face (H. 0.76 m.; W. 0.76 m.; Th. 0.185 m.). L.H. 0.012 m.

Text: Two lines are reserved on the left side.

οἱ ἐφη[β— — —]  
[— — —]ιος

**E28:** *The ephebes of an unknown tribe.*

Date: Enrollment Year: 334/3-323/2 (Lycurgan).

Find Spot: Rhamnous (Rhamnous Inv.No. 1018).

Bibliography: Petrakos 1991, 48, no. 20. Petrakos 1999, 87-7, no. 101. *SEG* 43.67 = 49.193.

Description: Fragment of a base, remnants of an erased ephebic dedication on left and right sides. L.H. 0.005 m. (left side) 0.014 m. (right side).

Text:

[— — —]ιος

ἡ φυλὴ

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